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Abstract 
 
 
 This thesis is an exploration of the EL, one of the pan-European party federations, 
which is concurrently one of the most recently-launched transnational parties. The 
work explores the theoretical literature on Europeanisation of parties and applies a 
three-pronged theoretical framework, involving the theoretical insights of Johansson 
and Raunio, Charalambous’ ‘communist dilemma’, as well as discourse analysis to 
the EL and some of its most important national components. These are constituted by 
the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left, the French Communist Party, the Spanish 
United Left, and the Italian Rifondazione Comunista. The analysis covers the pan-
European level, seeking to reconstruct the EL’s vision of the European Union, as well 
as its organisational and ideological capacity to influence the Union’s direction, and 
its degree of institutionalisation and Europeanisation. Concurrently, it addresses the 
national level, involving the aforementioned case studies of Greece, France, Spain, 
and Italy, as well as the internal party dimension by seeking to evaluate the importance 
of the parties’ long-standing factions with regards to the parties’ stance towards the 
process of European integration. Its most salient findings relate to the high degree of 
convergence between the parties under analysis, both with regards to their ideological 
core, as well as their policy proposals, something that could initially verify the 
argument of policy transfer between national and European level. Moreover, the thesis 
findings suggest that the financial crisis that has been affecting the whole of the EU 
ever since 2008 has strengthened the parties’ distinct left Europeanism.  Finally, the 
thesis’ findings suggest that there is indeed a unified political discourse of the 
European radical left that has been fighting for hegemony inside the EU for the last 
decade and that at the moment of the drafting of the present thesis has been able to 
create a growing consensus inside the EL with regards to the party’s future direction 
and to the means of bringing about the radical changes that it professes with regards 
to the Union’s alternative future.  
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I. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 The fall of the Berlin wall and the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s 
caused a political earthquake across the world. With regards to politics and ideology, 
the end of the Cold War was viewed by many liberal and conservative commentators 
as the final defeat of socialism and the ‘end of history’, as suggested by scholars such 
as Francis Fukuyama (1992). As a result, these events led the Communist and radical 
left parties (RLPs) to a downward spiral of internal turmoil, electoral demise, and a 
severe crisis of identity. Throughout the 1990s, the radical left in Europe struggled to 
maintain their importance inside their respective party systems and national political 
arenas, as they were, to an extent, unable to create a coherent discourse able to compete 
with the mainstream discourses that also saw the end of the Cold War as the end of 
any possible alternative system of production. Nevertheless, the late 1990s saw the 
rise of several societal movements that sought to oppose the process of capitalist 
globalisation the growth of which was accelerated by the end of the Cold War and the 
gradual inclusion of Eastern Europe and the Russian Federation in the global market. 
The formation of these novel societal movements constituted arguably the first sign of 
opposition to the new world order and presented the parties on the left of social 
democracy with an opportunity to overcome their deep-rooted crisis of identity. 
Indeed, during the early 2000s the majority of Europe’s fragmented RLPs opted for 
the creation of broad alliances that sought to reinstate them as credible political actors. 
Concurrently, the interconnected acceleration of the process of European integration 
brought about an intensified cooperation of the European RLPs that led to the creation 
of the Party of the European Left (EL). Thus, in 2004 the most important European 
RLPs decided to found a Europarty that would aim at promoting the coordination and 
convergence of its member parties while seeking the creation of a pan-European 
movement aimed at the refoundation of the European project based on its alternative 
vision of European integration.  
 The aforementioned attempt to coordinate their action and build convergences could 
trace its origins back to the early 1970s, when the most important Western European 
parties started to gradually break their ties with the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union. Indeed, the Communist Party of Italy, Spain, France, as well as the faction of 
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the Greek Communist party (KKE) that created the KKE-Interior attempted to fill the 
void left by their exiting the International Communist Movement, led by the Soviet 
Union, by attempting to coordinate their action and create their own movement that 
was later named Eurocommunism. Indeed, the Eurocommunist movement aimed 
primarily at the creation of a Europe that would present a third pole between the major 
protagonists of the Cold War, the USA, and the USSR. The Eurocommunist 
movement, arguably, failed; and the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet 
Union left the parties in a state of internal divisions, turmoil, as well as a profound 
crisis of identity. Nevertheless, we could argue that the paradigm of the 
Eurocommunist movement served as an inspiration for the creation of the EL and its 
objective to coordinate the action of the radical left in Europe could be seen to be 
carried on. Indeed, even if the term Eurocommunism could be argued to have fallen 
out of use, this thesis argues that the ideological underpinnings of the Eurocommunist 
movement remain almost intact as important elements of the EL’s and the majority of 
its member parties’ ideology and political discourse.  
 Indeed, it would appear as if the parties’ left Europeanism, seen as a necessary 
response to the Euro-rejectionism of the orthodox Communist parties, is vital for the 
RLPs that carry on the legacy of the Eurocommunist movement. Given the 
internationalist perspective of their professed Marxism, these parties saw and continue 
to see the European Union as a project that creates the necessary conditions for 
transcending the national divisions of the working classes, uniting the peoples of 
Europe. Consequently, and despite the past divergence between the French 
Communist Party and the rest of the Eurocommunists, the parties under study here 
continue to hold a critical, yet supportive, stance towards the EU, as rejecting it would 
mean a complete negation of their core ideological positions. Indeed, if they were to 
reject the European project altogether, they would deny their core European 
federalism, which has always, alas with the exception of the PCF during the 1970s and 
1980s, been a key ideological component. In addition to the importance of the 
European project as means to achieving socialism, which is of great importance since 
the national roads to socialism are negated, the parties’ stance also renders them 
distinguishable to the rest of the European radical left that reject the European project 
altogether, as well as the social democratic parties that have, to an extent, laid the 
foundations for the current European architecture. Thus, the notion of left 
Europeanism is not only a core ideological pillar of those parties, but also an important 
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component for the parties’ identification inside the national and European political 
spectrum. Evidence of such importance can be traced within the internal turmoil that 
the European question has generated inside the parties under study here. Indeed, as the 
thesis’ case studies will demonstrate, European related issues have led to internal 
schisms and divisions between the parties’ constitutive factions. Despite said divisions 
and schisms, the parties, viewed as a single unit, have remained loyal to their left 
Europeanism, even if on occasion an altered position would have generated more 
favourable outcomes, both in terms of electoral support and intra-party unity.  
 The present thesis will provide an in-depth analysis of the EL’s most important 
member parties with a particular focus on their stance towards the process of European 
integration. Thus, it adds to the current literature on European RLPs by attempting a 
comparative study that provides with an in-depth analysis of arguably the most 
important and successful European RLPs, while attempting to test their convergence 
with regards to the European question. Concurrently, it argues that the growing 
convergence amongst the member parties of the EL has, arguably, led to policy 
transfer between them and the EL on important issues, such as the question of the 
member states’ sovereign debts. Additionally, the present thesis argues that the 
financial crisis has had a strengthening effect on the parties’ left Europeanism, whilst 
having led to a growing consensus inside the EL with regards to the party’s role inside 
European politics. Indeed, despite the EL not being viewed as one of the strong and 
important Europarties, the present thesis argues that its role and scope go beyond the 
rest of the Europarties, as it constitutes a necessity imposed by their core ideological 
left Europeanism. Finally, the thesis argues that the EL and its member parties have 
created a unified and coherent political discourse that is currently attempting to 
antagonise the mainstream political discourses inside the EU. The EL’s political 
discourse aims at creating a strong and wide social movement inside the EU that would 
be able to support the radical changes that the EL proposes to the Union’s current 
architecture.  
 Consequently, the present thesis aims to add to the literature its strong comparative 
dimension of the EL’s most important member parties. Concurrently, it presents with 
an in-depth empirical analysis of the EL’s and the member parties’ most recent 
congress materials and political decisions that updates the relevant literature and adds 
elements that were missing altogether from it. At the same time, the thesis’ discussion 
and analysis of the dialectics of European, national, and intra-party interplays adds 
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another dimension to the, so far, two-dimensional analyses of RLPs and offers a wider 
perspective. Finally, the thesis adds to the present literature an overview of the unified 
political discourse promoted by the EL and its member parties in their attempt to 
antagonise mainstream political discourses in Europe.  
 In order to be able to do so, the present thesis builds on the literature on 
Europeanisation and seeks to answer several research questions with regards to the EL 
and its most important member parties. Firstly, it attempts to identify the EL’s key 
strategic political positions with regards to the future and alternative structure of the 
European edifice, while attempting to evaluate the degree of importance that socialism 
holds in the Europarty’s political discourse. Secondly, it aims at evaluating the 
importance and influence of the EL on the member parties’ overall stance towards the 
EU, as well as evaluating the efficiency and efficacy of the EL in performing its role 
and the existence, or lack thereof of a consensus inside the EL with regards to the 
Europarty’s future direction. Thirdly, it seeks to test the argument that the current 
financial crisis has strengthened the EL’s and the national member parties’ left 
Europeanism and attempts to identify the reason behind such a phenomenon while 
seeking to highlight the reasons behind the differing electoral outcomes of the party 
members from Greece, Spain, France, and Italy. Finally, the present thesis seeks to 
reconstruct the discourse created by the EL and its most important member parties in 
order to explain the current state of the EU whilst concurrently competing for 
hegemony against the mainstream political discourses inside the EU. To be able to 
address the aforementioned research questions, the present thesis focuses on four case 
studies: the Spanish United Left, the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left, the Italian 
Rifondazione Comunista, and the French Communist Party.  
 The thesis will provide an in-depth analysis of these political parties adopting a 
combination of two significant theoretical frameworks. The first one is constituted by 
the one proposed by Johansson and Raunio (2001). Johansson and Raunio’s 
framework identifies seven factors that can be viewed as influencing party stances 
towards the process of European integration. The seven factors are constituted by party 
ideology, party factionalism, public opinion, party leadership, party competition, 
transnational affiliations, and the process of European integration per se. This 
theoretical framework will allow this thesis to provide with a three-dimensional 
analysis of the member parties. Indeed, in addition to the analysis of the parties as a 
single unit inside their respective national political arenas, the present thesis will refer 
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to two additional levels of analysis; the first one relates to the intra-party discourse 
and the effect that this has on the party’s overall stance towards the EU, while the 
second one regards the parties’ transnational affiliations providing, thus, a third 
European level of analysis.  
 This three-dimensional analysis of the member parties of the EL, will be further 
integrated by the Charalambous’ communist dilemma (2013). Charalambous’ (2013) 
builds on the literature on Europeanisation and provides a significant addition to the 
lens through which we study radical left and Communist parties. Indeed, by providing 
a framework for analysis specifically designed for the radical left, Charalambous’ 
theoretical lens enables this thesis to grasp the manner that the parties under analysis 
responded to the series of dilemmas posed by the process of European integration. In 
fact, the framework allows the present thesis to consider the parties’ responsive 
mechanisms with regards to the degree of salience placed on issues pertinent to party 
competition, programmatic positions and policy rhetoric, and transnational 
affiliations. Following Charalambous’ (2013) argument, political parties tend to place 
more or less emphasis on EU-related issues in their attempt to demonstrate themselves 
as having chosen ideological consistency, or attempt to show their moderation or 
pragmatism. With regards to transnational affiliations, the theoretical lens of the 
communist dilemma will be of great importance to the present thesis as it will allow 
the thesis to reach further conclusions on the EL’s importance for the national member 
parties. Indeed, the Communist dilemma presents the present thesis with a very 
valuable tool that allows us to grasp the essence of the parties’ response to the process 
of European integration. In fact, departing from the premise that those radical left 
parties, such as the ones studied here, that do not reject the European Union are the 
ones that face several dilemmas by the process of the European integration. The reason 
behind this can be seen in their distinct left Europeanism. Indeed, it is the uniqueness 
of these parties’ view of the EU that generates several more dilemmas, as the process 
of European integration moves forward at an accelerated pace. Thus, the Communist 
dilemma, which is thought for both for Euro-rejectionist parties such as the KKE and 
for parties that continue to remain loyal to left Europeanism such as the PRC, allows 
us to identify the way that these parties respond to those dilemmas. Indeed, as the 
financial crisis was deepening across Europe, the Communist dilemma allowed the 
present thesis to identify the tendency of the parties to place more emphasis, than in 
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the pre-crisis period, to their firm critique of the European edifice, as well as to their 
professed alternative for the Union’s architecture.  
 The first part of the present thesis is divided in three chapters. The first chapter relates 
to the literature review synthesised in three major categories of works pertinent to the 
European radical left: single case studies, cross country studies, and comparative 
studies. Following the analysis of the current literature, this thesis will attempt to place 
itself inside said literature and address the gaps present inside of it. The second chapter 
will involve the evolution of the various theoretical frameworks on Europeanisation 
commencing with Ladrech’s original framework and follows its evolution to 
Johansson’s and Raunio’s (2001), as well as Charalambous’ (2013) ones that are 
predominately based on it. Finally, the second chapter will include a thorough analysis 
of Fairclough’s (1992) three-dimensional model of critical discourse analysis and its 
relevance to this thesis’ research objectives. The third and final chapter of the first part 
refers to the methodology adopted by the present thesis and its choices of ontology 
and epistemology, choices that are of great importance for every research project, as 
it has direct consequences to its direction and research objectives. Moreover, the third 
chapter will involve an outline of the case study selection and design, as well as an 
analysis of the ethical questions that it raises.  
 The second part of the thesis is constituted by the four case studies: the Spanish United 
Left, the Italian Rifondazione Comunista, the French Communist Party, and the Greek 
Coalition of the Radical Left. Finally, the conclusion attempts to synthesise the thesis’ 
main findings and paves the way for future research as well as the possible expansion 
of this study to more member parties of the EL. 
 The first case study that regards the Spanish United Left commences with a brief 
overview of the historical path followed by the Spanish Communist Party throughout 
the 20th Century amid the Spanish Civil War until the restoration of Democracy in the 
late 1970s, the subsequent creation of the United Left coalition, and finally the 
decision to ally with Podemos at the Spanish general elections held in 2016. Following 
this overview, the chapter on the Spanish United Left will provide a thorough analysis 
of all the factors that the thesis’ theoretical framework demands. The analysis is based 
on a variety of primary, secondary, and tertiary sources ranging from previous 
academic studies, as well as party documents, electoral material. The final section of 
the chapter will attempt to reach some preliminary conclusions with regards to the 
convergence between the Spanish United Left and the EL.  
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 The second case study that refers to the Italian Rifondazione Comunista commences 
with the historical trajectory of the party’s predecessor, the Italian Communist Party 
(PCI), and attempts to highlight the most salient points in the party’s long and eventful 
history. Indeed, this section seeks to highlight the importance of PCI’s legacy in 
shaping Rifondazione’s present and future, by focusing on the PCI’s role in shaping 
the Eurocommunist movement, laying thus the theoretical foundations for the party’s 
stance towards the process of European integration that could be argued to still exert 
influence on the European radical left’s response to the process. Following the 
historical introduction, the chapter applies this thesis’ theoretical lens in order to be 
able to analyse the relative importance of the interconnected factors for 
Rifondazione’s stance towards the process of European integration. 
 The third case study involves the French Communist Party (PCF) and starts with an 
overview of the historical path of the PCF. Indeed, it attempts to synthesise the party’s 
long and important path from the first signs of discontent with the Soviet Union to 
joining the Eurocommunist movement despite the important divergence of opinions 
between itself and the PCI. This historical overview follows the party as it attempted 
to regain its electoral importance by creating, alongside former members of the French 
Socialist Party, the Left Front following the successful campaign of the French radical 
left against the European Constitutional Treaty during the referendum held in 2005. 
Finally, the section concludes with several remarks on the possible reasons behind the 
end of the Left Front and the PCF’s future after the apparent rupture with Jean-Luc 
Melenchon that led to the dissolution of the Left Front. Following the brief 
introduction, the chapter carries on an analysis of the theoretical frameworks’ factors 
and seeks to analyse the relative importance of them in the party’s stance towards the 
EU between 2004 and the present day.  
 This thesis’ fourth and final case study involves the Greek Coalition of the Radical 
Left and initially attempts to trace the party’s origins in the KKE-Interior during the 
1970s, as well as in Synaspismos’ long history inside the Greek radical left. It follows 
the party in the path towards the electoral triumph in the elections held in January 
2015, when Syriza managed to become the first full member of the EL to win general 
elections and lead a coalition government in its national arena. The chapter’s historical 
introduction concludes with the internal turmoil that followed the party’s decision to 
reach a deal with the European institutions that led to the resignation of several party 
officials. Following the introduction, the chapter attempts to apply the thesis’ 
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theoretical lens and reach several conclusions as to the importance of certain factors 
with regards to the party’s stance vis-à-vis the EU over time.  
 The thesis’ final chapter attempts to address the research questions and compare the 
findings of each case study. It aims, thus, to synthesise the EL’s alternative vision of 
the EU and compare it with the party member under analysis, while seeking to evaluate 
the Europarty’s efficiency and efficacy in performing its professed role. Moreover, it 
seeks to verify the existence or lack thereof of a broad consensus with regards to the 
party’s future direction. Moreover, the final part attempts to test the argument that sees 
the financial crisis as an event that strengthened significantly the parties’ distinct left 
Europeanism and brought them closer together in their shared struggle towards a 
Europe of the peoples. Finally, this final chapter will attempt to reconstruct the EL’s 
political discourse by utilising Syriza’s discourse as an exemplification of it alongside 
extracts from the EL president’s public statements. Concurrently, it will seek to 
analyse the visual reconstruction of this discourse as seen in the parties’ utilisation of 
imagery in their respective electoral material. The thesis will conclude with a synthesis 
of its findings and will also seek to pave the way for future research that could possibly 
involve the expansion of the member parties under investigation. This could arguably 
lead to the extrapolation of more generalizable conclusions with regards to the state 
of affairs of the European radical left.   
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II. Literature Review 
 
 
 
a. Introduction 
 
 Despite the lack of substantial difference in the electoral performance of radical right 
parties and parties of the radical left, there is arguably a relatively underdeveloped 
literature concerning the latter. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent 
‘scientific’ certainty over the dominance of capitalism and interconnected defeat of 
any alternative socio-politicoeconomic alternative is arguably one of the most 
important reasons. Authoritative scholars such as D. Sassoon (2010) indeed chose to 
focus predominately on social democratic parties, leaving aside the –especially during 
the 1990s–  fragmented and under distress parties on the left of Social Democracy. 
Sassoon (2010), indeed, argued that this was the only viable form of socialism left in 
Europe. The high degree of fragmentation is another reason behind the 
underdevelopment of the literature regarding the radical Left. The multiplicity of 
political subjects and the constant schisms leading to the continuous creation of 
smaller and less electorally relevant political formations constituted an obstacle to 
their further classification. Nevertheless, an increasing academic interest in the study 
of RLPs has been observed over the last decades. Indeed, the staggering effects of the 
global financial crisis have provided the parties on the left of social democracy with 
an opportunity to represent the social opposition and regain some relevance in their 
respective national scenes. In addition to this, the creation of the Party of the European 
Left (EL) in 2004 is an initial response of the radical left to the increasing 
Europeanisation of national politics, as well as the means to achieve European 
relevance. The re-emergence of both the parties and the literature on them does not, 
nevertheless, render RLPs mainstream parties. Luke March (2011) in his seminal work 
argued that this is a sign that “RLPs have, albeit still partially, begun to recover from 
the collapse of communism” (March, 2011, p. 1). The emergence of a new party family 
of the radical left following the demise of Western European Communist Parties 
(WECPs) is argued by recent research in the field of radical left politics1. In addition 
                                                
1 For more information see, Escalona & Vieira (2013). 
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to that, recent quantitative research2 shows that the unemployed and those in the lower 
income strata of the society are far more likely to support a radical left ideology. The 
current financial crisis, in the form of the sovereign debt crisis, has had some 
catastrophic effects on several European societies, especially in the South. Thus, given 
the number of unemployed people and those that saw their incomes suddenly 
declining, the opportunity for the RLPs is unique, rendering the comparative study of 
this party family even more timely and significant. A notable example which could be 
argued to prove these findings right is by Syriza’s electoral triumph in the Greek 
general elections that took place in 2015. Nevertheless, for the moment we have no 
indication that the same will happen in the rest of the European South. Indeed, in Italy, 
a country also hit by the financial crisis, the radical left has then again struggled in the 
elections and historic RLPs have remained with no parliamentary representation3. 
 
b. Literature Review Category I; Single Country and Cross-Country Studies 
 
 The existing literature regarding the parties on the left of social democracy in Europe 
could be divided into three major categories. The first one relates to studies of parties 
from a single country as well as cross-country comparisons of RLPs. With the 
exclusion of the first two works, the residual studies treat the evolution of various 
RLPs following the end of the Cold War. As most WECPs, the RLPs under 
examination underwent a period of significant ideological and structural mutations. 
Examples of the first category are the studies of Bell and Criddle (1994) and Guiat 
(2003). Bell and Criddle (1994) attempt to shed light on the events taking place inside 
the French Communist Party (PCF) during the times of the French Fifth Republic, 
whereas Guiat (2003) attempts a cross-country examination of the PCF and the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI). Both works present valuable historical analyses of both the 
French and Italian Communist parties, parties which amongst others played a 
fundamental role in shaping the European Left’s legacy. The influence of these parties 
in shaping the principles of Eurocommunism is without a doubt of great importance. 
The fact that Eurocommunism still appears to be part of the starting point for the 
                                                
2 For more information see, Visser, et al. (2013). 
3 Except for Sinistra, Ecologia e Libertà (SEL), which was part of the Democratic Party’s (PD) wider 
centre-left coalition. 
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formulation of several European RLPs’ position vis-à-vis the European integration 
renders the importance of such works even more useful to the present thesis’ 
objectives. Notwithstanding said importance, the current works clearly lack a pan-
European comparative perspective. In addition to that, there is undoubtedly a need for 
them to be updated with the latest development inside the European radical left, 
especially in times, when the European edifice appears less secure than ever.  
 In addition to those important works, one could add more recent works relating to 
single case studies. These works differentiate themselves from the previous studies by 
presenting the post-1989 mutational era for the European left. The works of 
Katsourides (2012) and Dunphy (2007) provide two significant contributions on the 
rather unique, in terms of electoral support, ideological stance as well as transnational 
affiliations, Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) in Cyprus,  party that for a 
long time has managed to combine an orthodox Communist ideological identity 
internally, while maintaining a mainstream position in the national political life. 
Furthermore, AKEL has so far managed to preserve close international relations with 
both the orthodox Marxist-Leninist parties such as the Communist Party of Greece 
(KKE) and the Communist Party of Portugal (PCP), as well as maintaining an observer 
status in the Party of the European Left. Bordandini’s (2013) and Baccetti’s (2003) 
works constitute primary examples of case studies involving the post-1989 mutations 
of the PCI and the many RLPs that are still fighting over its legacy. Bordandini’s 
(2013) work focuses on the Italian RLPs currently active in the Italian political life: 
Federation of the Left (FDS) and Left Ecology and Freedom (SEL). The paper under 
review here aims at reconstructing the complex origin of the two parties, comparing 
their organisational structures, analysing their ability to involve their members in their 
respective decision-making processes as well as examining the relationship between 
the two parties and civil society organisations. The comparison concerns mainly 
organisational patterns relating to the linkage with social movements as well as 
middle-level party officials and leadership model. The author concludes that the 
differences between FDS and SEL are related, on the one hand, to the history and to 
the degree of factionalism that defined them and, on the other, to their organisational 
structure and the characteristics of their leaderships. From an organisational point of 
view, the FDS is founded on collective leadership, a traditional structure with 
provincial and regional federations, grassroot organisations as well as workers’ 
circles. Indeed, organisational linkage appears to be prevailing in the FDS. SEL, on 
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the other hand, sees its strength in the charismatic leadership of Nichi Vendola. In 
addition to that, the party places vital importance in utilising the latest advancements 
in social networking and is found to experiment with forms of participatory and digital 
democracy. The employment of such modern means aims not only at the 
dissemination of the party’s political positions but also at internal and external 
communication. In the case of SEL one cannot but conclude that a direct link between 
party leadership and the electorate prevails. This in conjunction with the fact that the 
party demonstrates a greater inclination towards a bottom-up logic as well as the direct 
involvement of individuals in the party decision making process, renders SEL a 
highly-personalised party able to adapt to the volatile Italian system. Thus, as the 
author concludes “the influence of SEL at an institutional level is much broader than 
that of the FDS” (Bordandini, 2013, p. 77). Baccetti’s (2003) work on the other hand, 
focuses on the various political formations that came into existence following the end 
of the PCI. The importance of this period is particularly high, given the high degree 
of fragmentation inside the Italian left, as well as the continuing electoral losses that 
Italian RLPs have been facing lately.   
 The final works of the present category involve Leclercq’s and Platone’s (2003) study 
of the PCF’s mutational period, which led to the birth of the modern Front de Gauche 
in France, as well as Fernandez’s (2002) corresponding study of the transformational 
era of the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) and the subsequent birth of the actual 
United Left coalition in Spain. As with the majority of the studies in the present 
category of the literature, Fernandez’s (2002) and Leclercq’s and Platone’s (2003) 
research draws the post-1989 picture of the Spanish and French left, including the 
transformation of the Communist Parties as well as the creation of various left parties 
and factions which eventually joined forces and created wide coalitions. In addition to 
the above analyses of the French and Spanish radical left, Hough et al. (2007) treat the 
birth and evolution of Die Linke. The German party is amongst the most successful in 
Europe and has played a fundamental role in the creation of the Party of the European 
Left. In their significant work, Hough et al. (2007) thoroughly examine the post-
unification era of the German state and the process of the formation of Die Linke. The 
work carries on an in-depth analysis of the party’s policies as well as its office seeking 
behavioural patterns. In doing so, it draws a brief comparison between the Left and 
the Greens. In the final part of the book, the authors provide a valuable overview of 
the party’s involvement in the local governments of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 
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as well as the city of Berlin and the effect that such an experience has had on the 
party’s identity.  
 Although the works of the first category constitute key studies on some of the most 
important RLPs in Europe, the lack of a European perspective is evident in such 
focused analyses. Those works undoubtedly serve as the basis for any contemporary 
comparative study of the European left parties’ family, which would take into 
consideration the past in studying the current state of the European left. Thus, all the 
works mentioned above will serve greatly in the current thesis’ case studies. The 
importance of the national political scene and the amount of information present in 
those single or cross-country studies clearly provide an insight to each national reality 
and open the way for additional research in the field. The present thesis aims exactly 
at widening the perspective as well as introducing a pan-European view, which could 
lead to much clearer findings relating to the left party family’s alternative for the 
European Union.   
  
c. Literature Review Category II; Specific Matter Studies 
 
 The second category of the existing literature includes studies pertinent to the 
responses formulated by RLPs about specific matters. These include mainly the 
process of European integration, participation in government coalitions as well as 
organisational patterns of RLPs such as linkage with social movements. Dunphy’s 
(2004) germinal work constitutes arguably the most important work in this category. 
In his book, Dunphy (2004) sheds light into the stance of RLPs vis-à-vis the process 
of European integration. He commences by highlighting the reasons behind the 
fruitless attempts made by the leadership of the PCI during the 1980s to create a strong 
left alternative to the European integration project. The case studies presented in his 
work involve the most important parties inside the United Left/Nordic Green Left 
(GUE/NGL) European parliamentary group. By applying the Johansson and Raunio 
framework, he manages to consider all aspects of the parties’ life, in an attempt to 
evaluate the importance of those factors on the parties’ responses to European 
integration. Dunphy’s (2004) work concludes with a rather prophetic observation 
regarding those parties inside the radical left that are united by their shared vision of 
the European integration as a step towards the transcendence of national divisions of 
the working class. We could argue that the creation of the EL in late 2004 verified 
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Dunphy’s (2004) argument. The present thesis builds on the foundations laid down by 
this pivotal work and argues that more generalizable conclusions could be drawn by 
limiting the scope to the arguably homogeneous parties that founded the EL. The 
comparison, thus, between the EL’s position with those professed by its Greek, 
Spanish, French and Italian counterparts could provide us with a clear European 
perspective of rather homogeneous parties.  
 Another study relating to the issue of European integration is constituted by 
Charalambous (2011). In his study Charalambous (2011) explores the impact that the 
process of European integration has had on the Italian PRC. The author evaluates two 
sub-processes:  the positional realignment in relation to European integration and the 
entrenchment by the party of an EU dimension of issues and activities (Charalambous, 
2011, p. 29). The analysis draws upon patterns of party competition, programmatic 
change, and affiliations beyond the national party system. The study’s results indicate 
that “Rifondazione gradually increased the use of the issue of European integration to 
differentiate its European vision, thus presenting the EU as a necessary terrain of 
struggle” (Charalambous, 2011, p. 29). It also indicates that the party underwent slight 
programmatic and attitudinal realignment towards a less critical approach towards the 
EU. Heine’s (2010) comparative study of the underlying ideological reasons behind 
the left’s opposition to the Constitutional Treaty in France and Germany constitutes 
another important work relating to the EU integration process. It challenges the 
assumptions present in both the academic and journalistic literature, which treat the 
movements opposing the EU as ‘nationalistic’ or ‘anti-European’. By analysing the 
core arguments behind the German and French opposition to the Constitutional Treaty, 
Heine’s (2010) research shows that “[…] the criticism against the current EU mostly 
contains social and democratic arguments and that their identity dimension mixes 
national and European elements” (Heine, 2010, p. 313). Heine (2010) indeed 
highlights the presence of a strong demand for increased European integration 
amongst the movements in both France and Germany. The pro-European and Euro-
patriotic nature of several critical attitudes indicates, according to the author, the 
Europeanisation of resistance towards the current structure of the European edifice. 
The author’s findings seem to verify one of the present thesis’ arguments. The distinct 
left Europeanism which constitutes the very core of the parties under study is arguably 
their major ideological inspiration. It influences not only the parties’ stance vis-à-vis 
the EU but also their efforts for deeper cooperation at a European level. Nonetheless, 
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there is undoubtedly a long way to go for the EL to become a significant actor in EU 
politics. The primacy of the national parties’ agenda is something that not every 
member of the EL is ready to sacrifice. Similarly to Charalambous’ (2011) and 
Dunphy’s (2004) research, Castellina’s (1988) work focuses on the integration process 
and the effect that it has had on the European left.  
 Hough and Verge (2009), Daiber (2010), Dunphy and Bale (2011) and Olsen and Koß 
(2010) constitute additional important works of this category. Hough’s and Verge’s 
(2009) work relates to the study of left-left coalitions and involves two case studies; 
Germany and Spain. The conclusion vis-à-vis the optimal conditions for left-left 
coalition formation is significant, especially in the current electorally volatile situation 
in most European countries, particularly the ones in the European South. Daiber’s 
(2010) comparative study of left forces gaining governmental participation in both 
Europe and Latin America presents us with significant data. It evaluates both 
theoretically and practically the viability of left politics in government. Dunphy’s and 
Bale’s (2011) work seeks to understand the assessment mechanisms used by RLPs 
vis-à-vis their participation in coalition governments. It deals with a variety of 
European countries, where RLPs either participated in coalition governments such as 
in Cyprus, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, and Norway or have provided political 
support in parliament as in Denmark and Sweden. In addition to that, Dunphy’s and 
Bale’s (2011) work also involves the case study of the Netherlands where the Socialist 
Party (SP) was at that time assessing the advantages and disadvantages of participating 
in a coalition government. The importance of this study lies in the fact that it provides 
us with an analysis of the mechanism according to which left parties evaluate their 
participation in coalition governments. By posing the question of what constitutes 
success and failure for the parties’ involvement in governmental participation, several 
valuable considerations are being made vis-à-vis their ambitions and electoral strategy 
as well as the problems that left parties face given their open and democratic structure. 
Dunphy’s and Bale’s (2011) methodological aspect combined with the one used in the 
volume mentioned above by Daiber (2010) in terms of evaluating the left’s 
governmental policies could be immensely useful for the current thesis. All the above-
mentioned works focus on the single issue of participation of left parties in national 
governments. The work edited by Olsen and Koß (2010) applies the framework of 
‘hard choices’ between office, votes and policy to a significant number of RLPs across 
Europe. The authors predominantly ask three questions, “why and how these parties 
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enter [or do not enter] government, what they actually do when they get there, and 
what happens to them […] subsequently” (Olsen & Koß, 2010, p. 3). As regards the 
first question, three factors are found to potentially influence the choice of government 
participation; the ideological distance between the left and the social democratic party, 
the electoral dynamics of each country, segmentation, and block politics. Regarding 
the effects that governmental participation has on RLPs the authors conclude that 
electoral losses constitute the common outcome and that internal divisions tend to 
sharpen while in government.  
 Another set of works relates to the specific matter of linkage in cases of RLPs. Those 
are constituted by the works of Charalambous and Christophorou (2013) , Ramiro and 
Verge (2013), Tsakatika and Eleftheriou (2013) as well as Tsakatika and Lisi (2013). 
Charalambous’ and Christophorou’s (2013) work relates to the Cypriot AKEL, and it 
explores three issues. Firstly, it focuses on the intensity of linkage processes through 
the examination of participation patterns and organisational practices in the party. 
Secondly, it traces the predominant direction of influence between AKEL and society. 
Thirdly, it assesses the explanatory value of four potential factors; ideology, electoral 
competition, party leadership and party model. The authors’ results show that the 
exceptional nature of AKEL rendered the party more resistant to organisational change 
than most RLPs in the post-1989 European era. As a result, AKEL managed to 
significantly broaden its social appeal by responding to emerging issues and 
demonstrating a degree of flexibility in coping with post-materialist values widespread 
in modern European societies. On the other hand, such a process had no effect on intra-
party functioning. Therefore, the authors conclude that “[…] no ‘real’ environmental 
linkage is taking place here” (Charalambous & Christophorou, 2013, p. 117). 
Following the case study of AKEL examined by Charalambous and Christophorou 
(2013), Ramiro’s and Verge’s (2013) research focuses on the linkage processes of the 
Spanish left. The work follows the post-1980s mutations of the Spanish Communist 
Party (PCE) and the change it underwent up until the creation of the Spanish United 
Left (IU). The article “[…] gives an account of the design and implementation of 
participatory and environmental linkages by the Spanish United Left and evaluates 
their specific outputs” (Ramiro & Verge, 2013, p. 41). The timeframe includes the 
period between the 1980s and the 2010s. It focuses on both participatory and 
environmental linkage and seeks to identify the degree of success of the strategies 
adopted by the party in an attempt to re-establish a close connection with society. The 
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authors’ conclusions present a rather negative output vis-à-vis the success of the 
adopted linkage strategies and reach to a wider conclusion regarding the broader area 
of Southern Europe and the effects that the financial crisis has had on the societies. 
Indeed, they conclude that, “[…] although the social mobilisations that the economic 
crisis has brought about in Southern Europe offer an opportunity to reconnect with 
society, RLPs must avoid giving the impression that relationships with social groups 
are established for mere strategic electoral reasons” (Ramiro & Verge, 2013, p. 57). 
Tsakatika’s and Eleftheriou’s (2013) research focuses on the Greek case study of the 
Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza). It 
compares the diverse strategies for re-establishing close ties with social movements as 
well as trade unions. The ideological differences amongst the two parties rendered the 
strategies employed by KKE and Syriza very much different. Notwithstanding those 
differences, the linkage strategies of both parties appear to have been successful for 
both. The financial crisis and the harsh effects that it had on Greek society appears, 
according to the authors, to have favoured Syriza’s pluralistic and open to social 
movements approach. In a volatile political environment such as the one that Greece 
has found itself upon ever since 2010, Syriza managed to grasp a mainstream role in 
the political life of Greece. As Tsakatika and Eleftheriou (2013) note, “[…] whether 
their ‘turn towards civil society’ will survive electoral defeat in the case of the KKE, 
and government-in-waiting status in the case of SYRIZA, remains to be seen” 
(Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013, p. 96). 
 The final work of the current category is a very significant comparative study of the 
linkage strategies of Southern Europe’s RLPs. Indeed, Tsakatika and Lisi (2013) 
present the case of the radical left party family as not following the trend amongst 
Western political parties, which appear to have turned their backs to their social roots. 
The persistence of RLPs to encourage their members in internal decision-making and 
insistence on promoting organised links to trade unions and social movements is 
attributed by the authors to four factors: ideology, electoral incentives, party 
competition and external events. At the same time, organisational trajectory is argued 
to account for the variation in linkage strategies inside the radical left party family. 
The study builds on all Southern European countries including Greece (KKE, 
SYRIZA), Cyprus (AKEL), Italy (PRC) and Party of the Italian Communists (PdCI), 
Portugal (PCP) and Left Bloc (BE) and Spain (IU). It argues that the current financial 
crisis constitutes an important turning point for the RLPs approach to linkage. The 
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degree of social mobilisation generated by the austerity policies imposed to the 
countries of the European South by the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
rendered the reconnection with social movements of paramount importance for the 
those parties. Ideology and more specifically the importance of ideological 
consistency appears to have influenced RLPs’ focus on linkage. By virtue of their 
ideology, the radical left party family has inherited a legacy that emphasizes the 
importance of social roots both in their discourse as well as their internal functioning 
(Tsakatika & Lisi, 2013, p. 6). Electoral incentives have also been found to have 
influenced largely. As a response to electoral downturns the parties of the radical left 
family introduced new forms of linkage and extra-parliamentary mobilisation. 
Changes in national party competition are also argued to play a fundamental role in 
the RLPs’ prioritization of linkage strategies. Finally, external events seem to play part 
in ‘triggering’ RLPs’ focus on linkage. The authors emphasise on the current financial 
crisis, as the high levels of social protest presented both an opportunity and a challenge 
for the Southern European RLPs’ linkage pursuit. The authors conclude their study by 
comparing the linkage strategies inside the radical left parties’ family. The differences 
between parties operating under the principle of democratic centralism such as the 
PCP, KKE and AKEL and parties which opted out of democratic centralism in their 
internal organisation appear to be profound.  
Despite of being a rather important factor in evaluating the parties’ behavioural 
patterns, these single-issue studies fail to address the multidimensional role that parties 
inside the EU have nowadays. Nonetheless, the findings of these works present 
valuable data for the evaluation of the Left’s political manoeuvring in terms of 
ideology and programmatic positions when in an office-seeking position. In addition 
to that, works such as Tsakatika and Eleftheriou (2013) highlight the need for further 
comparative research in trying to generalise their findings in the entire European 
radical left parties’ family. This thesis aims, amongst other things, at carrying on the 
research in this field by presenting a comparative study, which includes case studies 
from both the European South and North. 
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d. Literature Review Category III; Comparative Studies of RLPs 
 
 The third and last category of the existing literature includes comparative studies of 
RLPs. The main works of this category involve Bell (1993), Heywood and Bull 
(1994), Botella and Fernandez (2003), Bosco (2000), Hudson (2000), Backes and 
Moreau (2008), Hildebrandt and Daiber (Hildebrandt & Daiber, 2009), Keith (2011) 
and the more recent and significant March (2011) and Charalambous (2013). A first 
series of academic works in the literature treat the highly significant era commencing 
with the demise of the Soviet Union. Those works aim at establishing the effect that 
the end of the bipolar world had on Communist Parties in Western Europe and 
emphasize on explaining the effects that those events had for the future of the 
European radical left.  
 Bell’s (1993) work constitutes one of the first attempts to analyse the post-Cold War 
era for Western Communist Parties. The work edited by Bull and Heywood (1994) 
constitutes a study of the divergent reactions that the Communist Parties of Italy, 
France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Britain and Germany had in relation to the Soviet 
Union’s demise and the dramatic events of the 1989-1991 era,  events that without any 
doubt posed an existential threat to the Communist parties in Western Europe, while 
at the same time marking the beginning of an era of mutation and transformation for 
most of them. Yet another comparative study of the mutational era for Western 
European Communist Parties (WECPs) is that of Bosco (2000). As mentioned 
previously, the demise of the Soviet Union had a domino effect on all WECPs. Bosco’s 
(2000) research focuses on the organisational and ideological dimension, as well as on 
the mechanisms of party competition regarding the PCI, PCP and PCE. According to 
the author, the outcomes of this process vary greatly as the PCI opted for abandoning 
its communist identity and transformed itself into a social-democratic political force. 
On the other hand, the Portuguese PCP maintained its identity for most of the aspects. 
The party chose to abandon the revolutionary perspective that it once held. The case 
of the Spanish PCE constitutes a middle way between the PCI’s complete 
transformation and the PCP’s stance. It maintained its core ideological identity quasi- 
unaltered, whilst founding a broad left coalition (IU) based on the principles of 
democratic socialism. The volume edited by Backes and Moreau (2008) involves a 
brief overview of the various communist and post-communist formations across 
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Europe and concludes with a comparative analysis of the various parties, emphasising 
on the transnational links between them.  
 Keith’s (2011) paper presents the development of WECPs and their post-communist 
successor parties and their remarkable, yet differing, adaptation mechanisms to the 
post-1989 Western Europe. It seeks to analyse the reasons behind the divergent 
trajectories of four WECPs from four countries; the Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland, and 
Portugal. To this end it introduces a novel analytical framework based on previous 
research into the party system of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In doing so the 
author argues that frameworks thought for the Communist parties of the CEE could 
lead us to learn more about WECPs. Keith’s (2011) results show a probabilistic 
relationship between organisational variables and programmatic change in WECPs. 
According to his research, certain leadership advancement practices and 
organisational reforms made programmatic change more likely. The author’s results 
also highlight that party leaders’ attributes and decisions are often pivotal in shaping 
party adaptation to the new political and social context.  
 March’s (2011) work differentiates from the others, given the study of a vast number 
of RLPs. In his study, March (2011) commences by categorising RLPs into various 
groups; conservative communist parties, reform communist, democratic socialist, 
populist socialist and social populist. This up to date classification provides a better 
understanding of the current political situation in Europe’s left party system, that 
updates the old classification of Taggart’s (1998) Euroscepticism of Western 
European parties at once. He then carries on with a thorough analysis of each 
category’s most significant national parties. His study is rendered more concise than 
previous works on this subject, given the inclusion of both Western and Eastern 
European Communist parties as well as the so-called modern democratic socialists. In 
the last part of his work, he analyses the connection between RLPs and social 
movements, which appeared during the last decades across Europe. The effort to 
connect with various civil movements is of vital importance for parties of the so called 
new left, such as the majority of the members of the EL. Contrary to orthodox 
communist parties, the internal organisation of which, based on the principle of 
democratic centralism leads to a certain degree of isolation, parties of the new left 
manage to widen their electoral support through opening up to new social formations. 
Building on the findings of March’s (2011) study vis-à-vis the ‘Democratic socialist 
parties’ in the EU, this thesis will try to address the absence of a comparative study of 
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Europe’s most important RLPs and their interconnection with the EL vis-à-vis the 
future developments inside the EU. By limiting the scope of the research to parties 
which appear to be more coherent from an ideological but even organisational point 
of view, the present thesis aims at testing the parties’ homogeneity and opposition to 
capitalism.  
 One of the most recent and significant works of the present category of the literature 
is that of Charalambous (2013). His book aims to fill the gap by providing an up-to-
date and comprehensive study of the Greek KKE, the Cypriot AKEL and the Italian 
Rifondazione. While based on the existing literature vis-à-vis the stance of the RLPs 
towards European integration, it presents two major novelties. Firstly, it widens the 
focus as it takes into consideration the wider process of European integration and not 
only specific European issues. Secondly, it provides us with an up-to-date narrative, 
covering a period commencing in the 1980s up to the present day. It aims at and 
succeeds in investigating the responses of the above-mentioned parties to European 
integration, by analysing three areas of activity: the patterns of party competition, their 
policy rhetoric as well as their transnational affiliations. The above-mentioned areas 
of activity are analysed through the lens of the communist dilemma, which consists in 
examining whether the parties under investigation have responded to the challenges 
of European integration in their respective national political scenes by moderating or 
maintaining their ideological positions. In order to answer this question, it proceeds 
one step further than previous studies by analysing not only formal programmatic 
positions, but also the levels of importance that the parties place upon relevant 
European issues. For the research question to be assessed, the author considers both 
official documents from each party as well as several interviews with party officials. 
Through the study of the aforementioned data, the book investigates how the responses 
were shaped by four conditioning factors; ideology, party system position, 
leadership/leadership change and the dissolution of the Soviet bloc. The author’s main 
finding consists of the fact that Communist parties aiming at moderating their 
positions vis-à-vis the Communist dilemma tend to place less salience on European 
issues or downplay their critique towards them. Formal change of their 
programmatic/ideological positions is rarely the case. In addition to that, the 
comparative study shows that there is no high uniformity amongst the parties in terms 
of their positions towards the European edifice. The work’s major strength lies in the 
fact that the author demonstrates how the theories on Europeanisation can be used for 
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communist and mainstream parties alike. Furthermore, it shows how European 
integration is an opportunity structure for parties and at the same time a factor 
constraining their overall strategy. Finally, the work is part of a growing literature 
suggesting that researchers should focus more on comparative studies of the radical 
left and treat them more like real political actors. The chapter on AKEL presents a 
useful contribution to the existing literature regarding the Cypriot party. The party’s 
unique notion of Marxism-Leninism is brought into analysis. In fact, the author shows 
how AKEL manages to apply an orthodox rhetoric when it comes to its core members, 
while at the same time supporting the European future of the country. Indeed, the 
Cypriot issue is used by AKEL as a justification for accepting the process of European 
integration, which is presented as a necessary evil for the resolution of the ongoing 
conflict. Finally, the author provides an insight on how the party’s unique ideological 
blend renders wider transnational cooperation with non-communist left-wing forces 
possible, while concurrently maintaining close links with orthodox communist parties 
such as the KKE. The chapter on the KKE, constitutes a welcome contribution to the 
quasi-non-existent literature on this unique orthodox Marxist-Leninist party. The 
chapter’s most interesting point consists of the fact that even an orthodox party like 
KKE underwent a moderation period during which it was part of a coalition 
government. Indeed, during this period the ruling elite of the party downplayed 
significantly their heavy criticism towards Europe-related issues. The period was 
short-lived, since the fight over the party’s leadership was won by the orthodox 
communist hardliners led by the party’s former secretary Aleka Papariga. The book’s 
last case study regards the Italian Rifondazione party. In this chapter Charalambous 
demonstrates how the Italian party carried on the former communist party’s PCI 
Eurocommunist legacy. In addition to that, the author shows that from time to time 
the party managed to manipulate the salience levels vis-à-vis European integration. 
Following the book’s findings, we could conclude that the party downplayed its 
European integration criticism during its two terms in the centre-left coalition 
government.  The book concludes by highlighting the high differentiation amongst 
WECPs regarding their responses towards European integration. KKE’s unwillingness 
to moderate its ideological positions is shown to contrast with AKEL’s and 
Rifondazione’s moderation and ideological flexibility. It is precisely this that the 
author describes as a true oxymoron. The inability of those parties to embrace the core 
communist value of internationalism, by presenting unifying and homogeneous 
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answers to the European integration neoliberal process, poses a threat to the very 
survival of WECPs in the future. Indeed, as the author suggests both the communist 
dilemma as well as several interconnected internal and external factors limit the 
possibility of coordination inside the communist movement and at the same time 
quasi-nullify its core value of internationalism. Notwithstanding his focus on three 
communist parties, his book presents a novel analytical framework, which could be 
broadly used for communist and non-communist parties alike. By introducing the 
‘communist dilemma’, the choice between moderation and preservation of the party’s 
core ideological values, Charalambous (2013) manages to investigate the responsive 
mechanism of the aforementioned parties in regard to European integration. The 
author’s findings reveal a very important common denominator. That is to say, that all 
parties under study when faced with the above-mentioned dilemma would lower the 
salience of their negative views regarding the European edifice rather than denounce 
their core ideology. This, we could argue, can apply for non-communist RLPs alike, 
something that this thesis will attempt throughout the four case studies. 
 The literature on RLPs in Europe has also produced several research papers and books 
relating to the study of a vast number of European RLPs. Fine examples of this part 
of the third category are the book edited by Daiber, Hildebrandt and Striethorst (2010), 
the volume edited by Kopecek (2005), another volume edited by Hildebrandt and 
Daiber (2009), the paper by Benedetto and Quaglia (2007), Dunphy and March (2013), 
Escalona and Vieira (2013), Janssen (2013),  Lisi (2010) as well as Calossi’s (2012) 
important contribution to the literature with a specific study on the role and 
organisation of the European Left Party. Commencing with the volume edited by 
Daiber et al. (2010) one comes across an important contribution to the literature 
regarding the European left. Indeed, the volume under examination here examines a 
significant number of RLPs across Europe, including the former Yugoslav Republics 
as well as countries of Eastern and Central Europe (ECE), and Turkey. The editors of 
the volume selected only the left-wing parties which, according to their own self-
image, belong to the political left, but neither to the social democratic nor to the green-
alternative family (Daiber, et al., 2010, p. 4). Amongst the editors’ selection criteria, 
one comes across the membership in one of the relevant European cooperative 
networks, such as the EL, the New European Left Forum (NELF), and the alliance of 
the Nordic Green Left (NGLA). Parties whose elected members of the European 
parliament (MEPs) participate the confederal Group of GUE/NGL were also included 
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in the study. The structure of the volume includes 23 country reports. The focus of the 
study is placed on their development, political concepts, their self-understanding, 
organisational structures, strategies, political programme as well as their current use 
value in the political structure of their respective countries. Given the differences 
between the various political scenes and political traditions, each report follows a 
different structure. The volume under review, aims at raising several significant 
answers relating to RLPs in Europe. Amongst others, it seeks to identify the answers 
that those parties give in relation to the existential issues of European development. In 
their effort to explain the tendency of RLPs to form coalitions to partake in elections, 
the authors of the volume have chosen to include a brief description of the various 
electoral systems in the countries of Europe in the end of the work. Notwithstanding 
the importance of the data that such a large number of reports present, the volume 
under review lacks a comparative perspective. This in combination with the selection 
of parties with significant differences both in terms of ideology and structure render 
the deduction of clear conclusions vis-à-vis the stance of RLPs towards the existential 
issues of European development rather difficult to grasp.  
 The volume edited by Kopecek (2005) constitutes a study of several social 
democratic, ex-communist and post-communist political formations both in Western 
as well as Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, the volume includes a report on the 
Austrian social democracy, the Danish social democrats, the French Communist Party 
as well as the KKE and Synaspismos from Greece. In the second part of the volume, 
one comes across a comparative report on left parties in Central Europe, one on the 
Polish Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), a report on the Communist Party of Bohemia 
and Moravia (KSCM) followed by a brief analysis of the party’s stance towards its 
own history, a part on the Slovenian United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD) and an 
analysis of the Slovak Direction - Social Democracy (SMER). The volume edited by 
Kopecek (2005) adds to the existing literature several reports relating to political 
formations, which have not been yet examined in detail. The Eastern and Central 
European section of the book arguably achieves many significant comparative 
conclusions. On the other hand, the section on Western Europe presents the same 
shortcomings as the volume edited by Daiber et.al (2010), as it lacks both a 
comparative perspective whilst considering parties that differ greatly in ideology, 
political programme, and organisation.  
 42 
 Moving towards the next work under review, one comes across yet another volume 
edited by Hildebrandt and Daiber (2009). The present volume differs from the one 
reviewed above mainly because of its focus on the financial crisis which was brought 
upon the European countries. According to the editor, the Left has not risen to the 
opportunity presented by the crisis. A crisis which, according to the editor, has proved 
the left’s criticism critique towards the neoliberal European development right. 
Nonetheless, the common ground amongst the European RLPs has “[…] not been 
enough to rally people around a unifying alternative project that could mount a 
challenge to neo-liberalism” (Hildebrandt & Daiber, 2009, p. 5) . The volume seeks 
to respond to several very important questions relating to the causes of the left’s 
inability to form a common front against the European status quo as well as the 
possible solutions towards building an alternative hegemonic bloc. Being part of a 
long-term project, the present volume constitutes a mere snapshot of what is to be 
published in the future. The selected parties represent all the shades of the 
contemporary European RLPs; post-communist, communist as well as those of the 
reformist Left. The number of country reports is significantly wide, including a section 
on Western, Northern, North Western, Central, Southern and South Eastern Europe. 
Another novelty of the present volume consists in the fact that most of the reports are 
not party specific. Instead, they tend to analyse the left from a wider national 
perspective. This enables the reader to grasp a wider perspective of the dynamic of left 
formations in each country. In the first section one comes across the report on 
Belgium. The chapter relates to the possibilities and limitations of the anti-capitalist 
left in the country. Following the chapter on Belgium, we come across a highly 
interesting section focused on France and the interconnection between the protest 
movements and the various left formations in the country. Moving onwards, we come 
across a report on Luxembourg and immediately after the one on the Netherlands. The 
second section of the volume contains four reports on the Scandinavian countries; 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The third section relates to the left in Britain 
and the radical left politics in Ireland focusing mainly on Sinn Fein. The fourth section 
concerns reports on the Austrian, Czech, German, Polish and Slovak left. The German 
and Slovak reports are again party specific focusing on the German Die Linke and the 
Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS). The fifth section includes reports on Southern 
Europe. The first one is an analysis of the Italian left, the second is focused on the 
Spanish United Left (IU) and last one focused on the Portuguese Bloco de Esquerda 
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and the founding of a new left in Portugal. The final section is dedicated to South 
Eastern Europe and includes a report on Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. A 
rather party-specific report on AKEL is found in the section relating to Cyprus. This 
volume shares the shortcomings of the ones reviewed above. Nevertheless, the fact 
that most reports relate to a variety of political formations instead of a specific party 
distinguish the present volume from the others. The quantity of secondary data present 
in the volume under review is large, data which could be proven significant in the 
contemplation of the present thesis.  
 Benedetto’s and Quaglia’s (2007) research paper compares the Euroscepticism of 
three West European parties from the same party family: The Communists. The paper 
addresses the questions of how the Communist Parties of France (PCF), Italy (PCI) 
and Spain (PCE) have adapted to the process of European integration, as well as the 
factors that have affected their differing responses over time. Indeed, the French and 
Italian parties have moved away from Euroscepticism to softer or even pro-integration 
approaches, whereas the PCE has never been Eurosceptic. The authors argue that party 
response to Europe is affected by international, national, and party-specific factors, 
which have different degrees of explanatory power. In fact, during the early decades 
of European integration international factors, and more specifically the relationship 
with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) constituted the main reason 
behind the WECPs’ Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, the authors argue that as with most 
party families the Communists have also responded to vote and coalition-seeking 
opportunities. The authors’ argument is the following: “having started in the same 
place due to international factors affecting their party family, Communist parties 
moved in the same direction but at different speeds and times, depending on the 
configuration of national and party-specific factors” (Benedetto & Quaglia, 2007, p. 
483). Benedetto and Quaglia (2007) conclude that international factors appear to 
explain divergence in party responses towards Europe during critical historical 
junctures such as 1962, 1974, 1985, and of course 1989. On the other hand, national 
and party-specific factors acquire explanatory power from the 1970s onwards. Two 
variables appear to be important at the national level: public opinion and political 
institutions. The papers’ argument is found to be verified, given that in fact the parties 
under analysis have modified their respective Euroscepticism at different speeds and 
at different times. In addition to verifying their argument, the authors manage to prove 
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that domestic and party-specific factors are of equal weight to the international factors 
in terms of explanatory power.  
 Dunphy’s and March’s (2013) research paper relates to the newest Europarty, the 
Party of the European Left (EL). Following the Lisbon treaty, the authors argue that 
the EL has faced significant challenges regarding its ability to bring the professed 
social change. The organisational development and cohesiveness of the EL is 
examined through the focus on the interaction between national parties, the EL and 
the GUE/NGL group of the European parliament. The authors argue that the EL 
currently seeks to deepen the party’s organisational cohesion whilst widening its 
political representation by increasing the number of party members. Dunphy’s and 
March’s (2013) overall interest lies with establishing the degree to which the EL has 
emerged as a consolidated Transnational Party (TNP) able to influence EU politics. 
The paper moves from a historical overview to the party’s structure and composition. 
Subsequently it focuses on the European elections of 2009 and the party’s third 
congress in 2010. The authors conclude that the EL could be argued to perform some 
of the core functions of a TNP. Although EL’s performance is argued to be 
inconsistent in some respects, the current state could serve as a basis for future 
intensification of its transnational functions. The existence per se of the EL is also 
argued to constitute a factor strengthening the Europeanism of several European 
RLPs. Nevertheless, the EL as all TNPs is seen by the authors as weak agent, given 
that they are closely supervised by the much stronger national party principals. The 
final remark made by the authors relates to the inability of the EL to attract large 
parties whose attitude towards the EU is far less ideological than the orthodox Marxist 
KKE or PCP. Parties such as the Danish Socialist People’s Party, the Dutch Socialist 
Party and the Swedish Left Party constitute parties, whose membership in the EL could 
lead to a significant strengthening of its influence over European politics. This last 
remark is of high importance for this thesis, given its aim at further examining the 
reasons behind the EL’s inability to attract those parties.  
 Escalona’s and Vieira’s (2013) is one of the most recent contribution to the literature 
and argues that following the collapse of Western communism a new political family 
emerged. The authors of the paper argue that the crisis of the WECPs can be attributed 
to two sets of factors: social and cultural changes that coincided with the advent of the 
post-industrial society in the late 1970s and the cultural shift in terms of the pre-
eminence of individualism and post-materialist values in modern Western societies.  
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In addition to that, the authors believe that several political and organisational factors 
were partially responsible for the decline of WECPs. Escalona and Vieira (2013) then 
present the typology of the party family which emerged following the demise of 
WECPs. The four components are the left of social democracy, the red-green alliance, 
orthodox communism and the revolutionary far left. The authors then seek to identify 
the main components of the radical left party family. Firstly, they examine the 
ideological component. Contestation of neo-liberalism and to some extent of the 
ability of capitalism to meet basic human needs whilst maintaining a stable democracy 
constitute the basic pillars of the family’s ideological edifice. The ideological 
opposition to the current EU structure is the reason why the radical left challenges the 
structure in the first place. Post-materialist values are also hugely popular within the 
commitments of the radical left, in the case of combating all kinds of domination that 
cannot be reduced to the class cleavage. Secondly, they treat the family’s social 
component. Indeed, the authors argue that the contemporary radical left no longer 
treats industrial workers as preeminent revolutionary agents and are aware of the 
diverse social strata that constitute their electorate. Thirdly, the family’s organisational 
component is being examined. According to the authors, the RLPs do not yet stand 
out with a genuinely specific type of organisation that is consistent with the two 
aforementioned components. Nonetheless, several shared characteristics remain such 
as the small size of all the existing parties, the spurning of the vanguard role of the 
party and the eagerness to forge ties with the social movements. The authors conclude 
that this “emergent family must still cope with numerous challenges, among them its 
own cohesion and electoral attractiveness. It has still a long way to go before becoming 
a genuine anti-systemic movement, as the social democratic family used to be a 
century ago” (Escalona & Vieira, 2013, p. 14). 
 
e. Objectives and Research Questions of the Thesis 
 
 The present study is aiming directly at expanding the current literature in respect to 
the quasi-novel supranational political formation inside the European left, the EL. So 
far studies addressed the ‘radical left’ altogether. Notwithstanding the significance of 
such a wide perspective, the works so far have failed to present a specific idea that the 
European Left has vis-à-vis EU’s future. Since the creation of the EL, a homogeneous 
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supranational entity has been in place and is promoting cooperation across the Union’s 
countries. By focusing on the EL, we could attempt to reach a conclusion as to the 
Left’s alternative proposals. The current critical economic and political situation 
renders the study both interesting and significant. The multiple levels of analysis 
constitute another novel characteristic of the present study. Contrary to most of the 
studies involving the European left, the project aims at grasping the wider picture and 
highlighting the alternative proposed by the EL and its member parties at both a 
supranational and national level. The study of the EL at the three levels mentioned 
above, European, national, internal for each case study, provides with the following 
advantages: The European level will present us with a wider perspective of the 
coordination efforts through the EL. In addition to that, an evaluation of the EL’s 
ability to influence EU policies will also be carried out. At the same time, it will also 
allow us to understand its perception of the Union and identify the key theoretical 
components of its strategy. The national level of analysis on the other hand, will 
provide us with an overview of the various national political scenes and the differing 
political environments, in which the parties under study exist and compete.  The final 
level of analysis will try to evaluate the importance of the internal struggle of the 
constitutive factions of each party under examination. Given that Syriza and the 
Spanish IU constitute coalitions rather than unitary parties, the importance of this level 
of analysis is rendered even more significant. Furthermore, given the open structure 
of the unitary parties’ organisational patterns the research would be incomplete 
without the third level of analysis, as the influence of the parties’ factions bearing 
different ideological background, will enable us to understand exactly how the 
decision-making mechanism works and how it affects the parties’ credibility and 
overall stance. The third level of analysis will also allow us to highlight how office 
seeking positions combined with ideological mutations affect the parties’ internal 
divisions. 
 Several works in the current literature are examining the Left’s response to a single 
issue. The present study aims to provide a significantly wider point of view. As stated 
above, the main question regards the alternative to the current neoliberal structure of 
the European edifice. Alternatives thought to tackle the ongoing crisis, seen as a direct 
by-product of said structure, and solve the sharpening social issues of unemployment, 
financial instability, and poverty. The parties under examination driven by their 
distinct left Europeanism and their firm belief to the dictum ‘European problems call 
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for European solutions’ propose a social and political change inside the EU. The image 
of this alternative Europe is the essential question that this thesis aims to respond.  
Accordingly, the research questions that this thesis explores are: 
 
• What are the key strategic positions of the EL? 
• What is the future vision that the EL has for the EU? 
• Is democratic socialism still the outmost goal of the EL and its national 
members? 
• To what degree does the EL influence the national parties’ positions and 
overall stance towards the EU? 
• How efficient is the EL’s structure in performing its role? Is there a consensus 
amongst the member parties of the EL?  
• Are we going to witness more than a Déjà vu of the Eurocommunist 1970s and 
1980s? 
• Is the current financial crisis actually strengthening the ELs’ and the national 
party members’ left Europeanism and if so why?  
• What is the discourse that the EL and its member parties create to explain the 
EU’s current state, while promoting their alternative vision? 
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III. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
a. Introduction 
 
 To be able to assess the research questions, the present thesis draws mainly upon the 
vast literature on the Europeanisation of national political parties.  In addition to the 
theoretical lens provided by Europeanisation, the current study will be taking 
advantage of the theoretical, and methodological advantages offered by the Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA). After examining the origins of the term Europeanisation, 
this section moves on to discuss the original works that laid the foundations of the 
academic debate on the Europeanisation of political parties. Furthermore, it deals with 
the evolution of the framework for the analysis of the effects of the process of 
European integration. Following the framework for analysis, the section concludes 
with outlining the major novelties relating to the formation of transnational parties. 
Given the thesis’ focus on the EL, the aforementioned theoretical tool would provide 
a clear lens, which will enable us to evaluate the developments inside the EL. This 
double-layered theoretical framework is chosen to enable an in-depth analysis of the 
current state of the EL. While Europeanisation provides us with a theory explaining 
the impact of the European edifice on national parties, the CDA enables us to see 
through the party rhetoric and grasp the essence of the alternative message which the 
EL is currently spreading across the continent. At the same time, through the 
theoretical lens of the CDA, we can draw conclusions as to the way through which 
RLPs are currently trying to establish themselves as legitimate political actors in their 
respective national scenes, as well as the EL’s discourse examined as a unified 
political actor in European politics. 
 
b. Europeanisation; The Path towards a Working Definition 
 
 Before commencing the analysis of the literature on Europeanisation, a definition of 
the term is without any doubt essential. In the current literature, there is a vast number 
of definitions of Europeanisation. The most important of them could be synthesised 
as follows. According to Thomas Lawton Europeanisation is a “de jure transfer of 
sovereignty to the EU level” (Lawton, 1999); while according to Andersen and 
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Eliassen it is the “sharing of power between national governments and the EU” 
(Andersen & Eliassen, 1993). Borzel (1999) defines Europeanisation as “a process by 
which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making” 
(Borzel, 1999, p. 574). Concurrently, Risse et al. (2001) view it as “the emergence and 
development at the European level of distinct structures […] that formalise 
interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specialising in the creation of 
authoritative European rules” (Risse, et al., 2001, p. 4). Beate Kohler-Koch (1999) 
elaborated an additional definition concerning the widening of the political arena in 
virtue of the process of European integration; indeed according to the author, 
Europeanisation is “ […] extending the boundaries of the relevant political space 
beyond the Member States” (Kohler-Koch, 1999, p. 15). Amongst the many 
definitions of Europeanisation, the current thesis follows Ladrech’s (2002) one. 
According to said definition, “Europeanisation is a term used to describe the effects 
of European integration on the politics and policies of its Member States as well as the 
process of enhancing European-level political institutions” (Ladrech, 2002, p. 389). In 
one of his most important works, the author identifies five key areas for investigation. 
Those include policy and programmatic content, organisation, patterns of party 
competition, party-governmental relations, and relations beyond the party system. 
Ladrech’s (2002) work constitutes one of the most valuable contributions to the study 
of European integration, given that before his significant work the national parties’ 
role in the process was quasi-absent from the literature. Indeed, the study of the 
European edifice as an environment potentially influencing national political parties 
was very limited. In fact, there were two categories of studies carried out, prior to 
Ladrech’s work.  
 On the one hand, there were studies focusing on national parties’ activities beyond 
the domestic political system, through a close analysis of party groups inside the 
European Parliament (EP) as well as the development of EU’s ‘system’. Examples of 
such studies are Stanley Henig’s (1979)  study of political parties in the European 
Union, Geoffrey and Pippa Pridham’s (1981) work relating to transnational 
cooperation amongst political parties and the role played by the process of European 
integration. In addition to those, another important study of this part of the literature 
is undoubtedly Hix’s and Lord’s (1997) work on political parties in the European 
Union, a work that provided an essential update of Henig’s (1979) study. The works 
so far relate to the study of political parties in the context of the EU and the integration 
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process. Ladrech (2002) notices that an additional common denominator amongst 
those works is that their dependent variable relates to the development of what they 
called the EU ‘system’ (Ladrech, 2002, p. 390).  
 On the other hand, works such as the work edited by John Gaffney (1996) focused on 
the European policy orientation of individual political parties. Studies belonging to 
this second category of the literature incorporated various methodological patterns 
including studies on party families, and national political systems. Notwithstanding 
the potential for in-depth comparative analyses, the works of this second category have 
failed to reach their comparative potential due to their focus and the salience they 
placed on domestic determinants vis-à-vis the parties’ stance. In fact, studies of both 
categories failed to acknowledge national political parties as real political actors inside 
the EU, as well as their potentially high degree of influence on the process of European 
integration and vice versa. One of the aims of this thesis is to study the EL and its most 
important party members as real political actors in the European political scene, actors 
that are influencing while constantly being influenced by the process of European 
integration.  
 More recent research brought about a significant change in the way Europeanisation 
was both ideated and studied. The two facades of Europeanisation were best captured 
by Hix and Goetz (2000). The two authors manage to link Europeanisation’s two 
dimensions, the mobilisation of domestic actors at a European level, and the influence 
of the process of European integration in the various indigenous political systems. In 
relation to the latter, the authors examine how “a new institutional arena at the 
European level impacts on domestic political systems by providing a new ‘structure 
of opportunities’ for domestic actors” (Hix & Goetz, 2000, p. 12). Moreover, the two 
authors synthesise three types of opportunities for domestic actors. Firstly, domestic 
actors have the possibility to exit the national arena by predicting favourable EU 
outcomes. Secondly, they can veto on national actions, which would be otherwise 
insuperable based on EU outcomes. Thirdly, national actors could gain significant 
advantages relating to the exchange of information as a direct result of links and 
affiliations at a European level with both actors as well as institutions. The authors’ 
work played a significant role in the development of a framework for analysis 
regarding the domestic variant of Europeanisation. In fact, their theoretical lens 
provides a highly significant analytical tool that allows us to comprehend the various 
strategies of national actors vis-à-vis EU inputs.  
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 This view of Europeanisation as a ‘structure of opportunities’ for domestic actors, 
was enriched by the research conducted by Robert Ladrech (1994) and Claudio 
Radaelli (2000) with the dimension of organisation and domestic actors’ behaviour. 
As Ladrech’s (1994) definition suggests, “Europeanisation is an incremental process 
re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and 
economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and 
policy-making” (Ladrech, 1994, p. 69). In fact, the author suggests that national actors 
are assiduously trying to adapt their organisational patterns to an ever changing, by 
the process of European integration, environment. Radaelli’s (2000) definition of 
Europeanisation, whilst based on Ladrech’s (1994) aforementioned idea, suggests that 
it also relates to several processes through which EU social, political, and economic 
dynamics “ […] become incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, 
political structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 2000, p. 4). Furthermore, Radaelli 
(2000) argues that Europeanisation is not convergence, even if convergence is one of 
its dimensions, as it can also produce divergence. On another point, he suggests that 
Europeanisation is not harmonisation, as it often leads to regulatory competition. The 
most important insight provided by Ladrech’s (1994) and Radaelli’s (2000) definitions 
relates to the focus on the adaptive response of domestic actors to an ever-changing 
primary environment, more precisely, the political arena which has the most decisive 
impact on resources, system, or organization maintenance. Indeed, Ladrech’s (1994) 
and Radaelli’s (2000) definitions argue that even if change is mostly an incremental 
process, where the EU’s input on domestic political systems has been dramatic, as 
was, for instance, the introduction of the single currency, change might be much more 
rapid. In conclusion, the choice of the current thesis to apply a theoretical framework 
inspired by Ladrech’s and Radaelli’s original definitions, and visions of the process 
becomes more evident. The choice to deal with Europeanisation as a process altering 
the environment in which political parties exist and compete with one another, enables 
us to identify factors conditioning a party’s response to this ever-changing 
environment. As suggested by Ladrech (2002) these responses, despite their 
limitations, could even bring about changes and influence at a supranational level 
(Ladrech, 2002, p. 393). This aspect of the process of Europeanisation constitutes 
another dimension of the present study, which aims at grasping the essence, and the 
feasibility of such an influence that the EL seeks to exert on the current European 
status quo.  
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c. The Europeanisation of Political Parties; the Origins 
 
Until the early 2000s, the academic debate was lacking studies specifically oriented 
towards the effects of Europeanisation on parties and party systems. In fact, most 
studies on political parties were focusing on the organisation of and elections to the 
EP. Primary examples of such studies could be seen in the works of Simon Hix and 
Christopher Lord (1997), and Mogens Pedersen (1996). Moreover, several authors 
chose to use the term Europeanisation to highlight a party’s policy and strategic 
change towards either a more positive or a more negative stance vis-à-vis the EU 
membership of their respective countries. Amongst the most prominent examples of 
such studies is Philip Daniel’s (1998) study on the Labour Party’s change of shift 
regarding the EU. Another example involving the Irish Labour Party is Edward 
Moxon-Browne’s (1999) paper. As far as national party systems are involved, authors 
such as Peter Mair (2000) argued that the process of European integration had little or 
no impact on national party systems. In fact, Mair (2000) argues that amongst the 
many areas of domestic politics affected by the process of European integration, party 
systems have proven the most impermeable to any significant change (Mair, 2000, p. 
4). Nonetheless, Mair (2000) highlights a potential indirect impact of the European 
integration process to national party systems: 
“In the first place, European integration increasingly operates to constrain the freedom 
of movement of national governments, and hence encourages a hollowing out of 
competition among those parties with a governing aspiration. As such, it promotes a 
degree of consensus across the mainstream and an inevitable reduction in the range of 
policy alternatives available to voters. Second, by taking Europe itself out of national 
competition, and by working within a supranational structure that clearly lacks 
democratic accountability, party and political leaderships do little to counteract the 
notion of the irrelevance of conventional politics”. 
(Mair, 2000, pp. 48-49)  
 In fact, as far as the national system’s mechanics and format are involved, European 
integration has provoked very little change. One could only think of the addition of 
the European Parliament elections on each member state’s political calendar. Other 
than that, the scene appears to be unchanged. Mair (2000) in the above abstract raises 
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two significant points: the constraints on government policy manoeuvrability which 
according to the author ‘hollow out’ competition amongst parties with governmental 
aspirations, and the ever-growing idea of the irrelevance of conventional politics. 
Those two points constitute according to Ladrech (2002) “precisely the areas of 
investigation for evidence of Europeanisation of political parties, because they both 
draw the attention to altered conditions of parties’ primary operating environments as 
well as crucial associated factors” (Ladrech, 2002, p. 394). Mair’s (2000) first point, 
namely the ‘hollowing out’ of competition amongst parties with governmental 
aspiration, represents a very important idea for the present study. Following the 
author’s assumption, the logical consequence would be that given the constraints that 
national political parties face in respect to their political manoeuvrability, their 
possible response would be the implementation of strategies for overcoming such 
constraints. One such possible strategy towards this objective is represented by the 
creation of supranational parties, such as the EL currently which constitutes the focal 
point of the present thesis. Of course, Europeanisation alone is not the only reason 
behind the creation of the EL. Several reasons intrinsic both to the history of the 
European radical left, as well as the challenges that contemporary capitalism has 
presented them with, constitute, arguably, some of them.  
 
d. Towards a Framework for Analysis; Ladrech 
 
 Precisely these effects of the process of European integration on national political 
parties led the present thesis to deal with the first framework of analysis for measuring 
the parties’ response to the process of European integration. Robert Ladrech’s (2002) 
pivotal work constitutes the foundation of the combined framework used by this thesis. 
As a result, a brief introduction to the author’s original ideas on identifying party 
responses to Europeanisation is deemed necessary.  Following Ladrech (2002), the 
task of the researcher is to try to trace possible party responses to Europeanisation. To 
be able to achieve this goal, the author identifies five areas for investigation: 
policy/programmatic content, organisation, patterns of party competition, party-
government relations, and relations beyond the national political party system 
(Ladrech, 2002, p. 396).  
 The first area of investigation is concerns policy/programmatic content and is 
arguably amongst the most specific types of evidence. Modifications to party 
 54 
programmes can be measured both quantitatively, as well as qualitatively. A 
quantitative method could be highlighting an increase of the reference to the EU policy 
per se, as well as any reference to the EU in policy areas thought to belong exclusively 
to the domestic arena of politics.  A qualitative method of investigation would imply 
tracing references to the EU as an additional factor in pursuing several policies, which 
were thought to be connected to the domestic arena, such as the policies relating to 
immigration. At the same time, references to transnational institutions and 
organisations, such as groups of the EP and Euro-parties, should also be considered as 
evidence of a party responding to Europeanisation. The growing importance of the EU 
dimension on a party’s programmatic discourse will eventually lead to more 
sophisticated ideas regarding European development, recognising in a subtle manner 
the impact of the Union on national political parties. An example relevant to the 
present thesis’ theme is presented by Marliere’s (2001) investigation of the evolution 
of the PCI to the Democrats of the Left (DS). Indeed, the author traced several explicit, 
positive references to the EU, which was presented as a significant factor of Italy’s 
modernisation. The role of the EU was also made highly significant for the party’s 
supranational commitments. Following this evidence, the author suggested that the 
instrumentalisation of the EU was an important part of the PCI’s strategy.  
 The second area of investigation concerns the changes in the party’s organisation. 
This field of investigation cannot, in theory at least, provide with explicit and 
straightforward evidence of Europeanisation, as the programmatic field can. 
Nonetheless, in the absence of explicit statutory changes, which at the time of the 
present thesis are becoming increasingly frequent4, evidence of Europeanisation could 
be traced in subtle modifications relating to the role of a party’s EP delegation in party 
congresses, and, most importantly, amongst the party’s leadership bodies. Such 
organisational changes constitute arguably evidence of the party’s acknowledgement 
of the EU’s importance. 
 The third area of investigation relates to the patterns of party competition. The 
increasing politicisation of the EU in the domestic arena produces the opportunity to 
attract voters through campaigning for either pro or anti- EU positions. In addition to 
                                                
4 See for instance the organizational changes inside Syriza in Greece. In fact, after the party’s 
transformation in a unitary one, the internal opposition’s representation in the party’s organs, especially 
in the party’s Central Committee, became rather limited. 
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that, recent developments have shown that the increased politicisation of the EU has 
produced even more sophisticated party positions vis-à-vis the EU’s structure, which 
can no longer be labelled as simply pro, and anti-EU. Syriza constitutes a prime and 
relevant example of such a position. While acknowledging the importance of 
maintaining the Union, they advocate an alternative configuration of power, as well 
as several radical modifications to the current EU architecture. Indeed, the increasing 
importance of the party’s position regarding the EU in the national political debate 
could be also viewed as evidence of the Europeanisation of the parties’ national 
competition.  
 The fourth area of investigation relates to party-government relations. This area of 
inquiry relates primarily to the effect that the participation of governmental leaders in 
EU forums might have on their relationship with their national parties. Said area of 
investigation could be of particular interest for this thesis, given that at least one of the 
parties under study, Syriza, is leading a coalition government in Greece at the time 
when the present thesis is being drafted. The active participation in the EU policy 
process is thought by Ladrech (2002) to strain the relations, as the party’s idealist 
positions would have to face the political pragmatism that often comes with 
negotiating with the EU. Said divergence between government and party on EU issues 
could at the same time lead to transformations in the modus operandi of party 
management. Nicholas Aylott (1997) traced such a swift in the Swedish Social 
Democrats (SAP) party’s tactics. 
 The fifth and final area of investigation of Ladrech’s (2002) archetypical framework 
for analysis relates to the relations beyond the national party system. As the process 
of European integration intensifies, new perspectives on transnational cooperation 
with parties across the EU Member States arise. The creation of several Europarties 
representing the major party families in Europe constitutes evidence of such a claim. 
Indeed, the Party of the European Socialists (PES), the European People’s Party 
(EPP), the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), the European 
Green Party (EGP), and most importantly, at least in relation to the current thesis, the 
EL constitute the major Europarties inside the newly-elected European Parliament. 
Ever since Ladrech’s (2002) initial theoretical framework, the number of Europarties 
has raised significantly. In addition to that, the level of sophistication of said parties’ 
organisation and decision-making processes could be argued to prove the increasing 
importance of them inside the national political arenas. In some instances, parties even 
 56 
seek legitimisation through the association with a Europarty, as was the case of 
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia in Italy. Another example, more relevant to the current 
thesis’ theme was Syriza’s strategy to emphasise on its EL affiliation throughout the 
electoral campaigns in 2015. Ladrech’s (2002) work undoubtedly laid the foundations 
for future research investigating “changes in political parties that result from the 
challenge presented to their classic functions by the impact of the EU upon their 
primary operating environments, the national political system” (Ladrech, 2002, p. 
400). This framework constitutes a theoretical tool that enables the systematic 
comparison of party responses in several political systems, a task the present thesis 
sets itself. Ever since Ladrech’s (2002) original framework, several scholars have 
added elements to it, rendering it more efficient for the successful comparative 
analysis of political systems and parties.  
 
e. Towards a Framework for Analysis; Raunio and Johansson 
 
 One of those frameworks is the one that the present thesis will be applying. The 
framework was developed by Karl Magnus Johansson and Tapio Raunio (2001). The 
importance of such a work for the present thesis lies with the analytical power of the 
factors included by the authors. In addition to the analytical power of the factors, the 
authors’ work was amongst the first ones aiming at highlighting the existence of cross-
national factors, which can explain a party’s stance towards the process of European 
integration. Undoubtedly, the importance of domestic/national factors cannot be 
overlooked, but the importance of cross-national ones shall not be underestimated. 
The existence and at the same time importance of such factors constitute one of the 
key elements of the current comparative study, which aims at highlighting the possible 
common patterns amongst the stance of the party members of the EL. As a result, an 
analytical framework such as the Johansson and Raunio (2001) one constitutes a 
highly valuable analytical tool for the comparative study of several European political 
parties, as well as the study of the EL.  
 In addition to the framework’s focus on cross-national factors, another significant 
advantage lies with its clear-cut structure and simplicity. The aforesaid simplicity, of 
course, contrary to the word’s negative connotation, cannot be seen but as an 
advantage due to the fact that it enables the researcher to individuate and analyse the 
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factors with ease and certainty. A characteristic that becomes even more important 
given the number of different countries under analysis in the present thesis. The 
framework’s seven factors involve the following: basic ideology, public opinion, party 
factionalism, leadership influence, party competition, transnational links, and the 
development of integration per se. A brief analysis of the seven factors is deemed 
necessary to introduce the notion of each factor, as well as an introductory comment 
on the factor’s analytical power.  
i. Basic ideology. As the authors note, party systems in Europe vary widely. 
Nonetheless, inside each party system, several relative commonalities can be 
traced to those parties of the same political family or party family. This 
categorisation of parties is mainly based on the parties’ ideology, which 
constitutes the party’s view regarding social, economic, and political issues. 
Johansson and Raunio (2001) were amongst the authors, who acknowledged 
the shift of the social democratic parties towards the political centre, especially 
with regards to economic policies in relation to their support of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). The authors also note that a similar process, 
albeit to a lesser extent, could be seen vis-à-vis the parties of the radical left 
political family. The member parties of the EL share a neo-Marxist ideological 
standpoint towards the process of European integration, which is mainly based 
on their version of distinct left Europeanism. The current thesis argues that this 
constitutes one of the most important factors of their positive, albeit critical, 
stance towards the process of Europeanisation, which could ideally, according 
to them, bring about the Europe of the peoples. 
ii. Public opinion. The importance of public opinion cannot, of course, be 
underestimated. The present factor appears to be very much domestic oriented, 
given that public opinion vis-à-vis the EU, and EU related matters vary widely 
from one country to another. As a result, any given party would try to 
acknowledge said stance to its political position, depending mainly on its 
affiliations with certain social strata and pressure groups. Nonetheless, the 
current thesis argues that despite the variety of opinions, the parties under 
study in the present thesis manage to hold on to their positive yet critical views 
on the EU. Contrary to the predominately Euro-rejectionist orthodox 
Communist Parties, the member parties of the EL seek the vote of this 
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percentage of the electorate, which openly criticises the current EU structure, 
but has not yet abandoned the European idea.  
iii. Party factionalism. According to Hine (1982), factions are “[…] solidly 
organized, disciplined, self-aware groups, enjoying relatively stable and 
cohesive personnel over time” (Hine, 1982, pp. 38-39). The parties under study 
in this thesis share, amongst other characteristics, the existence of several 
factions inside them. As Johansson and Raunio (2001) argue, “a way to cope 
with factionalism is to allow intra-party rivalry on Europe. While the party 
may formulate a European programme, the leadership can indicate, either 
willingly or because it hardly has a choice, that there is a scope for 
‘conscientious objection’ within the party” (Johansson & Raunio, 2001, p. 
228). As many authors in the literature have noticed, party factionalism over 
EU related issues is a conscious choice of most parties. The reason behind such 
a stance can be traced by comparing the possible side-effects of such an 
internal division; to the possibility of electoral losses or, even, defections to 
other parties5.  
iv. Leadership influence. The stance of the party’s officials, as well as its leader 
can possibly have a decisive impact on the party’s official line vis-à-vis the 
EU. The present thesis through this specific factor will try to argue that despite 
these parties’ open and democratic organisation, the leader’s stance is 
becoming increasingly important. This argument is found to be compatible 
with studies on the party leadership’s role in shaping the official line regarding 
the EU. According to Johansson and Raunio (2001), “[…] such top-down 
preference formation or framing is arguably particularly manifest in issues 
such as European integration. Where the party activists and voters have little 
knowledge of EU matters, they tend to look for advice or cues from party 
leaders” (Johansson & Raunio, 2001, p. 229). Examples can be found in 
several instances in the literature. For instance, Guyomarch (1995) notes that 
F. Mitterrand used his position inside the party to impose his own European 
vision. As mentioned above, the open structure of most of the member parties 
of the EL would, at a first glance, lead an observer to underestimate the 
                                                
5 For examples of such party strategies in the Swedish and French political system see Aylott (1997), 
and Guyomarch (1995)  accordingly. 
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importance of the leadership factor in the party family of the radical left. 
Nonetheless, examples such as Syriza in Greece and SEL in Italy lead to the 
opposite direction6. 
v. Party competition. Given that the balance of power in the EU is still tipped in 
favour of Member States, primarily the domestic political arena constitutes the 
outmost priority of national parties. Nonetheless, the growing importance of 
the EU in domestic politics renders the party’s stance towards the EU an 
important factor influencing its governability. The space for political 
manoeuvring in respect to the party’s stance towards the EU varies widely 
from one country to another. As a result, the parties of the European left can 
face political competition both from left-wing Eurosceptic parties, such as the 
KKE in Greece, or from strong social-democratic ones, such as the PD in Italy. 
Nonetheless, as Johansson and Raunio (2001)  note government parties, as well 
as those seeking government office, tend to be more Euro-friendly. In fact, as 
they state, “government responsibility means regular participation in the 
Council of Ministers and the European Council. It is expected that this 
institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation leads government parties to 
adopt more Euro-friendly positions than opposition parties” (Johansson & 
Raunio, 2001, p. 229).  
vi. Transnational links. According to Johansson and Raunio (2001) transnational 
links and membership of Europarties can impact the party’s stance to the 
process of European integration. The development of transnational parties, and 
more specifically Europarties will be dealt with in the next section of this 
chapter. The growing political relevance of such transnational institutions has 
been noted in the literature from the early 1990s7. As the authors note, 
“political parties have generally become more willing to engage in 
coordination with like-minded parties” (Johansson & Raunio, 2001, p. 230). 
In addition to that, the quantitative, as well as qualitative intensification of the 
contacts of national political parties with both European parties and institutions 
renders the possibility of policy transfer and policy diffusion very much likely. 
                                                
6 For a study pressing on the importance of SEL’s leader, Nichi Vendola, in the party’s stance see, 
Bordandini (2013). 
7 For more see, Bell & Lord (1998) and Ladrech (1997). 
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This factor is of utmost importance for the present thesis. The study of the EL 
and its most important member parties aims exactly at establishing the 
intensification of the contacts, the diffusion of policies through policy transfer, 
and evaluating the EL’s influence as an actor in European politics. 
vii. The development of integration. According to Johansson and Raunio (2001), 
the integration process per se constitutes the independent variable of their 
framework. Of course, as the authors note, the parties of the EU major Member 
States such as Germany and France represent the key components of the 
integration process. Nonetheless, no single party or party family could claim 
to oversee EU policies, or the direction of the integration process. Especially 
after the Maastricht Treaty, the importance of EU policies and EU legislation 
has shifted the stance of several parties towards the Union. Examples include 
the social democrats, and the Greens. The initial reluctance, or even hostility 
in some instances8, towards the EU was followed by the open acceptance of 
the single market, and led them to come up with sophisticated policies aiming 
towards the change of the Union’s social and environmental policies.  
Johansson’s and Raunio’s (2001)  framework constitutes the major theoretical lens 
of the present thesis. It provides a very focused perspective of party responses to 
European integration and manages to identify in detail the areas where party 
responses to the process can be traced systematically. In recent years, the 
intensification of the academic debate on the subject matter under study has 
produced several significant works. Giorgos Charalambous’ (2013) work provides 
an example of such a development in the literature. His theoretical approach aims 
at grasping the essence of party response to European integration, maintaining a 
focus on Communist parties in three European countries; Greece, Italy, and 
Cyprus. The theoretical and methodological features of his work will be combined 
to the aforementioned framework. The reason behind such a choice is that while 
Johansson and Raunio’s (2001) framework identify the key areas for the research 
of party response to European integration, Charalambous’ (2013) 
conceptualisation provides an excellent set of tools for the study of communist, 
                                                
8 Arguably, one of the best examples is constituted by the Greek social democrats of the PanHellenic 
Socialist Movement (PASOK). 
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and RLPs towards the process. It is, thus, an addition to the original framework 
that will enable the thesis to answer its research questions.  
 
f. Towards a Framework for Analysis; Charalambous’ Communist Dilemma 
 
 In utilising Charalambous’ (2013) conceptualisation, this thesis accepts its principal 
theoretical argument. The author, indeed, argues that the communist dilemma “[…] is 
a useful conceptual lens for the study of the responses of communist parties to 
European integration” (Charalambous, 2013, p. 15). As regards the use of this 
theoretical lens by the present thesis it should be underlined that the parties under 
study, with the exception of some, do not identify themselves as Communist ones. 
Undoubtedly, the differences between the Greek Communist Party (KKE) under study 
in Charalambous’ (2013) work, Syriza, PCF, IU, and Rifondazione Comunista (PRC) 
are indeed very significant. At the same time, the author’s work provides with a case 
study of a party member of the EL, the PRC. In addition to that, the author in 
presenting a historical overview of the communist dilemma demonstrates its 
applicability to the parties of the Eurocommunist tradition. The identification of the 
totality of the parties under study here with the Eurocommunist movement and the 
distinct left Europeanism which was inherent in said movement constitutes, according 
to the present, the most important common denominator. Thus, the application of the 
Communist dilemma, in conjunction with Johansson and Raunio’s (2001) framework 
is a condition sine qua non for answering the thesis’ main research questions. 
 The communist dilemma is, according to the author, “the notion of pressure from two 
directions: ideological purity/consistency and moderation/pragmatism” 
(Charalambous, 2013, p. 15). This distinction between ideological consistency and 
moderation can be traced back as far as before the Russian Revolution. During this 
era, the communists represented the middle ground between the ideological purists 
represented by the anarchists, and the moderate pragmatists represented by the social 
democrats. Traces of such ‘middle ground’ positions can be viewed in several Lenin’s 
pamphlets of the era, where he encouraged the communist parties of his time to use 
the tools offered by the parliamentary opposition, so as to exploit the conflict of 
interest amongst the bourgeois parties present in it. Lenin’s thesis is frequently used 
by various RLPs, including several of the parties under study in the present thesis, to 
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’justify’ parliamentary manoeuvres, as well as their participation in national 
parliaments. The role that this dilemma played in the history of the European 
communist movement, both the Eastern and Western is key in tracing the roots of the 
parties under study. According to Charalambous (2013), there was more that united 
the PCF, the Communist Party of Spain (PCE), the PCI, and the splinter party 
occurring after the break-up of the KKE bearing the name KKE-Interior, than the mere 
hostility towards the Soviet Union. As the author notes, “[…] while this was an 
important aspect of the Eurocommunist phenomenon, the underlying leitmotif ran 
much deeper” (Charalambous, 2013, p. 25). The author argues convincingly, 
according to the present thesis, that a huge role was played by the growing hostility 
towards the Soviet Union, in conjunction with the ever-growing excitement of the 
public opinion vis-à-vis the developments of the, then, European Community (EC). In 
the process of changing their stance towards the EC, parties such as the PCI altered 
the way in which they interpreted several communist theoretical writings to enlarge 
their vote share and transform themselves into a more prone-to-cooperation political 
force. Thus, many scholars such as Boggs (1981) explained in the past the 
phenomenon in a way that assimilates Charalambous original idea. Boggs, indeed, 
noted “here Eurocommunism, like other Marxist movements before it, confronts an 
old dilemma: how to achieve instrumental (efficiency and power-oriented) goals 
without undermining revolutionary (democratic and egalitarian) ones” (Boggs, 1981, 
p. 20).  
 Bearing this in mind, one could conclude that the communist dilemma as a theoretical 
lens presents a significant degree of explanatory power. As Charalambous (2013) 
notes, this conceptual lens has the main attributes of a ‘law’ detecting regularity in 
several historical examples, and more specifically a tendency law “[…] in so far as the 
regularity does not concern a direct or inverse relation” (Charalambous, 2013, p. 30). 
Before moving towards linking the communist dilemma with the previously 
mentioned literature on Europeanisation of political parties, a significant detail must 
be noted: In evaluating the ideological moderation of any given political party, one 
should not consider the generalised ideological state of a party family, such as the 
Democratic Socialists9, but the specific party’s ideological stance before its response 
to the dilemma. This theoretical lens is thus not a static one, as it tends to evolve 
                                                
9 Following Luke March’s (2011) classification. For more see, March (2011, p. 17). 
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according to the party in question. Although the dilemma can present itself in several 
forms, such as office, policy, and vote seeking, the principal dichotomy is between 
ideological consistency and moderation towards a more pragmatic stance, which 
would, in a way, legitimise the party in the eyes of a wider electorate. The application 
of the communist dilemma to the present thesis’ case studies would be of great 
significance. In the following section, the linkage between what appears to be a 
historical ‘law’ and the study’s framework pertinent to the Europeanisation of political 
parties will be rendered much clearer.  
 
g. Towards a Framework for Analysis; The Communist Dilemma and European 
Integration 
 
 The theoretical lens of the communist dilemma enables this thesis to provide an 
insight into a party’s decision between consistency and moderation. The process of 
European integration has been presenting parties of the radical left with several 
difficult choices. Historically, except for the Eurocommunist movement, parties of the 
Radical Left rejected the concept of the EC, and firmly opposed the process of 
European integration. To highlight the reasons behind the Radical Left’s response to 
such dilemmas, the communist dilemma is combined with Robert Ladrech’s 
framework of analysis. As mentioned in a previous part of the chapter, Ladrech (2002) 
identified five areas of investigation: programmatic change, patterns of party 
competition, party-government relations, transnational relations, and organizational 
issues.  
 Charalambous’ (2013) analytical framework utilises three of the aforementioned 
areas of investigation; namely, party competition, programmatic positions, and 
transnational relations. By this the author aims to grasp “the transposition of the 
communist dilemma’s competing logics’ interaction into the various aspects of 
possible communist party change” (Charalambous, 2013, p. 42). The major novelty of 
Charalambous’ analytical tool, as well as the main reason behind the present thesis’ 
choice to utilise it, lies with the focus it places on salience. Based on the argument that 
competing political parties tend to seek the maximisation of their vote- share, salience 
theories argue that a party emphasizes on an issue in order to attract the attention of 
the public. Conversely, they place less salience, or de-emphasize, on a matter that, 
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according to the party’s strategic planning, would prove ineffective in electoral terms. 
As a result, in respect to European integration parties would place either more, or less 
salience on European issues, according to political conjuncture. Therefore, alteration 
of salience levels placed on a stance/position on specific issues points to a party’s 
determination to project or conceal this stance or position. Given that high salience 
levels equal a strong determination to either support or oppose a given policy and that 
low salience levels indicate the opposite, then alterations in the projection of 
determination to place either more, or less salience signify changes in ideological 
confidence and thus a tendency towards either ideological consistency or moderation.  
 Accordingly, the argument here is twofold. Firstly, when RLPs undergo moderation, 
they tend to place less salience on certain stances or actions, either positive or negative 
to European integration. Conversely, when they are ideologically consistent they tend 
to use them as important electoral weapons and project them accordingly that is, 
mention and implement them much more frequently. Secondly, salience levels must 
not concern only programmatic positions, but all areas of party activity. As a result, 
the present thesis will apply this theory on three of the areas of investigation in order 
to shed light on both direct and indirect divergence from ideological consistency.  
 The first one consists of the patterns of party competition. The issue here relates to 
the parties’ profile on European integration and their interaction with their propaganda 
against or in favour of the other national political forces. This could, arguably, 
highlight both how such moderation, or lack thereof, manifests itself in the context of 
domestic party competition, as well as whether electoral opportunities or changes in 
overall strategy are the main driving factors of change on the issue. Accordingly, as 
Charalambous (2013) summarizes, the analysis of a party’s approach towards other 
parties’ European policies can be summarized by the following questions: 
“Have a party’s main opponents or electoral strategy changed, thus explaining 
attitudinal or salience changes in its profile on the issue of European integration? 
Through their general views on European integration and EU-related matters, do 
communist parties differentiate themselves from other left or non-left actors and, if so, 
how they achieve this?” 
(Charalambous, 2013, p. 46) 
 To be able to utilise these questions, the present thesis will need to slightly modify 
the second question. Given that the parties under study cannot be argued to constitute 
Communist ones, the second questions will be formulated as follows. Through their 
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general views on European integration and EU-related matters, do RLPs differentiate 
themselves from other left, communist, and non-left actors, and if so, how they achieve 
this? As a result, three possibilities can be hypothesized in respect to the parties’ 
responses. The first possibility views the parties projecting EU-related matters in their 
public discourse or emphasize them in a way that highlights that they have become 
more moderate than before. For instance, if a party’s position on the country’s 
membership inside the Eurozone has changed, then the party will emphasize this 
change by placing more salience on its revised position. The second possibility views 
the parties as utilising the same mechanisms to present themselves as more radical in 
a way that they move more closely towards their ideological identity. An example can 
be traced in Syriza’s change of stance towards the Maastricht Treaty. Whereas the 
party voted in favour of the ratification of the treaty in the parliament in 1992, during 
its 1st Congress denounced such a choice, and placed much more salience on this 
change. The third, and final, possibility views the parties as utilising the same 
mechanisms in their effort to reconfirm their existing ideological profile. Another 
example can be seen, in the parties’ under study emphasis of their long-standing 
criticism to the ideological leitmotif of the process of European integration. In the 
context of the communist dilemma, the first possibility would signify that the parties 
chose compromise over ideological consistency. Conversely, both radicalisation, 
second possibility, and stability, third possibility, would signify that the parties chose 
ideological consistency over compromise/pragmatism.  
 The second area relates to programmatic positions and policy rhetoric and constitutes 
an addition to the seven factors that the present thesis borrowed by Johansson and 
Raunio’s (2001) theoretical framework. Programmatic positions are more specifically 
elaborated and developed than general views. Thus, such positions could indicate 
policy formulations and details. In respect to the process of European integration, 
programmatic/rhetoric change could manifest itself in several ways. Firstly, it is 
revealed through change of positions either in a moderating or more radical direction 
than in the past. Secondly, salience is once again of importance. Salience in this 
instance could be measured in terms of the frequency of negative references to 
European integration, as well as the depth of the argument per se in respect to EU-
related issues and policies that emerge in the domestic sphere. Accordingly, the greater 
the negative references to, and argumentation on emerging EU-related issues, the more 
salience is placed on opposing European integration in programmatic positions. 
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Again, we could hypothesize three possibilities of parties’ responses regarding their 
programmatic positions and policy rhetoric. The first one would view the parties 
formulating EU-related programmatic positions, or emphasizing on doing so, in a way 
that presents them as more moderate than in the past. The second one would view the 
parties utilising the same mechanisms in a way that they appear more radical than 
before. The third, and final one would view the parties taking advantage of the same 
mechanisms in a way that reconfirms and establishes further their existing 
programmatic positions and policy rhetoric. If we examined the three possibilities 
under the lens of the communist dilemma, the outcome would be that the first one 
would signify that the parties have chosen moderation over ideological consistency. 
Conversely, the second and third one would signify that the parties have chosen 
ideological consistency over moderation or pragmatism.  
 The third area of investigation relates to transnational affiliations. All political parties 
with parliamentary representation have sought cooperation with parties from other EU 
countries. The parties under study in the present thesis are all members of the EL, as 
well as the GUE/NGL group of the EP. Their active participation in the EP as well as 
their membership at the EL constitutes a condition sine qua non in order to seek to 
influence European policy even minimally. Concurrently, the failure to do so would 
deprive them of their legitimacy as national political actors too.  Consequently, the 
eventual changes in affiliations beyond the national party system could be seen as a 
response of the parties to the dilemma posed by the process of European integration. 
For instance, a party can alter the levels of its activity and mobilisation at the EU level, 
in so far as these are altered in pursuit of less or more identification with its existing 
partners. This arguably constitutes an ideological message transmitted by the party 
and can be measured, according to Charalambous “[…] only indirectly and by 
approximation” (Charalambous, 2013, p. 50). Given that the present thesis treats party 
members of a specific Europarty, the EL, the focus of the study will be placed not on 
their choice of partners, but on the emphasis that each party places on their chosen 
transnational link. Salience levels will, once again, be traced in an effort to identify 
possible responses to European integration. Salience placed on the EL in the party’s 
political discourse will be used as independent indicator of the intensity of ideological 
identification with this specific Europarty. Of course, the degree of radicalisation or 
moderation can be measured on a case-to-case basis, on the grounds of the party’s 
specific ideological identity, made out from the combination of the party’s constituent 
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factions. The comparison will, of course, be carried out between the competing 
discourses inside each party, based on the proposals’ substance. For example, 
emphasizing on a party’s position on the nationalisation of the banking sector, either 
partial or total can be viewed as an effort of the party to present itself as a more radical 
political force. If that level of salience on this specific policy has remained unchanged 
through the period under study, it will mean that the party chose to re-establish its 
radical nature. Conversely, if the party chose to place either more, or less salience on 
such a policy, it would mean that it either chose to present itself as a more radical or 
moderate political force. In respect to the salience placed on the party’s transnational 
affiliations the examination of change in the salience levels through the lens of the 
communist dilemma leads to three possible outcomes. The first one, would view the 
party engaging in such activities, relate to such parties and party groups, or emphasize 
them in way that it becomes more moderate than before. The second one would view 
the party utilising the same mechanisms, so that the party can appear more radical. 
The third one would view the party using the same mechanisms, so that the party can 
appear to reconfirm and establish further its existing ideological profile.  
 The contribution of Charalambous’ (2013) conceptualisation is crucial for the present 
thesis, as it sheds light into the very important aspect of salience and aids greatly in 
measuring the importance that the member parties place on the EL. Indeed, without 
the inclusion of the Communist Dilemma it would be very difficult to verify the 
arguments formulated in the present thesis, as well as answering the research questions 
that the thesis posed at the beginning. Thus, the theoretical framework that is being 
utilised will allow the analysis to provide an overview of all three dimensions affecting 
the parties under examination. The Communist Dilemma is of great importance with 
regards to the questions pertinent to the EL and the national parties, to party 
competition, and policy proposals. Concurrently, the Johansson and Raunio (2001) 
framework allow for a multidimensional analysis of almost all aspects of the parties’ 
life.  
 
h. Towards a framework of Analysis; Fairclough’s three-dimensional model 
 
Introduction to Fairclough’s conceptualisation 
 
 This thesis follows Fairclough’s useful framework for the analysis of discourse as 
social practice. As with the majority of the discursive analytical frameworks, 
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Fairclough’s one contains a range of interconnected concepts, creating a three-
dimensional model. The discourse in Fairclough’s framework “is an important form 
of social practice which both reproduces and changes knowledge, identities and social 
relations including power relations, and at the same time is also shaped by other social 
practices and structures. Thus, discourse is in a dialectical relationship with other 
social dimensions” (2002, p. 65). Social structure is, according to Fairclough, “as 
social relations both in society as a whole and in specific institutions, and as consisting 
of both discursive and non-discursive elements” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 64). One of the 
most important elements in Fairclough’s analysis is expressed by the combination of 
textual and social analysis. The contribution of this interpretative tradition is to 
provide an understanding of how people actively create a rule-bound world in 
everyday practices (Fairclough, 1992).  This leads to an understanding of discourse as 
both constitutive and constituted. Fairclough, thus, conceives the relationship between 
discursive practice and social structures as complex and variable across time.  
 
Key concepts; Discourse, its functions, and dimensions 
 
 Fairclough applies the concept of discourse in three diverse ways. Firstly, in the most 
abstract sense, discourse refers to language use as social practice, as used for instance 
above. Secondly, discourse is understood as the kind of language used within a specific 
field, as for instance, in the case of the present thesis, the political discourse. Thirdly, 
in the most concrete usage, discourse refers to a way of speaking which gives meaning 
to experiences from a particular perspective. An example of such a discourse can be 
given by the present thesis’ focus on the radical left’s discourse, contrasting the 
neoliberal discourse. For Fairclough, discourse is limited to semiotic systems such as 
languages and images. Thus, the present thesis’ analysis will focus on the parties’ 
language as featured in their political speeches, as well as on the choice of the parties 
vis-à-vis the utilisation of ideologically charged images/symbols.  
 Regarding the functions of discourse, Fairclough notes that it contributes to the 
construction of social identities, social relations, and systems of knowledge and 
meaning. Thus “discourse has three functions: an identity function, a ‘relational’ 
function, and an ‘ideational’ function” (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 67). The 
important focal points in any analysis following this tradition involve the 
communicative event, and the order of the discourse. The first one relates to an 
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instance of language use, which for the present thesis will involve several political 
speeches made by the parties’ leaders. The second one relates to the configuration of 
all the discourse types, which are used within a social institution or a social field, 
which consist of discourses and genres (Fairclough, 1995, p. 66). A genre, according 
the Fairclough, is a particular usage of language, which participates in, and constitutes 
part of a particular social practice (Fairclough, 1995, p. 56). Again, for this thesis the 
genre relates to the political genre.  
 Fairclough’s model for a critical discourse analysis is, as previously mentioned, three-
dimensional. Accordingly, every instance of language use is a communicative event 
consisting of the following dimensions. Firstly, it is a text that consists of a written 
text, a speech, a visual image, or a combination of these. Secondly, it is a discursive 
practice, involving both the production and consumption of texts. Thirdly, it is a social 
practice. This final social dimension is the major reason behind the present thesis’ 
utilisation of Fairclough’s model. The connection between the parties’ discourse and 
their social practice constitutes the research objective of the present thesis. As a result 
of the aforementioned dimensions, the analysis will focus on the following. The first 
focal point relates to the linguistic features of the text. The second relates to the 
processes of production and consumption of the text. The third relates to the wider 
social practice to which the communicative event belongs. A synthesis of the three 
dimensions of the Fairclough’s analysis to the present thesis’ research objectives is 
deemed necessary. The first, and at the same time, the narrowest dimension relates to 
the text per se. That will involve, consequently, the analysis of the words that the 
parties under study choose in order to communicate with the electorate, in their effort 
to attract an even larger audience. The analysis at this level will address the formal 
features of the text, such as grammar, vocabulary and so on. The second dimension 
will relate with the process leading to the creation of the text. The analysis of this 
second dimension will relate to the process of how the parties under study, draw on 
already existing discourses and genres to create a text. The analysis at this level will 
take into account the internal party discourse; a process leading to the creation of the 
text, which the party communicates to the electorate. Thus, the analysis of the 
communicative event, so far, includes the analysis of the discursive practice, as well 
as its linguistic structure. The third dimension of the analysis will include 
considerations about whether the discursive practice reproduces or, instead 
restructures the existing order of the political discourse and about what consequences 
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this has for the broader social practice, which in the present thesis’ case relates to 
social mobilization.   
 The general purpose of the three-dimensional model is, therefore, to provide an 
analytical framework promoting the following principle. Texts can never be 
understood in isolation. Their relation to webs of other texts, as well as to the social 
context is of paramount importance. Fairclough understands the relationship between 
the communicative event and the order of discourse as dialectical. Accordingly, the 
order of the discourse is a system, “but not a system in a structuralist sense” (Jorgensen 
& Phillips, 2002, p. 71). As a result, communicative events not only reproduce orders 
of discourse, but can also aim at changing them through creative language use. 
Fairclough and Chouliaraki managed to couple the term ‘order of discourse’ with 
Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of field (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 101). A field, 
according to Bourdieu, “is a relatively autonomous social domain obeying a specific 
social logic” (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 72). Actors within a specific field, politics 
in the case of the present thesis, compete in order to achieve the same goal, which is 
constituted by expanding their vote share, and gaining office. This competition, thus, 
links those actors to one another in a conflictual way. The order of discourse is 
therefore conceptualised as a potentially conflictual configuration of discourses within 
a given social field.  
 In conclusion, the use of the aforementioned theoretical lens borrowed by the CDA 
aims at highlighting three important aspects of the parties’ discourse. It will transcend 
the parties’ word choice, and will aim on grasping the essence of the discourses’ 
production, as well as its linkage to social practice. As a result, this thesis will try to 
reconstruct the parties’ discourse and trace its production process in the parties’ 
internal. The third dimension will allow to verify the arguments of the present thesis 
vis-à-vis social mobilisation and/or radicalisation. Fairclough’s notion of the 
conflictual configuration of discourses within the field of politics will enable this 
thesis to analyse the parties’ discourse as a competing one, amongst the variety of 
discourses created by other political forces in their respective political scenes. The 
same will apply at the European level, where the discourse created by the EL will be 
analysed as a competing one to the remaining European political parties. Thus, the 
analysis will provide with important data vis-à-vis party competition.  
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IV. Methodology 
 
 
a. Introduction 
 
So far, the present thesis established the academic background, by providing an up-to-
date review of the literature relating to European RLPs. Subsequently, it proposed a 
combined three-dimensional theoretical framework. Said framework will enable the 
present chapter to examine the current state of the major European RLPs. 
Concurrently, it will allow the present thesis to respond to the research questions 
presented in the previous section. However, before proceeding to the empirical 
investigation, it is important to briefly outline the methodology adopted.  Firstly, the 
present chapter will address the abstract issues of ontology and epistemology.  
Secondly, it will present the thesis’ case studies, providing the underlying rationale 
behind the choice of each party, as well as the author’s method of obtaining relevant 
data. These include a variety of primary, and secondary sources. Thirdly, it will 
address issues pertinent to ethics. 
 
b. Ontology and Epistemology 
 
 The aim of the present section relates to the presentation of the current thesis’ 
ontological and epistemological approaches. This thesis draws mainly on the work of 
Marsh and Furlong (2010) to justify its ontological and epistemological positions. 
Ontology constitutes a more abstract notion and thus precedes the choice of 
epistemology. However, before discussing the present thesis’ choice, it is important to 
briefly outline what ontology actually relates to. According to Marsh and Furlong 
(2010) ontology concerns itself with “whether there is a ‘real’ world ‘out there’ that is 
independent to our knowledge of it” (Marsh & Furlong, 2010, p. 18).  The answer that 
a researcher gives to this question creates an important distinction. The distinction 
relates to either a foundationalist ontological position or an anti-foundationalist one. 
A foundationalist ontological position reflects an approach resembling that of the 
natural sciences, where social phenomena exist externally beyond our control or 
influence, similar thus to natural phenomena such as gravity, or the laws governing 
the cosmos. Thus, the real question to be answered relates to the internal dynamics 
and structure. On the other hand, an anti-foundationalist ontological position reflects 
 72 
an approach, which treats social reality as something that does not exist independently 
of our knowledge of it. Thus, the world is socially and discursively constructed and 
hence dependent on a specific time or culture. 
 As a result, the choice of either position is crucial as it significantly affects the choice 
of epistemology, which aims to address the question “what we can know about the 
world and how can we know it” (Marsh & Furlong, 2010, p. 19). Moreover, according 
to Marsh and Furlong (2010), two more questions are closely related to any 
epistemological position: 
1. Is it possible to identify ‘real’ or ‘objective’ relations between social 
phenomena? 
2. If so, how is it possible? 
  (Marsh & Furlong, 2010, p. 19) 
 At this point, there are again two distinctions to be made here: on the one hand, it is 
possible to acquire unmediated knowledge about the world. This implies that 
objectivity is possible, as any given observer would see things in the same way. On 
the other hand, the position would be inverted, as no observation is objective since 
they would be affected by the social constructions of ‘reality’. Undoubtedly, this 
relates back to ontology. Foundationalists would take the former point of view, while 
anti-foundationalists would employ the latter. The latter approach leads the researcher 
to the problem known as the double hermeneutic: “the world is interpreted by actors 
[…], and their interpretation is interpreted by the observer” (Marsh & Furlong, 2010, 
p. 19), making it a double interpretation even less objective than the initial one.  
 There are two completely opposed research traditions with regards to ontology and 
epistemology. On the one hand, one comes across positivism, which adopts a 
foundationalist ontology and accordingly epistemology. Positivism developed from 
the empiricist tradition of natural sciences and holds social sciences capable of the 
same possibilities as the natural sciences. The ultimate goal is to find general laws and 
causal relationships in relation to social phenomena, following the process of testing 
a argument by way of direct observation. Thus, for this research tradition, there is no 
such thing as a dichotomy between appearance and reality. Positivists tend to apply 
quantitative methods, which appear objective and thus able to produce generalizable 
and replicable results (Marsh & Furlong, 2010).  
 On the other hand, one comes across relativism, which adopts an anti-foundationalist 
ontology and epistemology. For relativists, objective statements about the real world 
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are impossible, as such a thing does not exist. The view of the world as socially and 
discursively constructed constitutes the principle axiom of this tradition. Following 
this axiom, the followers of the relativist tradition deny the possibility of producing 
general laws relating to social phenomena by means of sheer observation. As a result, 
relativists tend to apply qualitative research methods. Unlike positivists they aim at 
understanding social behaviour instead of explaining and focusing on its meaning.  
 Both approaches have received a fair share of criticism in relation to their axiomatic 
positions. Positivism has come under attack from two different sides. Firstly, 
questions arise from the concepts of objectivity and absolute reality. Following the 
tradition’s axiom, objectivity is only possible, when no mediating factor alters our 
observations. As Hollis and Smith (1991) underline this is not possible as, “the five 
senses do not and cannot give us ‘unvarnished news’- information independent of the 
concepts used to classify it” (Hollis & Smith, 1991, p. 55). Following the authors’ 
rationale, a researcher automatically uses concepts to describe observations and these 
concepts inevitably shape the outcome. Thus, what would appear to be a simple 
observation constitutes a subjective interpretation. Concurrently, the same could be 
argued regarding testing a theory, as the theory will per se influence the way a 
researcher makes observations and analyses the outcomes. Secondly, criticisms is 
exerted in relation to the presumed parallels between social and natural sciences. 
Critics mainly point to the fundamental differences between social and natural 
phenomena, as natural phenomena occur independently, whereas social phenomena 
are to an extent dependent on specific events and activities. At the same time, as Hay 
(2002) pointed out the views that the agents acting on these social structures have 
about them shape these very structures. As these views are subject to change over 
time, the same is applied to the structures per se, which can, therefore, vary across 
space and time.  
 Relativism, on the other hand, has been criticised from the exact opposite direction. 
The major criticism relates to the issues raised by the concepts of validity and 
subjectivity, “to positivists, the interpretist tradition merely offers opinions of 
subjective judgements about the world. As such, there is no basis on which to judge 
the validity of their knowledge claims. One person’s view of the world, and of the 
relationship between social phenomena within it, is as good as another’s view” (Marsh 
& Furlong, 2010, p. 27).  As argued by Marsh and Furlong (2010), any given research 
area is formed and influenced by historically produced norms, rules, as well as 
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conventions. The content of said norms provides a certain narrative, which could be 
used by a relativist researcher to refute this criticism.  
 The choice of ontology and epistemology are the foundations on which a researcher 
must build his research as “they shape the approach to theory and the methods” (Marsh 
& Furlong, 2010, p. 17). Concurrently, Marsh and Furlong have claimed that the 
researcher’s choice regarding ontology and epistemology is “like a skin not a sweater: 
they cannot be put on or taken off whenever the researcher sees fit” (Marsh & Furlong, 
2010, p. 17). The authors’ dictum operates on two assumptions. On one hand, it 
assumes that the method of our research is unavoidably linked to our ontological and 
epistemological views. On the other, it is assumed that said choices cannot be changed, 
as they echo fundamental views about the world.  Subsequently, changes in ontology 
and epistemology cannot be made without affecting completely the way that the 
researcher understands the mere concept of knowledge, research, truth and so on. The 
connection between ontology, epistemology, and research methods is rendered more 
evident, given the strong tendency of positivists towards quantitative research 
methods, and inversely the tendency of relativists towards qualitative ones.  
 Quantitative methods are to a large extent employed by positivists. This could be 
partially explained by their inherent need to follow the methods of the natural sciences. 
Such methods relate to the use of statistics and surveys, in the quest to establish 
irrefutable causational relationships. One irrefutable advantage of using quantitative 
methods is that the data is easy to replicate, and could be easily generalised.  
 Relativists, on the other hand, usually employ qualitative methods. Led by their 
ontological and epistemological viewpoints, relativists employ methods such as 
interviews, primary, secondary, and tertiary sources, focus groups amongst others. 
Such methods are very common amongst the so-called descriptive research, such as 
the present thesis. The use of qualitative methods raises some questions for some 
researchers, given the lack of a way to measure their reliability, validity, and 
generalizability. Nonetheless, as Lunt and Livingstone suggest, “the notions of 
reliability and validity are inextricably linked to quantitative work and so are irrelevant 
to qualitative work” (Lunt & Livingstone, 1996, p. 90).  
 The differences between the qualitative and quantitative methods have been made 
clear so far. Both at the theoretical and practical level, the two methods appear prima 
facie quasi-incompatible. Even so, several leading scholars, such as Read and Marsh, 
argue that those differences can “[…] easily be overstated” (Read & Marsh, 2002, p. 
 75 
232). The authors, here, make a reference to Bryman’s position in respect to the 
distinction between the two methodologies. Indeed, Bryman argued that “there is 
nothing inherent in the properties of the different methodological positions which 
prevents their use by researchers who are operating from different epistemological 
positions” (Read & Marsh, 2002, pp. 232-233). Thus, contrary to the position held by 
Marsh and Furlong, who believe that there is a clear dependence between a 
researcher’s ontological and epistemological views, and the methodological tools at 
its disposal, Read, amongst others, argues that “the link between epistemology and 
methodology is important, but far from determinant” (Read & Marsh, 2002, p. 235).  
 The present thesis follows the tradition of descriptive research. The thesis’ ontological 
and epistemological positions could be viewed as anti-foundationalist and relativist. 
Thus, it accepts the axiom, which views the world as socially constructed. In such a 
socially constructed world, competing discourses try to maximize their power over 
society. Subsequently, the present thesis aims at grasping the essence of the discourse 
that the RLPs under analysis construct to articulate their alternative vision of the EU. 
Said discourse ultimately aims on maximizing the parties’ power over society. 
Following the aforementioned positions relating to the connection between ontology, 
epistemology, and methodology, the present study follows Read’s and Marsh’s (2002) 
thesis. It will, thus, apply mainly qualitative methods, but will not dogmatically deny 
quantitative data in supporting its findings, especially with regards to the analysis of 
electoral performances, polling data, and public opinion measurements provided by 
the European barometers. 
 The objective of this section was to briefly introduce the discourse of ontology and 
epistemology, and the subsequent connection with methodology. Concurrently, the 
section briefly outlined the thesis’ ontological, epistemological positions. Following 
these philosophical considerations this chapter will now proceed to examine the case 
study research design adopted in the present. 
 
c. Case Study Research Design 
 
 The aim of this section is to discuss the research design of the present thesis, which 
will take the form of five case studies. Following David De Vaus’ (2001) argument, 
“the function of research design is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to 
answer the initial question as unambiguously as possible” (De Vaus, 2001, p. 9). With 
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a process similar to laying the foundations for a building, the research design 
constitutes one of the most important aspects of a research project. This section will 
relate firstly to the case study selection criteria, rationale, and theoretical foundation. 
Secondly, it will refer to the methods of obtaining data for the completion of the 
project. 
 Case studies constitute one of the most popular research designs in political science. 
Although it could, at least theoretically, based both on qualitative and quantitative 
data, it is mainly associated with qualitative methodological choices. Burnham et al. 
(2004) identify several significant advantages associated with case study research 
design. Firstly, according to the Burnham et al. “in order to have a wider impact than 
that of merely being a detailed account of a unique case, a strong theoretical dimension 
is often incorporated into case study research design” (Burnham, et al., 2004, p. 54). 
Indeed, in this thesis the sampling process has had major theoretical underpinnings. 
Secondly, the authors stress that “in descriptive case studies there must be a focus for 
the research so that it does not become a haphazard collection of material about the 
selected case study” (Burnham, et al., 2004, p. 54). In fact, the present thesis’s in-
depth case studies will generate large amounts of material, which will be organised by 
following the three-dimensional theoretical framework. Thus, the thesis design is 
meant to allow for the collection of specific information for each case study without 
the risk of losing the primary focus. The third and last point made by Burnham et al. 
(2004) relates to the importance of the multiple case studies. Indeed, the authors argue 
that “selected multiple cases will provide a much more robust test of a theory and can 
specify the conditions under which arguments and theories may or may not hold” 
(Burnham, et al., 2004, p. 55). In fact, this thesis is constituted by the comparative 
study of four case studies, in reality four countries with significant member parties of 
the EL carefully selected to be able to produce as generalizable findings as possible. 
The selection criteria, and the underlying rationale underlying the case studies choices, 
are meant to respond to issues raised by several authors. Indeed, as Bryman (2001) 
notes, “it is important to appreciate that case study researchers do not delude 
themselves that it is possible to identify typical cases that can be used to represent a 
certain class of objects” (Bryman, 2001, p. 50). Bearing those principles and notes in 
mind, the following section will address the sampling strategy of the present thesis. 
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d. The Case Studies of the Present Thesis 
 
 The present thesis aims on grasping the essence of the alternative message, which the 
EL promotes by closely studying the Europarty’s most important members. Given said 
intent, the case studies chosen had to satisfy several important requirements. Those 
requirements relate to the full membership of the EL, to an extent a common 
Eurocommunist past, their national political strength, and the importance inside the 
EL’s structure. The status of the countries following the severe financial crisis, 
commencing in 2008, was also taken into consideration. In relation to this, this thesis 
seeks to maintain a balance by studying parties from countries that faced both severe 
and less severe consequences from the financial crisis. The reason underlying this 
choice is this is the need to minimize the effect of the national situation in the party’s 
success or lack thereof. The reason behind this lies with the broader European picture 
which the present thesis aims to draw upon. The case studies selected satisfy the 
majority, if not the totality, of the aforementioned requirements. The exclusion of 
other parties from the present, such as the Portuguese Bloco de Esquerda (Bloco), will 
be justified in the end of the present section of the chapter.  
 The first case study relates to the Spanish United Left (IU). The IU, made of the 
Spanish Communist Party (PCE), and the Republican Left (IR), was amongst the 
founding members of the EL. The role of the PCE in the Eurocommunist movement 
was, as for the totality of the parties under study in the present, pivotal. The party’s 
political strength can be viewed as moderate, and ever increasing. The fact that a 
member of PCE’s general secretariat10 currently holds the position of vice-president 
of the party arguably reflects IU’s importance inside the EL.  
 The second case study relates to the Italian Rifondazione Comunista (PRC). The PRC 
constitutes one of the founding members of the EL. The party’s Eurocommunist 
heritage deriving from the former PCI is amongst the richest in the continent. The 
party’s importance for the EL is expressed by the fact that Fausto Bertinotti was 
elected as the first President of the party. Bertinotti, at the time secretary of the PRC, 
was indeed unanimously elected President at the EL’s founding congress in Rome in 
2004. In terms of political strength, the PRC is currently amongst the least strong 
party-members of the EL. In fact, it is the only party under study in the present that, 
                                                
10 Maite Mola Sáinz. 
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at the time of the writing, has no parliamentary representation in its country. 
Nonetheless, recent advances inside the Italian left brought about a significant 
electoral victory in the elections for the EP held in 201411. In terms of continuity with 
the PCI’s Eurocommunist and Europeanist inheritance, worthwhile mentioning is one 
more fact. Following the elections for the EP in 2014, Barbara Spinelli, daughter of 
the leading European federalist thinker and PCI MEP Altiero Spinelli, who is often 
credited with having converted the PCI leadership under Berlinguer to full-blooded 
European federalism, was elected an MEP representing the electoral list L’Altra 
Europa.  
 The third case study relates to the PCF. The PCF was amongst the founding members 
of the EL, while PCF’s Secretary, Pierre Laurent was the President of the EL between 
2010 and 2016. At the same time, the party’s role in the Eurocommunist movement 
was pivotal. The PCF displays a moderate political strength in French politics. The 
PCF’s recent electoral performances have not met the high expectations created by 
relatively high polling numbers. The PCF presents the present thesis with the case of 
a party representing the second most influential member state of the EU. Concurrently, 
the PCF constitutes the party that has struggle the most with the process of European 
integration. Indeed, its position has been historically rather unique in comparison to 
the rest of the parties of this thesis. 
 The fourth and final case study involves the study of the Greek Syriza. Syriza, indeed, 
satisfies all the criteria. Being a founding member of the EL, Syriza has always been 
present to all the attempts of coordination amongst left forces inside the EU. At the 
same time, Syriza constitutes, to an extent, the party that carries the legacy of the KKE-
Interior, which has been amongst the founding members of the Eurocommunist 
movement during the late 1960s. In relation to the party’s national political strength, 
Syriza arguably constitutes the strongest left force in Europe. The party entered in 
European radical left’s history for being the first Western European RLP and full 
member of the EL12 to lead a coalition government. Said political success was 
                                                
11 The PRC was amongst the political forces that supported the electoral list bearing the name of Alexis 
Tsipras. (L’Altra Europa con Tsipras), which managed to reach the threshold of 4%, and be represented 
in the current EP. 
12 The Cypriot AKEL has led coalition governments before Syriza, but is an observant member of the 
EL. 
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arguably echoed in the party’s president, Alexis Tsipras, candidacy for the position of 
the President of the European Commission (EC). Tsipras’ nomination by the EL 
clearly shows Syriza’s importance inside the party.  The final requirement relates to 
the country’s status following the financial crisis. Greece arguably constitutes the 
country that faced the most severe consequences from the financial crisis, which made 
its appearance in European under the façade of the sovereign debt crisis and brought 
about severe effects for both the Greek economy, and society. The draconian measures 
imposed to the country by the so-called troika13, led the country to an unprecedented 
economic recession.  
 As mentioned at the beginning, the present thesis chose not to include case studies, 
which satisfied the aforementioned criteria. Amongst those case studies, the 
Portuguese Bloco can be viewed as the most obvious one. The reasons behind the 
exclusion of Bloco are purely methodological. The present thesis, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, depends to a great extent to the ability to comprehend original texts 
produced by the parties. As a result, the use of original texts in Portuguese would be 
a condition sine qua non for a successful analysis. Subsequently, given the limited 
command of the language, the Portuguese case study was deemed unfeasible. For the 
same reason, several other case studies were excluded. For instance, the Danish Red-
Green Alliance (Enhedlisten), as well as the Finnish Left Alliance (VAS) could have 
also been included in the present. Both the language barrier, as well as space and time 
limitations led the present to exclude further case studies.  
 The aforementioned section has attempted to shed light on the thesis’ choice of case 
studies. The underlying rationale involved both practical, and methodological criteria, 
as well as theoretical requirements. Considering the above, the case studies chosen 
will attempt to present a balanced and up-to-date account of the European Left Party 
and its major national party-members.  
 
e. Methods of Obtaining Data 
 
 The methods for obtaining data for the present thesis consist of two main elements. 
The first one involves documentary analysis. Following Burnham et al. (2004), the 
sources consulted for the needs of the present could be classified in three categories:  
                                                
13 A group made of technocrats from the IMF, the EU, and the ECB. 
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i) primary sources: constituted by evidence of an event intended for a limited 
audience;  
ii) secondary sources: publically available material relating to events;  
iii) tertiary sources: consisting of all public work aimed at reconstructing an 
event.  
 The present thesis will make use of mainly secondary sources. Several political 
manifestos from each party, alongside congress material, public speeches, radio 
interviews, televised debates, as well as electoral campaign material, will be 
thoroughly analysed in accordance with the thesis’ theoretical framework.  
 The second element relates to the use of academic secondary sources. Several 
academic sources were thoroughly analysed at all stages of the present thesis. On one 
hand, the secondary academic sources were carefully studied whilst working the 
literature review, as well as the theoretical framework. On the other, secondary sources 
were utilised regarding specific parts of the case studies. First and foremost, the 
consultation of said sources was significant for the case study selection. Secondly, 
they constituted the pillars of the brief historical notes on the parties under study, 
which precedes the analysis of each party. The final section of the present chapter 
addresses ethical questions.  
 
f. Ethics 
 
 In social sciences, ethical considerations tend to play a less significant role than in 
natural sciences. Nonetheless, several ethical principles must be followed when 
conducting research in political science. The present thesis did not utilise any methods 
that could have given rise to any ethical questions, apart from the truthful 
representation of the party materials that have been translated into English.  
 
g. Conclusion 
 
 The purpose of this section of the thesis related to important methodological aspects. 
Stating a priori the thesis’ methodology is of paramount importance, as it helps to 
clarify important theoretical and practical issues. Firstly, the present section aimed at 
and sought to shed light on its theoretical core which comprises of ontology and 
epistemology. As mentioned above, ontology relates to what really exists as implied 
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by the name14. Epistemology, on the other hand, relates to how we can acquire 
knowledge of anything. This thesis follows an anti-foundationalist ontology. An anti-
foundationalist ontological position reflects an approach, which treats social reality as 
something that does not exist independently of our knowledge of it. The choice of 
ontology heavily influenced the present thesis’ choice of epistemology. The choice of 
a relativist epistemological approach was coherent with the thesis’ anti-foundationalist 
ontological position. As a result, the present accepts the axiom, which views the world 
as socially constructed. In such a socially constructed world, competing discourses try 
to maximize their power over society. Said choices reflect the thesis’ approach in 
trying to answer the research questions that have been posed a priori in the opening 
chapter of the present thesis.  
 Secondly, the present chapter introduced the main features of the case study research 
design. The main research characteristics were thoroughly discussed. Concurrently, 
the selection criteria underlying the case studies chosen for the present thesis were 
discussed in detail. As mentioned above, the parties chosen present a number of 
common characteristics in relation to their status inside the EL, as well as their shared 
Eurocommunist heritage. While the parties chosen share a number of common 
characteristics, they vary greatly in relation to their political strength internally, and in 
relation to their home-country’s status following the financial crisis. This will allow 
the thesis to be balanced, as it will involve a series of both very electorally successful 
and less successful parties.  
 Thirdly, the present section shed light on the methods of obtaining data, as well as 
addressing ethical issues. The main methods are constituted by secondary and tertiary 
sources. The importance of academic secondary sources at all the stages of the 
research was also emphasized. Finally, the last part addressed ethical issues. 
Notwithstanding the minor importance of such issues for the social sciences, several 
principles were set and subsequently followed closely throughout the research process.  
 This section concludes the theoretical component of this thesis. Commencing with 
the literature review, the present has placed itself upon the literature relating to the 
study of RLPs. Concurrently, a vast number of secondary works were consulted. 
Those works constituted both an inspiration and a verification of the validity of the 
research questions posed by the present. Subsequently, the formulation of a three-fold 
                                                
14 Ontology derives from the Greek ὤν, the present participle of the verb ‘to be’. 
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theoretical framework combining the research traditions of Europeanisation with 
elements of discourse analysis was perceived as necessary to address the research 
questions proposed by the present. Those combined with the present methodological 
chapter will serve as the basis for the discussion of the empirical part, commencing 
with the next chapter. The following chapters will, indeed, deal with the case studies 
according to the following order: 
 
i. The Spanish United Left 
ii. The Italian Rifondazione Comunista 
iii. The French PCF 
iv. The Greek Syriza 
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V. The Spanish United Left 
 
 
1. History of the Spanish United Left 
 
a. Introduction 
 
 The first case study involves the Spanish United Left (IU). Before commencing this 
brief historical analysis, it is of significance to note that much like Syriza until 2013, 
the IU constituted a coalition of several leftist, communist, and Green parties. Within 
the IU, the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) is the only political formation with a 
nationwide base, as the rest of the parties are predominately regionally rooted. As a 
result, the following historical overview will relate primarily to the PCE in the pre-
and post-Franco era. Following the creation of the IU in April 1986, the historical 
overview will involve the events that led to the creation and consolidation of this 
political coalition and will lay the foundation for the examination of the party’s 
responses towards the process of European integration that will follow in the 
proceeding section of the present chapter.  
 
b. Ideological Struggles and the Birth of the PCE 1920-1921 
 
 The PCE was founded on the 15th of April 1920 following a break inside the Socialist 
Workers Party of Spain (PSOE). Two tendencies were struggling inside the PSOE at 
the time: the revolutionary one and the reformist one (PCE, 2013, p. 23). The process 
of the creation of the PCE was long and laborious. In fact, three extraordinary 
congresses were necessary for its formation. The guiding force behind the foundation 
of the PCE was the Federation of the Young Socialists (FdJS). Indeed, it was in Madrid 
where the National Assembly of the FdJS voted in favour of the transformation of the 
Young Socialists into the Communist Party of Spain. The breaking point was 
according to the founding document of the PCE the decision of the Socialist Party to 
support the allies in the First World War. Indeed, the decision clearly states, “during 
the war, the Socialist Party of Spain placed itself openly on the side of the allies, who 
were portrayed as the defenders of democracy, of freedom and justice. This profound 
doctrinal error, given that the war was clearly and manifestly an imperialist war, 
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clearly demonstrates the petty-bourgeois ideology of its leaders […] we reached a 
moment when we will be accomplices of this state of things if we were to hesitate to 
move forward as we do now” (PCE, 2013, p. 24). Further breaks inside the PSOE led 
to the foundation of the Spanish Communist Workers’ Party (PCOE) in April 1921. 
Soon after the creation of the PCOE, the Communist International contributed to the 
overcoming of this situation and led to the unification of these two parties. In fact, in 
November of 1921, the two communist parties merged into the PCE. 
 
c. PCE; The Civil War and the Clandestine Era 1931-1975 
 
 The proclamation of the Second Republic in 1931 found the party in a desolate state, 
as internal conflicts were driving it to the brink of collapse (Heilig, 2012, p. 256). 
Notwithstanding the internal state of affairs, the party managed to win several seats in 
the Spanish Parliament in the 1933 elections. The workers’ uprisings that commenced 
in 1934 found the PCE playing an important and active role. The party decided to join 
the Popular Front in 1936 and contest the elections, which it managed to win but only 
a very narrow margin (Heilig, 2012, p. 256). The civil war that commenced that same 
year found the PCE attracting many new members, as the party fought alongside the 
Popular Front against Franco.  
 The end of the civil war and Franco’s victory led to the PCE being declared illegal. 
The party’s members and sympathisers were persecuted, tortured, and murdered by 
Franco’s regime. Those that managed to survive the immediate persecution fled the 
country and went into exile mostly in the USSR and neighbouring France. During this 
period, the PCE rallied in the movement against Nazism, especially inside the French 
resistance movement. At the same time, the party initiated the guerrilla fighting in 
Spain, widely known as maquis, based on the premise that the defeat of Hitler in 
Europe could provoke an intervention against Franco in Spain.  
 As the Second World War came to an end, the party decided to abandon the struggle 
against Franco inside Spain, as the aspiration of an international intervention 
supporting the Spanish partisans was never fulfilled. Concurrently, by 1948 the 
developments were marked by the death of a large number of communist militants and 
the hard oppression towards the people of the zones where the guerrilla fights took 
place. In addition to this, the guerrilla fighters had to face the increased hostility of the 
local populations. We could argue that this hostility can be attributed to the economic 
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hardships, Franco’s oppression, and the significant influence of the Catholic Church 
amongst the predominately rural and illiterate population.   
 Following the end of the guerrilla warfare, the party opted for the Leninist tactic of 
combining illegal struggle with the exploitation of all legal means of representation 
that the regime permitted. As a result, the communists participated in the vertical trade 
unions, as well as all the mass organisations that Franco’s regime permitted. The 
environment in which the PCE operated became increasingly hostile as soon as the 
Cold War divisions became a reality in Europe. Indeed, in 1950 the French Minister 
of Interior, Jule Moch, decreed the outlawing of the PCE in France and the subsequent 
detention of its political leaders (La Vanguardia, 2014). Thereafter, the PCE’s voice 
will be aired via the Spanish Independent Radio from Eastern Europe.  
 In September 1954, the PCE celebrated its Fifth Congress, during which the party 
established its novel two-stage strategy. The first stage that the party propagated 
related to the creation of an ample front that would put an end to the dictatorship and 
would form a provisional government. This government would then have three 
important tasks. Firstly, it would seek to re-establish democratic rights and civil 
liberties. Secondly, it would give amnesty to the political prisoners and the political 
exiles. Thirdly, it would adopt immediate ways of improving the living conditions of 
the Spanish population.  Following the application of the immediate measures, the 
government would hold free elections and restore democracy. In June 1956, the PCE 
elaborated its ‘National Reconciliation’ policy with the support of the Unified 
Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC). During this period, the student movement was 
gaining momentum, as the Spanish Student Union (SEU) was settled and an increasing 
number of bourgeois democratic movements were being developed inside Spain. The 
struggle of the PCE was increasingly representing with much more clarity the fight for 
civil liberties and democratic freedoms. Creating an alliance between all the 
democratic forces meant that the responsibilities for the civil war and the post-war era 
were to be put aside. PCE’s declaration in June 1956 stated openly regarding the 
national reconciliation policy: 
“The Communist Party represents undoubtedly this part of the population that has 
suffered the most during this last twenty years; the working class, the small farmers, 
the agricultural labourers, the poor farmers, the advanced intelligentsia. If one had to 
create a summary of the grievances nobody would be mentioned more than us. We 
believe that the best justice for every one that fell and suffered for liberty consists, 
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precisely, in the establishment of freedom in Spain. A policy of vengeance will not 
help Spain to exit the state in which it finds itself. What Spain needs is civil peace, 
reconciliation of its sons, and freedom” 
(Carrillo & Sanchez-Montero, 2000, p. 200).  
 Nevertheless, Franco’s regime regained its strength once it became a member of the 
United Nations (UN) in 195515 and thus decided to intensify oppression. In 1957, the 
PCE played an active role in the boycotts in Madrid and Barcelona, as well as the 
workers’ struggles in Seville, Alcoy, Valladolid and more specifically in the miners’ 
struggle in Asturias during the March of 1958. An equally important role was played 
again by the PCE in the General Strike of June 1959.  
 In January 1960, the PCE celebrated its 6th Congress in Prague. The party’s congress 
elected Santiago Carrillo as the new General Secretary and Dolores Ibarruri as the 
President of the Party. Amid an economic crisis, when the real salary of the workers 
was falling more than 40 % due to the suspension of overtime, premiums, and bonuses, 
PCE capitalised the opposition to Franco by creating the Workers’ Commissions 
(CCOO) and calling a peaceful national strike. Layoffs were becoming increasingly 
frequent, and unemployment was rising at a rather quick pace. Difficulties were also 
reaching the petty-bourgeoisie as well as the merchants, who were affected by the fall 
in the purchasing power of the majority of the population.  
 Between 1961 and 1964 approximately 1500 communists were imprisoned. In 1962, 
Julian Grimau, a member of PCE’s Central Committee, was detained and tortured by 
the Socio-Political Brigade of the regime (Publico, 2013). In 1963, he was sentenced 
to death, something that led to an unprecedented wave of international protests and 
pressures towards the regime. A multitude of demonstrations was held in many 
European and Latin American capitals. In response to said international indignation, 
Manuel Fraga, Minister of Information and Tourism, initiated an intense campaign 
addressed to the international press attributing to Grimau the worst of crimes. Grimau 
was finally executed in the dawn of April 20, 1963 (Publico, 2013).  
 Internally, similarly to the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the PCE was seeking an 
autonomous path from the control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) and the Soviet Union itself, outlining what will be later called 
                                                
15 The US sought to support and endorse Spain’s membership given the ongoing Cold War and the 
strong anti-communist ideology behind Franco’s regime. 
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Eurocommunism. The choice of said path led to several internal struggles between the 
General Secretary and some party officials. In 1964 Fernando Claudin and Jorge 
Semprun were expelled from the party. That same year a faction of the party that 
opposed the policy of national reconciliation as well as the Eurocommunist path left 
the party and created the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Spain (PCE m-l). In 
1965, the PCE celebrated its 7th Congress, which defended the steps towards socialism 
in a peaceful and parliamentary manner, a manner that would be adequate to the 
specific needs of Spain, opting for nonalignment at the international level. The 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and its subsequent condemnation by the PCE led 
several important party officials to leave the party and create the Communist Party of 
Spain16. Indeed, in July 31st, from the pages of Nuestra Bandera17, Carrillo placed 
himself completely on the side of Czechoslovakia, considering this position of PCE 
as the first serious divergence between Western European Communist Parties and the 
CPSU. In addition to this, on August 28th the Executive Committee of the PCE sent 
from the exile a communiqué via the French newspaper L’Humanite, in which it 
clarified its position in the following manner: 
“The PCE has expressed at the time its sympathy to the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia (KSC) and its support to the policies that the plenum of its Central 
Committee has adopted this past January, as well as for the new designation of the 
director of its Presidium, Alexander Dubcek. In the same way, the PCE has manifested 
its opposition to the intervention in Czechoslovakia and believes that the solution to 
the country’s problems belongs to the KSC and to the Czechoslovak people, aided by 
the Socialist States and the parties of the workers movement and of international 
communism […] The events of recent days confirm the urgent need to address deeper 
issues such as the different ways and modalities of socialist transformation, while we 
affirm that the differences that have arisen in no way affect our appreciation of the 
                                                
16 The Communist Party of Spain [Partido Comunista de Espana (VIII-IX Congresos)] was founded in 
1968 by Agustin Gomez Pagola and Eduardo Garcia Lopez following their firm opposition to PCE’s 
condemnation of the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia.  For further reading regarding the Communist 
Party of Spain and the multitude of its splinter parties see, Vera-Jimenez (2009). 
 
17 Nuestra Bandera [Our Flag] is a magazine founded in 1937 by the PCE. It is a theoretical magazine 
of Marxist analysis. The magazine changed its name to Utopias, Nuestra Bandera [Utopias, Our Flag] 
in January 1993. 
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critical role that the USSR has had in the struggle against imperialism. Thus, we reject 
the anti-Soviet campaign that seeks to utilise for its own purposes what happened in 
Czechoslovakia” (Ferrero-Blanco, 2004, p. 240).  
 As Ferrero-Blanco (2004) suggested “the PCE had to simultaneously strongly support 
Czechoslovakia and its unequivocal condemnation of the Soviet invasion, with the 
reassertion of the anti-imperialist role of international communism, in order to not 
weaken its antifascist position within Spain itself” (Ferrero-Blanco, 2004, p. 240).  
 Following the Party’s 8th Congress held in 1972, during which the party created its 
definitive Eurocommunist political line, Enrique Lister left the PCE and founded the 
Spanish Communist Workers’ Party (PCOE). Carrillo’s new policy was embodied in 
Paris, where on 30th July 1974 the PCE together with other parties18 and independent 
personalities founded the Democratic Board of Spain (Junta Democratica de Espana). 
This organisation was key during the Spanish transition to democracy and later in the 
Democratic Coordination (Coordinacion Democratica, also known as Platajunta), a 
union between the Junta and the Convergence Platform hosted by the Spanish Socialist 
Workers’ Party (PSOE).  
 
d. Transition to Democracy and the End of the Carrillo Era 1975-1985 
 
 In December 1975 King Juan Carlos communicated to Santiago Carrillo that he 
intended to democratise the Spanish regime, calling for patience and an end to the 
attacks against monarchy. Indeed, the PCE’s executive committee of January 1976 
decided to leave from one side the criticism against the King and on the other lower 
the level of offensive and mobilisation. On 11th February 1977, the PCE presented the 
necessary documentation to be included in the Registry of Associations and on 9th 
April of the same year the PCE became a legal political party. Indeed, the PCE took 
part in the elections with Santiago Carrillo as its candidate. In 1978, at its 9th Congress, 
the first congress to be celebrated in Spain after 1932, Santiago Carrillo was 
reconfirmed General Secretary of the party, while Dolores Ibarruri would be elected 
as the party’s President. The internal divisions that already existed continued to deepen 
especially after the vote that rendered the PCE no longer Marxist-Leninist, but 
                                                
18 The founding parties were the PCE, the People’s Socialist Party (PSP), the Workers’ Commissions 
(CCOO), the Socialist Alliance of Andalucía (ASA), the Democratic Justice (Justicia Democratica), 
the Carlist Party (PC), and the Workers’ Party of Spain [PCE (i)].  
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revolutionary Marxist19. In addition to this important ideological mutation, the PCE 
opted to break with the tradition of democratic centralism in its internal organisation. 
In fact, the PCE moved from a cellular structure to a territorial one, to achieve certain 
openness with regards to its organisation and possibly augment its electoral support, 
something that led to many internal convulsions. Indeed, by 1979 PCE’s membership 
fell from 200,000 to 170,000.  
 In June 1981, the PCE held its 10th Congress. During this Congress two factions 
opposed Carrillo’s leadership. On the one side, there were the Leninists, also known 
as pro-Soviet, such as Ignacio Gallego and Francisco Garcia Salve. This faction 
defended a more orthodox stance closer to the Soviet Union. On the other side, there 
were the renewers, who defended a more moderate and open stance. Carrillo attempted 
to balance the internal tension by creating the figure of the vice-General Secretary 
inside the party’s Executive Committee. Notwithstanding Carrillo’s attempts to 
harmonise the internal struggles, by 1982 several important party officials left the 
party. This resulted in the creation of a multitude of left-wing political formations, 
especially at a regional level (Vera-Jimenez, 2009, pp. 44-45). Legislative elections 
took place in Spain in October 1982. Prior to the elections, PCE’s General Secretary, 
Carrillo, denounced the electoral legislation as of ‘dubious constitutionality’. 
According to the PCE’s opinion the system was manipulated in a manner leading to 
an intensive polarisation of the political scene that benefited its political opponents (El 
Pais, 1982). Indeed, the electoral results were disappointing for the PCE, which 
managed to secure a mere 4,02 per cent of the vote share (Ministerio Interior, 1982). 
Following this disappointing electoral performance, Carrillo resigned and Gerardo 
Iglesias replaced him as General Secretary of the PCE. 
 In December 1983, the PCE held its 11th Congress. During the congress the 
Carrillistas, the Leninist or pro-Soviet sector, and the renewers led by Ignacio Gallego 
constituted the three opposing factions inside the PCE. The renewers were finally the 
ones to reach the necessary intra-party majority that permitted them to elect Gerardo 
Iglesias as General Secretary, Dolores Ibarruri as President, and Enrique Curiel as 
vice-General Secretary. The consensus that the majoritarian tension achieved regarded 
the creation of a unitary left project that would seek social and political convergence 
with other political forces (Prades, 1983). Carrillo accused the renewers that they had 
                                                
19 The decisive vote was passed with 965 votes against 248. 
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no proper political programme other than being dependent on the Socialist Party 
(PSOE) and intending to destroy the PCE. Two years later in 1985 prominent party 
officials such as Nicolas Sartorius, Dolores Ibarruri, and Gerardo Iglesias decided to 
expel Carrillo from the Party. This paved the way for the creation of the United Left 
that was founded a year later in 1986. 
 
e. The Founding of the United Left 1986-1992 
 
 
 The Spanish United Left [Izquierda Unida] (IU) was founded on 27th April 1986. As 
we saw in the previous part, the internal struggle inside the PCE and the final victory 
of the faction of the renewers led by the General Secretary, Gerardo Iglesias, led to a 
certain period of openness of the PCE to other forces of the wider left. In addition to 
the internal struggles of the PCE another set of events played a significant role in the 
creation of IU. Those events concern primarily the Socialist Workers Party of Spain 
(PSOE). In fact, as Heilig (2012) notes, “by the end of the 1970s, the PSOE established 
itself as a strong alternative to the hitherto ruling Union of the Democratic Centre 
(UCD)” (Heilig, 2012, p. 257). During the electoral campaign leading to the legislative 
elections of October 1982, the PSOE exerted pressure in relation to the unpopular 
accession of Spain into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The 
Socialists of PSOE promised to hold a referendum regarding the country’s NATO 
membership, if they were to win the overall majority. By 1986, when the referendum 
was finally held, the PSOE had suddenly shifted its position and was therefore in 
favour of staying in the alliance (Heilig, 2012, p. 258). This ideological shift from the 
PSOE gave the necessary opportunity to the forces on the left of it to unite in their 
campaign against the country’s NATO membership. 
 It was indeed, via the foundation of the Citizens’ Platform for the Withdrawal of Spain 
from NATO, that the left electoral alliance for the legislative elections of 1986 was 
developed. Around the NATO issue several disappointed PSOE voters and members 
united with the renewers of PCE to found an initially loose electoral alliance that 
progressively became the most important radical left party in Spain (Heilig, 2012, p. 
258). In fact, in the political declaration of the Citizens’ Platform (PC), one comes 
across a part relating to “the bases of a new left” (Plataforma Civica, 1986). This part 
of the PC’s political declaration clearly states: 
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“Undoubtedly, the margin of error of our evaluations is very ample. Nevertheless, it 
seems evident, if we judge from it, the strong impact that the referendum has had on 
the internal political spectrum, which broke the established vote share between the 
political formations and questioned the whole scheme of bipartisanship. Even more 
clear is, going back to the NATO issue, the irruption of a considerable part of the 
citizenship that places itself on the left of the governing party in an issue of prime 
importance, as a counterpart of PSOE to slip into right positions, finding there the 
votes originating from the Peoples’ Alliance. There are not, of course, seven million 
Spanish people that dissented PSOE departing from a progressive approach. 
Nevertheless, one could affirm that a majoritarian part of the people that voted ‘no’ 
responded to this motivation, in order to speak of a political demand placed with 
clarity, in the streets and in the polls, during the NATO referendum. The issue does 
not relate, therefore, to the legitimacy of the alternative, but conferring to the 
alternative political operability” (Plataforma Civica, 1986, p. 5).  
Moving forward from the evaluation of the referendum’s result, the PC defined its 
future in the last part of its political declaration. There the PC defines its primary 
conclusions for the future of a political project that would be characterized by its 
plurality and openness. Amongst its conclusions ones comes across the call towards 
all parties and organisations of the left, from all regions and communities to coordinate 
their efforts and examine all possible forms of cooperation. Finally, the PC calls “all 
the political, social, civic, cultural, independent persons, that agree with the general 
orientation of its political declaration to elaborate a left political alternative” 
(Plataforma Civica, 1986, p. 9).  
 The United Left Platform was thus born in the aftermath of the NATO referendum 
thanks to the initiatives undertaken by the PC. The eight founding members of the IU 
were the PCE, the Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain (PCPE), the Socialist 
Action Party (PASOC), the Republican Left (IR), the Progressive Federation (FP), the 
Carlist Party, the Humanist Party, and the Unity Collective of the Workers of 
Andalusia/Andalusian Leftist Bloc (Heilig, 2012, p. 259). In its founding document, 
the platform of the IU highlights the need of convergence amongst all the progressive 
forces in view of the legislative elections of June 1986. Following the NATO 
referendum, the IU states that an increasing number of citizens have lost faith in the 
PSOE, the policies of which have taken a shift towards the centre-right (IU, 1986, p. 
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3). The eight pillars of the platform’s agreement can be briefly synthesised in the 
following manner: 
i. The political forces agreed to run together at the elections of June 1986; 
ii. The political forces agreed to designate a working group to come up with a 
common political programme based on several general principles; 
iii. To create a Commission that would seek to establish a fair representation of 
the coalition’s political powers in respect to the candidates; 
iv. To create a distinct parliamentary group following the elections that would 
nevertheless not affect their political independence; 
v. To institute an Electoral Commission that would deal with ensure that all the 
legal requirements regarding the elections were met on time; 
vi. To institute a Design Commission that would create the electoral material with 
a special emphasis on the proportional representation of all the political forces 
and their respective emblems; 
vii. To create a Finance Commission that would make sure that the coalition 
receives all the funding necessary; 
viii. To ensure that the coalition will run again during the successive administrative 
elections, as well as the elections for the EP. 
(IU, 1986, pp. 4-7) 
  
 The coalition managed to achieve parliamentary representation as it won 4.6% 
of the vote and seven seats in the Congress of Deputies in the legislative 
elections of June 1986 (Linz & Montero, 2001, p. 163). Subsequently, the IU 
increased its vote to 7.18% in the administrative elections of 1987. Following 
the early electoral success, the IU coalition ran again during the 1989 
legislative elections, when it managed to boost its vote share by achieving a 
9.07% and gaining 17 seats in the Congress of Deputies (Heilig, 2012, p. 258). 
The fact that the coalition of the IU appeared to be functioning in a rather 
efficient manner alongside the early electoral successes led the founding party 
members to decide to register the IU as a unitary political party.   
 
f. IU; The Early Days and the Socialist Crisis 1993-2008 
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During the 1990s the IU managed to achieve very positive electoral results and 
substantially increase its vote share. In fact, during the 1993 legislative elections, the 
IU gained the 9.55% of the vote share and 18 seats in the Spanish Congress of Deputies 
(Heilig, 2012, p. 260). The electoral success carried on all through the 1990s. During 
the legislative elections of 1996, the IU increased yet again its vote share by achieving 
a 10.54% of the vote share which translated in 21 seats in the Congress of Deputies. 
Nevertheless, the IU did not manage to maintain these excellent electoral results 
during the first decade of the 21st century. Indeed, the IU’s vote share was decreased 
to single digit numbers ever since the election for the EP in 1999. Indeed, the IU 
secured a mere 5.77% of the vote share, electing 4 MEPs (Ministerio Interior, 1999). 
During the legislative elections that took place the following year, the IU saw its 
electoral percentages falling yet again. The party’s vote share was decreased indeed 
by 5.09% in comparison to the 1996 legislative elections. Thus, by securing 5.45% of 
the vote, the IU lost 13 seats in the Spanish parliament (Ministerio Interior, 2000). 
This downward spiral persisted for both legislative and EP elections throughout the 
first decade of the 21st century. In fact, it was during the elections for the EP in 2009 
that achieved the lowest vote share of its history. The IU gained a mere 3.71% and 
elected only 2 MEPs (Ministerio Interior, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
The continuous negative electoral results of the IU created an increased number of 
programmatic, political, and strategic disputes among the party members of the IU 
(Heilig, 2012, p. 261). In addition to this, the party’s choice to support the minority 
government of Jose Zapatero during the 2004-2008 term was highlighted by many 
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party officials as the reason behind the party’s electoral demise during this period. 
Concurrently, IU’s support for the socialist government of Jose Zapatero led to the 
strenghthening of bipartisanship. Indeed, given the IU’s supportive stance the PSOE 
was able to call its supporters to “not waste their vote, or to vote their fears of a right-
wing victory” (Heilig, 2012, p. 261).  
 Prior to the party’s Federal Assembly in November 2008, the coalition’s Coordinator 
General Gaspar Llamazares submitted his resignation. During the aforementioned 
assembly the internal struggles inside the IU rendered the election of a new General 
Coordinator impossible (Heilig, 2012, p. 261). Nevertheless, the new Executive 
Bureau of the IU managed to elect Cayo Lara, a PCE member, as the new General 
Coordinator. Immediately after his election, Lara sought to emphasize on IU’s 
autonomy from the PSOE. As a result, he immediately dissolved the strategic alliance 
between the IU and the ruling PSOE. Following this very important change regarding 
its strategy, the IU entered the a of the financial crisis that started gravely affecting the 
Member States of the EU20 ever since 2010. 
 
g. IU in the Era of the Crisis 
 
 Prior to the legislative election of November 2011, Spain found itself badly hit by the 
global financial crisis. Indeed, together with Portugal, Ireland, and Greece, the Spanish 
economy was gradually collapsing. As noted by Heilig (2012), “the boom of the 
preceding years was long past; and, it had in case stood on feet of clay” (Heilig, 2012, 
p. 270). The construction and real estate sectors of the Spanish economy were heavily 
involved in the surge of the financial and stock markets in the early 2000s. As a result, 
the global crisis brought about the popping of the real estate bubble in Spain, which 
in turn produced several dramatic consequences for the country’s banking sector. 
According to the Spanish Central Bank, the sum of outstanding mortgages in the 
Spanish economy amounted to 176 billion Euros (Heilig, 2012, p. 270). This resulted 
in thousands of evictions affecting Spanish citizens. In addition to the rising number 
of evictions, Spanish society was witnessing the second highest unemployment rate21. 
                                                
20 The peripheral Member States of the Eurozone were particularly exposed to the effects of the global 
financial crisis. 
21 Second only to Greece according to the data provided by Eurostat. For more see (Eurostat, 2015). 
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Indeed, currently Spain’s unemployment rate is equal to 22,5 per cent, with youth 
unemployment rising well above 50 per cent (Eurostat, 2015).  
 The effects of the financial crisis were addressed with a series of austerity measures 
brought about by the PSOE government. Following the remedy proposed by the troika 
in Greece and Portugal, Spain sought to create revenue by aggressively cutting public 
sector services and welfare. Concurrently, a series of drastic changes in salaries, 
pensions, and retirement requirements were introduced. This resulted in a sharp rise 
in the percentage of Spanish citizens living well beyond the poverty line22. The 
austerity measures imposed to Spanish society created a wave of protests and created 
the necessary conditions for the electoral rise of the IU commencing with the 
legislative elections in November 2011. The May 15th Movement, also known as the 
indignados, initially constituted the necessary platform for the electoral rise of the IU 
after the devastating performance during the 2008 legislative elections.  
 The decline of the PSOE and the growing assimilation of its policies to the ones 
proposed by the Popular Party’s (PP) Mariano Rajoy created the necessary space for 
the rebuilding of the IU as an alternative to the mainstream political parties. Indeed, 
the IU pressed on the importance of defending society from the neoliberal attack on 
the welfare state and the subsequent effects that this was producing for the Spanish 
people. In fact, the IU sought to involve itself with the protest movements taking place 
in Spain’s biggest cities. As argued by Heilig (2012), “this was not just cheap 
campaign publicizing, but rather included a serious involvement of the Spanish protest 
movement by the parliamentary left, as was shown by the process of drafting the 
party’s electoral programme. In the strict sense, it was not an electoral programme at 
all, but rather a call to the voters by the IU to “struggle against the crisis and mobilize 
for a social alternative and for true democracy” (Heilig, 2012, p. 271). This process of 
inclusion of the broad protest movements in the shaping of IU’s response to the 
Spanish crisis produced the document known as the Seven Revolutions of the United 
Left. Said document will be analysed in the following section of the present chapter.  
  Following this drastic change vis-à-vis the party’s electoral strategy, the IU managed 
to regain its previous vote share. Indeed, the IU achieved 6.92%, electing 11 MPs 
(Ministerio Interior, 2011). This electoral success was therefore able to “reinforce 
                                                
22 Data presented by Heilig (2012, p.270) suggest a figure close to 21.8% of Spaniards living below the 
poverty line. 
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[Lara’s] position in the IU, and he is now more than ever the unchallenged leader of 
the party” (Heilig, 2012, p. 261). The IU managed to return to its previous electoral 
results receiving an impressive 10,03 per cent during the Elections for the EP in 2014. 
Nevertheless, the party’s electoral momentum was in a sense thwarted by a novel 
political formation. Ever since January 2014, the Spanish protest movement, 
consolidated into a political formation bearing the name of Podemos. In fact, Podemos 
managed to achieve a spectacular 7.98 per cent during the aforementioned Elections 
for the EP in May 2014 (Ministerio Interior, 2014), just four months after its creation. 
Ever since its initial electoral success, Podemos has been polling spectacularly high. 
For instance, a poll published by the Spanish newspaper El Pais in November 2014, 
Podemos was found to be the most popular party in Spain gaining a 27.7 per cent of 
the vote share (Garea, 2014). Contrary to the positive trend involving Podemos, the 
IU entered a downward spiral according to the majority of polls published in Spanish 
media. The relationship between Podemos and IU and its importance for IU’s stance 
will be analysed in depth during the following chapter and most specifically the 
section relating to party competition.  
 The parties, thus, did not join forces and ran separate electoral campaigns in light of 
the 2015 general election. The electoral results produced a very fragmented parliament 
that resulted in the inability to form a stable government. The IU’s electoral 
perfomance was abysmal as it only managed to secure 3.68% electing only 2 MPs 
(Ministerio Interior, 2015). Following the inability to form a government, new 
elections were announced for June 2016. It is important to note here that, given the 
negative trend of the IU’s electoral influence and despite the initial hesitation 
demonstrated in regard to a coalition between the IU and Podemos23, the two parties 
decided to run a joint electoral campaign bearing the name Unidos Podemos24 
[Together We Can]. Despite forming this electoral coalition, the two parties did not 
manage to secure the expected electoral result, mainly due to the high degree of 
polarisation and  the electoral reemergence of PSOE. Indeed, the coalition secured 
13.42% and elected 45 MPs, PSOE, 22.63%, and PP, 33.01% (Ministerio Interior, 
2016). Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if the coalition will remain in place in the 
                                                
23 Indeed, both parties were very much hesitant to join forces. In fact, Podemos declined an invitation 
to join the wide coalition that the IU had created during the 2015 Electoral Campaign. 
24 Here the name is clearly a combination of the two parties’ names. 
 97 
future or it will prove yet another short-term coalition as was the case several times in 
the European Left’s history. 
 In an attempt to conclude on the IU’s historical path, we could argue the following. 
Firstly, the Spanish left similar to the left in the other European countries under study 
here underwent major transformations and divisions following the late 1960s. In 
addition to the divisions created inside the European left during the aforementioned 
period, the Spanish left was heavily affected by the events of the Civil War as well as 
the Franco dictatorship. Secondly, the PCE’s subsequnet Eurocommunist turn cleared 
the path for further divisions and breaks inside the Spanish left. Concurrently, the 
party’s Eurocommunist turn rendered the party much more open and prone to form 
broader coalitions both at a European level, see for instance the creation of the EL, as 
well as at a national one. Thirdly, the IU’s choice to support a social democratic 
government confirmed the trend that views RLPs exiting such a period with substantial 
electoral losses25. Nevertheless, the IU managed to regain its electoral strenght 
especially in the aftermath of the grave financial crisis affecting the country ever since 
2010. The IU’s path towards a successful path similar to the one witnessed for Syriza 
in Greece was thwarded arguably by the creation of Podemos26.   
                                                
25 Another similar instance will be encountered in the following chapter involving the Italian 
Rifondazione Comunista. 
26 A very compelling illustration of such a trend can be viewed in a graph published by El Pais available 
here, El Pais (2015). 
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2. IU’s Stance Towards the EU Over Time 
 
a. Introduction 
 
To be able to assess IU’s stance towards the European edifice, the present thesis will 
apply the Johansson and Raunio’s theoretical framework. The timeframe will involve, 
as per the other case studies, the period following the creation of the EL in December 
2004 until the present day. The aforementioned framework relates to the close study 
of seven conditioning factors: party ideology, public opinion, party factionalism, 
leadership change, party competition, transnational links and finally the integration 
process per se constitute the factors under investigation here.  Notwithstanding the 
wide number of political formations that make up the IU, the present thesis treats the 
IU as a single political unit. The interaction between its various members will be dealt 
with during the analysis of the party factionalism factor. 
 
b. Ideology 
 
To assess the ideology factor in IU’s stance towards the EU several party documents 
produced during the party’s congresses will be analysed in depth. The analysis will 
commence with the political resolution of the party’s 8th congress that was held in 
December 2004. In addition to this, the political documents produced by the party’s 
9th and 10th Congresses held in 2008 and 2012 respectively, as well as the assembly 
for the restructuring of the left held in 2010 will be taken into account. As illustrated 
in the previous historical section of this chapter, the IU is the outcome of several chain 
reactions inside the Spanish left. The spring of 1969, the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, and the end of the Cold War served as a catalyst that led to several important 
breaks inside the Western European Communist movement. The IU, same as Syriza, 
became a coalition of the forces of the so-called new left united especially by their 
absolute rejection of Stalinism and the critical stance towards the so-called existing 
socialism.  
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IU’s VIII Congress 
 
The first document under analysis here is the outcome of the 8th extraordinary congress 
of the IU held in December 2004. The very first page of the document under study 
here presents us a clear ideological message. Indeed, it clearly read, “for a united left 
that is red, green, feminist, federalist, and republican” (IU, 2004, p. 1), an enumeration 
of all the constitutive elements of the new left: communist past, ecological dimension, 
struggles for gender equality. To these two traditional elements, the IU added two that 
are arguably related to the Spanish psyche; federalism as a means of representation of 
the various identities that make up for the Spanish people, and republicanism as 
opposed to monarchy. The document initially addressed the electoral crisis that 
affected the party for the first time after its creation back in 198627. In fact, the opening 
statement clearly mentioned that the IU “called this extraordinary congress to address 
to a situation of crisis. Evidence of such a crisis has been seen with all its cruelty in 
the latest clearly negative electoral results, which present a menace for our institutional 
representation and our social presence that serves as a guarantor for a political space 
for a left that is necessary, critical, alternative, and aims to transformations” (IU, 2004, 
p. 3). The document called for an inclusive debate amongst the progressive forces of 
the left, an open and public discussion, which would render the IU the reference point 
for all the political movements of the left alternative.  
 The party’s political manifesto commenced by addressing the issues of social and 
environmental crisis, as well as the war in Iraq launched by the US and its allies at the 
time of the party’s congress. This first part of the document finds the IU critically 
assessing the role of the US, EU, and Southeast Asia following the end of the bipolar 
world order. The IU saw the process of globalisation as “a predatory and destructive 
neo-imperialism that brings our planet to the edge of an abyss of social exclusion, 
environmental degradation, and political authoritarianism” (IU, 2004, p. 6). The IU 
presented itself as a force of social transformation of emancipation and socialism that 
seeks the active participation and struggle of the peoples and the socio-political 
organisations that it represents. The neoliberal and authoritarian nature of the process 
known as globalisation created the necessary conditions for the intensification of the 
                                                
27 For the electoral results, see the graph present in the opening section of this chapter. 
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class struggle between workers and the capital. Following this, the IU concluded that 
Friedrich Engels’ words had never been as relevant as they were at that moment. 
Indeed, following both Engels and the IU “the world is at a crossroad; Socialism or 
Barbarism” (IU, 2004, p. 6).  
 Indeed, the document under study presents several assertions and arguments that 
outline the party’s ideological identity. Traditional Marxist tools of analysis, such as 
the class struggle, are used. Indeed, the IU accepted the Marxist dictum that views the 
“[…] history of humanity is the history of class struggles” (IU, 2004, p. 57). 
Nevertheless, the IU finds that the orthodox model of a party in the vanguard of 
working class28 is currently outdated. Indeed, the IU supports that “in the field of 
struggle there is a need for a plurality of political and social subjects that express a 
vocation for real change […] we insist there is not and will never be a singular subject 
of transformation” (IU, 2004, p. 17). Nevertheless, the working-class movement is the 
key element for the professed socialist transformation. “The working-class movement 
is the key of the transformation of the society. The workers have the production in 
their hands, they have the power to provoke a historic turnaround, and they are the 
ones that will manage the construction of a new economic order; the democratic 
planning of production” (IU, 2004, p. 19). The IU emphasized once again the 
importance of the socialist ideal when it asserts that “we do not forget, that the 
objective of the revolution, is the disappearance of the capitalist system and the 
creation of an alternative social system in its place” (IU, 2004, p. 20).  
 The party carried on an in-depth analysis of the significance of socialism for the 
contemporary society. Indeed, the party openly argued in favour of a socialist society. 
Socialism is, thus, seen as a response to the alleged inevitability of the worsening 
working conditions, the rising unemployment, and ecological destruction (IU, 2004, 
p. 55). The party believed that “if we can learn from the rich experience of the 
international labour movement in these last years, of the successes and failures, 
socialism is an alternative able to connect with the aspirations of many people” (IU, 
2004, p. 55). To substantiate its claim, the IU presented some interesting data provided 
by an opinion poll in Germany. Indeed, “in a poll that took place in Germany, 76% of 
the interviewees that used to live in the former German Democratic Republic (DDR) 
                                                
28 And consequently, the singular political subject that would bring about the social transformation and 
revolution. 
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think that socialism is a good idea that has been badly applied. The same thing is 
believed by 51% of those living in the German Federal Republic” (IU, 2004, p. 55). 
The critical approach to the former states of existing socialism is being emphasized in 
the party’s assertion that “socialism and democracy will only be complete, and will 
work, if they are inseparably united” (IU, 2004, p. 57).  
 The IU called for a social reaccreditation of the struggle for socialism. It moved, thus, 
in the opposite direction of the mainstream opinion regarding the end of history. The 
party, indeed, believes that the bloc of the real existing socialism committed errors 
and produced deformations. Nevertheless, the IU considered that the propaganda of 
the ‘unitary thought’ based precisely on those errors has extended the idea that 
capitalism is a one-way road. Consequently, the idea of socialism is rendered 
“politically impossible, historically non-viable, and morally undesirable” (IU, 2004, 
p. 7). The IU concluded that the propaganda of the unitary thought can be divided in 
two groups. On the one hand, the moderate one views the IU as representing “[…] a 
failed project […]” (IU, 2004, p. 7). On the other hand, the most aggressive 
propaganda views the IU as being “[…] part of the horrors and tyrannies of the 20th 
Century” (IU, 2004, p. 7). In this hostile political context, the IU affirms that the need 
for reaccrediting socialism is of great importance. Said importance is rendered timelier 
by the social and ecological crisis that according to the party is affecting the world.  
 According to the IU, the crisis affecting the world had entered a new phase in the 
post-9/11 era. Indeed, the party noted that this era has seen the “masters of 
globalisation changing their strategy, becoming masters of war inside global 
neoliberalism” (IU, 2004, p. 10). “Militarism and the recourse to force to impose an 
‘a-la Carte globalisation’, is a globalisation without limits and that is the preferred 
strategy of the extreme right in the US and the new right in Europe” (IU, 2004, p. 10). 
The consequences of this swift change in the ideological nature of globalisation are, 
according to the IU, multiple. Indeed, the party claimed that “the consequences of the 
primacy of this model have produced an increasing deterioration of democracy, as 
well as civil liberties” (IU, 2004, p. 10). Concurrently, the US is seen by the IU as the 
leading force of a globalising imperialism that “has actively acted to thwart any 
advancement of equality, justice, environmental protection, or disarmament […] this 
globalising imperialism is an unprecedented threat, both for its ideological 
aggressiveness, as well as for its destructive capacity” (IU, 2004, p. 11). This changing 
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environment has brought about the destructive, according to the IU, war in Iraq, which 
the party decides to treat separately in the proceeding part of its political decision.  
 The IU heavily criticised the war against Iraq waged by the US with the active support 
of Aznar29. The massive protest movement against the war echoed, according to the 
IU, a broader message. Indeed, the IU “[…] recognises, one more time, that the 
resistance and the mobilisations have marked the limits of patience of broader sectors 
that begin to perceive that between the messages of fear and insecurity hides the 
hidden agenda of the iron surgeon of liberalisations, privatisations, social 
precariousness, and repression” (IU, 2004, p. 11). This created an opportunity for the 
left that could bring about “[…] a new accumulation of forces and resistance 
movements. The concretion [of these forces], one way or the other, could open new 
possibilities” (IU, 2004, p. 11).  
 In the proceeding part of its political decision, the IU treated the issue of the EU. The 
title clearly echoes the party’s position on the European edifice. Indeed, it reads 
“contesting the model according to which Europe is being constructed” (IU, 2004, p. 
12). According to the party, the referendums that took place in various European 
countries, as well as the very low turnout during the elections for the EP constitute a 
turning point. The EU “cannot be seen in the same way […] both data [turnout, 
referendum results] signal that almost the majority of the European citizenry finds 
itself in the margin of the process of the European construction […] considering those 
results and other data, it appears evident that we are facing an important crisis of 
legitimacy of current way of constructing the EU” (IU, 2004, p. 12). The IU interpreted 
those events as verifying their long-standing position regarding the EU. The document 
reads clearly that “it appears obvious that the result reinforces our assertion that a 
social, economic, and political re-foundation of the project of European integration is 
an absolute necessity” (IU, 2004, p. 12).  
 Following the criticism of the path that the process of European integration has taken, 
the IU drew several rather negative conclusions from the election of Barroso as the 
President of the European Commission (EC). The party viewed Barroso’s election as 
“[…] very bad news for the construction of Europe” (IU, 2004, p. 12). The 
understanding between the European socialists and liberals that led to Barroso’s 
election anticipates, according to the IU, an antisocial European agenda. This 
                                                
29 At the time the Spanish PM. 
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antisocial agenda is made of the core requirements of neoliberalism. “More flexibility, 
more liberalisations, more insecurity, less labour and union rights, less social policies, 
more incentives for the sacking of the social state” (IU, 2004, p. 12) constitute those 
core requirements according to the IU. The party concluded that this agenda revealed 
“[…] an increasing politicisation of the EC without having put in place the necessary 
requirements for its complete democratic control” (IU, 2004, p. 12).  
 The party intensified its critique towards the European edifice in the proceeding part 
that refers to the referendums relating to the Constitutional treaty of the EU. Indeed, 
the IU underlined that the majority of the European peoples are right to oppose such a 
project. The party, indeed, considered that it is necessary “to reopen a new type of 
constitutional process that would promote the participation of the citizenry” (IU, 2004, 
p. 12). In addition to this, the IU believed that the low turnout during the elections for 
the EP across Europe clearly signifies the people’s indifference. Moreover, the IU 
found that the Maastricht Treaty signified the beginning of a “process of integration 
with huge imbalances and asymmetries: a process structurally anchored on the 
democratic deficit; profoundly neoliberal and economist; [a process] that 
compromises the ecological health of the planet” (IU, 2004, p. 13). As a result, the IU 
declared that “this is not the Constitution that Europe needs and it is not the 
Constitution that the alternative left can even critically support. As a result, we propose 
a negative vote in the referendum that will take place in Spain. And we will make our 
best efforts so that this would be a coordinated opinion across the EU” (IU, 2004, p. 
14).  
  The document summarised the party’s position towards the EU in the following 
motto, “Yes to Europe, but not this way” (IU, 2004, p. 14). The IU, thus, declared that 
it will work at a European level “[…] both via its presence in the EL as well as closely 
to the Party of the European Left in order to create bridges of convergence inside the 
traditional left and the alternative and ecological left that will strengthen the cohesion 
of a transformatory, European, and Europeanist left” (IU, 2004, p. 14). The party’s 
Europeanism is evident once again when it declares that “if we do not dream of Europe 
we will not be able to dream of the political future of our societies” (IU, 2004, p. 14). 
An assertion clearly showing how the IU views the EU as a political and social reality 
that cannot and should not be negated a priori. It is, thus, the role of the Europeanist 
left to work towards creating the necessary conditions that will radically transform the 
European edifice. A Union that “[…] could be configured as a counterweight of social, 
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ecological, egalitarian, and solidary front to neoliberal globalisation; an EU that 
strengthens the areas of participation and democratic decision-making; a solidary 
Europe with the peoples and regions that are more in need in the planet; an EU that 
recognises women’s rights; an EU open to integration, miscegenation, and 
multiculturalism” (IU, 2004, p. 15). The IU, consequently, will be an integral part of 
the efforts for creating an EU founded on democracy and socialism, where its peoples 
and the European workers will really have the control […]” (IU, 2004, p. 59). The 
party’s Europeanism is thus founded on its conviction that any significant change can 
be achieved through the “unity of the working class in every country and at an 
international level, with a socialist programme that will create a formidable social 
force” (IU, 2004, p. 58). For the IU, this unity cannot be achieved by negating the 
primary field of class struggle, which currently is the EU, but by coordinating the 
efforts of all the political subjects that argue for socialism. 
 
IU’s IX Congress 
 
The path towards the party’s ninth Congress was paved by a political document 
produced some months prior to it, in June 2008. At the time, Europe has had a first 
glimpse of one of the most severe financial crisis of its history. Nevertheless, at the 
time of the document under study here the effects were solely visible in the other side 
of the Atlantic Ocean. Concurrently, the party was already undergoing a substantive 
process of self-criticism regarding primarily its support to the government led by the 
social democrats of Zapatero. Indeed, the document’s title reflects the identity crisis 
that the party was going through. As the title reads, “for an anti-capitalist, republican, 
federal, and alternative United Left, organised as a political and social movement: 
republic, federal state and socialism in the 21st Century” (IU, 2008, p. 1). The 
document exerts sharp criticism to the party’s leadership. Said criticism will be dealt 
with in relation to the party factionalism factor of the thesis’ framework. 
 The document produced in 2008 reiterates the party’s core ideological positions 
regarding the importance of struggle against neoliberalism and for socialism. Indeed, 
the party’s positions are strengthened by the financial meltdown of several American 
banks and the crisis that those events produced for the global economy. The party, 
thus, concluded that the current phase of capitalism had produced several negative 
consequences. “Firstly, the increasing separation between the financial-monetary 
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aspects and the real aspects of the economy, secondly, the structural weakening of the 
regulatory instruments of the state, thirdly, the vertiginous increase of inequalities, a 
consequence of the application of policies that favour the interests of the financial 
capital” (IU, 2008, p. 6). Notwithstanding the changing nature of capitalist production, 
the IU remained faithful to the Marxist analysis. As such, the party found that the real 
“problem, either one recognises it or not, is capitalism and its logic of processes of 
accumulation and reproduction” (IU, 2008, p. 6).  
 The changing nature of the capitalist mode of production and its neoliberal leitmotif 
is found by the IU to have influenced the Lisbon Treaty to a great extent. Indeed, the 
IU heavily criticized the EU for having lost a historical opportunity to “elaborate a 
Constitution that would serve as an example at an international level promoting 
primarily human rights, peace and freedom, quality full employment, social 
protection, public services, and the power of public intervention in the economy in the 
context of sustainable development” (IU, 2008, p. 8). Consequently, the treaty was 
found to place the interests of predator capitalists above the interests and rights of the 
European citizens. Given the highly neoliberal turn of the EU, the IU believes that it 
is of paramount importance to “develop a political subject able to construct a social 
and political alternative to the Europe of merchants and capital” (IU, 2008, p. 20).  
 The EL constitutes “the hope and the nucleus, barely embryonic, of a [political] force 
that emerges with the will to become the political reference of the left in Europe” (IU, 
2008, p. 20). Nevertheless, the IU found that the current structure of the EL is not able 
to produce the necessary results of pan-European coordination. The IU, thus, found 
that “[the EL] requires a radical change in order to assume a less rigid organisational 
pattern: it cannot pretend to be a party that tries to unite the party-members that are 
representatives of the ideological plurality of the left” (IU, 2008, pp. 20-21). The IU 
firmly believed that the EL is the necessary vehicle for the coordination of concrete 
policies at a European level. Said policies were meant to demonstrate to the European 
peoples that the problems affecting the EU, affect us all. In addition to this, the IU 
believed that there is an increasing need for a wider inclusion of social movements 
under the organisational umbrella of the EL. The primary objective of all those efforts 
was “to place the idea of a new socialism in the political agenda, that will serve as a 
compass for the future. Our conviction is that in order to exit the current crisis of the 
Left we need to create an antagonistic [political] subject” (IU, 2008, p. 22). This 
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antagonistic political subject should, according to the IU, be open to the multiple social 
movements that struggle for an alternative to capitalism. 
IU’s Refounding Congress 
 
 In 2010, the severe consequences of the financial crisis had already hit the Spanish 
economy and society. As a result, the IU sought to open the debate regarding the 
party’s strategy aimed on “creating alternatives, constructing a movement, and 
refounding the left” (IU, 2010a), a motto that the party’s document, thought to address 
to the wider Spanish left, thus placing it on its first page. The party finds that the 
dramatic turn of the capitalist crisis and the subsequent social mobilisations are 
demanding for a refoundation of its political program.  
 The IU asserted that “saving the social conquests, reconstructing the yearning of a 
democratic and egalitarian Europe, and committing to fight and mobilise society for a 
real alternative, is today the essential objective of an alternative left” (IU, 2010a, p. 
2). This alternative relates to the overthrow of capitalism, which according to the IU 
was at the time entering its most destructive phase. The severe financial crisis was 
presented as a direct consequence of capitalism’s destructive stage. The party declared 
that the people “[…] will not pay their crisis” (IU, 2010a, p. 3). Therefore, the crisis 
does not, according to the IU, belong to the people. The true authors of the crisis are 
none others than the European social democrats and conservatives, who regardless of 
their alleged ideological differences managed to create the so-called Brussels 
consensus. The IU believed that the left should respond to this ‘unholy’ alliance by 
creating a “very wide social and political alliance, searching for a social anti-capitalist 
alternative […]” (IU, 2010a, p. 4). Moreover, the IU viewed the agenda for a change 
for a social Europe produced by the EL as an important step towards the creation of 
such an alternative.  
 Regarding the process of European integration, the IU considered that Europe was at 
that specific time at a crossroads. The party declared that it “[…] wants more and not 
less Europe” (IU, 2010a, p. 5). It reiterated its complete opposition to the neoliberal 
leitmotif of the current European edifice. Indeed, the party stated that “we were 
pioneers in unmasking the neoliberal bases of the EU’s construction” (IU, 2010a, p. 
5). Commencing with the Maastricht Treaty, which according to the IU constituted 
the beginning of the end of the European project, and ending up with the Lisbon 
Treaty, the IU heavily criticized the undemocratic nature of the current EU. 
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Notwithstanding the heavy criticism towards the EU, the party underlined that the 
alternative to the present model can only be achieved at a European level. Indeed, the 
party stated that “it is imperative that we surpass the national divisions of the popular 
classes and articulate a European response. The prospect of a general mobilisation at 
said scale is no longer a chimera, but a hopeful possibility” (IU, 2010a, p. 6). The party 
then adopted the Social Agenda for Europe as presented by the EL, and stated that it 
is the EL that should pave the way towards the building of a front that will work for 
the survival of the European peoples. It is clear thus that the IU views the crisis in 
Europe as being part of the neoliberal project that commenced with the Maastricht 
Treaty. The party’s Europeanism leads it to assert that there could be no national path 
towards the overthrow of capitalism. This assertion clearly demarcates the IU from 
the Eastern Communist movement. With regards to the notion of the Eastern 
Communist movement, the present thesis follows Domenico Losurdo’s (2014) 
division between those parties that remained loyal to the CPSU until the dissolution 
of the USSR and continued to carry on the ideological legacy of the USSR. Indeed, 
those parties, such as the KKE in Greece, have a critical yet supportive stance towards 
the socialist experiments of the 20th century. Something that completely separates 
them from the parties under study in the present thesis, which are united by their 
complete negation of Stalinism and their critical stance towards the USSR and the 
Eastern Socialist Republics.   
 Following this opening statement of the IU, the party’s document presents six axes 
for a new political program. The first one relates to the alternatives that the left can 
give to the crisis. The second axis involves a new economic model that would promote 
ecological sustainability. The third axis regards social rights and public services. The 
fourth relates to political rights, democratic participation, federalism, and the republic. 
The fifth regards feminism. The sixth and final one engages with internationalism, the 
EU, and international solidarity. Regarding the first axis, the IU uses Marxist tools to 
provide an analysis of the crisis. Indeed, the party argued that “it is a crisis of 
overproduction that is manifested essentially as a financial crisis that, at the same time, 
functions as a catalyst for the worsening of the real economy’s crisis” (IU, 2010b, p. 
5). It then carries on with an attack to the austerity measures that the government has 
imposed to the people. For the IU said measures serve for nothing else than “[…] 
amplifying the guarantees of the financial speculators […]” (IU, 2010b, p. 5).  
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 The IU declared that its objective is to “[…] construct a different society that will 
surpass capitalism, and that we call socialism of the 21st Century. This new model of 
production is, essentially, a program of transition towards this society” (IU, 2010b, p. 
10). The IU argued that the working class should be the epicentre of this alternative 
model of production. Indeed, the party asserts that “[…] the workers must form part 
of the new relations of production […]” (IU, 2010b, p. 12). More specifically the party 
believed that the law should “recognise the right of workers to participate in the 
management of companies as well as in the distribution of their surplus” (IU, 2010b, 
p. 12). This novel model of production is not, according to the IU, a chimera. It is “a 
series of real elements that develop in neighbouring countries, if it were not so we 
would be condemned to face more cyclical capitalist crises that every time will be 
more profound” (IU, 2010b, p. 12). This final assertion constitutes one more indication 
of the party’s acceptance of the traditional tools of Marxist analysis, while revealing 
the party’s clear anti-capitalist ideological nature.  
 Finally, the party’s final axis presents several important assertions and arguments as 
to its European strategy. The severe consequences of the crisis to the social model of 
Europe lead the IU to appeal for the intensification of the process towards the creation 
of a pan-European agenda. Indeed, the party stated that “within the context of the EL 
and the GUE/NGL it will be possible to accelerate the creation of a convergent social 
force able to stop the frontal attack to the European social model, as well as to the 
social and territorial cohesion of the EU” (IU, 2010b, p. 47). In addition to this, the IU 
stated that the EL was in need to undergo a process of self-criticism, that would permit 
the party to “convert itself to a useful instrument for organising a vast social 
convergence of the European forces interested not only in resisting the antisocial 
effects of the treaties, but also to construct, disseminate, defend an alternative that will 
readjust the European construction towards the interest of the European peoples and 
their well-being, based on a different political and economic architecture” (IU, 2010b, 
p. 48). 
 
IU’s X Congress 
 
 The final political document under study is constituted by the party’s political 
decision as presented at its tenth congress in December 2012. The continuing 
devastating effects of the crisis on the Spanish economy, as well as the intensification 
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of the mobilisations against the government’s austerity measures led the IU to appeal 
for “transforming the mobilisation in organisation, the rebelliousness in alternative, 
and the alternative to power” (IU, 2012a, p. 1). Indeed, the party painted a rather 
negative picture regarding the measures imposed to the Spanish government by the 
troika, made of the IMF, EC, and the ECB. It finds that the measures imposed have 
played a major role in the deepening of the crisis.  
 The party reiterated its harsh criticism of the EU, which was viewed as being based 
on the neoliberal axioms of market deregulation and privatisation. Indeed, it stated 
that “this EU is not useful. For this reason, it is necessary that we refound [the EU], to 
put it to the service of the people and not of the markets. We demand the democratic 
control over the European Central Bank (ECB) and the immediate elimination of tax 
havens inside the EU” (IU, 2012a, p. 2). At this point, the IU demonstrates another 
utilisation of Marxist thought in its attempt to analyse the crisis and propose its 
alternative. Indeed, the document stated that “they want to make us believe that the 
economy handles wealth, and politics handles power, as if they were separate things. 
We know that this is not true and we demand the democratisation of both public life 
and the economy in the same direction: change the economic relationships to end the 
exploitation of the working-class majority by a minority, with a sustainable production 
model” (IU, 2012a, p. 2).  
 The party’s economic document followed the footsteps of previous congress 
resolutions. Indeed, the crisis was viewed once again as “global systemic crisis, based 
on a crisis of overproduction, characterised by a decrease in the rate of profits and, 
consequently, a [capital] accumulation, and not a mere financial crisis” (IU, 2012b, p. 
2). The IU, thus, showed a certain continuity in utilising Marxist tools of analysis in 
its political documents. Something that is evident in its assertion that the contradiction 
between capital and working class is a central factor in its professed alternative. 
Indeed, the party’s political document clearly reads that “an essential factor of our 
analysis is the contradiction between capital and working class seen as a central factor 
that articulates the rest of the [capitalist] contradictions, and the verification that the 
problem of political power is linked to this contradiction, in the way of production and 
the procurement of the surplus” (IU, 2012b, p. 2).  
 The party carried on an in-depth analysis of the crisis affecting the European 
periphery. In said analysis the IU asserted that “the sovereign debt crisis is the crisis 
of the euro. It was the European economic forces and the collusion between the social 
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democrats and the conservatives that imposed the euro and configured a Eurozone and 
the institutions that assure the neoliberal model. The euro, far from being a common 
currency, is a mere means of exchange that generates contradictions insurmountable 
without a common fiscal policy and without convergence in the economic policy” (IU, 
2012b, p. 4). Due to these issues affecting the Eurozone ever since its creation, the EU 
has been unable to respond to the crisis. Instead, the EU via the troika has imposed 
several harsh austerity measures to the countries of the European South. Those 
measures were, according to the IU, against the “[…] workers, against the peoples, 
and against the nations” (IU, 2012b, p. 5).  
 Against the imposition of austerity, the IU argued that the only possible exit from the 
crisis is through a new model of production. According to the party, the measures 
applied during the crisis of 1929 are insufficient, as they “[…] were merely refounding 
the capitalist system” (IU, 2012b, p. 15). Instead of said measures of a Keynesian 
logic, the IU proposed “a new alternative model of production in a new society that 
will be an advanced social and political, participatory, and egalitarian democracy, in 
which it will be possible to proceed towards a socialist system” (IU, 2012b, p. 15). In 
this direction, the IU proposed “nationalising the banking sector and other strategic 
economic sectors […] the society will not exit the crisis by returning to the social 
democratic recipes, but by surpassing the [capitalist] system” (IU, 2012b, p. 15). The 
party continued its sharp criticism to social democracy by declaring that “capitalism 
is in crisis and we must seek an alternative; it is a matter of questioning and surpassing 
capitalism, not fixing it or refounding it, or giving it a more human face. The crisis did 
not bring exploitation, this is inherent to all phases of capitalism and it is being 
produced also in times of growth” (IU, 2012b, p. 29). It becomes, thus, almost evident 
that the deepening crisis affecting the EU has strengthened the Marxist analysis of the 
IU. The party’s distinct internationalism, in the form of Europeanism, is evident once 
again when the IU states that “we are conscious that the measures we propose cannot 
succeed if they are not applied at the level of the EU. For this reason, the tenth 
Congress has agreed on a complete alternative for Europe that requires the 
mobilisation of unions and parties as well as the coordination of unions and alternative 
left political forces” (IU, 2012b, p. 30).  
 The party’s political document on the other hand represents an attempt to open to the 
various movements that were on the rise inside Spanish society. Especially the 15M 
movement is viewed as “having given additional quality to the mobilisations, to pose 
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the democratic question under primary focus. This could be a significant turn for 
politics” (IU, 2012c, p. 3). From a political point of view, capitalism is viewed as 
having achieved complete domination both at an economical level, as well as at a 
cultural and ideological one (IU, 2012c, p. 6). Said domination has led the European 
project to an undemocratic and absolutist path. Indeed, the IU firmly believes that the 
EU “should be refounded from and for the people” (IU, 2012c, p. 12).  
 The IU sought to re-emphasize the importance of the Maastricht Treaty as the turning 
point for the complete domination of the European project by the neoliberal political 
powers. The subsequent creation of the ECB under its current form is viewed as having 
“[…] lethal consequences for the European citizenry” (IU, 2012c, p. 12). The IU 
asserted that the European peoples have not managed so far to properly respond to this 
hostile takeover of the European project. Nevertheless, it considered that “we find 
ourselves at a point where a significant upturn for the forces of the transforming left 
that undoubtedly signals which direction we need to take. The electoral result of the 
Left Front in France, the expectative [sic] of the Socialist Party in Holland, and above 
all Syriza in Greece, have helped the European peoples visualise that the left can 
provide an alternative to the crisis” (IU, 2012c, p. 13). In addition to these positive 
advancements, the party presented several proposals that would see the European 
project refounded following an alternative direction. The direction proposed by the IU 
is one of a European federation, where “a constitutional process will guarantee the 
coexistence of two sovereignties, the national and the European one, with a parliament 
that will legislate, elect, and control the European government, with a Public Treasury 
and a European Central Bank that will be converted to the federal reserve of the EU” 
(IU, 2012c, p. 13). A federal Europe that will need to have a much stronger social 
dimension, while promoting human rights and peace at an international level.  
 It is precisely for these reasons that the IU ever since its creation has been amongst 
the leading forces of coordination of left anti-capitalist forces in Europe. The IU 
emphasises this element by reiterating the fact that the party has been “[…] among the 
founding members of the EL in 2004 departing from the positive experience of the 
GUE/NGL in the European parliament” (IU, 2012c, p. 14). Subsequently, the IU 
declares its commitment to the agenda for another Europe presented at the latest 
congress of the EL. In addition to this, the party states that “[…] this does not preclude 
the possibility of ameliorating and enriching this [alternative] vision in the next EL 
Congress in Madrid in 2013” (IU, 2012c, p. 15). 
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 The EL’s alternative agenda is utilised once again by the IU when attempting to 
theorise the construction of socio-political bloc against the crisis. Indeed, the IU shares 
the EL’s conclusions as to the effects that the crisis can have regarding Europe’s 
future. The IU, thus, reiterates that “not only are we in front of a crisis: we are in front 
of a situation of rupture that threats the social models and the European democracy as 
we know it […] the Europe that will exit the crisis will not be the same that entered 
the crisis” (IU, 2012c, pp. 35-36). For this reason, it is of paramount importance to 
strengthen the attempts to unite the European alternative left forces. Examples of such 
attempts, such as Syriza in Greece and the Left Front in France are emphasised as 
paving the way forward for Spain. The IU concludes that “it is for the first time in the 
26 years of its history that the IU has the possibility to play such a determinant role in 
such a determinant time for the future of the country” (IU, 2012c, p. 37).  
 
Conclusion 
 
 Concluding on IU’s ideology viewed as a conditioning factor towards the party’s 
stance vis-à-vis the EU, we could argue that the party’s ideological core has played an 
important role. The party’s distinct left Europeanism is a direct by-product of the 
party’s firm negation of the Stalinist dogma on the national paths to socialism. The 
party’s Europeanism can be also viewed as being a constitutive part of 
internationalism, and the Marxist motto appealing for the unity of workers worldwide. 
Thus, the idea of an alternative, socialist Europe has been a constant ideological 
position of the IU ever since its creation in 1986. The party was constantly criticising 
the European architecture, and its neoliberal leitmotif. Ever since the Maastricht 
Treaty, which the party completely opposed, the IU has been intensifying its criticism 
towards the EU. The severe crisis and its effects on both the European and Spanish 
society are viewed by the IU as a verification of their past criticism. Concurrently, the 
IU asserts the need for intensifying the struggle at a European level, as the current 
crisis is posing an existential threat to the European project. Given that the IU views 
Europe as the necessary platform for transcending the national divisions of the 
working classes of the continent, the possibility of a rupture is arguably a scenario to 
be avoided at all costs. Indeed, IU’s internal debate is completely devoid of an in-
extremis Euro-exit, as was the case with the rest of the parties under examination in 
the present thesis. 
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c. Public Opinion 
 
 To be able to assess the role of the Spanish public opinion in IU’s stance vis-à-vis the 
EU, this thesis will make use the data published by the standard Eurobarometer. More 
precisely, the thesis will present a comparative analysis of the measurements from the 
Standard Eurobarometer of fall 2004, 2008, 2013, and 2015. In addition to the reports, 
the present thesis will analyse several interesting findings included in a special report 
regarding the crisis that was published in 2012. The data will be treated initially 
separately. A final comparative analysis of the findings will serve as the conclusion of 
the analysis of the present factor.  
 Commencing with the data relevant to 2004, we come across a very important aspect. 
Indeed, it appears that a big percentage of the Spanish society were rather optimistic 
regarding their future. A total of 41% of the citizenry thought that life in the next 12 
months would be better (EC, 2004a, p. 4). Indeed, the Spanish people scored much 
higher than the EU average of 35%. Another important marker from the 2004 
Eurobarometer relates to the public support of the country’s EU membership. The 
report’s findings show that 72% of the Spanish citizenry views the country’s EU 
membership as something positive (EC, 2004a, p. 12). This places Spain well above 
the EU average of 56%, as well as in the fifth position overall. Indeed, only 
Luxembourg, Ireland, Netherlands, and Belgium scored higher than Spain (EC, 2004a, 
p. 12). This high score is closely related to the fact that the 70% of the Spanish 
citizenry found that the country’s EU membership has benefited the country (EC, 
2004a, p. 14). Moreover, Spanish people appear to place more trust towards the 
European institutions than the EU average. As a matter of fact, 57% appear to have 
faith on the EC, while a higher 64% place their faith on the EP (EC, 2004a, pp. 18-
19). The final marker that will be utilised involves the opinion of the Spanish society 
on globalisation and its effects. Given the emphasis placed by the IU on the negative 
aspects of globalisation as well as the neoliberal leitmotif of the process, it is of great 
importance to see the public perception on the matter. Indeed, it appears as if a great 
percentage of the Spanish society shared IU’s suspiciousness towards globalisation. 
46% of Spanish people thought that globalisation was not something good for Spain 
(EC, 2004a, p. 40). Moreover, 55% of the Spanish citizenry found that globalisation 
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concentrates more power to corporations and big businesses at the expense of the 
people (EC, 2004a, p. 40). 
 Moving onwards to the Eurobarometer of 2008, we come across a rather pessimistic 
picture. Contrary to the mainly optimistic attitude towards the future demonstrated in 
2004, 52% perceives the national economic situation as bad (EC, 2008a, p. 5). 
Concurrently, 39% of the Spanish people considered the employment situation as very 
bad (EC, 2008a, p. 5). Regarding the public opinion’s stance towards the EU, we 
witness a slight decrease both in terms of trust towards the EU, as well as to the 
country’s EU membership. Indeed, a 55% of the Spanish people declared their faith 
in the EU, scoring eight points higher than the EU average of 47% (EC, 2008a, p. 15). 
At the same time, 62% of the Spanish citizenry viewed the country’s EU membership 
as something positive (EC, 2008a, p. 15). Moreover, 45% of the Spanish public 
opinion continued to maintain a relatively positive image of the EU. A percentage that 
is decisively higher than the EU average of 39% (EC, 2008a, p. 27). The slight 
negative trend is being repeated also in terms of confidence towards the EU 
institutions. 52%, 57%, and 50% of the Spanish public opinion declare their faith in 
the EC, the EP, and the ECB respectively (EC, 2008a, p. 32). Evaluating the data 
provided by the 2008 Eurobarometer, we could conclude that there is a slight negative 
turn both in terms of the citizens’ optimism towards the future, as well as in terms of 
their overall stance towards the EU. Nevertheless, the peoples’ overall evaluation of 
the country’s EU membership can be argued to have remained high in comparison to 
most European countries. 
 The severe effects of the global crisis made their first appearance in Spain in 2010, 
rendering the data available for the post-2010 era rather significant. The citizens’ 
perception of the role that the EU has played in tackling those effects will be analysed 
henceforth. The meltdown of the Spanish economy, the rise of unemployment, and the 
imposition of draconian austerity measures by the Spanish government created a series 
of chain reactions in Spanish society. As a result, the analysis of two separate 
Eurobarometers, as well as the special issue of the Eurobarometer on the crisis is 
deemed necessary.  
 In the special issue regarding the crisis published in 2012, we come across some very 
interesting data. Indeed, 69% of the Spanish citizenry found that the EU has been 
totally ineffective in combating the crisis (EC, 2012, p. 19). This constitutes a 
significant increase when compared to the previous year’s finding of 56%.  When 
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asked about the possible measures to combat the crisis, an overwhelming percentage 
of Spanish citizens responded in a way indicating the inclination for more Europe. 
Indeed, 83% view that a stronger coordination of economic policy among EU Member 
States will be effective in tackling the crisis (EC, 2012, p. 26). In addition to this, 81% 
and 80% of the interviewees found that a stronger coordination of economic and 
financial policies among the countries of the euro area, and a more important role for 
the EU in regulating financial services would respectively constitute effective 
measures (EC, 2012, p. 26). Concurrently, the clear majority of the Spanish society 
appears to be favourable towards imposing more taxes to banking institutions, 
regulating rating agencies and taxing financial transactions, as 81%, 75%, and 64% of 
the Spanish interviewees respectively declared their support to such measures imposed 
by the EU (EC, 2012, p. 26). Another important marker relates to EU’s future. Indeed, 
53% of Spanish society feels that the EU will be stronger in the long run (EC, 2012, 
p. 37). Spain scored higher than the EU average, indicating a certain degree of 
optimism among Spanish society. Moreover, 49% of the Spanish citizenry feel closer 
to other EU citizens because of the crisis (EC, 2012, p. 37), something that could relate 
to the continuous appeals for European solidarity by both the IU and the EL. 
 Moving towards the findings of the 2013 Eurobarometer, we come across several 
interesting data. It seems that the deepening of the crisis was provoking further 
decrease in people’s faith in both European and national institutions. As a matter of 
fact, a mere 19% of the Spanish citizenry placed its trust to the ECB. At the same time, 
23% of the Spanish society declared their faith in the EC and the EP (EC, 2013a, p. 
5). This places Spain amongst the countries that tend to mistrust the EU the most. 
Indeed, the EU average of trust towards the ECB, the EC, and the EP is 34%, 35%, 
and 39% respectively (EC, 2013a, p. 5). This negative trend towards the EU’s handling 
of the crisis is being demonstrated in yet another marker. A mere 23% of Spanish 
society finds that the EU is in the right direction in tackling the crisis (EC, 2013a, p. 
8). Once again, Spain scores significantly lower than the EU average of 42% (EC, 
2013a, p. 8). Regardless of this negative evaluation, Spanish citizens view that the EU 
is more able to address the effects of the crisis than the national government (EC, 
2013a, p. 9). It is of some importance to note that Spanish society scored much lower 
than the EU average in respect to the national government’s ability to tackle the crisis. 
Indeed, a mere 17% of the Spanish interviewees believed that the national government 
can present a way out of the crisis.  
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 Regarding the evaluation of measures thought to tackle the crisis, Spanish society 
demonstrates a trend towards Europeanist solutions. Indeed, the Spanish public 
opinion appears to be well above the EU average when asked to evaluate measures 
that relate to extending more powers to European institutions. Indeed, 87% of the 
Spanish interviewees positively evaluated more coordination of economic policies of 
EU Member States, while 84% more coordination of economic and financial policies 
of the Member States of the Eurozone (EC, 2013a, p. 12). Here, Spain’s score is well 
above the EU average of 76% (EC, 2013a, p. 12). Moreover, 79% of Spaniards seemed 
to approve the idea of a European banking union, 73% in favour of governments 
receiving fines by the EU in case of EU economic rules violations, and 62% positively 
viewed the pre-approval by the EU of the national governments’ budgets (EC, 2013a, 
p. 12). On all those markers, Spain scored well above the EU average of 70%, 63%, 
and 58% respectively. This could arguably be a reaction to the general mistrust 
towards the Spanish government, and conversely to the higher trust that the Spaniards 
place in the EU as a supranational institution. Oddly enough, the majority of the 
Spanish citizenry appears to be contrary to the idea of a Europe wide Finance minister. 
Indeed, 48% of the interviewees were favourable to this measure against the EU 
average of 52% (EC, 2013a, p. 12). This could arguably relate to the general mistrust 
towards the current European institutions and the rules that regulate their functions.   
 Finally, an analysis of the data provided by the 2015 Eurobarometer will present us 
with the latest trends in Spanish society. The first marker relates to the evaluation of 
the national economy. Here, the picture painted by the Spanish interviewees is rather 
negative. Indeed, a 93% find that the situation of the economy is bad, when the 
corresponding EU average is of 58% (EC, 2015a, p. 1). The second marker relates to 
the trust or lack thereof towards national and European institutions. Here, the Spanish 
public opinion reiterates its quasi-complete mistrust towards the national government, 
84%, and national parliament, 80% (EC, 2015a, p. 3). At the same time, just over half 
the interviewees, 54%, declared their mistrust towards the EU (EC, 2015a, p. 3). When 
compared to the EU average, Spain’s scores suggest that the mistrust towards the 
national institutions is significantly higher than in the average European member state. 
It is evident that most European citizens distrust their national governments and 
parliaments, but the percentages are of 63% and 62% respectively. This could be 
viewed as a reaction of the Spanish citizenry to the severe effects that the crisis has 
had in their country. In addition to that, it clearly demonstrates that the clear majority 
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of Spanish society holds the national institutions much more responsible for the 
negative effects on their everyday life. Regardless of the very negative picture painted 
by most Spanish citizens, data from the 2015 Eurobarometer indicate a slightly 
optimistic trend. Indeed, it appears as if 56% of the interviewees believe that the crisis 
has reached its peak (EC, 2015a, p. 4). This optimist trend could aid us in explaining 
the slight increase of the EU’s image in the Spanish society. Indeed, 34% of the 
interviewees viewed the EU in a positive manner, against 16% that viewed the EU in 
a negative one (EC, 2015a, p. 5). This signifies an increase of 3% in the positive 
outlook, and conversely a 5% decrease in the negative one in comparison to the 
findings of 2014. It is worthwhile noting that this positive trend brings the Spanish 
scores closer to the EU average.  
 An initial comparative analysis of the data provided by the Eurobarometer suggests 
that Spanish public opinion towards the EU has been greatly influenced by the crisis. 
During the 2008-2013 period, trust towards the EU has been gradually decreasing 
reaching historically low levels, a trend that has been reversed in most recent times. 
This could be viewed as a direct result of the austerity measures imposed to the country 
by the government. Given the role that the EU has played in the imposition of said 
measures, we could argue that the IU’s narrative vis-à-vis the current state of the 
European edifice is coherent with the majoritarian tensions inside Spanish society. As 
demonstrated by the findings of the Eurobarometers, Spaniards seem to have lost their 
faith in both European and national institutions. Nevertheless, the European 
institutions appear to have maintained more respect and trust than their national 
counterparts. This is again coherent to IU’s narrative and the professed 
democratisation of European institutions, and could be seen as a conditioning factor 
in the party’s firm Europeanism. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the Spanish 
society appears to be favourable to Europeanist and even federalist measures 
considered to tackle the crisis. Said findings could lead us to the conclusion that IU’s 
positive and at the same time critical stance towards the EU is compatible with social 
beliefs, especially in the post-crisis era. Indeed, IU’s appeals for more Europe can be 
viewed as echoing the vast majority of Spanish society. The majority of the Spanish 
society, therefore, considers the EU as the only vehicle that could lead the country out 
of the severe crisis. This could explain to an extent the complete lack of the possibility 
of exiting the EU from IU’s internal debate. 
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d. Party Factionalism 
 
 As mentioned in the previous section of the present section, the IU is the outcome of 
a unitary process inside the Spanish radical left that started during the 1986 
referendum on the country’s NATO membership. It is important to note beforehand 
that all IU member parties maintain their autonomy both nationally as well as 
internationally. An example of said autonomy can be seen in PCE’s autonomous 
membership to the EL. The focus of the present section of the thesis will be placed 
upon the two major internal factions of the IU. On one hand, one comes across the 
PCE-led faction. The PCE represents the only member party with nationwide 
organisation, and a long history in Spanish politics. On the other hand, one finds the 
Open IU faction. This faction led by IU’s former Federal Coordinator, Gaspar 
Llamazares, was officially recognised as a political party in 2012, bearing the name 
Open Left (IA). IA became the newest party member of the IU and intends to promote 
its distinct political proposals in the party’s internal debate. The eight founding 
members of the IU were: 
i. The Communist Party of Spain, 
ii. the Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain (PCPE), 
iii. the Socialist Action Party (PASOC), 
iv. the Republican Left (IR), 
v. the Progressive Federation (FP), 
vi. the Carlist Party, 
vii. the Humanist Party, and,  
viii. the Unity Collective of the Workers of Andalusia/Andalusian Leftist Bloc. 
 Nevertheless, it must be noted that all the constituent parties, apart from the PCE and 
the Andalusian Leftist Bloc, left the IU between 1987-2001, only to return after 2001. 
Ever since this era, several smaller leftist political forces have joined the IU. Those 
include the Catalan United and Alternative Left, the left-alternative-Trotskyist 
Alternative Space, the Unity Collective, and the small Trotskyist groups Fourth 
International, New Clarity, Revolutionary Workers Party and Revolutionary Party of 
the Workers/Revolutionary Left (Heilig, 2012, p. 260). Because of the minor status of 
most IU’s party members, the PCE and the IA constitute the major poles of intra-party 
competition. The former appears to represent the more radical, in the sense of anti-
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capitalist, forces, while the latter echoes the positions of those forces that place 
themselves somehow closer to the social-democratic left. Both factions have managed 
influence the direction of the IU during the period under study. Indeed, IA’s Gaspar 
Llamazares was the party’s federal coordinator from 2000-2008, while PCE’s Cayo 
Lara replaced him in December 2008 and remains in this position up until the present 
day. Concurrently, another PCE member30, Alberto Garzon, was elected as IU’s 
secretary of the constituent process of the party and was subsequently elected as the 
candidate PM in the 2015 general elections31. The importance of leadership seen as a 
conditioning factor will be thoroughly analysed in the following section.  
The major point of contention between the two factions present in the IU relate to the 
party’s strategy inside the Spanish political system. Indeed, the influence of the IA led 
the party to a strategic coalition, as well as parliamentary support, of the PSOE 
government led by PM Jose Zapatero. Conversely, when the PCE managed to gain 
greater influence inside the party, the IU opted to emphasize on its autonomy and 
dissolve the alliance with PSOE. Regardless of the dispute over IU’s strategy, the two 
factions share their firm Europeanism and maintain coherent positions vis-à-vis the 
EU. This is evident in the party’s political decisions of both periods. Nevertheless, 
PCE’s era of influence has brought about a much more intense criticism to the 
European edifice32. It should be noted that during the PCE’s IX Congress held in 2009, 
a minority of the party’s members appealed for the withdrawal both from the IU and 
from the European Left Party (Heilig, 2012, p. 266). A clear majority, nevertheless, 
rejected the appeal. Even so, this could serve as an indication of the balance of power 
inside both the IU and the PCE. 
                                                
30 Originating from the Union of the Spanish Communist Youth [Union de Juventudes Comunistas de 
Espana (UJCE)], the politically autonomous youth of the PCE. The UJCE maintains an internal 
organization that bears the characteristics of democratic centralism. Ideologically, it appears to be closer 
to the Eastern Communist Movement than both the PCE and the IU.  
31 This unusual diarchy resembles the era when Alavanos and Tsipras shared the leadership of Syriza 
and Synaspismos respectively. The resemblance between the two cases is rendered even more 
interesting if one is to consider that both Garzon and Tsipras are young politicians that began their 
political careers in the Communist youth.   
32 A more intense criticism that is undoubtedly connected to the detrimental effects that the crisis has 
had on both the Spanish economy and society.  
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 The analysis of the current factor will involve the study of the document of internal 
debate signed by a group of influential party members closer to the PCE. The 
document was published in the aftermath of the elections in 2008, and paved the way 
towards the change in the party’s leadership. Indeed, the document places its emphasis 
on the ideological differences between the two factions by rephrasing the motto 
utilized in previous party documents. In fact, the 2008 document title bears the 
following title: “for an anti-capitalist, republican, federal, and alternative IU, 
organised as a political and social movement” (IU, 2008, p. 1). This motto replaced 
the previous one that read clearly: “for a red, green, feminist, federalist, and republican 
IU” (IU, 2004, p. 1). The title alone arguably summarizes the major points of 
contention between the two factions. Those are constituted by the emphasis on the 
anti-capitalist ideological nature of the party, as well as on the necessary changes so 
that the party can perform its political role.  
 As the signatories of the document state, “the IU finds itself immersed in a deep 
political and organisational crisis that threatens the project for which it [the IU] was 
born, a project that was no other than for it to constitute the space of political and 
social convergence of the ideas and the activists that defend a social alternative to the 
neoliberal, globalising, and dehumanising capitalism that wants to present itself as the 
only viable social alternative” (IU, 2008, p. 1). The document then asserts that the IU 
under the direction of Llamazares was either unwilling or unable to create a discourse 
that could unify the aforementioned forces. Because of these shortcomings, the “IU 
finds itself at the end of a political era in a context that the political, economic, social, 
and cultural conditions render its existence of great importance for Spanish society” 
(IU, 2008, p. 1). In such a context, the PCE-led faction appeals for the necessary 
changes that would enable the party to perform its important political role.  
 The document proceeds with a short evaluation of the previous era. The title read 
clearly, “evaluation of an era: subordination and dissolution of a project” (IU, 2008, 
p. 2). Once again, the title summarises very effectively the core of the PCE-led 
faction’s criticism towards the IA one. Indeed, the PCE-led faction’s analysis finds 
that the choice to support the PSOE campaign in its attempt to defeat the PP was self-
destructive for the IU. “[…] We cannot evaluate positively the discourse suggesting 
that it was so important to provoke the PP’s defeat, that we were ready to sacrifice 
ourselves: the victorious image that the direction of the IU was transmitting in 2004 is 
a clear reflection of this drift that continued when they decided to align with the 
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Zapatero government and form, practically, a parliamentary majority with the PSOE 
government” (IU, 2008, p. 2). According to the signatories of the document, the 
electoral and social defeat of the IU is a direct result of this strategic decision. More 
specifically the document asserts that “[…] the IU has suffered an important electoral 
recoil as a result of a double drain: the useful vote, fruit of the polarisation of 
bipartisanship from which we were not willing or able to protect ourselves, and the 
abstention of an important part of our electoral base as an expression of the rejection 
of a political practice of subordination to the PSOE government, as well as the 
prolonged demobilisation that resulted from the absence of an authentic left-wing 
opposition both institutionally and in the streets” (IU, 2008, p. 3). The PCE-led faction, 
thus, finds that Llamazares, and consequently the IA, has led the party to lose its 
character of autonomous political force, as well as to disconnect from society.  
 The document proceeds with presenting a brief outline of the objectives that the party 
should set. Those are none others than “rebuilding an alternative political force with a 
truly anti-capitalist programme and with the objective to build a socialist society for 
the 21st Century. It is necessary for the IU to recover as a plural and participatory 
Political and Social Movement (MPS) that draws its strength from the mobilisation 
and in the unity of its action. Based on these assumptions we want to build a force 
capable of organising an alternative political subject […] (IU, 2008, p. 4). The PCE 
faction, thus, calls for a significant change in the party’s organisational pattern that 
will give more power to grassroots organisations. It is precisely these organisational 
patterns that the document criticises heavily. Indeed, the document clearly reads, “the 
democratic regeneration of the project [the IU] requires to avoid expressions of 
authoritarianism in its leadership and the recovery of the protagonist role of grassroots 
organisations, as well as the regular function of the organs: the internal division can 
only be surpassed through the respect of the rules of the game, in a way that there will 
be no way for the leadership to behave as a faction that intends to change the project 
itself against the party members” (IU, 2008, pp. 4-5).  
 Therefore, the document paints a rather negative image of the party’s status in the 
aftermath of Llamazares’ leadership. In addition to the strategic and organisational 
shortcomings of the party’s former direction, the PCE-led faction addresses several 
criticisms to the organisational patterns of the EL. With regards to the EL, the PCE-
led faction stresses, as it did with regards to the IU, the importance of “less rigid 
organisational structure” (IU, 2008, pp. 20-21), so that it can perform its role as a 
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political reference of the left in Europe. As the document reads, “[the EL] cannot 
pretend to be a party that will unify the party and political forces-members that are 
representing the ideological plurality of the left” (IU, 2008, p. 21). Following this, we 
can argue that the PCE-led faction views the EL in the same way that it views the IU. 
It firmly believes that it should operate as an umbrella organisation that would 
accommodate interaction between parties of the radical left and the numerous political 
movements that operate both in Europe and Spain.  
 In attempting to evaluate the importance of party factionalism vis-à-vis IU’s stance 
towards the EU, we could reach the following conclusions. IU’s intra-party debate is 
primarily concerned with organisational and to an extent ideological issues. The PCE-
led faction sought to appeal for a significant change to the party’s organisational 
patterns. Indeed, the PCE-led faction sought that the party should function as an 
umbrella organisation. This would enable it to interact with the numerous social and 
political movements and aid in shaping the political object that will bring about the 
overthrow of capitalism and the construction of socialism. The PCE-led faction 
addressed the same criticism towards the EL. It argued, thus, against an attempt to 
unify the Europarty’s party members. Something that would violate the guiding 
principle of plurality in the Eurocommunist left’s tradition. With regards to ideology, 
we could argue that there is a certain degree of convergence and coherence amongst 
the two major factions. Nevertheless, the PCE-led faction appears zealous to 
emphasise on the anticapitalist nature of the party’s ideology. In conclusion, we could 
argue that party factionalism appears less important with regards to IU’s stance 
towards the EU than in the residual case studies of the present thesis, as both factions 
firmly believe that the European project is the most important field of class struggle.  
 
e. Party Leadership 
 
 Moving towards the fourth conditioning factor on IU’s stance towards the EU, we 
come across party leadership. During the period under examination by this thesis, there 
has been one official change in leadership. Indeed, the current federal coordinator, 
Cayo Lara, succeeded Gaspar Llamazares in 2008. In 2014, the party elected Alberto 
Garzon as the secretary of the constituent process of the IU, as well as the party’s PM 
candidate for the 2015 elections. As mentioned in the preceding section of the chapter, 
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Llamazares’ leadership brought about the greater influence of the IA faction to the 
party’s direction. Conversely, both Lara and Garzon originate from the PCE-led 
faction that heavily criticized Llamazares’ leadership, especially in relation to the 
support of the PSOE government led by Zapatero. Notwithstanding the heavy 
criticism launched against Llamazares and the IA, the party managed to maintain its 
internal balance. Indeed, Llamazares launched a new party, Izquierda Abierta (IA) in 
2012. IA was immediately integrated in the IU aiming to propagate its political 
positions in the IU’s internal debate. Regardless of the important differences between 
the past and present leadership regarding party strategy and organisation, the IU has 
maintained its firm ideological position towards the EU both during Llamazares’ and 
Lara’s time. To assess the views of IU’s former and current coordinators, several 
important initiatives undertaken during their respective time in the party’s leadership 
will be considered. Regarding Llamazares’ views several press releases involving the 
IA will be taken into account.  
 Gaspar Llamazares’ leadership attempted to imprint to the party more of an eco-
socialist than a communist or libertarian orientation. This led to significant tension 
between him and the PCE-led faction. Indeed, following the IU’s worst electoral result 
in 2004, Llamazares called for an extraordinary congress that would “reformulate 
without limitations the IU project” (Cue, 2004a). Indeed, “the idea was to continue the 
path of reforms towards eco-socialism that the resistance of the faction led by 
Francisco Frutos33 slowed down in the previous year” (Cue, 2004a). Indeed, the PCE 
leader stated in the aftermath of the 2004 election result that “the party’s leadership is 
not qualified to direct the political program of the IU” (Cue, 2004a). Moreover 
Llamazares’ intentions were evident ever since the party’s 2003 congress, when he 
even tried to change the name of the party to Green Left [Izquierda Verde], an attempt 
stopped by the PCE-led faction and its leader. Nevertheless, both factions agreed on a 
temporary truce that did not last long. In fact, following the disappointing electoral 
performance in the general elections Frutos declared that Llamazares “[…] must take 
his suitcase and march towards his people” (Cue, 2004a).  
 At the time, the centre of the internal debate between Llamazares and the PCE-led 
faction did not involve the party’s electoral pact with PSOE. Given Frutos’ 2000 
electoral pact with the former PSOE leader, Joaquin Almunia, he was unable to 
                                                
33 At the time, Francisco Frutos was the general secretary of the PCE. 
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criticize Llamazares’ strategic move (Diez, 2000). As a result, the point of contention 
between Llamazares and Frutos regarded IU’s organisational pattern and the PCE’s 
hegemonic role inside the party. Notwithstanding the firm opposition to Llamazares’ 
leadership, the 8th extraordinary congress of the IU re-elected Llamazares regardless 
of receiving just the 49.54% of the 840 party delegates (Cue, 2004b). Nevertheless, 
Llamazares’ influence over the political council of the party was to an extent 
maintained. This enabled him to continue the political pact with the PSOE, as well as 
the “transformation of the IU in a political force that synthesises the red tradition with 
eco-socialism and the new anti-globalisation tendencies” (Cue, 2004b, p. 1). Indeed, 
IU continued to support the PSOE government during the 2004-2008 period. The 
election result of the 2008 legislative elections served as a catalyst for the, already, 
tense internal struggle for leadership. Indeed, the IU achieved the worst electoral result 
of its history gaining a mere 3.8% (Gutierez-Calvo, 2008a). This poor electoral 
performance meant that the party lost 3 seats in the parliament and was left with only 
2 MPs. Because of this poor electoral performance, Llamazares decided to resign from 
his position as the party’s federal coordinator. Indeed, Llamazares assumed all 
responsibility for the party’s electoral demise. Moreover, he stated that “this campaign 
of bipartisanship was a blow to the political pluralism of this country, as well as for 
the IU. They have done a great disservice to democracy! The [electoral] result is a 
failure, but that does not mean that the IU has failed: the IU is still alive and we intend 
to revitalise this project in the following months. The left-wing ‘society’ needs the IU. 
The [political] space on the left of PSOE exists” (Gutierez-Calvo, 2008a).  
 Following his resignation from his role as federal coordinator, Llamazares launched 
a novel political formation in 2012. Indeed, through this political move “[…] the 
faction of open IU sought to move out of its invisibility and grow” (Romero, 2011). It 
was, thus, a move that would confer to this faction a status equal to the one held by 
the PCE. The IA during its founding congress reiterated the willingness to “become a 
force that will push for a ‘broad front’ of the left capable of fighting neoliberalism” 
(Romero, 2012). Llamazares during his intervention at the party’s founding congress 
stressed the progressive nature of his project. To address the accusations of 
pragmatism raised during his time as the IU federal coordinator he stated, “we are 
irremediably of the left, without complexes or dogmas” (Romero, 2012). He then 
provided a synthesis of the IA’s positions in front of the crisis, “no to ‘austerity-cide’, 
no to the labour, educational, and health counter-reforms, no to the kidnapping of the 
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Spanish democracy by the two big parties, and no to the ‘law’ of double standards that 
the government applies, which damages and drowns the citizens while approving more 
funds to multinationals, pharmaceutical companies, and the weapons industry” 
(Romero, 2012). In addition to this synthesis, Llamazares noted that he does not share 
Cayo Lara’s criticism regarding the euro, positing himself, thus, contrary to any 
revision of the country’s Eurozone membership. We could conclude, thus, that 
Llamazares sought to found the IA to create the necessary counterweight to PCE’s 
current dominance inside the IU. As such, his party promotes the strategic positions 
of broader alliances, both political and social, without the dogmatic restrictions of the 
PCE leadership.  
 Cayo Lara was, as mentioned above, Llamazares’ successor in the coordination of the 
IU. The PCE-led faction, as well as other independent factions inside the IU supported 
Lara. His candidacy was supported by 55% of the Federal Political Council (Gutierez-
Calvo, 2008b). Lara’s ideological identity is much closer to the traditional Marxist left 
than the identity of his predecessor. Indeed, during an interview given a few days after 
his election, he gave clear indications of his vision for the IU. “What is clear is that 
capitalism cannot resolve the issues of humanity” (Galan, 2008), declared Lara and he 
added, “this crisis is a disgrace that could offer an alternative to the people. It could 
show us the way towards socialism of the 21st century, a model inspired by consent 
and liberties, because the absence of liberties is one of the biggest flaws of historical 
communism” (Galan, 2008). In fact, Lara believed that the IU’s refounding should be 
made by “working, standing with the people in the protests and turning to the unions 
so that they understand that one must start a new path. The poor, the unemployed, the 
young, and those who yearn for equality are waiting for us” (Galan, 2008). 
Consequently, Lara sought to put an end to the electoral pact with PSOE in an attempt 
to stop the electoral decline of the party.  The electoral results of the 2011 general 
elections came as an initial confirmation of Lara’s changes in the party strategy.  
Nevertheless, the party’s electoral rise was thwarted by a novel political formation that 
originated from the indignados movement and the political party that was create 
therein. Indeed, the Podemos phenomenon provoked a series of chain reactions inside 
the Spanish political system and ultimately led to Lara’s decision not to stand as the 
party’s PM candidate for the 2015 elections. He, nevertheless, maintained his position 
as the party’s federal coordinator. The reasons behind this move can be traced in the 
speech he delivered at the party’s political council.  
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 Indeed, he asserted that “I took this decision because I love this organisation, because 
I believe in the collective effort, thinking, and working. I do not believe in leaders” 
(Gutierez-Calvo, 2014). He then carried on defending IU’s identity and stated that 
“nobody, no financial, economic, or media power will break this organisation, because 
it is solidified in the memory of the struggle. Without a strong and organised IU, there 
cannot be any real change” (Gutierez-Calvo, 2014). Indeed, it appears as if Lara’s 
decision not to stand as IU’s candidate is a sign of the radical changes and the 
generational renovation that has been affecting Spanish politics ever since the eruption 
of Podemos. The results of the 2014 elections for the EP accelerated this process. 
Although the IU managed to increase its vote share, a novel party managed to win the 
electoral support of a good part of IU’s natural electorate in a mere four-month period. 
Thereafter, as far as the polls suggest, IU’s vote share was decreasing while Podemos’ 
increasing34. As a result, Lara’s decision can be interpreted as a move aiming at re-
gaining the support of IU’s natural electorate by promoting the candidacy of Alberto 
Garzon. Indeed, Garzon appears to be the ideal candidate, both because of his 
involvement with the indignados protest movement as well as his young age.  
 The final part of the present section will relate to the political identity of the party’s 
candidate for the 2015 general elections, Alberto Garzon. As mentioned in the 
introductory part of this section, Garzon is an economist inspired primarily by the 
critical Marxist school. Indeed, in an interview given after his election as MP for the 
IU he stated that, “capitalism is incompatible with democracy because in this 
economic system, votes are determined by money, in a way that the votes of those that 
have more [money] are more important. If the resources are not managed by society, 
if they are not public resources managed democratically, it’s evident that the power 
and the capacity of deciding what is going to be produced and what we are going to 
do with it becomes a private space far away from the citizenry. We must acknowledge 
that the big companies and the strategic sectors of the economy must be public so that 
everything is decided democratically. This is a requirement so that democracy can 
effectively exist” (Otero, 2013). A recent interview given by Garzon in the aftermath 
of Syriza’s choice to accept the harsh deal with the European institutions can prove 
rather enlightening as to his opinions on the EU. In this interview, Garzon reiterates 
                                                
34 The role of Podemos in shaping IU’s stance will be dealt with in the proceeding section of this chapter, 
under the party competition factor. 
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his core belief that capitalism is incompatible with democracy. Moreover, he argues 
that the electoral demise of most the European social democratic parties proves that 
their professed model is clearly outdated (Garzon, 2015a, p. 2). Moreover, when asked 
how a movement, like Syriza, can liberate itself from the pressures of Brussels, Garzon 
replied by arguing that “it is not Brussels that exercises the pressure. Brussels is the 
geographical space in which the representatives of oligarchy meet, and where the 
decisions are made regarding the institutional changes that a country must accept so 
that it adapts to the needs of capitalism. The pressure is therefore the logic of the 
system and its dynamic. The only way to stop it is with a favourable correlation of 
forces. Not only a correlation of mere political forces, but of economic forces, too. If 
one seizes the control of a country and its productive forces with certain autonomy, 
then one will have ample space for manoeuvring” (Garzon, 2015a, p. 2).  Garzon when 
asked about the means for regaining economic sovereignty gave a very enlightening 
answer. Indeed, he argued that there are three possible options. The first one would 
see the exit from Eurozone. According to Garzon this would be a disastrous move, as 
this would help “retrieve monetary policy and its instruments. But it would not modify 
the structure of the economy and the way of production […]” (Garzon, 2015a, p. 3). 
The return to a devaluated currency would lead, according to Garzon, to increasing 
social frustration that the left would be unable to manage. The second option would 
see a European alliance of the South35. For this to happen, one would have to configure 
a new system of regional integration based on inter-regional solidarity instead of 
neoliberal values. The path towards such a policy has been open, argues Garzon, with 
Syriza’s left government. For Garzon this second option appears to be the most 
adequate solution. Moreover, Garzon proposes a third and final option. This consists 
of utilising “political pressure to bow down the European institutions from within” 
(Garzon, 2015a, p. 3). On this instance, Garzon argues that the ability of a country to 
politically pressure the European institutions depends heavily on the country’s 
economic capacity. Arguably to highlight the difference between the Spanish and the 
Greek one36, Garzon argues that the Spanish economy constitutes almost 12 per cent 
                                                
35 Here the opinions appear to coincide with Tsipras’ idea as proposed in his article in El Pais in 2012 
(See the Syriza Chapter for more). 
36 After the failure of Tsipras to effectively pressure the European institutions towards accepting 
Syriza’s plan in July 2015. 
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of the Eurozone’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), whereas the Greek economy is not 
even close to 2 per cent. Thus, for Garzon the currency debate is not sufficient to create 
those radical economic transformations that would see the country exiting the crisis. 
When confronted with Tsipras’ acceptance of the third bailout, Garzon suggested that 
the Greek PM had alternatives. He argued that the third bailout would be fruitless as 
was the first one and the second one. Nevertheless, he stresses the fact that the IU still 
supported Syriza during the September 2015 elections.  
 In conclusion to the role that the party leadership has played regarding the party’s 
stance towards the EU we could argue the following. The changes in party leadership 
have shaped the degree of emphasis placed on the party’s ideological identity, as well 
as the party’s electoral strategy to the extent that they signified a change in the balance 
of power between the party’s factions. Llamazares’ period signified a period of 
opening of the IU towards the social-democratic left. The electoral pact with PSOE 
and the support of the Zapatero government brought the IU amid an identity crisis. 
Indeed, the IU achieved the worst electoral results in its history during Llamazares’ 
leadership. The abysmal electoral results of the 2008 elections led to Llamazares’ 
resignation and the subsequent election of Cayo Lara to the party’s leadership. Lara 
sought to reinstate the party’s anti-capitalist nature, arguably to reconnect with those 
parts of society that supported the party ever since its creation in 1986. The path 
towards a substantial increase in IU’s popular support was thwarted by the eruption of 
the Podemos phenomenon, which appears to have occupied the political space of the 
IU, as well as a big part of that of PSOE. To address the electoral threat that Podemos 
represented, Lara decided not to run for PM in the December 2015 election. Instead 
of Lara, a young economist, Alberto Garzon, will be the head of the IU. Garzon 
represents the PCE-led faction of the IU. Nevertheless, he appears to be less dogmatic 
and more open to wider coalitions with left forces. In terms of the stance towards the 
EU, all three leaders appear to have maintained a firm critical belief towards the 
European project. Syriza’s experience has led the IU to believe that change will only 
be possible inside the EU if the countries of the South create an alliance that will force 
the EU to reconfigure itself.  
 
f. Party Competition 
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 IU operates in a party system that is currently undergoing radical changes. The 
conservatives of Partido Popular (PP) and the social democrats of PSOE have 
dominated the Spanish political life ever since the restoration of democracy in the late 
1970s. Ever since 2008, when the effects of the crisis made their first appearance in 
the Spanish economy and society, the bipartisan nature of the Spanish political system 
started to tremble. The electoral rise of the IU from 2008 onwards, but most 
importantly the eruption of the Podemos phenomenon led to a significant weakening 
of the support of the two major political parties. As mentioned at the beginning of the 
chapter, the IU and Podemos finally decided to join forces, following the snap 
elections that took place in June 2016. Despite having joined forces, the importance 
of Podemos as a political force that influenced IU ever since its creation could be 
argued to be rather high.  
 To be able to assess the role of party competition in respect to IU’s stance towards 
the EU, a brief analysis of IU’s main political opponent should be provided. Podemos 
appears prima facie a political formation that could be labelled as a being part of the 
radical left. Nevertheless, the party’s strategy and ideology renders any classification 
rather problematic. On the one hand, Podemos emerged from the protest movement 
known as indignados that took over the squares of Spain ever since 201137. In addition 
to this, a great number of the party’s officials have had some connection with the IU 
or other radical left forces in the past. Moreover, Podemos opted to join the GUE/NGL 
parliamentary group in the EP. Nevertheless, Podemos has opted to keep its distance 
from the EL, arguably to avoid their further identification with the IU and the radical 
left. On the other hand, the party’s official documents, as well as the positions 
presented by the party’s leader, Pablo Iglesias, lack any solid ideological foundation. 
Thus, this initial categorisation of Podemos as a radical left party appears too 
simplistic. In the following paragraphs of this section an attempt will be made to 
analyse the interaction between the IU and Podemos and the importance of said 
interaction for IU’s stance towards the EU. To be able to reach several useful 
conclusions, the present part will analyse Podemos’ founding political documents, as 
well as several interviews given by the party’s leader. In addition to this, a few 
                                                
37 Also known as the 15-M Movement (Movimiento 15M), as it emerged during the mass rallies held in 
the majority of Spain’s big cities in May 15th, 2011.  
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interviews and articles of IU’s candidate, Alberto Garzon, will be taken into 
consideration.  
 As mentioned above, Podemos’ political document lacks any significant ideological 
background that helps the party theorise its own role in the political system. Indeed, 
throughout the party’s document that bears the title political principles one finds but 
traces of ideological positions. The document opens with a reference to the party’s 
role as the vehicle through which the social majority will be able to become a 
protagonist in Spanish politics (Podemos, 2014, p. 5). Podemos argues that this 
constitutes a clear historical opportunity for the Spanish people. Indeed, Podemos 
views the crisis in Spain as a crisis of a regime imposed by the country’s oligarchs that 
are slowly being delegitimised in the eyes of society. In such a context, the “15M 
movement [indignados] contributed in articulating a part of the non-satisfied citizens 
that up until that moment were orphans or were ostracised and depoliticised” 
(Podemos, 2014, pp. 5-6). This movement, thus, led the masses to clearly oppose the 
responsible, for the crisis, elites and propose several political alternatives. 
Nevertheless, this process of “small cultural transformations did not affect in same 
manner all the country and did not alter the balance of power from an electoral and 
institutional point of view” (Podemos, 2014, p. 6).  
  Following these opening remarks, the two following paragraphs are concerned with 
the responsibilities of the country’s biggest traditional forces. PP is presented as the 
great beneficiary of the political earthquake of the 2008 elections. Regardless of PP 
managing to win the elections, Podemos finds that the 15M movement managed to 
“weaken the electoral legitimisation: winning the elections was not any more the only 
element of political legitimisation, and as a result it did not constitute any more a carte 
blanche” (Podemos, 2014, p. 6). Notwithstanding this important change in political 
culture, the party considers that the Spanish society appears to be very much 
fragmented after the 30-year dominance of neoliberalism. As a result, collective 
identities are unable to articulate all the differing dissatisfactions with the status quo 
(Podemos, 2014, p. 6).  
 On the other hand, Podemos notes that “while the voices of protest in the street were 
rising, in the institutions the party of the left was accumulating power, which it used 
to launch a hard and ambitious project of oligarchic reform of the state” (Podemos, 
2014, p. 6). The PSOE is, thus, accused of playing an important role in the support of 
the status quo, as well as the program of adjustment imposed by the troika. Regarding 
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the IU, Podemos finds that “a part of the party elite was generationally and culturally 
bound to the 1978 [political] order, and have, apart from some honourable exceptions, 
reacted in a timid and conservative way. They entrusted in the movements of the 
parameters before the crisis and the gradual and progressive collection of the electoral 
support that PSOE had been losing, ever since the IU placed itself on [the PSOE’s] 
left” (Podemos, 2014, p. 6).  
 Podemos views the crisis affecting the country as an organic crisis of the 1978 regime. 
Indeed, the party firmly believes that the political crisis can last much less than the 
financial one. It finds that the social mobilisation is being torpedoed by the current 
regime, which could establish itself firmly in the aftermath of the crisis. Here Podemos 
uses the example of the US and the UK under Reagan and Thatcher respectively. The 
window of opportunity for the anti-establishment social and political forces could, 
thus, close quite early. That would signify the complete domination of the country by 
a regime that would have a “[…] semi-colonial role inside the EU” (Podemos, 2014, 
p. 7). In such a context, Podemos stresses the importance of winning the electoral 
battles against the forces that support the oligarchy and their supporting elites.  
 The party provides an analysis that views the elections for the EP of 2014 as a 
breaking point in Spanish political life. The electoral losses of the country’s two major 
parties were such that their function as communicating vases could be over once and 
for all (Podemos, 2014, p. 7). While PP’s and PSOE’s influence could have ended, as 
did the myth of the impossibility of an electoral majority that would not involve either 
of the two big parties. Podemos considers that its force as a political movement is 
much bigger than the 8 per cent that it achieved in the 2014 EP elections. It argues that 
this is evident from the attacks that the regime and the cast38 have been waging against 
the party ever since the elections. The result is, thus, seen as having validated the 
party’s argument that “[…] popular and transversal unity as our success when we 
offered a place of articulation and inscription, with a new [political] language and new 
forms, to represent what was lying in society but was unable to being expressed 
politically” (Podemos, 2014, p. 8). Podemos’ victory has, consequently, opened a 
window of opportunity for political alternatives to the current regime. The political 
time has been accelerated because of the party’s success, a party that views itself as a 
political outsider without any connections to the old regime. As a result, “we are 
                                                
38 La casta is the Spanish word that is very much central to Podemos’ discourse. 
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obliged to be extremely vigilant in front of any behaviour that might compromise our 
commitment to regeneration, transparency, and defence of interests of the social 
majority” (Podemos, 2014, p. 9). The conclusion that Podemos reaches regarding its 
core objective is to aim at winning the elections both at a regional, as well as a national 
level. The importance of winning the electoral battles is rendered even more evident 
in the interviews given by the party’s leader, Pablo Iglesias, that will be analysed in 
the following paragraphs.  
 Indeed, Iglesias declared during an interview he gave in June 2015, “let them keep 
their red flags and leave us in peace. I want to win” (Picazo & De Delas, 2015). Iglesias 
presents a more in depth analysis of this concept when he states that “there is a certain 
fetishism in the left. What you say belongs to the left, they tell me. Yes, indeed. Yes, 
the left likes what we have to say. But, the fact that the left likes what we have to say 
is not enough to change this country. It is not enough that some identify themselves 
with the left and the left-wing symbols. You need a social majority to identify with 
your discourse and your proposals, and inside this social majority there are many that 
say: the left is not part of my identity. We have demonstrated that with proposals that 
the left likes, but with a distinct discourse and with distinct forms, one can win, one 
can gain power. And that implies that one must do things contrary to the way the left 
is doing them” (Picazo & De Delas, 2015, p. 4). It is evident, thus, that Podemos’ 
strategy is creating a social majority regardless of one’s identification with the left. In 
fact, Iglesias launches a frontal attack to the old left. He depicts the typical left-wing 
politician in a rather negative way. Indeed, he argues that the old left is pessimistic. 
As a result, they choose to view the citizens as “[…] imbeciles that go to vote for 
Ciudadanos39, but I [the left-wing politician] prefer to stay with my 5 per cent, and 
my red flag […]” (Picazo & De Delas, 2015, p. 5). Iglesias views the old left as being 
responsible for the lack of any significant change in the country. He backs his 
argument up by arguing that in the last 25 years, the IU has been unable to understand 
what was going on in the country, and thus it was not in position to provide a coherent 
analysis (Picazo & De Delas, 2015, p. 5). Notwithstanding his harsh criticism to the 
traditional left, Iglesias declares that “in theory, it could seem a bit pretentious, but I 
consider myself a Marxist […] in cultural and emotional terms I believe that I respond 
                                                
39 Another novel political formation that could be placed on the center-right of the Spanish political 
spectrum.  
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to the archetypical left-wing politician, or someone that comes from the left” (Picazo 
& De Delas, 2015, p. 12). Nevertheless, Podemos’ willingness to achieve an electoral 
victory is proven once again by its decision to finally form a coalition with the IU, 
despite the sharp criticisms launched against it previously.  
 When asked about the possibility of an electoral pact with the IU, Iglesias was 
categorical. “None, zero. End of the discussion. Zero. There is no other title to put 
here” (Picazo & De Delas, 2015, p. 15). According to him such a coalition is exactly 
what PP and PSOE are longing for. Podemos, according to Iglesias, is aiming for the 
unity of the people not of parties. Iglesias appears to be completely opposed to accords 
from above, between party elites. The possibility of an electoral pact with the IU was 
a common theme in Spanish media during the electoral campaign leading to the 
December 2015 elections. Iglesias stated that he could not see how Podemos could 
create an alliance with the IU, given Garzon’s opinion that “[…] Podemos has done 
everything wrong […]” (Picazo & De Delas, 2015, p. 16).  
 On the possibility of such an electoral pact, Alberto Garzon has expressed his opinion 
in a similar manner. Indeed, Garzon accuses the mainstream media as creating a reality 
show involving the alleged open negotiations between IU and Podemos (Garzon, 
2015b, p. 1). According to Garzon, such attempts are aiming at thwarting a unitary 
front that, according to Garzon, is necessary in order for the country to change. 
Nevertheless, he states that “the sure thing is that there are no open negotiations with 
Podemos, neither in obscure spaces nor public squares. In my organisation, IU, we 
have approved – in my opinion, in an intelligent way- our commitment to contribute 
in the construction of places of confluence with those that unite the left-wing forces 
of the country around a project of democratic rupture; places of convergence 
constructed from below and with participatory mechanisms such as the open primary 
elections” (Garzon, 2015b, p. 2). In a later interview, Garzon admitted that Podemos 
approached him individually to convince him to become a Podemos candidate. Garzon 
stated that “I am not a footballer, I do not have a manager and I do not have a buy-out 
clause in my contract” (Alsina, 2015, p. 1). In this manner, Garzon ruled out any 
possibility of an electoral pact between IU and Podemos considering the legislative 
elections of December 2015. Nevertheless, he stated that IU’s enemy is not Podemos, 
but rather the right-wing politics that have brought about significant cuts in education, 
health and pensions. Regarding Podemos, Garzon asserts that there are plenty of points 
of convergence between the two political formations. Nevertheless, IU and Podemos 
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are different political projects that are part of different political traditions (Alsina, 
2015, p. 1).  
 Notwithstanding Iglesias’ harsh criticism towards the IU, Podemos has been an avid 
supporter of Syriza throughout the Greek party’s path to an electoral victory. Indeed, 
Pablo Iglesias has been amongst the protagonists of Syriza’s electoral campaign both 
during the January 2015, as well as the September 2015 Greek legislative election. 
Podemos was, thus, present in the squares of Athens alongside the IU, Die Linke, 
Rifondazione Comunista, Front De Gauche and the other European RLPs showing 
their active support towards the Greek party. In addition to that, Iglesias was called to 
the stage by Syriza’s president, Alexis Tsipras, during the party’s central political 
rally. In his brief message, Iglesias verbally reconstructed the theory of domino effect, 
which views the victory of the Greek party as the catalyst that would bring about 
further electoral victories of anti-austerity political forces throughout Europe. 
Following the events of July 2015, and Syriza’s tactical decision to accept the harsh 
measures imposed by the European institutions, Podemos maintained its support 
towards the Greek party. Indeed, it would appear that Podemos has demonstrated itself 
to be much more sympathetic towards Alexis Tsipras, than the IU.  
 Based on the above analysis of Podemos’ constitutive political documents, as well as 
the party’s leader interviews, we could argue that Podemos is a political formation that 
cannot be easily categorised as a radical left one. Its core political proposals do, 
indeed, have a certain left social-democratic character. Nevertheless, the party’s 
political documents almost completely lack a clear ideological and theoretical 
framework. It appears as if Podemos aims primarily at rallying this part of the 
population that has been heavily affected by the crisis, without providing an in-depth 
analysis of the reasons that led them to the present condition. Instead, the party opts 
to create a discourse based on the dichotomy between the cast and the common people, 
as well as the representatives of the old politics and those of the new politics. This 
divisive discourse can be argued to bear the characteristics of a left-wing populist one. 
Indeed, according to Mudde’s and Kaltwasser’s minimal definition, populism is “a 
political/discursive logic that considers society ultimately separated between two 
groups, ‘the people’ and ‘the elite,’ and that argues that politics should be an 
expression of the will of the people” (Mude & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 8). We could, thus, 
argue that Podemos is indeed a populist political force. As a result of the party’s 
populism, Podemos appears prima facie quite harsh in its account of the IU. The 
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party’s analysis considers that the IU elite forms part of the old political establishment 
and that it cannot help the people in the struggle against the cast. Except for some 
individuals, such as Garzon, Podemos appears to not seek an alliance with the IU. 
Another reason behind Podemos’ stance towards the IU can be argued to be the 
following. Podemos’ strategy consists of managing to win the elections at all costs, as 
the party believes that the window of opportunity for the alternative political forces is 
closing. As a result, it targets any part of the electorate whether one identifies oneself 
with the left or the right. This in turn renders any possible identification of Podemos 
with left-wing symbols or political forces impossible. Such an idea is evident in 
Iglesias’ interviews analysed above.  
 Regardless of Podemos’ rather populist than radical left nature, the party’s electoral 
success appeared to have influenced the IU. As the Podemos phenomenon was 
exploding, IU’s electoral return was thwarted. Indeed, it appears as if Podemos 
managed to attract the vote of a significant percentage of IU’s electorate. This in turn 
led IU’s federal coordinator, Cayo Lara, to step down from the electoral race and 
propose Alberto Garzon as the party’s PM candidate. As mentioned in the previous 
section, Garzon is a young politician with an active involvement in the indignados 
movement. As such, IU’s move can be argued to constitute a tactical decision in 
response to Podemos’ accusations regarding the left political forces, as well as the 
inability of the old left to bring about significant changes in the country. Regarding 
the IU’s stance towards the EU, we can argue that party competition has not played an 
important role. Indeed, both Podemos and the IU view the country’s EU membership 
as a necessary precondition for the successful implementation of their respective 
political programs. With regards to Podemos’ stance, we could argue that a major role 
is played by the Spanish public opinion, whereas the IU has a strong ideological 
attachment to the European ideal, as emphasized in the aforementioned parts of the 
present section. 
 The application of the theoretical lens of the communist dilemma to the patterns of 
party competition, could lead us to several important conclusions. As mentioned in 
the introductory part of this thesis, the issue here relates to the party’s profile on 
European integration and its interaction with their propaganda against or in favour of 
the other national political forces. This could, according to the present thesis, highlight 
both how much moderation, or lack thereof, manifests itself in the context of domestic 
party competition, as well as whether electoral opportunities or changes in overall 
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strategy are the main driving factors of change on the issue. Accordingly, as 
Charalambous (2013) summarizes, the analysis of a party’s approach towards other 
parties’ European policies can be summarized by the following questions: 
a. Have a party’s main opponents or electoral strategy changed, thus explaining 
attitudinal or salience changes in its profile on the issue of European 
integration? 
b. Through their general views on European integration and EU-related matters, 
do communist parties differentiate themselves from other left or non-left actors 
and, if so, how they achieve this? 
                                                                                                                              
(Charalambous, 2013, p.46) 
 In order to utilise the above questions, the second question needs a slight 
modification. Given that the IU is not a communist party, the term ‘RLPs’ will replace 
the term ‘communist’. As a result, three possibilities can be hypothesized in respect to 
the parties’ responses. The first one views the parties projecting EU-related matters in 
their public discourse or emphasize them in a way that highlights that they have 
become more moderate than before. The second possibility views the parties as 
utilising the same mechanisms to present themselves as more radical in a way that 
they move more closely towards their ideological identity. The third one views the 
parties as utilising the same mechanisms in their effort to reconfirm their existing 
ideological profile.  
 Following the careful analysis of the party competition factor, we could attempt to 
respond to the questions posed by Charalambous (2013). With regard to the first 
question, we could argue that there has been no substantial change in IU’s electoral 
opponents with regards to the issue of European integration. In relation to the second 
question, it seems that the third argument can be verified. Indeed, it appears as if the 
IU has been placing much more emphasis on its original critical view of the European 
construction. This can be viewed as an attempt to address the accusations coming from 
its most important competitor, Podemos. Accusations that viewed the IU as a political 
party that is part of the old political order. By placing more salience to reconfirm its 
existing ideological profile, the IU can be argued to have attempted a new approach 
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with the thousands of citizens that took the Spanish squares as a result of the austerity 
imposed to their country by the European institutions. 
 
g. Transnational Links 
 
 The next factor regards IU’s transnational affiliations. IU honours the Eurocommunist 
legacy of the PCE by partaking in all pan-European attempts for the bond 
strengthening amongst the European left political forces. As suggested in the 
introductory section of this thesis, the creation of the EL in 2004 came as a response 
to the need of European political party of the radical left and the IU was amongst its 
founding member parties (EL, 2013). The following analysis will involve the EL’s 
major political positions and the degree of coherence between the EL and the IU. To 
be able to assess said convergence, the analysis of the EL’s political theses as adopted 
by the party’s 2nd Congress held in November 2007 is necessary. Furthermore, the 
agenda for a social Europe as approved by the party’s 3rd Congress in December 2010 
presents us with the necessary post-crisis perspective. Finally, the political decision of 
the Europarty’s 4th Congress held in Madrid in 2013 will present us with EL’s analysis 
as the crisis inside the European edifice was deepening.  
 EL’s political theses displays, indeed, a great degree of convergence both 
ideologically and in terms of tactics and strategical goals with the IU. Indeed, EL’s 
political decision commences with the following quote, “the contradiction between 
capitalism and the emancipation of the individual, armament and war, climate change 
and environmental disasters, and the privatisation of all spheres of life lead us to ask 
once again ‘Socialism or Barbarism’? (EL, 2007, p. 1). This reference to Friedrich 
Engels’ famous motto is the exact same that we came across in the IU’s political 
decision. Following this opening statement, the EL draws a very negative picture of 
the current nature of the European edifice. Indeed, the party finds that the increasing 
effect of neoliberalism to the Union’s architecture has rendered it an “undemocratic, 
neoliberal, patriarchal and militaristic model of the European construction” (EL, 2007, 
p. 5).  
 The party’s alternative vision of Europe is presented as the complete antithesis of the 
current one. Indeed, the EL proposes an alternative to the current EU structure based 
on the principles of welfare and labour rights. In addition to this, the importance of the 
public nature of the most important social services is highlighted. Moreover, the EL 
 138 
stresses the importance of ecology and sustainable development as opposed to the 
global capitalism’s intensification of the ecological crisis (EL, 2007, pp. 13-17). For 
their professed vision of Europe to be achieved the party believes that “a deep 
democratic reconstruction of the European institutions is an indispensable component 
of our whole strategy. In this field the EL, and our large social and political alliance, 
take the historical responsibility to change the political balance and the political 
orientations in Europe” (EL, 2007, p. 18). Because of the above, we could argue that 
the major ideological positions of the EL are in line with the IU’s ideological pillars 
of ecology, feminism, as well as of a peaceful and democratic path towards socialism. 
 In the EL’s ‘Agenda for a Social Europe’, we come across a document heavily 
influenced by the financial crisis, which was very much deepened inside the Eurozone. 
The party considers that the troika made of the EC, ECB, and IMF has imposed several 
unacceptable sacrifices to the peoples of Europe. As a result, the EL views the current 
crisis as posing a risk of “economic collapse, massive exacerbation of poverty and 
precariousness, and the destruction of the social model and European civilisation 
itself” (EL, 2010, p. 1). To avoid such destructive consequences, the EL believes that 
the EU should bring about a radical change in its policies switching from the “logic of 
profit into the new logic of human development” (EL, 2010, p. 2). Moreover, the crisis 
is found to have been influenced by the Union’s democratic deficit, which needs to be 
addressed. In terms of actual measures to tackle the effects of the crisis, the EL 
proposes the regulation of the banking sector under social ownership and its 
consequent democratic control (EL, 2010, p. 8). In addition to that, the EL calls for 
the cancellation of a significant part of the affected countries’ sovereign debt, as well 
as for a Europe-wide minimum income for the unemployed, less working hours, and 
a Europe-wide minimum wage (EL, 2010, pp. 8-12). With regards to the party’s 
alternative vision, the EL reinstates its firm belief in “radically different world, 
democracy, peace and socialism […] we aspire to a world of freedom, justice, and 
equality, without repression, exploitation, wars, hunger or need” (EL, 2010, p. 16). 
 The party’s latest political decision, constitutes a political document heavily 
influenced by the deepening European crisis, which is characterised as the “worst 
crisis in its history since the Thirties and the Second World War” (EL, 2013, p. 1). 
Indeed, the EL opens its political document with a frontal attack to the European status 
quo, “according to the promises of the forces that dominate Europe, the European 
project was to be one of peace and social progress; it is now being transformed into a 
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nightmare where the only horizon offered to the peoples of Europe is one of brutal and 
generalised social regression. Europe as a whole has been thrust into this turmoil by 
the crisis of the financialised capitalist system, the social and ecological consequences 
of which have hit humanity and the planet with unprecedented violence, as well as by 
the crisis of a model of the European Union that has cast in an ultraliberal mould, 
under the supervision of the financial markets” (EL, 2013, p. 1). The EL reinstates its 
view of the crisis as an existential threat, and adds that the devastating effects that the 
crisis has had on most countries’ economy and society could bring about the re-
emergence of nationalisms and xenophobia. In such dark times, the EL notes that it is 
its historical role to create a “new European project, one which is based on the interests 
of the peoples and respect for their sovereignty, to restore a sense of meaning to 
European integration” (EL, 2013, p. 3).  
 The EL places even more salience on the importance of the neoliberal political forces’ 
role in shaping an EU based on market deregulation and decreasing social welfare. 
The party believes that these forces are to be blamed not only for the degree that the 
global financial crisis has influenced the European economy, but also for the inability 
of the EU to present a sustainable solution to the deepening of the crisis. Moreover, 
the party argues that the crisis has provided with “an opportunity to speed up a brutal 
process of structural adjustments” (EL, 2013, p. 5). Against this process, the EL 
proposes several measures, which could help in the shaping of a novel European 
edifice. The measures that the party proposed are divided in four pillars. The first one 
relates to employment, social, ecological, and solidarity development. The second 
relates to the emancipation of the European economy from the financial markets. The 
third one involves the respect for popular sovereignty and democratic development. 
The fourth and final one regards peace and cooperation among peoples. The final 
section of this chapter will deal with the specific programmatic position of the EL in 
an attempt to compare them with IU’s positions.  
 The application of the theoretical lens of the communist dilemma to the IU’s 
transnational affiliations may lead us to the following conclusion. The IU, especially 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis, has sought to place even more salience on its 
role inside the EL. The fact that a member of PCE’s elite, Maria Teresa Mola, is 
amongst the Europarty’s vice-presidents, can be argued to constitute proof of the IU’s 
importance for the EL and vice versa. Moreover, the IU has chosen to actively support 
Syriza’s electoral campaign throughout the 2015 legislative elections. Indeed, high 
 140 
ranking officials of the IU were constantly amongst the EL emissaries in Greece and 
have been taken the stage in Syriza’s political rallies, demonstrating their solidarity 
with the Greek party. Therefore, we could argue that the third argument formulated in 
previous chapter can be verified. It appears, thus, as if IU chose to place more salience 
to its European affiliations so it can reconfirm and establish further its existing 
ideological profile as a European force of the radical left.  
 Comparing the analyses, we could argue that the political analyses of the two parties 
appear very much coherent. The Union’s current state is found by both the EL and the 
IU to have reached an unprecedented low. Both parties note that the European 
neoliberal political forces are to be blamed for the Union’s state. The measures 
proposed by both parties are both in a social-democratic direction. Nevertheless, the 
peaceful and democratic path to socialism remains a constant ideological pillar that 
can be traced back to the Eurocommunist era. The importance of the EL in shaping 
the IU’s stance vis-à-vis the EU is of major significance. The presence of a Europarty 
is in itself a significant theoretical advantage in IU’s discourse, as it renders IU’s goal 
feasible. The EL, thus, constitutes IU’s response when faced with the issue of creating 
pan-European alliances to promote the European solutions dictated by the party’s 
distinct left Europeanism. Indeed, given the IU’s view of the European project as a 
step towards the transcendence of the national divisions of the working class, the EL 
provides the necessary vehicle for the necessary changes. Regardless of the party’s 
unquestionable support to the EL, the IU has often criticised the Europarty’s 
organisational patterns. 
 
h. European Integration 
 
The integration process itself constitutes the last conditioning factor. To be able to 
efficiently understand IU’s overall response to the process, a comparative analysis of 
the aforementioned factors is deemed necessary. This can enable the present thesis to 
reach some final conclusions as regards the party’s overall stance vis-à-vis the EU 
over the period under study here.  
 Given the IU’s Eurocommunist ideological heritage, its stance towards the integration 
process has been critical but constructive throughout the party’s history. The party, on 
one hand, heavily criticizes the neoliberal leitmotif of the process. On the other hand, 
it supports Spain’s permanence inside the EU, while actively seeking its refoundation 
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according to the party’s socialist standards from within. For the IU, as well as for the 
rest of the parties analysed in the present thesis, the peaceful and democratic path 
towards socialism can only be achieved through permanent struggle both at a national 
as well as at a European level. As a result, IU’s distinct left Europeanism renders the 
party’s responsive mechanism much easier to operate than communist parties of the 
Eastern tradition. Indeed, the devastating effects of the crisis have arguably solidified 
IU’s criticism towards the neoliberal structure of the European edifice. Concurrently, 
IU’s stance has managed to resuscitate the party’s vote share. As a result, the IU seen 
as a unit appears to be very consistent during the examined period. In regards to the 
third unit of analysis, IU’s internal debate, while very fierce in terms of the party’s 
tactical decision to enter into a governmental coalition with PSOE, has never arguably 
touched on the European issue. Therefore, despite the differing positions regarding its 
tactical and strategic moves, both the party’s major factions as well as the party’s 
leaders have maintained its firm belief in the European ideal. In summarizing the 
above, we could argue that the IU did not undergo any serious moderation in terms of 
ideology and programmatic positions. On the contrary, ever since the PCE-led faction 
managed to secure a more influential role inside the party’s decision-making 
mechanism, the IU has been placing much more emphasis on the party’s pluralist 
organisational patterns, as well as on its anti-capitalist ideological nature. Especially 
after the Podemos phenomenon took over the Spanish political system, the IU has 
sought to reinstate its role as the traditional political force in favour of radical 
transformations in the country.  
 Considering the above, we could suggest that the IU as most RLPs faced and 
continues to face dilemmas. The party’s Europeanism rendered its response to the 
dilemma less difficult than RLPs of the Eastern Communist movement. The 
devastating effects that the financial crisis has had on Spain’s economy and society 
solidified even more IU’s critical stance vis-à-vis the integration process. At the same 
time, the party’s stance has managed to ‘resuscitate’ the party’s electoral dynamic. 
The change in leadership and the subsequent higher level of influence that the PCE-
led faction is able to have on the party’s line has led the IU to place more emphasis on 
its ideological heritage. The devastating effects that Podemos has brought about in the 
Spanish party system, has led the IU to opt for a rejuvenation of the party elite. This 
has so far not provoked any serious changes regarding the party’s stance towards the 
EU. Overall, we could argue that the party throughout the period under study has 
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remained faithful to the vision of Europe of the peoples, regardless of the significant 
changes that the European integration process has underwent in recent years. 
 
i. Programmatic Policies; IU and the EL under the Lens of the Communist 
Dilemma 
 
 As suggested in a previous chapter of the present thesis, the theoretical lens of the 
communist dilemma will be applied to three areas of investigation. The first one 
related to party competition, the second involved the party’s transnational affiliations. 
The third and final one relates to the party’s programmatic policies. For the needs of 
this area of investigation, the present thesis will examine the degree of convergence 
or lack thereof between the party’s political texts, as examined above, and the party’s 
detailed political positions in the field of EU-related issues. Moreover, the present 
thesis views that several useful conclusions could be reached if we were to provide 
with a comparative analysis of IU and EL’s proposed policies. To do so, this thesis 
will seek to compare the policies presented to the Spanish electorate by the IU on the 
occasion the 2014 elections for the EP to the policies proposed by the EL during its 
congress in 2013.  
 Starting with our analysis, we will first examine the electoral programme as presented 
by the IU during the 2014 campaign for the EP elections. IU’s electoral programme is 
divided in seven pillars; economy, democratic rights and freedoms, public services, 
environmental policies, feminism and equality, culture, and peace and solidarity. 
Regarding the first pillar, the IU commences with the presentation of a coherent, to its 
ideological positions, characterisation of the European fiscal and deficit policies as a 
straitjacket of the Union’s neoliberal structure (IU, 2014, p. 8). Indeed, the IU 
considers that the legislation of fiscal stability imposed to the Spanish government by 
the EU “[…] as did Maastricht and the economic configuration of the EU puts on the 
shirt to public finances and it leaves them without a margin of manoeuvre” (IU, 2014, 
p. 8). In such a context, the IU finds that a great part of the European countries’ 
sovereign debt has been created to bail out financial institutions. As a result, the party 
calls for the qualification of a great part of the member-states’ sovereign debt as odious 
debt, as suggested by international law doctrine (IU, 2014, p. 9). Such a qualification 
would be the outcome of independent audits on sovereign debt. Subsequently, the 
party proposes the democratisation and nationalisation of the major financial 
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institutions, as well as the restructuring of both private and public debt (IU, 2014, p. 
10). Amongst the measures thought to tackle the sovereign debt crisis affecting the 
Eurozone relates to the “[…] pooling of sovereign debt through the emission of Euro 
bonds guaranteed by the ECB” (IU, 2014, p. 10)40.  
 Moving onwards, the IU addresses the issue of mass unemployment and calls for a 
European strategy that would bring about better chances for member-states to finance 
investments sought to combat unemployment (IU, 2014, p. 11). For the IU, thus, the 
role of the state is crucial to the struggle against unemployment. Moreover, in relation 
to the party’s employment proposed policies, we come across the policy of a European 
minimum wage that should be fixed “[…] in the 60% of the average salary, with a 
mechanism of revaluation that will assure better progress for the citizens’ purchasing 
power” (IU, 2014, p. 12). Concurrently with the European minimum wage, the IU 
calls for the institution of a European minimum income that would guarantee a 
dignified life to European citizens. In relation to the tax reforms, the IU proposes the 
creation of a European corporate tax, sought to stop fiscal competitiveness between 
Member States (IU, 2014, p. 14).  Finally, the IU calls for the emancipation from the 
financial markets. Amongst the measures sought to establish such emancipation, the 
IU calls for the democratisation of the ECB through its control by the European 
Parliament that would have the role of supervising its activity and nominate its 
directorate (IU, 2014, p. 16).  
 In relation to the policies sought to address issues of democracy, rights, and freedoms, 
the IU presents several proposals. The party commences its analysis by presenting the 
neoliberal project of the EU as a counterrevolution. Concurrently, the severe financial 
crisis has laid bare the hidden face of the European project (IU, 2014, p. 22). This 
process resulted in “[…] national sovereignty effectively moved from national 
constitutions to institutional forms with a new role such as the EC, the ECB, and the 
IMF- the troika” (IU, 2014, p. 22). Given this negative evaluation of EU’s current state 
of affairs, the IU proposes several policies sought to address the issues raised 
previously. Amongst those, one comes across the call for a Constitutive European 
Assembly elected by universal suffrage. This assembly would have, then, the role of 
                                                
40 Here we could suppose a possible influence of Yanis Varoufakis’ theoretical work. Indeed, 
Varoufakis was amongst the most avid supporters of the creation of Eurobonds, as a means of exiting 
the vicious circle of the financial crisis. For more on this matter, see (Varoufakis, 2015).  
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determining the democratic architecture of European institutions (IU, 2014, p. 23). 
Concurrently, the IU proposes the modification of the regulation regarding the 
European Citizens’ Initiative. Indeed, the party calls for “the European Citizens’ 
Initiative to be transmitted through the European Parliament and not through the 
Commission, and incorporate the possibility that the citizens’ initiative could be put 
to a referendum vote, once it reaches a specified minimum support” (IU, 2014, p. 23). 
In addition to this, the IU proposes a stricter regulation of the interest groups and 
lobbies operating close to the European Parliament, as well as the empowerment of 
the European Parliament viewed as “[…] the only democratically elected structure by 
the European citizenry” (IU, 2014, p. 23). In relation to regional integration, it is 
worthwhile noting that the IU chose to quote in its political programme Alexis Tsipras’ 
idea on a Southern European alliance presented in his 2013 article in El Pais41.  
 In attempting an initial evaluation to IU’s answer to the communist dilemma, this 
thesis argues that IU’s programmatic positions appear to be entirely coherent to the 
party’s political and ideological texts. Regarding the party’s programmatic positions 
vis-à-vis the process of European integration, we could argue that the IU has 
maintained its critical and concurrently constructive approach. Thus, we could verify 
that the party has chosen ideological consistency over moderation/pragmatism. 
Regardless of the change in the intraparty balance of power, IU’s distinct left 
Europeanism has been solidified by the financial crisis affecting the EU, and this is 
echoed in the party’s programmatic positions.  
 To be able to compare the policies of the IU to the ones proposed by the EL, this 
thesis will analyse the Europarty’s programmatic positions, as published during its 
latest congress. Indeed, EL’s political resolution concludes by proposing four policy 
pillars sought to address the devastating effects of  the crisis on the European project. 
The first pillar relates to employment, social, ecological and solidarity development. 
Defending and developing the public-sector features amongst the proposed policies of 
the EL, alongside the launching of new employment programmes sought to tackle 
unemployment. In addition to this, the EL proposes the restoration of minimum wages 
and pensions. Furthermore, the party states that “every single country should be able 
to increase wages and the level of social protection” (EL, 2013, p. 11). The second 
pillar regards the emancipation from the financial markets. Under this pillar, the EL 
                                                
41 For more see, Tsipras (2013), as well as the leadership factor in the chapter relating to Syriza. 
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“advocates the immediate organisation of a European convention on public debt, 
which will decide on the abolition of the biggest part of the – unsustainable – public 
debts of over-indebted countries, along with revised repayment terms, such as a 
growth-clause” (EL, 2013, p. 12). Following its proposal regarding the European 
sovereign debts, the EL calls for the democratisation of the ECB, as well as the 
creation of a novel European institution, which would have the role of promoting 
public investments. Moreover, the EL proposes several radical changes in the 
European tax system. Such changes would aim on addressing issues of social justice 
in the Union. The third pillar relates to issues of popular sovereignty and democratic 
development. Here, the EL proposes many policies sought to promote institutions of 
participatory democracy at a European level. In addition to this, the EL proposes the 
further development of the European Citizens’ Initiative. The fourth and final pillar 
relates to peace and cooperation among peoples. Here, the EL calls for the abolition 
of the Schengen Treaty, as well as the abolition of FRONTEX. Furthermore, it calls 
for new economic and trade relations with the rest of the world, based on EL’s firm 
belief that “security is built through development” (EL, 2013, p. 13).  
 The comparison between IU and EL’s programmatic positions leads us to the 
conclusion that the parties present a high degree of convergence. Indeed, the parties’ 
policies regarding the issue of the sovereign debt are completely coherent, as they both 
appear to favour the cancellation of a significant part of the countries’ sovereign debt. 
The parties’ programmatic policies appear harmonised also regarding the paths that 
would help the EU exit the crisis. The importance of the public sector’s role is stressed 
alongside the necessity of an autonomous EU institution that would finance public 
investments sought to tackle the rising unemployment in the EU. Furthermore, both 
the EL and the IU appear to have very consistent, almost identical views, with regards 
to the creation of a European minimum wage, guaranteed income, and pensions. 
Finally, both the EL and the IU place a significant salience on issues relating to the 
democratisation of European institutions, both at an economical level as well as at a 
political one. Both parties, indeed, stress the importance of a democratic control over 
the ECB, as well as the strengthening of the powers of the EP and the institution of 
the European Citizens’ Initiative.  
 In attempting a conclusion to the above, we could argue that the IU’s critical yet 
constructive stance towards the process of European integration was maintained also 
at the level of programmatic positions. At the same time, the IU has responded to the 
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dilemma posed by European integration by maintaining its ideological consistence. 
Regarding the degree of harmonisation between EL’s and IU’s programmatic policies, 
we could argue that it appears quite high. The two parties’ programmatic positions are 
based on shared axioms and their formulation is very similar. In some areas, such as 
the democratisation of the ECB, the empowerment of the EL, and the institution of a 
European minimum wage, the two parties’ policies appear almost identical. 
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VI. The Italian Rifondazione Comunista 
 
 
 
1. From PCI to Rifondazione Comunista and Partito Comunista d’Italia: The 
Historical Path of the Italian Radical Left 
 
 Among the party-members of the EL in Italy, one comes across the Partito della 
Rifondazione Comunista (PRC), which is a full member of the EL, and the Partito dei 
Comunisti Italiani, now known as the Partito Comunista d’Italia (PCdI)42, which is 
an observer member of the EL. As with the overwhelming majority of the Italian left-
wing political formations, both parties constitute political by-products of the chain 
reactions that followed the disintegration of the historical Partito Comunista Italiano 
(PCI). The PCI constitutes without any doubt one of the most historic European RLPs, 
and has seen amongst its ranks several important figures of the Western European 
Communist movement, including Palmiro Togliatti, Antonio Gramsci, Enrico 
Berlinguer, and Pietro Ingrao. In fact, the PCI assumed a primary role in the modern 
history of the Italian state, during the Second World War. The party played a very 
significant role in the resistance against the German occupying forces, as well as the 
fascist Italian forces. The party’s leader, Palmiro Togliatti, opted for the collaboration 
of the communist partisans with the democratic Catholic, liberal, and socialist forces, 
and subsequently had a prominent role in the creation of the institutions of Italy’s first 
Republic. The PCI remained faithful to the political direction of the CPSU and the 
COMINFORM up until the late 1950s43. Under the leadership of Palmiro Togliatti and 
most importantly of Enrico Berlinguer, the PCI gradually became autonomous from 
the CPSU. Berlinguer’s leadership brought about the so-called historical compromise 
[compromesso storico] with Italy’s Christian Democrats (DC). Concurrently, under 
the guidance of Berlinguer the PCI was at the forefront of the Eurocommunist 
movement. In 1976, the PCI reached its electoral peak managing to achieve an 
impressive 34.37% electing 344 MPs between the country’s Senate and Camera 
                                                
42 The recent name change is undoubtedly an attempt to revive the memories of the historic PCI. Indeed, 
PCI’s original name in 1926 was Partito Comunista d’Italia.  
43 Indeed, the PCI remained a member of the COMINFORM up until its dissolution in 1956. For more 
on the PCI’s relationship with the CPSU during the period under question here see, Salvati (2003) and 
Amyot (1990). 
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(Ministero Interno, 1976). Following the end of the dissolution of the USSR and the 
fall of the Berlin wall, the PCI decided its own dissolution in 1991. 
 In order, thus, to be able to assess PRC’s response to the process of European 
integration, it is necessary to present a historical introduction to the political processes 
that led to their creation. In addition to the importance of the historical process per se, 
the pivotal role of the PCI for the creation of the Eurocommunist movement, renders 
a brief historical overview of its path from the late 1960s onwards all the most 
important for this thesis. As a result, the proceeding historical overview, will involve 
the years ranging from the Berlinguer era to the PCI’s dissolution in 1991 and the 
subsequent constitution of the Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS) [Democratic 
Left Party]44. Following the dissolution of the PCI in 1991, the historical overview of 
the present thesis will relate to the, at the time, newly founded PRC, and its political 
path up until the present day. As a result, the historical overview could be synthesized 
in the following manner: 
 
A. Berlinguer, the compromesso storico, and the Eurocommunist movement 
B. The end of the PCI and the creation of PRC 
C. PRC; the Bertinotti-Cossutta era 
D. PRC: Opening to the social movements and the European Left  
E. PRC: From a government ally to the Altra Europa con Tsipras 
 
  
                                                
44 Becoming, thus, the predecessor of the current Democratic Party.  
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a. Berlinguer, the Compromesso Storico, and the Eurocommunist Movement 
 
 Enrico Berlinguer was elected secretary of the PCI in 1969, during the party’s 12th 
Congress. At the time of Berlinguer’s election, the party was gaining momentum both 
in terms of its vote-share and with regards to its presence and linkage with the 
increasingly modernised Italian society. Despite being the unofficial winner of the 
1968 elections, the PCI was excluded from any possible involvement in government. 
In addition to the party’s electoral success, the PCI took another major step towards 
its stance vis-à-vis the USSR, a step that would aid it in paving the way to becoming 
a real office contender. The gradual detachment from the USSR, which was initiated 
with the PCI’s subtle denouncement of the events in Prague, meant that the party was 
slowly becoming more accepted inside the Italian political system. Indeed, amid the 
Cold War it was rather unthinkable for a Communist party with links to the USSR to 
become a real contender for office in a Western country. The path, nevertheless, that 
would bring about the complete autonomy of the PCI was still long, as the party 
circumscribed its dissent from the USSR regarding the Czechoslovak question.  
 The event that most than anything else provoked a series of chain reactions inside the 
Italian society and polity was the so-called movement of 1969. This movement was 
the outcome of a series of social changes that were taking place at the same time in 
most Western European countries. The industrialisation and interconnected economic 
boom led the younger generation to realise that morals and institutions needed to 
undergo a substantive liberalisation. In other words, the younger generation of the 
Western European countries was beginning to hold post-modern values that were in 
almost complete antithesis with the inherently conservative values held by the political 
elites of the time. The PCI was taken by surprise by this and several party officials 
were almost bothered by a youth movement, which was extremely ideologised and 
that had the clear intention not to take orders from anyone (Rossanda, 2005). Inside 
this movement, new ways were being explored via the models of Mao’s China, Fidel 
Castro’s and Che Guevara’s Cuba. The PCI was still an important point of reference 
and it managed to maintain an open dialogue with the new generation that was 
rebelling (Agosti, 2000). The youth protagonism, to which the new workers’ 
protagonism was added, was objectively creating difficulties for a party that never 
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believed in the possibility that, autonomously and spontaneously, ample sectors of 
society could rebel and plan a better world (Grisoni & Portelli, 1977). 
 During the party’s 12th Congress in 1969, the Italian path to socialism was redefined. 
Considering the recent movement, the party sought to redefine this ever-important 
ideological point by proposing a strategy of reforms. In addition to this, the congress 
specifically stated the political objective of a left government, open towards the new 
tendencies inside society (PCI, 1975). The PCI, motivated by the necessity not to lose 
touch with the social opposition, managed to channel to an extent a part of the 
movement. A significant role was also played by the united front of the major trade 
unions such as the CGIL, the Italian Confederation of Workers’ Trade Unions (CISL), 
and the Italian Labour Union (UIL). Concurrently, the party managed to channel a part 
of the student movement, despite its majority’s position that the PCI’s moves towards 
saving the democratic organisation of the state were clearly ‘oppressive’ (Agosti, 
2000). Nevertheless, the PCI was unable to prevent the creation on its left of a political 
space known as the ‘extra-parliamentary’ left, which viewed the PCI’s stance as 
openly reformist. This fracture did not appear initially deep, as it was rather 
concerning a minority, but brought about consequences that overstepped the initial 
prognosis (Zavoli, 1992).  
 As shown from the electoral results of the following years, the PCI arguably benefited 
from the ’68 movement in the medium and long term, but in the short term its 
relationship with the governmental political parties did not change (Colarizi, 1998). 
In addition to this, conservative forces conspired in a rather obscure manner aiming at 
counteracting the inevitable change in Italian politics and society. In such a political 
context, the country faced the massacre of Piazza Fontana in Milan on the 12th of 
December 1969. A terrorist attack that still maintains unaltered its obscurity, was 
utilised by the more conservative sector of the DC and the governmental majority. By 
bringing forward the ‘theory of the opposing extremisms’, this sector tried to alert the 
‘properly thinking’ public opinion of what they saw as dangerous political changes 
(Mondadori, 1981). The massacre of Piazza Fontana opened in a way the period in 
Italian history known as the years of lead (Anni di piombo), a period characterised by 
the increased tension between the conservative and progressive parts of society, which 
took the form of political violence, political assassinations, and massacres such as the 
bombing of the Bologna Central Station. The period known as years of lead constitutes 
a highly-contested period in Italian history, characterised by many theories that 
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involve foreign intelligence agencies, Soviet spies, secret societies, and their 
interaction with the Italian organised crime. It is arguably behind the present thesis’ 
scope to shed light to this era, but it is necessary to highlight the importance of this 
highly contested period as it is still influencing the country’s political debate.  
 The advancement of the conservative forces meant that the PCI had to react. The 
party’s first response was given during its 13th Congress, in March 1972, from the 
newly elected general secretary of the PCI, Enrico Berlinguer. Berlinguer, in his 
introductory speech, called for a government of a ‘democratic turn’, which would be 
the outcome of the three principal popular currents; the communist, the socialist, and 
the catholic (PCI, 1975). In such a context, unity of the left-wing forces was a 
necessary but not sufficient condition. An additional turn came about in 1973 in the 
aftermath of the coup d’état in Chile led by Pinochet against the left government of 
Salvador Allende. Berlinguer, who was worried that even Italy could face similar 
dangers for democracy45, relaunched with an article in the newspaper Rinascita the 
plan for a ‘historical compromise’, an alliance, of the three most popular parties in 
defence of the democratic institutions (Agosti, 2000). Berlinguer saw in the DC not a 
monolithic and conservative party, but a political force in constant evolution, inside 
which there were both reactionary forces, as well as important popular elements that 
could, and should, be convinced to cooperate with the PCI. In the following years, the 
PCI’s leader continued to promote this political plan amplifying it and coming to the 
point to propose an alliance with the DC not only in defence of the institutions, but 
also in terms of programmatic agreement. This programme argumented that a PCI and 
DC-led government, welding catholic solidarity with communist struggles, could aim 
towards the overcoming of the system with the gradual insertion of socialist elements 
(Veltroni, 1994).  
 The first consequences of the Italian ’68 were seen in 1974 alongside the referendum 
for repealing the law on divorce, approved back in 1970. When the referendum 
campaign officially started, the PCI sided with the ‘No’ campaign with all its force. 
The ‘No’ campaign won by a large margin of 60 per cent against 40 per cent, 
demonstrating how much the Italian society had changed ever since the ’68 protest 
movement. The amount of non-politicised people, who mobilised for the ‘No’ 
campaign demonstrated, additionally, a popular willingness to participate in politics 
                                                
45 Seen the rather difficult internal situation evolving from the anni di piombo. 
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that could not be underestimated. The PCI, thus, managed to raise its membership 
during this period, becoming, in 1976, the party with the most members. The ‘left-
wing’ turn of the Italian society surfaced in a clear manner during the local elections 
in 1975, when the PCI found itself governing six regions. In fact, the PCI managed to 
overcome for the first time the 30% threshold. This led the party to believe that the 
argument of surpassing the DC in the next elections was now a plausible scenario.  
 At the party’s 14th Congress, Berlinguer in addition to abandoning the idea of Italy’s 
exit from the NATO relaunched the strategy of the ‘historical compromise’, 
prospecting thus a government that would democratically transform the Italian society 
(Berlinguer, 1989). At the same time, Berlinguer, given the immorality present in the 
Italian party system, sought to pose dynamically the so-called ‘moral question’, which 
was based on the recovery of the ‘sense of the state’ by both the parties and the political 
actors (Veltroni, 1994). Therefore, the PCI entered the campaign for the general 
elections of June 1976 conscious that the primacy of the DC was for the first time 
under threat. That led to the so-called ‘fear of the communist overtaking’, which 
affected the moderate electorate. Thus, the clear majority of the moderate votes went 
directly to the DC, which maintained its relative majority in the parliament. At the 
same time, the PCI reached its all-time high managing to secure the 34.4% of the vote 
share, failing, nevertheless, to endanger DC’s supremacy. The polarization of the two 
major parties’ electorate, which altogether represented three quarters of the vote share, 
rendered a government coalition between them necessary. A first official act of 
cooperation between the two parties came when Ingrao was elected President of the 
Camera. Notwithstanding the opposition of the US, the DC and the PCI, thanks to the 
work of their leaders Aldo Moro46 and Enrico Berlinguer accordingly, managed to 
come to an understanding for the formation of a government47 consisting of DC 
ministers under Giulio Andreotti, something that did not fully satisfy the PCI 
(Rossanda, 2005). Nevertheless, the accord between the DC and the PCI managed to 
break with the anti-communist prejudice and opened the path towards the government 
for the party after thirty years. The PCI arguably hoped that this was to be a first step 
towards assuming ampler responsibilities in the future. Nevertheless, the party found 
                                                
46 Despite not being the secretary of the DC, Moro was able to profoundly condition the party’s line. 
47 Such a government is known in Italian as monocolore (single color). Indeed, the PCI was not 
represented in the Ministerial Council. 
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itself in a difficult situation, where it bore the political responsibility without 
effectively having any political power, whilst pressures from the party’s electorate and 
members were becoming greater (Agosti, 2000).  
 The real problems for the PCI came from its left, where the break with the extra-
parliamentary wing that up until then was rather latent, became rather profound. The 
popular movement of 1977, led by the ‘Workers Autonomy’ network, criticized the 
PCI’s strategy in a rather harsh manner (Caminati & Bianchi, 2004). Indeed, the 
movement of ’77 saw the PCI’s strategy resembling the one applied by the socialists 
of the centre-left. The protest was also marked by symbolic moves, such as the 
expulsion of the general secretary of the CGIL, Lama, from the University of Rome 
in February 1977 (Caminati & Bianchi, 2004), as well as the extensive violence 
amongst protesters and the police in the country’s major cities. The growth of the so-
called ‘red’ terrorist groups complicated even more the political situation of the PCI. 
The party had to push the DC for more responsibility in the government, while at the 
same time assuming a responsible stance that would isolate the terrorists. When the 
PCI managed to come to an understanding with the DC that saw the PCI entering in 
the government, the most important terrorist group of the time, the Red Brigades 
[Brigate Rosse] (BR), attempted and managed to kidnap Aldo Moro (Zavoli, 1992). 
The kidnapping of Aldo Moro is without any doubt the gravest terrorist act of the 
country’s republican history (Zavoli, 1992).  
 Indeed, as the ‘national solidarity’ government led by Andreotti government was 
about to receive a vote of confidence, the BR were kidnapping the politician behind 
this accord, Aldo Moro, and after long and divisive, for the entire nation, negotiations, 
murdered him. The circumstances of the kidnapping and the final assassination of 
Moro are a highly-contested matter in Italian history48. Nevertheless, Moro’s 
assassination led the PCI in a rather difficult position from which it managed to 
disengage only in January 1979. The party’s 15th Congress that followed in April 1979 
aimed to address the traumatic experiences of the past years. Concurrently, the party 
launched the strategy of ‘the democratic alternative’ that would replace the ‘national 
solidarity’. Said strategy saw popular and catholic forces as the true protagonists 
(Berlinguer, 1989). Berlinguer reaffirmed the connection between democracy and 
socialism and linked, in a transformatory prospective, the PCI with other European 
                                                
48 Part of the aforementioned era of the years of lead. 
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Communist Parties, especially the French and Spanish one. This rapprochement 
between those parties took the name of Eurocommunism, that is a third way between 
social democracy and really existing socialism (Di Napoli, 1977).  
 Berlinguer’s ideas regarding the pan-European and internationalist perspective for the 
overcoming of capitalism could be seen to an extent to echo the political thought of 
Altiero Spinelli whose rapprochement with the PCI is arguably a personal success of 
Berlinguer. Indeed, Spinelli who ranked amongst the most influential European 
federalists and was the author of one of the most influential books relating to Europe’s 
federal future, Il Manifesto di Ventotene, was expelled by the PCI in 193749. The 
terrain above which this rapprochement took place is arguably constituted by the role 
that Spinelli assigned to the European Community and its institutions. Europe should, 
according to Spinelli, pave the way for the overcoming of socio-economic imbalances 
via the democratic and participatory dynamics taking place in its interior. This was the 
common denominator between Berlinguer and Spinelli. Their common belief in the 
necessity of the internationalist and more specifically pan-European dimension for the 
successful transformation of the society brought could be argued to be amongst the 
reasons for Spinelli’s inclusion in the PCI’s electoral lists for the general elections of 
1976 (Ferrari, 2007, pp. 212-214)50.  
 Despite there being several opposing views amongst Spinelli and Berlinguer, we 
could argue that they both were aiming at the democratisation of the European 
institutions that would go alongside their empowerment so that they would be able to 
address the economic crisis of the time. In addition to this, the empowerment of the 
European institutions would enable them to confront the growing influence of 
multinational corporations, to control capital, as well as thwart the environmental 
degradation. These issues, argued Berlinguer and Spinelli, pose the need of deep 
structural reforms that the nation-states are not willing to undertake. Thus, the need of 
a sufficiently legitimised pan-European entity had reached its peak. The four major 
axes of the refoundation of the European project were for Berlinguer the following. 
                                                
49 For more details regarding Spinelli’s expulsion from the PCI see, (Spriano, 1970, p. 167) and 
(Graglia, 2008, p. 122-123). 
50 Spinelli’s was subsequently elected in the Italian Camera, presiding over the Mixed Parliamentary 
Group. Following his election, Spinelli will be part of the Italian delegation in the European Parliament, 
where he became part of the Communist Group. 
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Firstly, the complete autonomy of the European Community from the US. Europe’s 
autonomy and empowerment as an international actor was present in Spinelli’s 
thought ever since the 1960s (Ferrari, 2007, p. 191). It is of importance to note that 
the notion of an autonomous Europe, free from the heavy influence of the US is still 
present in PRC’s political documents and constitutes one of the pillars of the party’s 
alternative view of the EU. Secondly, Berlinguer believed that the EC should aim on 
promoting growth and development in its less advanced regions and Member States. 
An opinion shared by Spinelli, who argued that the EC should create “[…] 
development initiatives for the countries and regions that are underdeveloped […]” 
(Spinelli, 1987) Thirdly, as mentioned above the democratisation of its institutions 
constituted a conditio sine qua non for the EC’s existence. Fourthly, Berlinguer argued 
in favour of the EC’s opening towards the socialist states of the East, as well as the 
global South (Ferrari, 2007, pp. 195-196).  
 Considering the first ever elections for the EP, Berlinguer noted regarding the EC, 
“we are aware that the process of European integration is being carried out […] mainly 
by forces and interest groups […] linked to capitalist structures that we want to 
transform […] Regardless, we should push towards Europe and its unity. This 
challenge […] should be accepted, bringing the class struggle […] at a European level” 
(Berlinguer, 2014, pp. 185-186). During his first speech as an MEP, Berlinguer 
recognised on one hand the important differences amongst the parties of the 
communist group in the EP. Nevertheless, he underlined the substantial convergence 
on fundamental issues: “the necessity to fight against the excessive power of the 
multinational corporations, to democratise the life of the EC; to affirm […] that the 
new Europe will be a guarantor of peace, cooperation, and progress, a Europe where 
socialism – with freedom – will be affirmed as the primary means thwarting the 
decline of this part of our continent […]” (Berlinguer, 2014, pp. 20-22). For 
Berlinguer, the political unity of Europe constituted the most important point, a 
political unity that could be achieved if Europe was to become more than a mere 
common market. In that case, the power would have to pass from the governments to 
the EP, elected by the European citizenry. For Berlinguer, thus, a return to the Europe 
of the nation states and its fragmentation would thwart economic and cultural 
development both in Europe and globally. We could attempt to summarise his view 
by arguing that a Europe of the workers and of the peoples is the only viable future 
for the continent. The theses could be argued to constitute the core of Berlinguer’s 
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Eurocommunist thought. Berlinguer’s persistence on the importance of the role of a, 
profoundly renovated, Europe could be argued to be directly linked to both 
Eurocommunism and to the subsequent alternative roads to socialism. A peaceful 
revolutionary process led by the unified pan-European working class movement 
constituted the most suitable path towards socialism and are arguably a response to 
the ever-changing globalising capitalism. The core of Berlinguer’s Eurocommunism 
can be argued to constitute the ideological base of the PRC, which will be dealt with 
in the first section of the following chapter.  
 
b. The End of the PCI and the Creation of PRC 
 
 The PCI’s final decade commenced with the snap elections of June 1979, when it 
witnessed a loss of four per cent. These elections constitute an important moment in 
the political life of Italy, as it was then that the PSI under the leadership of Bettino 
Craxi will initiate its march to power. Craxi and the PSI would later play a decisive 
role in Italian political life. The successful implementation of a wide network of 
corruption and connections with the Mafia would serve as a catalyst for the process of 
disassociation of the citizenry with politics. Under this lens thus, Craxi’s rise to power 
constitutes the end of the vivid Italian society that was arguably led by the PCI for a 
good part of two decades. Concurrently, Craxi’s network of corruption and interaction 
with the Mafia paved the way for the rise to power of Silvio Berlusconi. A young 
lawyer who utilised the network inherited by Craxi managed to create a financial 
empire and a political party that ruled the country for almost twenty years. 
Berlusconi’s unique perspective of politics is widely known in Italy as Berlusconismo. 
His network of private media outlets brought about a quasi-cultural counter-revolution 
that arguably led to an era of political apathy and the promotion of neoliberal values 
and individualism.  
 The PCI’s status was rendered even more complex, once the definitive rupture with 
the USSR became a reality in the early 1980s (Pansa, 1982). After having harshly 
condemned the invasion in Afghanistan, the coup d’état in Poland constituted the final 
act in the PCI’s relationship with the Soviet Union. Enrico Berlinguer, during a TV 
interview, declared that the ’thrust of the October Revolution’ was concluded 
(Veltroni, 1994). This declaration provoked an important fracture inside the PCI. 
Indeed, the Soviet-friendly faction of the party, led by Armando Cossutta, openly 
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criticised the majority’s decision (Cossutta, 2004). Berlinguer, in an attempt to exit 
the political isolation, tried to recover the party’s role as the protagonist of the social 
opposition, a role that was arguably deemphasized during the years of the ‘national 
solidarity’. The party, thus, tried to reconstruct its alliances with the popular masses, 
seeking for convergence with new social forces that were fighting for the renewal of 
the Italian society. Concurrently, the PCI attempted to reinstate its relationship with 
the party’s traditional social reference; the working class. Under this strategy, one can 
explain the fight against the installation of the Euro-missiles, for peace, and 
disarmament. 
 The PCI commenced to realise that society was changing and that the party, as it was 
at the time, was an inappropriate instrument to lead. The number of party members 
began to fall with the same rate as they grew up until 1976, leading many in the party 
to believe that it was the beginning of its decline. Enrico Berlinguer, nevertheless, 
continued to work towards the renewal of the party as well as the country’s political 
life (Berlinguer, 1989). During the party’s 16th Congress in March 1983, Berlinguer, 
in addition to emphasizing the reasons behind the rupture with the USSR thus 
reaffirming his democratic alternative, posed in the centre of his speech the ‘moral 
question’, a concept that was of vital importance for the restoration of the state 
(Berlinguer, 1989). 
 The elections for the EP in 1984 found the PCI involved in intense political struggles. 
The peace movement was proven especially successful, as the party managed to 
interact with sectors of society that were not traditionally close to its political positions 
(Colarizi, 1998). As the party was moving towards the elections of June 1984 with a 
rather positive prospect, Enrico Berlinguer died. The party’s leader fell ill during a 
political rally in Padua, and died three days later June 11, 1984 (Veltroni, 1994). The 
elections for the EP, in the wake of Berlinguer’s funeral, gave a posthumous 
recognition to Enrico Berlinguer (Veltroni, 1994). Indeed, his name was written all 
the same in the electoral card by more than 600.000 electors of the PCI. The elections 
for the EP of June 1984 constitute the first and last time that the party managed to 
secure the overall majority in the country.  
 Alessandro Natta was the successor of Enrico Berlinguer as General Secretary. Natta 
was an exponent of the Berlinguer centre wing inside the PCI. The party’s 17th 
Congress held in April 1986, found the party facing the previous year’s negative 
results. As a response to the crisis, the party’s leadership group attempted, thanks to 
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the decisive push by the so-called ‘meliorism’51 wing led by Giorgio Napolitano, an 
international repositioning of the party proposing complete detachment from the 
communist movement so that the party can become part of the socialist European left. 
The wing led by Cossutta, a well organised albeit minority group, strongly opposed 
such a proposition (Cossutta, 2004). Alessandro Natta, who carried on Berlinguer’s 
legacy, tried to maintain a balance between the two factions that only lasted for a few 
years (Agosti, 2000). Nevertheless, the PCI’s negative electoral trend continued and 
led to Natta’s resignation and led to the election of Achille Occhetto.  
 During the party’s 18th Congress in March 1989, Occhetto attempted to open a new 
phase for the PCI declaring the end of ‘consociationalism’, the recognition of the 
universal value of liberal democracy, as well as making numerous openings in regards 
to the capitalist system and to the ‘market’, which was seen as the meter of efficiency 
as well as the driving factor of the economic system (Agosti, 2000). Occhetto’s new 
path appeared to give immediate results, as the PCI managed to invert the negative 
electoral trend in the elections for the EP of June 1989. Concurrently, the ‘really 
existing socialism’ was disintegrating and the fall of the Berlin wall on the night 
between the 9th and the 10th of November 1989 was the catalyst for the changes in the 
PCI. Indeed, on the 12th of November 1989, Achille Occhetto was giving a celebratory 
speech in the historic PCI section of Bolognina, in the city of Bologna. There, in front 
a large crowd of former partisans, Occhetto made the so-called turn52 and announced 
a series of important changes. The party’s leader proposed a true and proper change 
of direction that preluded the overcoming of the PCI and the birth of a new party 
(Zavoli, 1992). This led to a series of intra-party debates and the dissent was this time 
notable and involved ample sectors of the party’s members. Important elite members 
such as Ingrao, Natta, Tortorella, and Cossutta completely opposed the change of 
direction. To reach a decision on Occhetto’s proposal, the party decided to hold an 
extraordinary Congress, which took place in Bologna in March 1990. During the 
                                                
51 ‘Meliorism’ (migliorismo), term proposed by Salvatore Veca, is a political view that was developed 
inside the PCI, by a group led by Giorgio Napolitano, Gerardo Chiaromonte, and Emanuele Macaluso. 
The term derives from the verb migliorare (to ameliorate/improve) and sustains that it is possible to 
improve the capitalist system from within, through several gradual reforms practicing social-democratic 
policies, which do not oppose capitalism in a violent or conflictive way. This wing of the PCI was often 
called the party’s right wing. 
52 A change that took the name svolta della Bolognina (turning of the Bolognina). 
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Congress, there were three counter motions: 
i. The first one bore the title ‘Give life to a constituent phase of a novel political 
formation’ and was Occhetto’s proposal. It called for the construction of a new 
democratic party, which would be pro-reforms, open to secular and catholic 
components alike, as well as overcoming the notion of democratic centralism.  
ii. The second motion bore the title ‘For a true renewal of the PCI and of the left’, 
supported amongst others by Ingrao, Angius, Castellina, Chiarante, and 
Tortorella. It called for a renewal of the party, both in terms of its policies and 
organisational structure, but without losing itself.  
iii. The third motion bearing the title ‘For a Socialist Democracy in Europe’ was 
proposed by Cossutta’s group and was constructed on a rather orthodox 
communist basis 
 The first motion managed to secure 67% of the votes, against 30% of the second 
motion and a mere 3% of the third one. Thus, Occhetto was re-elected as the party’s 
general secretary and the motion he proposed was confirmed (Agosti, 2000). The 
change of direction was completed when the symbol and the name of the new party 
was decided upon. The new formation would be known as Partito Democratico della 
Sinistra (PDS) [Democratic Party of the Left]. Its symbol would be an oak on the base 
of which the PCI’s symbol was to be present. During its last months, the PCI’s 
membership as well as its vote share collapsed. The party’s final Congress held in 
Rimini in February of 1991 is also considered the first congress of the PDS, and saw 
again the submission of three opposing motions. The first one was Occhetto’s proposal 
supported by many party officials including D’Alema. The second one was an 
intermediate one supported by Bassolino and the third and final one was the outcome 
of the consolidation between Ingrao’s and Cossutta’s motion. Ingrao and Cossutta’s 
motion ended up second securing 26.9% of the delegates’ votes, after Occhetto’s 
motion that secured an overwhelming 67.4% (Leiss, 1991). Thus, on the 3rd of 
February 1991 the PCI gave its place to the PDS. Several party officials that had 
opposed the change of direction, amongst those Armando Cossutta, Sergio Garavini, 
Lucio Libertini, Ersilia Salvato, Rino Serri and Nichi Vendola did not join the PDS 
and founded Rifondazione Comunista that was legally registered as a political party 
in the 25th of February 1991 bearing the name Movement for the Communist 
Refoundation.  
 The biggest part of MRC’s promoters were members and party officials of Cossutta’s 
 160 
faction that was already part of the PCI’s internal structure for over a decade.  
Regardless of PCI’s prohibition of internal factions53, Cossutta’s ‘group’ was well 
organised and had members at a national level (Bertolino, 2004, p. 145). It maintained 
close contact with members of the extra-parliamentary communist left in the country. 
Notwithstanding Cossutta’s personal ‘political and organisational capital’, his 
resources outside of his own restricted political space were rather limited (Bertolino, 
2004, p. 145). Cossutta’s faction was rather restricted and had the additional 
disadvantage of being viewed by outsiders as rather conservative, in an orthodox 
Communist sense. 
 Contrary to that, the group originating from Ingrao’s faction was much less coherent 
and organised, but was much more popular and could have been viewed as having 
more political potential than the group of the so-called ‘Cossuttiani’. It was, thus, upon 
them that the future political appeal of the new party depended. In addition to these 
two vast groups, the process of formation of the new party was developed through two 
more stages. The first one related to the merging in June 1991 of the minor, but 
arguably important, political formation of Proletarian Democracy (DP). The second 
stage involved the decision of the leadership of the Party of Proletarian Unity for 
Communism (PdUP) to merge with the newly founded party, even if several PdUP’s 
leaders had already joined Rifondazione in March 1991 (Martini, 1991).  
 MRC’s political life started with the constitution of a provisory executive body made 
of Cossutta, Garavini, Salvato, Libertini, Serri, Cappelloni, Torsi, and Valentini. 
Garavini was elected national coordinator of the newly founded party with a 
unanimous vote. On 9th February, a communist group was created in the Italian senate 
consisting of the MRC’s members that were previously elected via the PCI lists. In 
September of the same year, the Communist Party of Italy (Marxist-Leninist), (PCd’I), 
decided to merge with MRC. The PCd’I was created in Livorno in October 1966 from 
a group of PCI members that accused the PCI of revisionism with regards to the party’s 
political line. The issue under dispute related to the so-called Khrushchev’s report 
during CPSU’s XX Congress that denigrated Stalin (Monicelli, 1978).  
 The party’s first congress was held in December 1991. The Congress decided upon 
the change of the party’s name, which was thus to be called the Party of Communist 
                                                
53 The notion of democratic centralism was part of PCI’s organisational pattern until its dissolution in 
1991. 
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Refoundation instead of Movement. Moreover, it decided upon the institution of two 
superior party organs; the national secretary, and the president of the party. Sergio 
Garavini and Armando Cossutta were respectively elected. The National Political 
Committee (CPN) [Comitato Politico Nazionale] was decided to replace what was the 
Central Committee of the PCI. Another important organisational change, in 
comparison with the PCI structure, was the ‘legalisation’ of organised factions inside 
the party. A symbolic move that could be viewed as representing the party’s intent can 
be seen in the PRC’s membership card, where one could find a quote of Marx, 
“Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to 
which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which 
abolishes the present state of things” (Marx & Engels, 1968, p. 14). The party’s 
decision prioritized the fight against the institutional turn towards the right, the 
opposition to the institutionalization of the labour unions, and a firm ‘No’ to NATO 
depicted as an unholy alliance of the world’s wealthiest countries. The party’s 
intention to remain on the left of PDS was echoed again in October 1992, when the 
party voted against the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, claiming that with the 
treaty “an authoritarian Europe ruled by the central banks and military structures was 
born” (Fabiani, 1992, p. 2), a position that the party reiterated several times in the 
future, especially during the years of the severe financial crisis.  
 In April 1992, PRC took part in its first general elections. The party managed to secure 
a vote share equal with 5.6% in the Camera and 6.5% in the Senate (Ministero Interno, 
1992), a result that was viewed as a relative success, given that the party found itself 
in its first months of life. Notwithstanding the initial electoral successes, the party did 
not manage to heal from the rupture that was initiated in April and May 1993, when a 
proposal brought forward by Garavini to the party’s central committee was rejected 
by half of its members. Indeed, Garavini was seeking the immediate approval of the 
party on a motion that was thought to make of the PRC a unitary pole of the alternative 
radical left attempting to open itself up to several important figures of the Italian left 
that were leaving PDS. Amongst those, one comes across Ingrao and Bertinotti. This 
plan did not, nevertheless, enjoy a wide approval and led to the later resignation of 
Garavini from the PRC (La Rocca, 1993). Following Garavini’s resignation, the party 
remained under the direction of a collegial committee that would lead the party to its 
second congress (Bruzzone, 1993).  
 As mentioned above, the PRC was not the only political party under distress during 
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the second quarter of 1993. Indeed, the PDS suffered the loss of several important 
political figures, such as Ingrao and Bertinotti. While Ingrao did not demonstrate an 
interest in joining the PRC, Bertinotti decided to join the PRC to help in the creation 
of a “radical and anti-capitalist left, an aggregation capable to run for office in the 
name of a real [political] alternative”, as he declared (Caporale, 1993, p. 5). Bertinotti, 
thus, joined the PRC and was destined to become the party’s new secretary with the 
active support of Cossutta (Caporale, 1993).  
 
c. The Bertinotti- Cossutta Era 
 
 During the party’s second congress in January 1994, Fausto Bertinotti was elected 
National Secretary of the PRC and led alongside Cossutta the party to the elections of 
March 1994. Given the change in the Italian electoral system thought to promote the 
creation of wide electoral coalitions54, the PRC took part in the elections as part of 
coalition; the alliance of the progressives [Alleanza dei Progressisti], alongside the 
PDS, the Greens and other minor political forces of the wider centre-left (Verderami, 
1994). During the elections of March 1994, the alliance of the progressives lost the 
election to the coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi, who became, thus Prime Minister 
(Ministero Interno, 1994a). An electoral result that the PRC managed to maintain once 
again during the elections for the EP of June of the same year, when it secured the 
6.08% of the vote-share electing 6 MEPs (Ministero Interno, 1994b). Berlusconi’s 
government was, nevertheless, ousted before its first semester in office. A super partes 
government consisting of the rest of the parliamentary forces, apart from the PRC, was 
thus created. The decision on whether to support this government divided the party 
and led to the resignation of a group of dissidents, amongst those Nappi, Dorigo, and 
Garavini, from their respective roles in the party. In addition to this, several MPs 
signed a press release heavily criticizing the party president Cossutta. The final blow 
to the party’s unity came when in March 1995 when Dini’s government requested a 
second vote of confidence from the parliament. Indeed, the government received 16 
votes from the dissident PRC MPs and managed to remain in power (Camera dei 
Deputati, 1995). The party’s initial reaction was limited to the promise of an extensive 
internal debate, guaranteed by Bertinotti (Rosso, 1995). Nevertheless, in June 1994, 
                                                
54 A change that the party still holds responsible for the electoral demise of the radical left in the country. 
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Garavini, Castellina, and Magri alongside 14 MPs, 3 Senators, and 2 MEPs withdrew 
from the party to form the Movement of Unitarian Communists (MCU) (Ballardin, 
1995).  
 Regardless the internal schisms, the PRC managed to increase its vote-share during 
the administrative elections of April (Ministero Interno, 1995). Because of the growth 
in PRC’s support, the PDS and the rest of the centre-left coalition’s party members 
realised that an accord with the PRC could be decisive. Indeed, Bertinotti was 
favourable to the argument of a centre-left coalition government, to win the battle 
against the right-wing (Brambilla, 1995). The possibility of such an accord with the 
centre-left met significant resistance inside the PRC. Indeed, two hundred national and 
regional party officials sent an open letter to Bertinotti stating that “Rifondazione can 
and must represent an alternative left that contrasts the neoliberalism of the PDS […] 
a left alternative that ends up being the appendix, even if critical, of a majority of 
centre-left government would deny its own political raison d’etre reducing itself to a 
decoration” (Brambilla, 1995, p. 8). Notwithstanding the internal opposition, the 
PRC’s political committee approved the accord between the PRC and the PDS in light 
of the elections of April 1996, an accord that did not, nevertheless, involve the active 
participation of PRC in the hypothetical Prodi-led government (La Repubblica, 1996). 
During the general elections of 1996, PRC managed to obtain the best electoral result 
of its history (Ministero Interno, 1996). Following the pact made with PDS, the PRC 
gave a vote of confidence to Prodi’s government in the parliament, but did not take 
actively part in forming the PM’s cabinet.  
 The understanding between the Prodi-led government and PRC was thoroughly 
discussed during the party’s third congress that took place in Rome in December 1996. 
The political document brought forward by both Bertinotti and Cossutta and managed 
to obtain the overwhelming majority of the delegates (Ridondazione, 1996). The party, 
thus, opted for influencing the experience of Prodi’s government to enable the country 
to go through a reformatory process, signalling thus that it moved past the devastating 
events of the 1980s, as well as the disastrous neoliberal policies of the 1990s. The 
keywords of the congress were, as a result, radicalism, and unity (Ridondazione, 
1996). PRC’s experience in supporting the Prodi-led government risked being very 
short lived, when the PRC declared its unwillingness to vote in favour of the 
government’s budget for 1998. Intense negotiations between the PRC and the PDS 
initiated and an accord that would enable the government to remain in place for 
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another year (Caprara, 1997). Nevertheless, the events of the second half of 1997 
demonstrated that the political cohabitation of the factions close to Cossutta and the 
ones close to Bertinotti was rather difficult to maintain. Indeed, as Cossutta declared 
from October 1997 “[…] a dissent between me and [Bertinotti] was raising, something 
that was not due to our characters, but something different” (Zuccolini, 1997, p. 5). 
Indeed, the tension between the two politicians intensified, as their views on the future 
strategy of the party were quasi-antithetical. On the one hand, Cossutta found that the 
party’s tactics was bearing fruits and believed that the two lefts of the country55 could 
compete loyally (Cossutta, 1997). On the other hand, Bertinotti found that the party 
should open to the social movements and refrain from participating in a coalition 
government with the centre-left (Bertinotti, 1998) .  
 By March 1998 the relationship between the president and the secretary of the party 
became abysmal, as the dissent on the party’s role inside the centre-left government 
grew. By the time of the initial parliamentary discussion on the budget of 1999 the 
rupture between the two sides became inevitable. The final blow to the party’s unity 
was given in a meeting of the CPN held in October 1998. Bertinotti’s proposal to vote 
against the government’s budget, thus ousting the government managed to secure the 
majority of the committee, while Cossutta’s proposal on maintaining the negotiation 
with the government was supported by a mere third of the organ. Following this 
decisive vote, Cossutta resigned from the PRC. This led to the almost immediate 
creation of a new political formation; the Party of Italian Communists (PdCI), which 
joined automatically the PDS-led coalition known as the Ulivo.  
 
d. PRC: The Opening Towards the Social Movements and the European Left 
 
 The split of the PdCI pushed the PRC towards an opening to social movements, 
following the ideas of the party’s leader Fausto Bertinotti. While ideologically the 
party appeared to have become much more coherent and thus able to follow its leader’s 
plan, it was significantly weakened electorally and financially, because of losing a 
significant number of MPs and party officials. It could be argued, thus, that the split 
related more to the party’s officials, than the party membership, which according to 
the party data was in November 1998 around 110 thousand and on a steady growing 
                                                
55 The two lefts were made of the PDS (PD) and the PRC.  
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trend (Liberazione, 1998). During the party’s 4th Congress in March 1999, two 
political motions were put into vote. The first one supported by Bertinotti’s faction, 
the Bandiera Rossa [Red Flag] 56, as well as the significant number of the members of 
the Cossutta-led faction that opted to remain in the PRC (Rifondazione, 1999). The 
second motion was presented by the Trotskyist faction led by Ferrando (Rifondazione, 
1999). The motion presented by Bertinotti managed to secure the overwhelming 
majority and was, thus, approved (Rosso, 1999). The party following the congress 
made a turn towards the social movements, without closing its doors to the centre-left. 
As Bertinotti stated during his closing speech at the congress, “we must know how to 
be both radical and open. Open to other paradigms of interpretation of reality […] For 
this reason we address the critical left, as well as to the left that finds itself inside the 
civil society and the federal unions, but also to the sensible forces inside the 
governmental majority. We must aim at an articulated deployment of forces, not 
judged by its quantity but by the quality of its contribution […] With all these forces 
we must conduct a critical analysis and come reach a shared plan for action” 
(Rifondazione, 1999).  
 Following the congress in March 1999, the PRC faced its first electoral battle 
following the split. Indeed, the elections for the EP in June 1999 proved rather 
problematic for the party, as it lost half of its vote share. This decrease in electoral 
support can be only partially explained by the split of the Cossutta-led faction, as the 
PdCI only secured a mere 2% (Ministero Interno, 1999). The party’s leadership 
characterised this electoral result as completely negative. As a response to such a 
significant loss, the party decided to launch several forums and initiatives meant to 
attract social forces and movements that were not part of the political system. The 
party, thus, decided to prioritise its linkage with society over its institutional role of 
political opposition. As a result, the PRC became one of the protagonists of the Genoa 
Social Forum, a federation of anti-G8 groups. The clashes that took place in Genova 
and its young anti-capitalist participants showed the natural source of Bertinotti’s 
ideas for the party: the no-global movements (Bertinotti, 2001). The ideological and 
tactical mutations of the party were instilled in the 63 theses approved by the CPN of 
the party in December 2001, written by Paolo Ferrero.  
 The approved document led the party to its 5th Congress which took place in April 
                                                
56 A Trotskyist faction led by Livio Maitan. 
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2002. During his opening speech, Bertinotti stated that “the problem of creating a new 
political project, for creating an alternative social and democratic model that can 
become a governmental alternative, grounded on the two pillars of the opposition to 
war and the neoliberal policies. At the same time, we propose to refound politics, 
departing from its highest ambition: transforming the capitalist society” (Bertinotti, 
2002). The final political position approved by the overwhelming majority of the party 
was based on three pillars. The first one was constituted by the complete support of 
the anti-war movement, which was reaching its peak following the war on terror in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. The second one involved the opening to the plurality of social 
movements and the third one the intensification of the party’s efforts to re-found the 
labour unions.  
 It was, nevertheless, on another front that the party’s leadership was making a 
breakthrough by early 2003. Indeed, in March 2003 Bertinotti met with Ulivo’s 
leadership. Their meeting was synthesised by Bertinotti as “we must discuss today, to 
determine the political conditions that would render possible an alliance […] It was a 
meeting between different subjects that are destined to remain different. But this time 
the confrontation between us and the centre-left is made different and can be useful 
due to two novelties. Above all, the advancement of the movement that is changing 
the socio-political geography of our country. Secondly, the articulation inside the 
centre-left renders the position of Rifondazione not simply external […] The current 
situation has nothing in common with the centre-left of 1996 and 1998: ever since 
then, the world has changed” (Colombo, 2003). That was reconfirmed by PRC’s 
leader, when he stated that a deal based on programmatic convergence with the Ulivo 
was the only way forward. Bertinotti motivated the decision to ally with the centre-
left by stating that “there are, nevertheless two risks. The first one is to become a ‘left’ 
of the centre-left. The second one relates to being called out of politics, thinking that 
by now the alternative has won and thus we should limit ourselves to extra-
institutional practices. Both these paths are wrong and devastating […] We must, thus, 
aim on our political protagonism, even for contributing towards the overcoming of the 
internal difficulties that the movement is facing” (Rifondazione, 2003b). It was, thus, 
the advancement of the propositions brought forward by the social movements that 
constituted the root causes behind the party’s tactical decision.  
 In the meantime, in January 2004 that the Party of the European Left was born in 
Berlin. A Europarty for which Bertinotti had worked hard for with several leaders of 
 167 
European RLPs. On this regard, Bertinotti declared that “[the creation of the EL] is a 
break of continuity with the past that cannot limit itself in disowning Stalinism and 
Leninism, but that introduces the non-violence as an element of reform of communism 
itself” (Guerzoni, 2004, p. 14). Upon his return, Bertinotti would face heavy 
opposition for making such a commitment without prior consultation of the 
appropriate party organs. Regardless of the internal fragmentation in relation to this 
matter, Bertinotti would later state that “the significant dissent proves that the choice 
is truly innovative” (Gorodisky, 2004, p. 10). In March of the same year, the party’s 
CPN formalised the party’s EL membership and thus the PRC took part in the 
founding congress of the EL in Rome on May 2004, which unanimously elected 
Bertinotti as the Europarty’s first ever President. The importance that the party’s 
majority placed on the creation of the EL can be seen in the modification of the party 
symbol, which from March 2004 onwards featured a red banner bearing the name 
Sinistra Europea [European Left] on it.  
 Following the founding congress of the EL and Bertinotti’s election, the negotiations 
relating to PRC’s inclusion in the Ulivo coalition resumed. Nevertheless, the fact that 
an accord between the two sides seemed finalised, created further ruptures inside the 
PRC, as the issue was not properly discussed in the party organs. Despite the rising 
tension between Bertinotti and the party’s internal opposition, the party’s secretary 
appeared rather decisive regarding the PRC’s involvement in a future centre-left 
government. Indeed, as he stated during an interview in September 2004, “not me, but 
others qualified representatives of Rifondazione must certainly take part in the 
government. And not in secondary positions. I think that it would be wise to institute 
new ministries […]” while adding that “[…] communism must be reinvented” (Mafai, 
2004). The accord between the forces of the centre-left and PRC were concluded in 
October 2004, when all the parties of the Ulivo decided to enlarge the coalition and 
admit the PRC. The new coalition took the name Great Democratic Alliance (GAD) 
[Grande Alleanza Democratica], which would later take the name the Union 
[L’unione] (Casadio, 2004). 
 The party held its 6th Congress in March 2005 during which the internal debate was 
monopolised by the party’s electoral strategy. Bertinotti opened the works of the 
Congress by declaring that this would be his last term as secretary of the party, as the 
party needed a generational change (Rifondazione, 2005d). Bertinotti responded to the 
accusations that the PRC was becoming increasingly less communist this way: “in this 
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party one speaks frequently as if he or she was the only communist. In this party we 
are all communists, rather it would be necessary to remember that there is no shortage 
of that as in Italy there are two parties that claim to be communist parties and perhaps 
a useful question would be why we are here and not there. My response to this question 
is a new question. I ask all you, what would we be without all this so-called change, 
without the rupture with Stalinism, without the choice of Genova and the movement, 
without the critique of power, without the non-violence, without the European left, 
without the proposal of the alternative left?” (Rifondazione, 2005a). Bertinotti was 
subsequently re-elected as secretary of the PRC having against him a united front of 
all the opposing factions.   
 The PRC entered, thus, the final negotiations relating to the coalition’s governmental 
programme very much divided. Indeed, the finalised programme was initially not 
signed by the PRC that only managed to secure a minimum of consensus after months 
of internal debates. It was clear by then, thus, that Bertinotti’s vision was not 
compatible with the growing internal opposition. Something that led to the inevitable 
rupture and crisis inside the PRC. Indeed, Bertinotti’s ideas were clear in his brief 
speech during the presentation of the electoral lists in March 2006. Indeed, on that 
occasion he stated that “we are need of a process of revisionism, that is to re-think our 
whole history, to be able to place in the centre of our debate not the work but the 
workers. To substitute in this way the concept of ‘class’ with the ‘person’ […] the 
party should, thus, overcome Marx and place inside of its internal discourse new 
elements, such as the community, the person, and freedom” (La Stampa, 2005). To 
this the party’s secretary added, “I understand that my party, Rifondazione, is not 
enough. Thus, we open ourselves to the associations, movements, the people that have 
moved towards the left in recent times, against war, against neoliberalism […] but 
those people would never be part of a party that calls itself communist. For this reason, 
I declare myself ready to enter in a novel political subject, a party that will pose as an 
objective to create an alternative European left” (La Stampa, 2005). This 
incompatibility of visions led as mentioned above to the inevitable internal rupture, 
which will be dealt with in the following part. 
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e. The PRC from a Government Ally to the Altra Europa con Tsipras 
 
 The party’s internal rupture continued in view of the general elections of April 2006. 
The coalition of Unione managed to win the elections, while PRC had very positive 
results (Ministero Interno, 2006). Following the elections, Bertinotti was nominated 
and later elected as the President of the Camera. As a result, the CPN of the party 
elected Franco Giordano as the new national secretary of the party in May 2006 
(Rifondazione, 2006c). In May 2006, the second Prodi-led government was sworn in 
and signified the first time that the PRC would actively participate in a government. 
The only minister from the PRC was Paolo Ferrero, Minister of Social Solidarity, 
while 7 more PRC members were named undersecretaries in a variety of ministries. 
The party’s participation, as was already evident from the times of the congress, raised 
the internal opposition and led to the split of the primarily Trotskyist faction led by 
Ferrando. The newly elected secretary Giordano immediately declared his intention to 
promote Bertinotti’s vision of a wider coalition of left-wing forces under the EL 
banner. According to Giordano such a move would not bring about the dissolution of 
the PRC, as the internal opposition was claiming. Indeed, as he noted the “approach 
of the EL does not pose a risk to the party’s existence and autonomy” (Rifondazione, 
2006a). During the following CPN in October 2006, the party’s majoritarian faction 
called for a party conference that “[…] would have in the epicentre two questions: 
why the PRC in the EL, which PRC in the EL” (Rifondazione, 2006b), as well as 
trying to prevent further internal schisms.  
 This conference came at a time of great pressure for the PRC which was supporting 
the coalition government. The decision of whether to continue to be part of this 
government divided once again the party, which found itself in an unprecedented 
situation of discord. As a result, the conference was not enough to prevent yet another 
split. It was, thus, this time the long-standing faction known as Erre (Critical Left) that 
decided to withdraw from the PRC. As a result, two main factions were present inside 
the PRC by June 2007. On one side, the faction close to Fausto Bertinotti that was in 
favour of the creation of a new left party, by merging the myriad of parties on the left 
of the PDS, thus overcoming both the PRC as well as the Italian sector of the EL. On 
the other side, there was a part of the majoritarian faction that was closer to the party 
secretary, Giordano, as well as the minoritarian factions that despite their differing 
views on various issues, were united in their support of a confederation that would 
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create unity on the left of the PDS, without, though, the dissolution of the present 
parties. In addition to the negative electoral results during the administrative elections 
of June 2007, the protest movement against the US President Bush’s visit in Rome, 
which saw most the party’s militants taking the streets, empowered the section of the 
party that was against the government involvement. During October 2007, several 
events served as catalysts for further reactions inside the wider Italian left, the most 
important amongst those being arguably the creation of the Democratic Party (PD) 
[Partito Democratico], which constitutes an evolution of the PDS without its more 
left-wing elements. Such an event rendered an approach between the forces on PD’s 
left much easier. Thus, the PRC, the PdCI, the Greens and the Democratic Left57 felt 
the need to constitute a unitary political platform. 
 The negotiations amongst the left-wing parties led to a unitary assembly that took 
place in December 2007. During this assembly, the PRC, the PdCI, the Democratic 
Left, and the Greens agreed to create a new federation that took the name ‘The rainbow 
left’ [La Sinistra l’Arcobaleno] that would unite them all under one banner (Rosso, 
2007). At the same time the government’s budget was approved by the parliament, 
nevertheless it was ousted as it lost the support of the Senate. The PRC declared that 
it would be open to the formation of an institutional government that would aim at 
modifying the electoral law, whilst not accepting the possibility of the inclusion to 
such a government of the right-wing parties. The attempts for the creation of an 
institutional government were futile, leading the PRC’s secretary to declare that any 
alliance with the moderate centre would no longer be possible, paving the path towards 
new elections.  
 The PRC took place in the general elections of April 2008 as part of the Rainbow Left 
coalition led by Bertinotti. The coalition was widely unsuccessful as it did not manage 
to reach the threshold for parliamentary representation. The reasons behind such an 
electoral defeat can be synthesized by the strong polarisation produced by the ‘fight’ 
between the PD and the right-wing coalition, the rising abstentionism of the electorate, 
as well as the loss of a significant number of votes to other minor political formations 
(Carugati, 2008). Following the electoral defeat, Bertinotti declared his retirement 
                                                
57 The Democratic Left (Sinistra Democratica) was founded in 2007 from a group of PDS dissidents 
that opposed the creation of the PD. The party was subsequently dissolved in 2010, when it became 
part of SEL. 
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from positions of political direction. Concurrently, the PRC’s secretary Giordano 
resigned from his position. The party was thus to be led by a committee of 12 
members, which would eventually stir the party to its 7th Congress, which took place 
in July 2008. During the congress, five motions were submitted to the delegates’ vote, 
demonstrating the existence of a significant internal debate, especially given the 
direction that party took in the years leading to its congress. Candidates for the PRC’s 
secretariat were Nichi Vendola, President of the Apulia region, supported by the 
majority of the party’s former leadership, and the former minister, Paolo Ferrero. 
Ferrero was supported by both members of the former leadership, as well as by most 
the party’s left-wing opposition. Vendola was in favour of the attempts for the creation 
of a new political formation in the left, while Ferrero supported the defence of the PRC 
and of its original political project. Ferrero was ultimately elected secretary of the PRC 
securing 51 per cent of the votes, thanks to the support of all three of the party’s left-
wing factions (Corriere della Sera, 2008). The newly-elected secretary synthesised his 
view stating that “Rifondazione exists now and will continue to do so tomorrow, we 
must re-launch a social opposition to Berlusconi’s government and maintain more 
autonomy from the PD” (Corriere della Sera, 2008). 
 In September 2008, the party elected the new members of its political committees. 
The party’s leadership sought to initiate a new period of social fights that would bring 
the PRC again amongst the protesters in the streets of the country. Regardless of the 
attempts of a unitary leadership of the party, the newly founded faction led by 
Vendola, Rifondazione per la Sinistra (RPS) initiated a fierce political fight with the 
party’s leadership, which it accused for an attempt to cancel the ideological and 
political changes that were brought about by Bertinotti’s leadership. The tension 
between them became unbearable and as a result the clear majority of the faction’s 
members of the party’s political directorate resigned in January 2009 (Rosso, 2009). 
Only weeks later, Vendola declared his resignation from the PRC that paved the way 
for the creation of the Movement for the left, which later took the name Sinistra 
Ecologia e Libertà (SEL) [Left, Ecology, and Liberty] (Buzzanca, 2009). Bertinotti 
declared that he would not continue to be a member of the PRC, but he would, 
nevertheless, not become a member of the Movement for the left, despite deciding to 
politically and morally support it.  
 Following the split, the party had to prepare itself for the upcoming elections for the 
EP of June 2009. The PRC had to face one more obstacle, given the approval of the 4 
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per cent threshold for representation at the EP. As a result, the PRC intensified its 
negotiations with other left-wing political forces, in order to create a ‘communist and 
anti-capitalist’ coalition that would “promote a coalition for the upcoming elections 
for the EP that departing from the presentation of the symbol of PRC-EL, shares the 
choice of membership at the GUE-NGL, and that unites all the anti-capitalist, 
communist, left-wing forces on the basis of the alternative contents to the Lisbon treaty 
and to the neoliberal and militarist imposition in the EU” (Rifondazione, 2009c). The 
negotiations led to a pact with the PdCI (Bartocci, 2009). The coalition was officially 
launched in Milan, in presence of Lothar Bisky and Alexis Tsipras, something that 
indicates both the importance of the wider European left for the creation of this 
coalition and vice versa. The results of the elections for the EP were disappointing for 
the Anti-Capitalist Coalition, as it did not manage to reach the threshold for 
representation in the EP (Ministero Interno, 2009). Following the disappointing result, 
PRC’s secretary, Ferrero, resigned from his position, but saw his resignation being 
rejected by the party’s CPN. 
 Despite the electoral defeat, the political forces that were united in the electoral 
coalition decided to create the Federation of the Left [Federazione della Sinistra] that 
can be viewed as a strong indication of the increasing Europeanisation of the Italian 
left, as indicated in the content of the coalition’s pan-European objectives. The 
federation, Partito della Rifondazione Comunista/Sinistra Europea-Partito dei 
Comunisti Italiani, better known as the Federation of the Left (FdS) was officially 
launched in December 2009 as a federation uniting “[…] people of the left, of the 
labour unions, of feminist organisations, of the LGBT movement, as well as the peace 
movement […]” (Rifondazione, 2009b). The party-members of the FdS were united 
in their opposition “[…] to neoliberal and technocratic Europe and to the government 
of the ‘great coalition’ made of European socialists, populists, and liberal democrats 
that has up until now dictated the construction of the EU. We fight with the social 
movements and the political forces of transformation of the European continent for 
another Europe” (Rifondazione, 2009b). The FdS “is entirely a member of the GUE-
NGL that unites communist, anti-capitalist, left socialist and ecologist parties, as well 
as a member of the EL” (Rifondazione, 2009b).  
 The PRC’s 8th Congress was held in the Autumn of 2011. The congress was 
articulated in the discussion of three motions. The first one, Uniting the alternative 
left-exiting from the capitalist crisis [unire la sinistra d’alternativa, uscire dal 
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capitalismo in crisi], was the outcome of a compromise amongst most the internal 
factions of the party, thus securing the support of the overwhelming majority. 
Amongst the motion’s central points, one comes across the political proposal of a 
democratic front against the right, which would be implemented in the form of an 
electoral, and not political or governmental accord to beat Silvio Berlusconi. Such a 
front would aim at aiding the return of the communists in parliament, without, 
nevertheless, them being tied to a future government of the centre-left (Rifondazione, 
2011a). 
  Indicative of the party’s critical view of the interim government led by Mario Monti, 
supported by both the centre-left and the centre-right, was Ferrero’s remarks during 
the congress. Indeed, Ferrero declared that “we must construct alternative proposals: 
the opposition to Monti’s government must be made by presenting an alternative to 
everything that the government proposes” (Rifondazione, 2011a). 2012 was marked 
by a firm opposition to the Monti-led government, which brought a rise in the PRC’s 
support during the administrative elections of September 2012 (Ministero Interno, 
2012). Despite the moderate success of the party members of the FdS, the relationship 
between them started to worsen considering the primary elections of the centre-left 
with the participation of the PD, PSI, SEL and of the Democratic Centre. The PRC 
declared that it found itself far away from the political positions of the centre-left, 
while the PdCI took part in the primaries supporting Nichi Vendola in the first round 
and Pier Luigi Bersani in the second and final round, refusing, thus, the proposal of 
Ferrero to convene a referendum on that matter amongst the members of the FdS 
(Collini, 2012). This event signified the beginning of the end of the FdS that was 
formalised in late 2015. 
 In light of the general elections of 2013, the PRC was amongst the promoters of 
diverse political initiatives that started in December 2012 aimed at creating a pole of 
left-wing forces that would be able to run independently. In December 2012, Antonio 
Ingroia58 announced that he would be the PM candidate of the coalition that would 
take the name Rivoluzione Civile. The coalition was made of the PRC, the PdCI, the 
Greens, the IdV (Italia dei Valori) and other minor political movements. The result of 
the general elections of February 2013 were disastrous for the coalition, as it remained 
without parliamentary representation (Ministero Interno, 2013). The PRC entered 
                                                
58 A magistrate very well known for his battle against mafia. 
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subsequently in a period of profound crisis. The party’s secretary resigned from his 
position immediately. The CPN of the party rejected once again Ferrero’s resignation, 
and called for an extraordinary party congress to be held by the end of 2013 
(Rifondazione, 2013a). During the party’s 9th Congress, the PRC reaffirmed the idea 
of “starting a constituent process from below of the alternative left, that would be able 
to create an alternative against this Europe, the austerity policies and the Letta-led 
government. A process of aggregation of the left, autonomous from the centre-left and 
from the PD that has become a moderate party” (Rifondazione, 2013b) and re-elected 
Ferrero as the party’s Secretary.  
 Following the appeal of several important intellectuals of the Italian left that appeared 
in the historical left-wing newspaper Il Manifesto in January 2014 (Camilleri, 2014), 
the party’s new secretariat initiated the process of the creation of unitary coalition in 
support of Tsipras’ candidacy for the chairmanship of the EC. The PRC decided to 
formally become part of this grand unitary list after holding relevant votes amongst its 
members. 84.1% of PRC’s militants were found to be favourable to this grand 
coalition of the left in support of Tsipras’ candidacy, which took the name of L’Altra 
Europa con Tsipras [The other Europe with Tsipras] (Rifondazione, 2014b). During 
the elections for the EP of May 2014, the coalition managed to secure 4.04% of the 
vote-share, electing 3 MEPs (Ministero Interno, 2014). The PRC, thus, returned to the 
EP after 8 long years.  
 The PRC in the following months initiated a political process aimed at evolving 
L’Altra Europa con Tsipras to a unitary political subject of the wider Italian left, 
alternative to the Renzi’s PD. Nevertheless, the project was slowed down by internal 
disputes. Throughout 2014, the fierce opposition of the workers’ and students’ 
movement to the Renzi-led government created the necessary conditions for a 
rapprochement amongst the forces of the Italian left. Indeed, in January 2015 SEL 
organised a convention named ‘Human Factor’. All the country’s left-wing 
organisations were present there, from the labour unions to the PRC, the Lista Tsipras, 
as well as PD’s minoritarian left-wing factions. During his speech, SEL’s president, 
Nichi Vendola, launched the proposition of a coordination of left-wing forces to create 
an anti-Renzi front (ANSA, 2015). The PRC’s secretary, Ferrero, declared during the 
convention that “I think that today there is need for the left to be in government, more 
precisely there is a need for a left that can advance a concrete proposal of change here 
and now” (ANSA, 2015). In April 2015, the party’s fourth Conference took place in 
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Rome. The conference’s theme was to re-launch the party, to unite the anti-neoliberal 
left, and to stop the austerity in Europe. The conference’s final document was 
supported by a very wide majority. Ferrero in his closing remark synthesised it thus, 
“thus, there are three objectives to strengthen the party: firstly, to re-launch the 
communist perspective, secondly, to create a united left against and outside of the 
centre-left, thirdly, to create a mass movement against austerity in order to stop those 
policies that are destructing the life prospects of the Italian people” (Salvatori, 2015). 
The party is up until the time when this thesis was being drafted still working towards 
the creation of wider coalition amongst the left-wing forces. 
 
f. The Evolution of PCI’s and PRC’s Vote Share in the Camera, Senate, and 
European Parliament from 1968 to 1989 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of PCI’s vote share in the Camera dei Deputati 1968-1987. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of PCI’s vote share in the Senate 1968-1987. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of PCI’s vote share in the European Parliament 1979-1989. 
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Figure 5: Evolution of PRC’s vote share in the Camera dei Deputati 1992-2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Evolution of PRC’s vote share in the Senate. Note that in 1994 and 1996 the party did 
not have candidates as per the agreement with the Progressisti coalition. Thus, in 1994 there is 
no data regarding PRC’s vote share in the Senate, and in 1996 the vote share is very close to 
zero. 
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Figure 7: Evolution of PRC’s vote share in the European Parliament. Note that the result of 2014 relates 
to the Altra Europa con Tsipras coalition. 
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2. Rifondazione’s Stance Towards the EU Over Time 
 
a. Introduction 
 
 To be able to assess Rifondazione’s stance towards the EU, the present thesis will 
apply the Johansson and Raunio theoretical framework, alongside the Communist 
dilemma as proposed by Charalambous (2013). The time frame refers, as per the other 
case studies, to the period following the creation of the EL in December 2004 until the 
present day. The framework relates to the close analysis of seven conditioning factors: 
party ideology, public opinion, party factionalism, leadership change, party 
competition, transnational links and finally the integration process per se. The first 
level of analysis views the party as one unit and thus the political documents under 
analysis in the present chapter are those that reflect the majority in party congresses. 
The second level of analysis relating to the machinations inside the party’s organs will 
be dealt with during the analysis of the party factionalism factor.  
 
b. Ideology 
 
 To assess the ideology factor in Rifondazione’s stance towards the EU several party 
documents adopted during the party’s congresses will be analysed in depth. The 
analysis will commence with the political decision of the party’s 6th Congress that was 
held in March 2005. In addition to this, the political documents approved by the party’s 
7th, 8th, and 9th Congresses held in 2008, 2011, and 2013 respectively will be analysed. 
As illustrated in the previous part of this chapter, Rifondazione was founded when 
several ideologically heterogeneous factions united in their opposition to the 
dissolution of the historic PCI. Their very heterogeneity led to many internal struggles 
and breaks. Despite the internal schisms, the party openly welcomed the existence of 
different factions, breaking with the tradition of democratic centralism. As a result, 
the party became a political space that united several divergent ideological traditions, 
creating a unique ideological blend that the present thesis will try to examine. 
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Rifondazione’s VI Congress 
 
 The first document under analysis here is the final political document produced by 
the party’s 6th congress held in March 2005. The document analysed here constituted 
the first out of five motions and was supported by the party’s secretary Fausto 
Bertinotti, bearing the title ‘the alternative for the society’s, a phrase that constitutes a 
constant in the party’s political decisions throughout the period under study. The 
document initially presents the case of a new political era that is characterised as 
extraordinary. It was the time, according to the PRC, to exit from the neoliberal crisis 
following a genuine left-wing agenda, being free from the ‘bankruptcy’ of reformism 
and social-democracy (Rifondazione, 2005e, p. 2). To be able to lead the way towards 
said exit, the party would need to change its strategy. This change consists in placing 
more relevance into the party’s linkage with social movements, focusing thus on the 
class struggle, instead of the institutions and the struggle amongst the political 
formations. Concurrently, the party should aim towards ameliorating its presence in 
the social struggles, as well as strengthening its organisational force (Rifondazione, 
2005e, p. 2). The document continued with a brief analysis of the political situation in 
the US and the European continent. With regards to the US, the PRC finds that Bush’s 
re-election in 2004 reconfirmed the crisis of both neoliberalism, seen as the 
representative of the unitary thought and guiding force of globalisation, as well as of 
a Democratic party that has accepted a more moderate version of neoliberalism 
rendering it centrist and ideologically insignificant (Rifondazione, 2005e, p. 2). At the 
same time, Bush’s re-election was an indication of capitalism separating itself from 
the liberal values and re-discovering the pre-modern values of God, Country, and 
Family. This was seen by the PRC as a reactionary choice coherent with the neo-
fundamentalism that accompanies said ideology. From an economical perspective, the 
policies implemented by Bush were characterised by the complete privatisation of 
public services, and market deregulation, which were opposed by the anti-
globalisation movement - a movement that the PRC should continue to support with 
all its power. The party concluded the analysis on US politics with a reference to the 
war in Iraq and throughout the Middle East and placed emphasis on the peace 
movement, which should be the PRC’s top priority.  
 As far as the EU is concerned, the party considered that it found itself at a crossroads. 
It could either choose to Americanise itself, or base its refoundation on the values of 
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the working-class movements and establish its true autonomy as a distinct political 
subject in the global arena59. The PRC considered that the current EU leadership, made 
of the elites of France, Germany, and Spain, is trying to maintain an ‘illusory’ balance. 
On one hand, political choices, such as the denouncement of the war in Iraq, echo a 
strong autonomy of Europe from the US. On the other hand, one finds their attempts 
to create a partnership with the US through dismantling the welfare state and its 
historical set of rights and guarantees (Rifondazione, 2005e, p. 2). According to the 
PRC, the EU via the constitutional treaty intends to establish the legal primacy of the 
market, while at the same time stripping peace and social rights from its identity. If 
the EU were to follow this path, it would never manage to exit its own crisis of identity. 
As a result, the PRC calls for a struggle against the treaty, a struggle that would be a 
political and a cultural one. The only alternative for the PRC is “[…] the other Europe, 
where one finds the initiatives of the movements, the growth of the social and mass 
struggle, and the mobilization of the non-partisan intellectuals” (Rifondazione, 2005e, 
p. 2). To this end, the creation of the EL appears to play a very important role. The 
party declared that it would invest an essential part of its work and identity. The reason 
behind this is the importance of the unification of the political subjects that oppose the 
Americanisation of the EU at a pan-European level (Rifondazione, 2005e, p. 2). The 
party concluded its brief analysis of the EU by presenting its own version of Europe. 
An EU that is characterised by “[…] peace, hospitality, social solidarity, universal 
citizenship, secular democracy: without a strong left, this Union cannot be born” 
(Rifondazione, 2005e, p. 2). The analysis is concluded by the decision to incorporate 
the EL’s symbol to the official emblem of the party, assuming all the way the strategic 
choice of the EL.  
 Following the analysis of the US and European political status, the document 
presented fifteen theses that the party should consider in its path forward. The most 
important one concerned the linkage of the party with the plurality of social 
movements present both in Italy and at an international level. The movements are 
                                                
59 A constant ideological belief of the Italian radical left. The autonomous role of Europe during the 
Cold War was amongst the key theoretical positions of Spinelli, and was wholeheartedly supported by 
Berlinguer. Despite the end of the Cold War, the PRC remains attached to the idea of Europe serving 
as a bridge between the US and the East, especially given that the party views the post-2001 world 
order as bipolar. 
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bringing forward the transformation of capitalist society, something that the PRC 
deems as a current issue. As the document clearly stated, “the alternative ‘Socialism 
or Barbarism’ is not outdated” (Rifondazione, 2005e, p. 3). The linkage with the social 
movements constitutes one of the most reoccurring issues of the documents under 
analysis. The profound belief of Bertinotti that the future lays with the party’s 
interconnection with them could be argued to be one of the most salient echoing a 
strategic choice that according to the PRC was rewarded by the people during the 
recent elections for the EP. The results of the elections for the EP in their pan-
European dimension have demonstrated, according to the PRC, a profound discontent 
of the European peoples. This discontent could lead to an important advancement for 
the working-class movement, a movement that was the great protagonist of the 1900s 
but was finally beaten, especially in the states of the so-called ‘existing socialism’. 
Here, the PRC declared that the critique of Stalinism is not simply a critique to the 
degenerations of the Eastern European systems, but is aimed to address the root cause 
of this defeat, which according to the PRC is Stalinism. As a result, the critique to 
Stalinism constitutes the conditio sine qua non for the creation of the new idea of 
communism, as well as the means to achieve it (Rifondazione, 2005e, p. 3). This 
would lead to the creation of a new working-class movement that will overcome the 
defeat of the 1900s. The PRC declared this objective as the party’s raison d’etre 
(Rifondazione, 2005e, p. 3).  
 Alongside the critique to Stalinism, the party elaborated several ideological key 
points. Firstly, one comes across peace, seen not only as absence of war, but as the 
construction of a world system that breaks with imperialism and is based on the ideas 
of autonomy and dialogue (Rifondazione, 2005e, p. 4). The relevance placed on the 
idea of peace as well as non-violence constitute two more focal points of Bertinotti’s 
influence on the party’s ideology. In addition to peace and non-violence, the PRC 
stressed the importance of the incorporation of ecology and feminism and views the 
EL as an instrument of incorporating them (Rifondazione, 2005e, p. 4). The documents 
final theses related to the party’s strategy regarding its participation in a hypothetical 
coalition government alongside the PD. The party, indeed, declared that “in our 
strategy, being in a government is not a value choice but a dependent variable. Being 
part of a government is not, thus, the objective of the alternative politics, but it could 
be a necessary passage” (Rifondazione, 2005e, p. 4). The necessity of this strategy is 
imposed by the need to construct an alternative to Berlusconi’s dominance of the 
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Italian political life. The PRC proposes a governmental programme that will break 
with Berlusconi’s policies based on four important axes: 
i. The redistribution of income in favour of wages, salaries, and pensions 
ii. The introduction of a social salary 
iii. The extension of the social and personal rights that it would create a new form 
of universal social citizenship, guaranteeing the respect for the human being 
iv. The creation of commons that would be subtracted from the logic of the market 
through the public development of the environment, the territory, and culture; 
the constitution of a new public involvement in the economy that would 
innovate the economic and social model 
 The party’s decision concluded by stating that the party is undergoing an 
important period. The first breakthrough seen in the creation of the EL and the 
party’s role in it, could be followed by another one at a national level. Thus, a true 
reform of the party that would enable it to open even more to social movements 
and the ideological traditions of the critical school of thought could lead the party 
towards a more successful future.  
 
Rifondazione’s VII Congress 
 
 The 7th Congress of the party in 2008 came at a time of internal chaos, as Bertinotti’s 
decision to step down from the party leadership led to great instability. Concurrently, 
the party’s participation in the PD-led government served as a catalyst for the reactions 
of the left-wing internal opposition. Indeed, the party was led to its 7th Congress by a 
committee made of 12 members. After days of heated internal debate, it managed to 
elect Paolo Ferrero as the PRC’s new secretary, leaving Nichi Vendola second. It is 
worthwhile noting that despite the submission of five distinct motions, none of them 
managed to secure the approval of the delegates’ majority. The political document 
approved with 342 out of 646 votes, was rather brief and focused primarily on the 
strategic mistakes of the past three years Indeed, the title can present with a clear 
indication of intent: “starting again: a turn towards the left” (Rifondazione, 2008, p. 
1). It stated that it considered as closed and done with the era of cooperation with the 
PD. It characterised the party’s participation in the PD-led government as a complete 
bankruptcy, and considered that the former leadership’s management of the party’s 
direction to have been completely erratic (Rifondazione, 2008, p. 1). It then stressed 
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the importance of PRC’s political, cultural, and organisational relaunch, while firmly 
rejecting any possibility of the party’s dissolution or merging within a larger coalition 
(Rifondazione, 2008, p. 1).  
 The political decision, then, moved forward establishing the focal points of the party’s 
re-launch. Regarding the party’s identity, the document stretched the importance of its 
independence and autonomy from the centre-left coalition led by the PD. According 
to the document, the PD has demonstrated its complete inefficacy rendering, thus, the 
idea of re-building the centre-left coalition wrong. The party considered that if this 
were to happen, the PRC would be reduced to a subordinate position in the bipartisan 
competition between the PD and the right-wing coalition of Silvio Berlusconi 
(Rifondazione, 2008, p. 1). In reality, the party believed that it needed to create an 
opposition to Berlusconi’s government, “[…] combining the social, moral, and 
democratic question, from a position of complete autonomy to the strategic project of 
the PD, demonstrating our alternative nature to the centre-left” (Rifondazione, 2008, 
p. 1). Concurrently, the PRC declared its willingness to re-evaluate the idea of political 
opposition, as a means of reconstruction, and a process of working on the party’s 
linkage with the anti-capitalist and communist movements that oppose the 
government’s policies. The party should, thus, focus on finding common grounds with 
all these collectives and all those individuals that find themselves outside the political 
parties (Rifondazione, 2008, p. 1).  
 Regarding the party’s future tactics and strategy, the document refered to the primary 
importance of uniting the members of the working class. By overcoming the obstacles 
posed by the divisions between the North and the South of the country, the public 
servants and the private employees, as well as the division between migrant and Italian 
workers, the PRC states that only the re-launch of the class struggle would avoid a war 
amongst the poor that would spread racism and xenophobia (Rifondazione, 2008, p. 
2). The PRC, thus, aimed at becoming the political and social force that would unite 
the working class under one banner, bringing back the working class protagonism that 
the movement had experienced in the days of the old PCI (Rifondazione, 2008, pp. 2-
3).  
 Following the party’s national tactics and strategy, the document carried out a brief 
overview of its internationalist strategy. Regarding the international scene, the party 
found that it should place even more importance on its presence in the anti-
globalisation movement. Likewise, on its attempts to collaborate and work together 
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with communist parties, and revolutionary movements, especially in Latin America, 
which fight against neoliberalism, war, and military occupation (Rifondazione, 2008, 
p. 3). In relation to the EL, the party argued in favour of a reinforcement of those 
political forces that place themselves on the left of the European Socialists. According 
to the PRC, the EL and the GUE/NGL were the necessary platforms for the 
intensification of the professed unity. Thus, the congress voted in favour of the 
permanence of the EL banner on the party’s official emblem reiterating the decision 
taken in the previous congress in 2005 (Rifondazione, 2008, p. 3). The party’s brief 
political decision concluded with the proposal for the initiation of a theoretical 
investigation relating to the morphology of contemporary capitalism. The reason 
behind this proposal lied with the party’s need to understand the new class 
composition, as well as the forms of the class struggle organisation (Rifondazione, 
2008, p. 4). Indeed, the investigation and the interconnected debate were carried out 
in the PRC’s 8th Congress, which will be dealt with in the following paragraphs.  
 
Rifondazione’s VIII Congress 
 
The party’s 8th Congress was held in 2011, amid the financial crisis that was affecting 
the country. As mentioned in the previous part, the party’s 7th Congress had called for 
a theoretical investigation on contemporary capitalism and its morphology. The 
document produced by the 8th Congress bore those characteristics, as it provided us 
with several important ideological constants of the PRC. The document that was 
approved by the majority of the delegates bore the name ‘Unite the alternative left, 
exit from the capitalism in crisis’. The title arguably presents with a clear indication 
of the party’s intention, which was the creation of wider left coalitions, both in Italy 
and in Europe, as well as devising the way of the gradual transformation of the 
capitalist society and economy. The document is divided in seven chapters 
commencing with the actuality of the communist idea, the necessity of PRC in the 
struggle, the root causes of the financial crisis, the crisis in the EU, the crisis of the 
Italian polity, the future of the PRC’s political project, and the four axes of the party’s 
political programme.  
 In the first chapter the PRC identified the root cause of the financial crisis. Indeed, 
the party considered that the crisis was not accidental, but a direct by-product of the 
neoliberal globalisation process (Rifondazione, 2011e, p. 2). Never, noted the party, 
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had the contradiction between the demand for liberty and justice and the system’s 
incapacity to provide it been so evident (Rifondazione, 2011e). As a result, the PRC 
noted that “breaking the cage of the capitalist social relations is thus an urgency for 
humanity and is what we call actuality of communism” (Rifondazione, 2011e, p. 2). 
Nevertheless, the majority of society did not share this objective urgency. The party 
attempted to explain such a contradiction, and provided two underlying reasons. On 
one hand, the party highlighted the cultural supremacy of the neoliberal ideology. 
Indeed, the ‘unitary thought’ has managed to convince the clear majority of the people 
that capitalism is a natural phenomenon. On the other hand, the party emphasised on 
the bankruptcy of social democracy and the systematic demolition of the communist 
perspective that has been made possible via the reduction of the history of communism 
to the history of Stalinism. Thus, the PRC concluded that “we find ourselves in the 
presence of the objective maturity for exiting from the capitalist social rapports, while 
in front of a public opinion that has been colonised by an ideology that presents 
capitalism as the ‘end of history’ and any socialist alternative as barbaric and a step 
backwards” (Rifondazione, 2011e, p. 2). Notwithstanding these important obstacles, 
the PRC found that great hope lies within the anti-globalisation movements that made 
their first appearance during the 1990s, as well as within the Latin American countries 
that are struggling to create an alternative society (Rifondazione, 2011e, pp. 2-3).  
 During the second chapter entitled ‘the necessity of PRC’, the party attempts to define 
its relationship with communist history. It is via a careful study of the communist 
movement that the party will be able to find its proper role and raison d’être. The party 
initially highlighted the importance of the communist movement during the 20th 
century. The October Revolution is thought to have profoundly altered the balance of 
powers in a global scale by breaking the monopoly of the capitalist market. Because 
of the October Revolution, the dominant classes of the Western world were forced to 
make significant concessions to the working-class movement. Despite the political 
and historical merits of October, the PRC argued that it did not manage to avoid the 
profound process of regression and degeneration of the post-revolutionary societies 
that constitute the principal reason behind their demise (Rifondazione, 2011e, p. 3). 
According to the party, the necessity to refound the communist school of thought, 
practice, and politics emerges from the dialectic between the validity of October’s 
Revolution and the failure of the attempts of transition to communism (Rifondazione, 
2011e, p. 3). For this reason, the communist identity of the 21st century that the PRC 
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proposed implies a radical rupture with Stalinism, seen as a paradigm of transition, a 
conceptualisation of politics, and of party function. The creation of a credible 
revolutionary argument is, thus, subject to its discontinuity regarding the socialist 
experiences of the past.   
 The party then attempted to identify the most important elements of this negative 
heritage. The first one is the concept of the communist bloc, which is a state-centric 
concept that ended up sacrificing the interests of the international working class 
movement. The second one concerns to the dogmatic ossification of the communist 
theory that became an authoritarian method of analysis and scientific enquiry. The 
third one regards the heavily centralised industrial development that did in fact lead to 
a great economic development, while concurrently reproducing hierarchical relations 
of production. In addition to this, the centralised industrialisation did not manage to 
liberate labour and contributed to the further anti-democratic centralisation of the state. 
The final and most important element for the PRC is the reduction of socialism in a 
one-dimensional concept which is essentially reduced to getting hold and managing 
the political power. The PRC found that this erratic conceptualisation of socialism led 
to the distortions that affected the former socialist countries (Rifondazione, 2011e, pp. 
3-4). The PRC’s conceptualisation of the communist idea is constructed in such a way 
in order to take advantage of the positive heritage of the communist movement of the 
past, whilst avoiding the mistakes, as identified above. The fundamental elements of 
the PRC’s communist idea could be summed up as follows. 
 The first one relates to the necessary international dimension of the struggle. The 
creation of an international working class movement constitutes, thus, a necessary 
condition so as to be able to propose itself as an alternative to the process of capitalist 
globalisation. The second one involves the democratisation of everyday life. Here the 
PRC notes that there can be no communism without democracy and the interconnected 
civil rights. The third one views the socialisation of the means of production and the 
social and environmental reconversion of the economy as another pillar of the PRC’s 
communism. The creation of an economy where the right to work is guaranteed and 
the mode of production is subject to the protection of the environment are of 
paramount importance for the communist idea of the 21st century. To create such an 
economy, it is necessary to overcome the private property of the means of production. 
The means of production would, thus, become property of the society and would 
operate under its democratic control. Another important aspect of PRC’s communist 
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ideal is a process of de-commodification, which is antithetical to capitalism’s attempt 
to transform everything into a commodity. The PRC sustained that decommodify 
means creating values that could satisfy social needs that are no longer viewed as a 
demand for a product, but as the practice of an inalienable right. The process of 
decommodification would necessarily include the labour market, as it is via its 
decommodification that labour can ultimately be liberated from its exploitation. 
Following the important element of decommodification, the PRC stated the 
importance of feminism and the struggle against the patriarchy as founding ideas of 
the refoundation of the communist idea. These important concepts for the communist 
refoundation culminate in the liberation of all men and women, which constitutes the 
true ultimate objective (Rifondazione, 2011e, pp. 3-7).   
 Following the important enunciation of the party’s communist ideal, the document 
presented a brief analysis of the financial crisis, seen as a crisis of the neoliberal 
policies imposed on a global scale ever since the 1970s. Indeed, the extended 
deregulation of the financial markets, the gigantic processes of privatisation have led 
to the almost complete financialisation of the economy. This process has in its turn led 
to a gigantic centralisation of capitals and to the globalisation of the production of 
goods (Rifondazione, 2011e, p. 8). Indeed, the PRC regarded that the financialisation 
of the economy is the root cause behind the financial bubbles that, considering the 
growing market interconnection, has had effects at a global level (Rifondazione, 
2011e, p. 8). The party, thus, concluded that the system cannot be reformed. It noted 
that capitalism’s inability to reform itself is evident ever since the 1970s and as a result 
today more than ever the slogan Socialism or Barbarism is being proven right 
(Rifondazione, 2011e, p. 9). The PRC also considered that the capitalist production 
has brought about an additional crisis regarding the scarcity of resources. Under the 
lens of this crisis, the party analysed the growing violent conflicts at a global scale, as 
well as the rise of nationalisms (Rifondazione, 2011e, pp. 9-10).  
 Regarding the EU, the party highlighted the EU’s inability to counteract the effects 
of the global financial crisis. The PRC argued that the political union has no power 
over the ECB, which has led the Member States to become pray of the markets and 
financial speculation. The document proceeded with a heavy critique of the pillars of 
the present EU, which are seen to have constitutionalised the dogmas of neoliberalism 
(Rifondazione, 2011e, p. 12). The architecture of the EU as laid down by the 
Maastricht and Lisbon treaties is found by the PRC to have profoundly broken the 
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continuity with the original ideas behind the European project. Thus, the present EU 
is, for the PRC, the home country of applied neoliberalism, where the social model 
has been transformed from an inclusive one to an exclusionary one (Rifondazione, 
2011e, p. 12). The European technocracies have, according to the PRC, brought about 
a financial coup d’état. This has led to the weakening of the national parliaments, 
which are faced with the task of ratifying policy choices taken by institutions whose 
power is not democratically legitimised (Rifondazione, 2011e, p. 13). This has 
resulted in the ECB being able to finance private banks that are speculating against 
Member States, which in turn must turn to the financial markets for financing. The 
way that the ECB and the European technocracy have decided to tackle the financial 
crisis was found by the PRC to prove the primacy of German capital in the EU today. 
The deflationary policies imposed by the ECB are viewed as benefiting the German 
economy, whilst aggravating the crisis across the rest of the EU (Rifondazione, 2011e, 
p. 13).  
 The final parts of the document concerned the party’s future and the pillars of its 
policy proposals both in Europe and in Italy. The party’s ultimate objective was clearly 
laid down by the party as being, “[…] the alternative society. We are men and women 
that fight for the overcoming of capitalism and of patriarchy and towards a communist 
society” (Rifondazione, 2011e, p. 26). To achieve such an objective, the party 
promoted the creation of a strong anti-capitalist front inside society, which would 
oppose the right-wing alternatives that propose nothing more than the management of 
the crisis. According to the PRC, the social movements represent the only genuine exit 
from the cage of neoliberal capitalism and its crisis. A fundamental characteristic of 
the social movement as conceived by the PRC, is its strong ties with its European and 
global counterparts (Rifondazione, 2011e, pp. 26-28). It is important to note at this 
point that the salience placed on the social movements, can be argued to be an 
indication of the importance of Ingrao’s political thought60 for the PRC. 
 In relation to the party’s alternative policy proposals, the PRC presented a platform 
that would lead to an effective overcoming of the crisis based on four axes; the 
regulation of the financial markets, the redistribution of wealth, the environmental and 
social reconversion of production, and the opposition to precariousness and an 
                                                
60 More on Ingrao’s political thought and on the importance of the social movements in the process of 
social transformation can be found in Paolino (2012).  
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effective application of the right to work (Rifondazione, 2011e, p. 31). In this context, 
the PRC underlined that the European level is of great importance, as it constitutes the 
ground of the real political battle. Thus, the PRC considered that “the European terrain, 
the creation of an effective Party of the European Left for us is not an issue of foreign 
policy, but a decisive point for the possibility of creating a left-wing response to the 
constituent crisis of capital” (Rifondazione, 2011e, p. 31). As a result, the PRC 
commenced the analysis of its policy axes with the European level. For the PRC, the 
European construction must be refounded. The party advocated the construction of a 
democratic Europe that would break with its current policies and would find its proper 
role in the highly globalised international scene. The strengthening of the powers of 
the EP and the control that it would have over the decisions of the ECB, the regulation 
against financial speculation, and the creation of a homogeneous pan-European system 
of taxation, welfare, and labour rights constitute the most important proposals of the 
PRC (Rifondazione, 2011e, p. 31). To pursue such a radical objective, the PRC called 
for the relaunch of a more efficient EL seen as a vehicle for such a change.  
 In terms of specific policy proposals at the European level, the PRC called for the 
modification of the Maastricht treaty and the ECB’s statute, which would enable the 
control of the ECB by the EP. Moreover, the PRC proposed higher taxes for 
speculative financial transactions, the abolition of tax havens, the rigorous regulation 
of financial markets, and the creation of a unitary tax system (Rifondazione, 2011e, p. 
32). In addition to this, the PRC argued for the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean area 
as a counterbalance to the Europe of the ECB influenced by the French-German axis. 
This idea of an alliance of the South constitutes a common theme in the analysis of all 
three Southern European parties and could be summed up in Alexis Tsipras’ article, 
‘An Alliance of the European South’, in El País mentioned in the previous chapter. 
The PRC concluded its European policy proposals by stating that Italy should act 
unilaterally to protect its citizens from the international speculators, in case the party’s 
proposals were to be ignored and the attacks to the country’s economy by the 
international financial speculators were to be continued. 
 Regarding the internal policy proposals, the PRC proposed the nationalisation of the 
most important banks that operate within the country to tackle financial speculation, 
the redistribution of wealth via a high taxation of large estates as well as well as the 
intensification of the battle against tax evasion. In addition to these, the PRC called 
for the reduction of the military expenses, of the useless grand public works, and the 
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privileges of the politicians, as well as the reinstatement of the core of the labour rights 
as guaranteed by the Constitution (Rifondazione, 2011e, pp. 32-35). Moreover, the 
party proposed several reforms relating to the legalisation of same sex marriage, the 
guarantee of the freedom of sexual expression, and the fight against the patriarchy.  
 The political decision of the party’s 8th Congress provides us, thus, with several 
important ideological elements. Indeed, the party, via this document, enunciated its 
core ideological positions regarding its idea of socialism for the 21st century. From an 
ideological perspective, the party remains firmly grounded on the critical view of the 
socialist experiments of Eastern Europe, and the constant anti-Stalinism. Regarding 
the party’s view of the EU, the PRC maintains unaltered its critical position. In fact, it 
heavily criticises the neoliberal architecture of the EU, which can be viewed as a 
rupture with the original project of the EU as conceived by thinkers such as Altiero 
Spinelli. The party’s alternative is based on the strengthening of the EP, and the 
creation of a homogenous welfare system that would promote social justice and the 
protection of workers’ rights at a pan-European level. Thus, the European level 
constitutes the core of the PRC’s policy proposals, as the party finds that it is there 
that the most important political battle will take place. As a result, the EL constitutes 
the necessary vehicle that could promote the radical changes that the party proposes. 
While the party appears to maintain several important aspects of Berlinguer’s legacy 
regarding the critical yet constructive view of the EU, it incorporates an important 
element of Ingrao’s political thought by highlighting the importance of the social 
movements for the professed social transformation. 
 
Rifondazione’s IX Congress 
 
 The PRC held its 9th Congress in 2013, in the midst, thus, of the financial crisis 
affecting both Italy and the EU. The party was coming out of another discouraging 
electoral result, as the Rivoluzione Civile, the broad coalition that the PRC joined - 
led by a very well-known anti-Mafia prosecutor- did not manage to achieve the 
necessary vote share for parliamentary representation, as mentioned in the previous 
section. The document approved by most of the party’s delegates appears to place 
much more salience on the anti-capitalist nature of the party. Concurrently, the 
document painted a very negative picture of the state of the EU and proposed a series 
of radical plans that will be examined in the following paragraphs. The document bore 
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the title ‘To reconstruct the left, for the democratic revolution and Socialism of the 
21st Century’ and is divided in 18 sections concerning issues ranging from the 
international capitalist crisis to the party’s internal organisation.  
 The document’s first section concerns the capitalist crisis and seeks to highlight the 
importance of a socialist project as a remedy to the crisis. It painted the devastating 
picture of capitalism’s effects on society. It highlighted how the crisis had affected a 
great number of European periphery countries, where poverty, desperation, 
depression, and suicides for economic reasons are growing rapidly (Rifondazione, 
2013c, p. 1). The party viewed that capitalism is unable to deal with such dramatic 
social situations, as the crisis only highlights the regressive character of the capitalist 
social relations that can be viewed as “[…] a cage that thwarts humanity from exiting 
its condition of slavery of needs” (Rifondazione, 2013c, p. 1). In such dramatic 
contexts, thus, the PRC reiterated the actuality of Marxism as a means of explaining 
the structural mechanisms of the capitalist system that constitute the basis of the crisis, 
as well as the means to interpret the root causes of the crisis and come up with possible 
alternatives (Rifondazione, 2013c, pp. 1-2). Communism has, thus, for the same 
reason become actual, as the PRC considers it as the only way out of the capitalist 
social relations and their social barbarity, human regression, and environmental 
catastrophe. The party aimed, as a result, to learn from the bankruptcy of the Eastern 
European attempts to overcome capitalism, and continue the fight for the successful 
social transformation according to its plan for Socialism of the 21st century 
(Rifondazione, 2013c, p. 2).  
 The second section was dedicated to the nature and the effects of the crisis, and 
commenced with a quote from Marx and Engels on the interconnection of economic 
crises, speculation, and overproduction. Via the tools of Marxist economic analysis, 
the PRC located the root cause of the crisis on the gradual overcoming of the economic 
model and the interconnected regulations that were born in the aftermath of World 
War II. A system, thus, whose objective was to avoid that the pure logic of the market 
could give birth to another exasperated competition that could lead to wars and conflict 
(Rifondazione, 2013c, p. 3). This gradual process reached its peak with the systemic 
crisis of 2007/2008 that is, for the PRC, a crisis of the real economy, generated by the 
overproduction, the fall of the rate of profit, and the abnormal growth of financial 
speculation. The PRC viewed, thus, the crisis as originating from the full victory of 
capitalism in the past decades (Rifondazione, 2013c, p. 3). The party’s analysis then 
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proceeded with capitalism’s inherent tendency towards imperialist wars and highlights 
the party’s longstanding ideological position of pacifism (Rifondazione, 2013c, pp. 3-
4).  
 Following the Marxist analysis of the crisis, the document proceeded with two 
sections dedicated to the EU. The first one opened with a quote of Mario Draghi, the 
Italian President of the ECB, which was found to be summarizing the current state of 
affairs in the Union. Indeed, the document quoted Draghi stating that “the outcome of 
the Italian elections, as well as other factors […] have no impact on the unity of intents 
of the EU regarding reforms. Many of the processes of restoration will continue to 
move forward on the autopilot” (Rifondazione, 2013c, p. 4). The PRC presented the 
EU to be willingly transforming the crisis of private financial speculation into a public 
debt crisis. Because of this process, the EU has launched an unprecedented attack 
against the labour movement, the social state, and ultimately democracy. Moreover, 
the EU was seen by the party as being divided between opposing national interests on 
an economic and geopolitical level. For the PRC, thus, Draghi’s words represent the 
current state of the EU and the real mechanisms of European government. As a result, 
the party concluded that there is no possibility of exiting the crisis by following the 
current European policies, as imposed by the treaties that have laid the foundations for 
the current European edifice (Rifondazione, 2013c, p. 4). The party, thus, reached an 
important conclusion relating to its stance towards the EU, as it stated that besides the 
right intent of attaining a European dimension of class struggle and its interconnected 
process of transformation in a socialist direction, the party was wrong in viewing the 
EU as a space open to the possibility of overthrowing neoliberalism. The PRC 
reiterated the virtue of its initial negative stance towards the Maastricht and Lisbon 
treaties, which led to the “[…] un-democratic and openly technocratic process of 
European unification” (Rifondazione, 2013c, p. 5). It also highlighted the party’s 
mistake in accepting the common currency, as it considers that “[…] we deluded 
ourselves that [the Monetary Union] could open, alongside the development of pan-
European struggles, a real process of democratisation inside the EU” (Rifondazione, 
2013c, p. 5).  
 The document concluded that this process has resulted in expropriating popular and 
democratic sovereignty from numerous countries, without the necessary construction 
of a supranational, democratic, and popular one. Consequently, the rupture with this 
EU was seen by the PRC as a conditio sine qua non for successfully exiting the 
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economic and cultural crisis, to open a path for peace, social justice, and democracy 
(Rifondazione, 2013c, p. 5). This, nevertheless, cannot be translated into a process of 
folding back on the national level. Contrary to that, the rupture would aid in 
comprehending the importance of regaining an effective popular sovereignty in the 
fight against the current attack to living conditions of the popular masses. This battle 
is a common one, alongside the European radical left forces, the EL, the GUE/NGL, 
and the increasing number of movements across the continent. The party concluded 
by stating that “in order to construct the other Europe of the peoples, of social justice 
and democracy, we need to defeat, in a first instance, the Europe of Maastricht and 
Lisbon” (Rifondazione, 2013c, p. 5).  
 Due to the party’s analysis of the current state of the EU, it called for disobedience to 
the EU. The party’s proposal concerns the unilateral disobedience to the treaties, to 
regain the necessary sovereignty to modify key economic policies. Concurrently, the 
unilateral disobedience is seen, by the PRC, as the only way towards the creation of 
social coalitions amongst the countries of the Southern periphery of the EU, which 
could subsequently “[…] oblige the ruling classes of countries such as Germany – that 
greatly gain from this situation – to renegotiate the overall functioning of the EU” 
(Rifondazione, 2013c, p. 5). The party, thus, believes that the EU can no longer be 
viewed as a common good per se. Indeed, the PRC declared that this EU needs to be 
unhinged commencing with the Treaties that regulate its most important functions 
(Rifondazione, 2013c, p. 5). The document, then, reiterated that a rupture with the EU 
will not mean the country’s isolation, but will bring Italy to the forefront of the creation 
of a web of alliances amongst peripheral countries. The PRC, thus, believed that the 
European level of the fight against the current EU is of great significance. Thus, it 
called for the intensification of the cooperation amongst the member parties of the EL, 
so that the common objective of another Europe can be achieved. Nevertheless, the 
PRC argued that in the case of a failed radical reform of the EU, the disparities will be 
extended and will eventually lead to the EU’s disintegration (Rifondazione, 2013c, p. 
6).  
 Following the analysis of the current state of the EU, the party found that Italy was 
amongst the countries that have been dramatically affected by the crisis. The structural 
weaknesses of the country’s economic and productive system rendered it increasingly 
marginal at a European level. As a result, the social and territorial disparities inside 
the country have been accentuated (Rifondazione, 2013c, p. 6). In such a context, the 
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PRC aimed to identify the reasons behind the party’s electoral demise. It highlighted 
that this crisis is primarily Italian, as examples of other European countries, such as 
Greece, Spain, France, and Ireland attest to the advancement of the working-class 
movement abroad. The document, indeed, synthesised the core reasons behind the 
PRC’s demise by presenting several factors, ranging from the bipartisanship that has 
been affecting the Italian political life for decades, the Maastricht Treaty and the 
common currency and its effects on the country, the degeneration of the country’s 
political life61, the crisis of the labour unions, the change in the labour dynamics, and 
the devastating cultural decadence brought forward by the commercialisation of 
culture.  
 Following the analysis of the party’s electoral demise, the PRC enunciated the focal 
points of its political project. The path towards Socialism for the 21st Century is 
identified by the PRC as being paved by the bottom up redistribution of power. In fact, 
the party believed that a mixture of elements ranging from representative and direct 
democracy, alongside workers control, state interventionism, and popular sovereignty 
over monetary policy is necessary for a socialist change in the country. The conditio 
sine qua non for such a change is, nevertheless, the radical discussion involving the 
EU and the defence of the country’s republican Constitution (Rifondazione, 2013c, p. 
11). Moreover, the PRC’s core policy objectives involved the radical redistribution of 
wealth and labour, an economy subject to social and environmental needs, the 
construction of an EU based on social and civil rights and on a sustainable growth 
model, and on the creation of a global system based on economic cooperation and 
peace, including the overcoming of NATO (Rifondazione, 2013c, pp. 11-12).  
 Regarding the means for such a change, the PRC reiterated its tendency towards social 
movements. Indeed, the document stressed the importance of the unification of the 
anti-neoliberal social movements under one banner. According to the PRC, this battle 
would require the creation of a strong Europe-wide social movement that could bring 
about “[…] a democratic revolution that will change the balance of political power 
                                                
61 The degeneration of the Italian political parties and more generally of the Italian political life was 
amongst the key concepts of the political thought of Enrico Berlinguer. Indeed, Enrico Berlinguer’s 
‘moral question’ [questione morale] sees the degeneration of Italian politics as one of the key reasons 
behind the crisis in Italian social, economic, and political life. For more, see Berlinguer’s interview to 
Eugenio Scalfari (Berlinguer, 1981). 
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between the social classes […]” (Rifondazione, 2013c, p. 15). A key element for the 
unification of the social movements were, according to PRC, the labour unions, which 
need a regeneration. The party considered that the creation of a left-wing labour union 
is necessary for the political battle against austerity and neo-liberalism (Rifondazione, 
2013c, pp. 16-17). A final and very important aspect of this process of unification 
concerns the unity of radical left formations in the country. The PRC inspired by the 
process of federalisation of other European RLPs, such as Syriza in Greece and 
Izquierda Unida in Spain, calls for the intensification for the creation of a platform 
that will unite those political forces on the left of the PD. According to the PRC the 
landmarks for this process are, the EL, the GUE/NGL group in the EP, the left-wing 
of the CISL Union, and the transformatory movements in European society 
(Rifondazione, 2013c, pp. 17-18).  
 The political document of the party’s 9th Congress constitutes, thus, a radical response 
to the financial crisis and signifies a turning point for the PRC that chose to highlight 
its anti-capitalist nature in a more decisive manner than in the past. According to the 
PRC, the bipartisanship that is reigning in Europe’s political life is to be blamed for 
the crisis affecting both Italy and the EU as a whole. The social-democrats alongside 
the conservatives are both presented to be promoting the neoliberal ideas that have 
shaped the process of European integration ever since the Maastricht Treaty. The party 
identifies in the unification of the social movements the most efficient response to the 
crisis and declares its firm belief in the key role of the movement in the process of 
transformation that would eventually lead to its professed Socialism for the 21st 
century. The PRC declares its willingness to fight alongside the movements for the 
rupture of the present EU and proposes the unilateral disobedience to the treaties that 
take away any idea of sovereignty from the peoples of Europe. In addition to this, the 
party passes a negative ex post judgement on its support for the common currency, 
and calls for the debate on the possible exit strategies from the Eurozone. The party’s 
linkage strategy with social movements is paired by its firm conviction that the 
creation of a left-wing federation like Syriza in Greece could be the only answer to the 
left’s demise in Italy. 
 
Conclusion  
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 Concluding on the PRC’s ideology viewed as a conditioning factor towards the 
party’s stance vis-à-vis the EU, we could argue that the party’s ideological core has 
played a very important role. The PRC sees itself as the party that keeps alive the 
heritage of the PCI. Given the importance of the PCI for the Western European 
Communist movement and its decisive role in the Eurocommunist current, the PRC’s 
stance towards the EU has been constantly one of constructive criticism. Indeed, the 
party opposed the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties seen as laying the foundations for 
the creation of a neo-liberal EU, and continues to see the current European architecture 
as a betrayal of the original European ideals as presented in the thoughts of Altiero 
Spinelli and Enrico Berlinguer. The crisis affecting the EU ever since 2008 has played 
a decisive role in the intensification of the party’s critique to the EU and its neoliberal 
leitmotif. We could argue, thus, that the crisis proved the party’s criticisms right and 
as a result strengthened its distinct left Europeanism. Nevertheless, the PRC cannot be 
viewed as a mere continuation of Berlinguer’s PCI. The numerous political factions 
that make up the party represent a variety of left-wing schools of thought. The party 
especially after Bertinotti’s resignation has been much more vocal of its anti-capitalist 
nature, while placing much more salience on its linkage strategy with the social 
movements an element that, as mentioned above, can be traced back to Ingrao’s 
political thought. Contrary to the IU and very similar to the left-wing of Syriza, the 
PRC in its latest political document debates the possibility of a rupture with the current 
EU and the Eurozone. The EU leadership is seen by the PRC as divided between 
national interests that alienate the peoples of Europe from the sphere of politics, whilst 
being unable to propose a real exit from the crisis. As a result, the PRC calls for the 
unilateral disobedience to the treaties both at a national and at a European or even 
Southern European level, to force the ‘German-centric’ EU to renegotiate. Finally, we 
could argue that the PRC bases a lot on the EL, as the party sees in it the only possible 
political allies. Nevertheless, the party appears to be reaching the conclusion that a 
pan-European movement for the radical transformation of the EU could possibly be 
achieved from the outside. 
 
c. Public Opinion 
 
To be able to assess the role of the Italian public opinion in the stance of PRC towards 
the EU, the present thesis will utilise the data published by the standard 
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Eurobarometer. More specifically, a comparative analysis of the findings of the 
Eurobarometer of fall 2004, 2008, 2013, and 2015 will be attempted. Moreover, 
several highly interesting findings presented in the Eurobarometer’s special report on 
the financial crisis published in 2012 will be analysed, providing a better insight on 
the key opinions of the Italian citizenry on the role of the EU in combatting the crisis. 
The data will be initially treated separately. A final comparative analysis will serve as 
the conclusion of the public opinion factor.  
 Commencing with the data relevant to 2004, we come across many important markers 
relating primarily to the outlook of the citizenry for the country’s future, the trust 
towards national and European political institutions, the citizens’ perception of the 
EU, and finally their opinion on the European Monetary Union and the European 
Constitution. The Italian citizenry appears to be more optimistic towards the future 
than the EU average. Indeed, 38 % of the Italian citizenry felt that their life would 
improve in the next year, scoring three points higher than the EU average of 35% (EC, 
2004b, p. 14). Regarding the trust towards political institutions, it is important to note 
that the EU emerges as the political institution that the Italian citizenry appears to trust 
the most. Indeed, the EU scores as high as 51%, whereas at a national level the lack 
of trust towards political parties and the government are of 71% and 62% respectively 
(EC, 2004b, p. 2). Amongst the European institutions, the Parliament, the 
Commission, the Council, and the Court of Justice are the only institutions recording 
levels of trust exceeding 50%. It is worthwhile noting that 60% of the Italian citizenry 
appears to trust the EC, a significantly higher percentage than the European average 
of 52% (EC, 2004b, p. 3). In respect to the support for Italy’s EU membership, 57% 
of the Italian sample appeared to support it. This places Italy slightly above the EU 
average of 56% (EC, 2004b, p. 3). Concurrently, 50% of the Italians interviewed stated 
that the country has benefited from the EU membership. This places Italy below the 
EU average of 53% (EC, 2004b, p. 3). An indication of the Italian citizenry’s approach 
towards the EU and its future could be seen in the vast majority’s positive stance 
towards the development of a European political Union. Indeed, Italy ranked among 
the most favourable within the EU with 69% compared to the EU average of 59% (EC, 
2004b, p. 4). The final marker relates to the support or lack thereof vis-à-vis the 
European Monetary Union, and the prospect of a European Constitution. With a figure 
of 62%, the percentage of Italians in favour of European Monetary Union with one 
single currency, the euro, is at its lowest level since the introduction of the new 
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currency. For the first time, the Italian figure is below the EU average of 63% (EC, 
2004b, p. 8). Nevertheless, the Italian sample scores significantly higher than the EU 
average in respect to the prospect of a European Constitution. Indeed, 73% of the 
Italian sample is in favour of this prospect, compared with a 68% of EU average (EC, 
2004b, p. 8).  
 Moving onwards to the Eurobarometer of 2008, we come across a more pessimistic 
picture. Contrary to the, relatively optimistic, outlook towards the future, only 24% of 
the Italians felt that they would be in a better condition in the next 12 months. A 
percentage that ranks Italy in par with the EU average of 24% (EC, 2008b). Regarding 
the citizens’ support towards the country’s EU membership, the decline is rather 
important compared to previous data, with 40% of the respondents considering Italy’s 
EU membership positively (EC, 2008b, p. 2). In addition to this, 41% of the Italian 
sample also believe that Italy has benefited from EU membership. Although this figure 
represents the relative majority of the sample, it is the lowest percentage recorded 
across the EU, after Hungary. The negative trend of trust towards political institutions 
is reiterated in this study. Indeed, 76% of the sample claim to not trust political parties, 
67% the Italian government, and 65% the Italian Parliament. Now, this distrust has 
extended towards the EU. Those having no confidence in the European institutions 
grew from 36% to 47%, overtaking the percentage of those who have trust in the EU 
(EC, 2008b, p. 2). The first effects of the financial and economic crisis have 
strengthened the Italians’ conviction that economic decisions should be taken at EU 
level, rather than by the national government. The percentage of those in favour 
increased significantly to 60% (EC, 2008b, p. 3). With regards to the Euro and the 
European Monetary Union, the Italian citizenry appears rather divided. Indeed, 48% 
is convinced that the euro did not improve the financial stability of the country. 
Nevertheless, an increasing majority of 61% favours the European Monetary Union, 
despite an overwhelming 82% which is very critical about EU economy (EC, 2008b, 
p. 3). A final important marker concerns the citizenry’s assessment of the globalisation 
and the role of the EU in the process. It is evident from the data available that Italians 
continue to believe that globalisation mainly represents a threat to national companies 
rather than an advantage. However, they view the EU as a shield against the negative 
effects of globalisation (EC, 2008b, p. 4).  
 The severe effects of the financial crisis made their initial appearance in Italy in 2010. 
This renders the post-2010 era quite important regarding the citizens’ view on the EU 
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and its future. As we have seen in the previous section, the PRC reached important 
conclusions in the post-crisis era. As a result, it is important to verify whether such a 
change could potentially reflect social needs. The special Eurobarometer of 2012 
regarding the financial crisis that affects the EU provides us with several interesting 
markers that could help us map the change or lack thereof in the Italian society’s stance 
towards the EU.  
 Amongst the very important markers present in the Special Eurobarometer, one 
comes across the lack of trust in the EU’s and national government’s ability to tackle 
the effects of the crisis. Indeed, only 23% of Italians appear to believe that the EU can 
take effective actions against the crisis, whereas a mere 14% has faith in the abilities 
of the national government (EC, 2012, p. 15). In comparison to the EU average, Italy 
scores higher in terms of the faith in the EU by two per cent, while the results reiterate 
the complete distrust towards the national government, which is seven per cent lower 
than the EU average (EC, 2012, p. 15). Regarding the evaluation of the attempts to 
tackle the crisis, 73% of the Italian sample found that the national government has 
been completely ineffective, while 61% expressed the same opinion with regards to 
the European attempts (EC, 2012, p. 19). It is worthwhile noting that both scores are 
well above the EU average. Another important marker concerns the evaluation of 
several measures thought to tackle the crisis’ effects on the European economy. The 
clear majority of Italians appears to be favourable to a stronger coordination of 
economic policy among all the EU Member States, as well as the countries of the euro 
by 71%, while 68% appear favourable to a more important role for the EU in 
regulating financial services (EC, 2012, p. 26). In addition to those generic measures, 
respondents have also indicated their opinion regarding specific policies. Once again, 
the clear majority of Italians appear to be in favour of tougher rules on tax avoidance 
and tax havens, the introduction of a tax on profits made by banks, tighter rules for 
credit rating agencies, and the introduction of Eurobonds (83%, 76%, 73%, and 52% 
respectively) (EC, 2012, p. 34).  The final set of markers that are deemed of importance 
for the present study comprises of questions relating to the future of the EU and to the 
degree of European solidarity perceived by the Italian citizenry. More specifically, 
54% of the Italian sample appears to believe that because of the crisis the EU will be 
stronger in the long run. On this instance, Italy scored a mere point above the EU 
average (EC, 2012, p. 37). The final marker involves the degree that the Italian citizens 
feel closer to other European countries due to the crisis. Italy scored the third highest 
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percentage after Cyprus and Greece. Indeed, 58% of Italians appear to feel closer to 
other EU countries; a percentage that is significantly higher than the EU average of 
42% (EC, 2012, p. 37).  
 Following the Special Eurobarometer on the crisis, the analysis will resume with the 
two final reports. The Eurobarometer of fall 2013 reiterates the negative trends with 
regards to the Italian citizens’ stance to the EU. Indeed, 59% of the Italian sample 
finds that the EU is responsible for the austerity measures applied in the country. 
Nevertheless, a clear majority of the Italian society appears favourable to the euro (EC, 
2013b, p. 4). Another important marker relates to the slight increase in the trust 
towards the ECB, which has risen to 31% from 28% in the previous study (EC, 2013b, 
p. 3). Whilst remaining much more trustworthy than the national institutions, the trust 
towards the EC decreased to 32%, while the same trend has appeared also in regards 
to the EP, which shrunk to 36% (EC, 2013b, p. 5) The overall trust towards the EU 
has fallen to a record low of 23% (EC, 2013b, p. 5).  
 The citizenry’s support for a stronger role of the EU was outlined in the clear support 
for a preventive approval of national budgets by EU authorities. Indeed, 66% of the 
Italian sample claimed that this measure could prove efficient for exiting the crisis 
(EC, 2013b, p. 6). In addition to that, 60% of Italians is favourable to the nomination 
of a EU Finance Minister; a percentage that is well above the EU average of 52% (EC, 
2013b, p. 6). The report under analysis reiterates the strong support of the Italian 
citizenry to many financial policies sought to tackle the crisis. Indeed, 81% agrees 
with tougher rules on tax avoidance and tax havens, 75% with the introduction of a 
tax on the banking sector’s profits, and 54% in favour of the introduction of Eurobonds 
(EC, 2013b, p. 6). With regards to the future of the EU, 55% of the Italian sample 
finds that the EU is in the wrong direction (EC, 2013b, p. 7). Given this marker, it is 
no surprise that 52% declared its pessimism in respect to the EU’s future (EC, 2013b, 
p. 7). This renders the Italian citizenry amongst the most pessimistic, given that the 
51% of the EU citizenry declared its optimism regarding the future of the EU (EC, 
2013b, p. 7).  
 The growing disaffection towards the EU could be argued to hide, nevertheless, a 
request for more integration and a desire for a qualitative change for the EU. Most of 
the Italian sample, 50%, does not see a better future for the country outside of the EU 
(EC, 2013b, p. 9). In addition to this, the relative majority of Italians appear to be 
favourable to a federalist future for the EU. Indeed, 40% agrees with the idea of the 
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EU promoting an integration process that would lead to the creation of a federation of 
nation states (EC, 2013b, p. 9). Finally, we could argue that the financial crisis appears 
to have strengthened the need for more integration. In fact, 74% of the Italian citizenry 
believes that due to the crisis, the EU Member States should cooperate more closely 
(EC, 2013b, p. 9).  
 The final Eurobarometer that was published in the second semester of 2015 could be 
viewed as repeating the negative trend inside the Italian society. In fact, 59% of the 
Italians find that the situation of the national economy is bad, while maintaining a 
complete pessimism towards their future (EC, 2015b, p. 1). Despite the pessimism, 
the Italian citizenry appears to have regained its relative trust towards the EU. Indeed, 
36% appears to trust the EU, while the report reiterates the complete mistrust towards 
the national institutions (EC, 2015b, p. 2). The positive trends towards the EU is 
reflected in the rise in the percentage of Italians that has a positive image of the EU 
that rose to 38%, just three decimals lower than the EU average of 41% (EC, 2015b, 
p. 3). The final markers of the 2015 report relate to the European identity and the most 
positive outcomes of the EU. Regarding the European identity of the Italian citizenry, 
only 53% of Italians feel a citizen of the EU; a percentage much lower than the 67% 
of the EU average (EC, 2015b, p. 4). As to the most positive results achieved by the 
EU, the Italian citizenry finds that free movement of people, peace among the Member 
States, the student exchange programmes, the euro, and the political and diplomatic 
influence of the EU in the global arena constitute the most important ones with the 
percentages ranging from 50%, 38%, 31%, 26%, and 25% respectively (EC, 2015b, 
p. 4).  
 An initial comparative analysis of the data provided by the Eurobarometer suggests 
that the Italian public opinion towards the EU has been greatly influenced by the crisis. 
Indeed, during the 2008-2013 period the distrust towards the EU had been gradually 
increasing. This negative trend has been, nevertheless, reversed in most recent times. 
The influence of the severe austerity measures that were imposed by the Italian 
government could be argued to have been important, given the fact that the clear 
majority of the Italian citizenry holds the EU responsible for them. We could argue, 
thus, that the PRC’s narrative regarding the European edifice is coherent to the 
majoritarian tendencies inside the Italian society. Indeed, the complete distrust in the 
national political institutions could be argued to echo the long-standing position of the 
Italian radical left from the times of the questione morale of Enrico Berlinguer. In 
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regards to the measures sought to tackle the crisis effects, the stricter regulation of the 
financial sector, as well as the introduction of Eurobonds present a high degree of 
coherence between social beliefs and core policies of the PRC. Another important 
common element can be seen in the majority’s belief in a federal future for the EU. 
As mentioned in the previous section of the present chapter, a constant ideological 
position of the PRC was the support for more political integration. Indeed, we could 
argue that the idea seeing the EU as having a key role in the reformation of the corrupt 
Italian state is another common denominator between the PRC’s proposals and the 
majoritarian tendencies in Italian society. This core belief, nevertheless, is what can 
be argued to be causing the party’s electoral demise in recent times. Indeed, the PRC’s 
in extremis argument of leaving the EU and Eurozone could be argued to have been 
amongst the reasons for the very negative electoral results in most recent general 
elections. This argument could be additionally substantiated by the relative success of 
the highly Europeanised electoral campaign that the PRC led in support of the Altra 
Europa list in the recent elections for the EP. We could, thus, conclude that public 
opinion appears to have a relative importance in the PRC’s stance towards the EU. 
The party has for a long time echoed the social need for reforms to the national 
political institutions, which for most of society cannot happen without the support of 
the EU. The party’s gradual, but significant, change of stance towards the EU could 
be argued to have been supported by the negative trend with regards to social opinions 
vis-à-vis the EU until 2013, when the distrust towards Europe reached the all-time 
low. Nevertheless, the inversion of this trend could be viewed as having conditioned 
the PRC in intensifying its attempts to create a highly Europeanised electoral coalition, 
which managed to secure the necessary social support.  
 
d. Party Factionalism 
 
 One of the most important organisational discontinuities between the PCI and the 
PRC relates to the break with the tradition of democratic centralism. As a result, ever 
since the creation of the PRC several ideologically diverse factions were founded. As 
mentioned in the first section of the present chapter the PRC was created when two 
historic ‘unofficial’ currents of the PCI merged; the first one led by Armando Cossutta 
and the second one by Pietro Ingrao. It was, thus, ever since the first days of the PRC 
that political factions with diverse ideas ranging from key ideological positions, the 
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party’s strategy, and the party’s organisation had to coexist. The party’s history, as 
outlined in the previous section, could serve as an indication of the issues that the 
parallel coexistence of those factions created for the party’s unity. The number of 
internal ruptures and splits is arguably the highest in the history of the European 
radical left family. To be able to assess the importance of party factionalism regarding 
the party’s stance towards the EU, the present thesis will initially provide a brief 
outline of the party’s current and historic factions. Following this brief introduction, 
an in-depth analysis of the alternative Congress document presented by the faction led 
by Sandro Targetti during the party’s most recent 9th Congress, will be carried out. 
Moreover, several amendments to the majority’s document, as presented in the 
ideology factor, will be analysed to shed light to the differing voices inside the party’s 
majoritarian faction.  
 Commencing with the current factions inside the PRC, we come across the group 
headed around the party’s secretary Paolo Ferrero, also known as Ferreriani. This 
faction presented the motion that managed to receive the overwhelming majority of 
the party’s delegate during the most recent Congress. We could argue that this faction 
displays a certain continuity with the old faction, known as Rifondazione in 
Movimento, as it calls for a greater commitment in the places of class conflict. The 
faction refuses the liquidation of the party’s ideology, as well as the merge with other 
political parties, and has declared its preference towards the creation of an alternative 
left pole in the form of a confederation, to preserve the party’s identity. Ideologically, 
the faction promotes anti-Stalinism and the idea of a democratic communism, open to 
other political cultures such as pacifism and feminism. The second current faction 
inside the PRC is known as Essere Comunisti [Being Communists] and is led by 
Claudio Grassi. Essere Comunisti could be argued to constitute the reorganisation of 
the left-wing of Cossutta’s faction at the times of Cossutta’s presidency of the PRC. 
As suggested by the fraction’s name, the group is an avid supporter of the party’s 
communist identity and very fond of the PCI’s tradition. The faction had a long dispute 
with the PRC’s former Secretary, Fausto Bertinotti, who was considered to have been 
excessively critical towards the socialist experiments of the 20th century. The faction 
came closer to Bertinotti following the electoral success of 2006 and declared its 
willingness to accept the creation of a pluralist federation of the left. That choice led 
to the split of the fraction’s more radical members that gave birth to two additional 
factions, L’Ernesto and Sinistra Comunista [Communist Left]. Following this split, 
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the faction decided to ally with the faction around Paolo Ferrero during the party’s 7th 
Congress, and led to Ferrero’s election as the PRC’s secretary. The reason behind this 
decision lies arguably with the fraction’s fear that the possible election of Nichi 
Vendola as secretary would have resulted in the disappearance of the party’s 
communist identity.  The faction worked alongside the Ferreriani for the creation of 
the motion presented in the party’s 8th Congress, remaining, thus, part of the party’s 
majority. Following the 9th Congress, Grassi officially declared the fraction’s rupture 
with the party’s secretariat and launched several assemblies aiming at the creation of 
a new left-wing coalition. The third and final current faction inside the PRC is made 
of a group of previously independent members that united during the 9th Congress 
under the leadership of Sandro Targetti. The fraction, or rather the loose group, 
brought forward a political document bearing the name ‘for the refoundation of a 
Communist Party’, which managed to secure 15% of the delegates’ votes. The 
signatories call for a reform of the party’s internal organisation, as well as for a process 
that could lead to the creation of a unitary Communist political force. The fraction’s 
members originate primarily from old PRC factions such as La Città Futura [the city 
of the future], and Collettivo Stella Rossa [Red Star Collective].  
 Regarding the party’s historic factions that to an extent led to the current ones, one 
comes across the Rifondazione in Movimento [Refoundation in the movement], and 
Rifondazione per la Sinistra [Refoundation for the left]. Both factions were part of the 
party’s majority for the first 14 years of its life and loyal to Fausto Bertinotti. The 
Rifondazione in Movimento was leaded by Paolo Ferrero and was mainly responsible 
for the party’s avid participation in the new social movements. The split took place 
when a part of the faction decided, during the party’s 7th Congress in 2008, to support 
the candidacy for the secretariat of Nichi Vendola and the transformation of the PRC 
in a non-communist political force. The Rifondazione per la Sinistra was born 
alongside the political document ‘Manifesto per la Rifondazione’ [Manifest for the re-
foundation] during the 7th Congress of the PRC. The faction’s political proposal placed 
the party in the centre of the pluralist left, in which the communists would be a cultural 
tendency, but not the defining ideological element. As mentioned above, the faction 
supported Vendola’s candidacy and managed to gain the support of almost half of the 
party’s delegates. Its positions, nevertheless, remained minoritarian as Ferrero’s 
candidacy united the residual factions. Vendola’s loss led, as mentioned in the first 
part of the chapter, to a further split and the subsequent creation of SEL. In addition 
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to those two more popular factions, one comes across three less popular and arguably 
more radical, in the sense of more prone to a more revolutionary and anti-capitalist 
rhetoric, ones. The first one is constituted by Sinistra Comunista [Communist Left], 
launched by Gianluigi Pegolo and Sandro Targetti during the party’s 7th Congress. The 
faction was subject to yet another series of splits that gave birth to the faction La Città 
Futura, a faction that had a deep-rooted belief in the unity of Communists in Italy. 
The last historic faction of the PRC is constituted by the FalceMartello [Hammer and 
Sickle]. This faction led by Claudio Bellotti is a Trotskyist formation that called for 
the permanent rupture with the centre-left and professed a turn of the PRC towards the 
working-class struggle. During the party’s 9th Congress the faction supported the 
minoritarian document entitled ‘Sinistra, Classe, Rivoluzione’ [Left, Class, 
Revolution]. Following the scarce support for its proposals, the faction renamed itself 
Sinistra Classe e Rivoluzione and officialised its exit from the PRC.  
 The analysis of the differing views of the EU inside the PRC will commence with the 
amendments to the ratified document presented by the internal faction Essere 
Comunisti led by Claudio Grassi. Indeed, the amendments proposed to the party’s 
political document prove that there are internal voices inside the party majority that 
have reached far more pessimistic conclusions regarding Italy’s membership in the 
Eurozone. The first amendment proposed by this faction relates to the fourth thesis of 
the majoritarian document involving the EU. Indeed, the group suggests that two extra 
paragraphs are added to the final text. The amendment opening argument states, “the 
euro is the most complete and most pernicious expression of the neoliberal and anti-
popular character of the EU” (Rifondazione, 2013d). It then follows with presenting 
the euro as the root cause for the economic imbalances between the European North 
and the European South. Indeed, the document underlines that the countries of the 
European South are being subordinated by the centralisation of the capital of Central 
and Northern Europe (Rifondazione, 2013d, p. 1). For these reasons, it concludes that 
any transformation of the policies and the founding treaties of the EU will be futile, if 
it were not to eliminate the monetary union constructing, instead of it, a relationship 
amongst economically homogeneous areas, significant elements of monetary 
sovereignty, and the ability of momentary currency devaluations (Rifondazione, 
2013d, p. 1). The first amendment, thus, appears to be much more resolute with 
regards to the Eurozone, which it depicts as the root cause for the European economic 
divide. It is arguably the case then, that the Essere Comunisti faction appears to treat 
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an exit from the Eurozone not as an in-extremis plan B, but as a primary objective for 
the economic and social transformation it proposes.  
 Indeed, the faction’s second amendment proposed the substitution of the fifth thesis 
with another one named ‘Exiting the euro from the left’. Here the proponents argue 
that the exit from the euro is inevitable, as the dominant groups of European capitalism 
appear to be hesitant to abandon the policies of deflationism and mercantilism 
(Rifondazione, 2013e, p. 1). In fact, the faction considers that the only chances for a 
change of direction of these policies could be achieved if the countries of the South, 
including Italy, were to choose to exit the Eurozone. This could not happen, 
nevertheless, when the option of exiting constitutes the extrema ratio, but only if being 
“[…] conscious of the historic necessity of exiting the euro, as a necessary passage for 
the construction of national autonomy and freely chosen international relations […] 
necessary for the achievement of our goal” (Rifondazione, 2013e, p. 1). The 
amendment, then, follows with a synthesis of the left exit from the euro. Such a 
scenario, indeed, would see the country controlling the movement of capitals, the 
prices of the most important products, the nationalisation of the banks, public 
intervention in the economy, and an industrial policy under social control. According 
to the amendment, this would lead the country out of the submission to the North 
Atlantic open market and would render it a protagonist of cooperation politics with 
the countries of the European South, the Mediterranean, as well as the emerging 
economies of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) (Rifondazione, 
2013e, p. 1).  
 Following this, the document stresses the importance of a strong support from the 
popular masses, for these radical changes to take place. The implementation of the 
changes could either derive from the election of a strong popular government or from 
a mass protest movement that could pave the way with the support of other European 
protest movements. Regardless of the conclusions that the faction reaches regarding 
the nature of the Eurozone, it does not call for an immediate and unilateral exit of the 
country from it. Instead, it emphasizes on the importance of the party breaking with 
the fear of a possible rupture with the Union, and work towards the consensual exit of 
the Southern European countries from Eurozone. Exiting the Eurozone does not 
necessarily imply the exit from the common market, and the opposition to any form 
of coordination of the economic policies of the various European nations. Indeed, the 
document calls for the reconstruction of an effective political union in a Confederal 
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form of the European countries, based on autonomy, and equality amongst all Member 
States (Rifondazione, 2013e, pp. 1-2). The document concludes with a critique to the 
majority’s proposal for a unilateral disobedience to the European Treaties. Indeed, the 
faction finds that “any tactical choice can only succeed if we are conscious of the fact 
that, given the rigidity of the European structure, even slight changes can brusquely 
accelerate a crisis of the euro and of the EU itself” (Rifondazione, 2013e, p. 2). As a 
result, the document underscores that a discourse revolving around exiting the 
Eurozone presents itself as the political space where a left-wing narrative could 
become hegemonic, giving the party the opportunity to lead the way to a socialist 
future. The second amendment serves, thus, as further verification of the argument 
that saw the Essere Comunisti assuming a much more resolute view regarding the 
country’s membership in the common currency. Indeed, it appears as if the faction 
criticizes the majority’s view of exiting the Eurozone as an extrema ratio. It is clear 
that the faction sees the majority’s tactics as ineffective to tackle the issue, and calls 
for the creation of an alternative plan that sees the coordinated exit of the Southern 
European countries from the Eurozone, an event that, according to the document, 
could, lead to significant changes at a European level. In addition to this, the faction 
proposes a Confederal model for the EU, to address the disparities and inequalities 
that are currently affecting it.  
 The final amendment pertinent to this thesis perspective concerns the necessary unity 
amongst the left-wing forces in Italy. Indeed, the proponents of the amendment find 
that the Italian left should follow the examples of unity that have been brought forward 
by the party’s European allies, such as Syriza, IU, Die Linke and so on (Rifondazione, 
2013f, p. 1). The proponents, thus, find that the PRC should lead the process that 
would unite the left-wing forces in the country, as this is the only way for the party to 
“[…] grow, be a significant force of transformation in Italian society and at a European 
level. Only thus, uniting forces, the objective to change the Treaties in order to build 
another Europe becomes credible” (Rifondazione, 2013f, p. 1). In that direction, the 
proponents believe that the PRC should keep an open dialogue with SEL and continue 
to urge its leadership to abandon the alliance with the PD. Concurrently, the faction 
argues in favour of the unification of the party with the PdCI. Indeed, they view that 
the differences between the two parties do not justify the existence of two divided 
communist parties, with similar banners and membership at the same EP group. 
Following this final proposal, it comes as no surprise that four of the proponents of 
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this amendment were amongst the key signatories of the appeal for the reconstruction 
of the PCI (PCdI, 2014d)62. It is evident, thus, from this amendment that the faction 
led by Grassi has been pushing for a concrete effort to unify the country’s left-wing 
forces. Contrary to the attempts to create a left-wing federation of the party’s majority, 
Essere Comunisti proposes a merging with the PCdI and a continuation of the attempts 
for the radicalisation of SEL’s leadership. We could argue that if the attempts of the 
PCdI to reconstruct the PCI are to be successful, the PRC could suffer one more 
painful split, losing once again several of its CPN members.  
 Moving onwards, the following paragraphs will refer to the document presented by 
the loose group led by Sergio Targetti during the party’s most recent congress. Indeed, 
the document’s initial part concerns the reasons behind the submission of an 
alternative document. The group argues that the party is affected by the degeneration 
of fragmentation, which is viewed as severely thwarting the dialectic of the party. In 
addition to fragmentation the proponents find that the party’s leadership is displaying 
a logic of promoting the majoritarian opinion, citing the raise of the number of 
signatories necessary for the presentation of an alternative congress document as proof 
of such an accusation (Rifondazione, 2013g, p. 1). As a result, the proponents state 
that the presentation of an alternative document does not signify the creation of a new 
faction (Rifondazione, 2013g, p. 1).  
 The document, then, provides an analysis of the political and economic crisis and 
reiterates the conclusions reached by the majoritarian document. It finds that the root 
cause of the current capitalist crisis lies with the neoliberal counter-revolution that 
commenced in 1973 and that has resulted in increasing the international competition 
between the capitalist powers, the affirmation of flexible production model, and an 
immeasurable increase of the speculative capital compared to the productive capital 
(Rifondazione, 2013g, pp. 1-2). Moreover, the document finds that the austerity 
imposed by the troika via the Treaties of Maastricht and Lisbon has created a crisis of 
legitimisation of the country’s political class. Nevertheless, this crisis has not 
produced a wave of revolt against capitalism also due to the errors made by Italy’s 
left-wing and communist forces. The document, thus, finds that “we find ourselves in 
                                                
62 Indeed, the PCdI will be holding a founding National Communist Assembly in June 2016 to 
reconstruct the PCI under its old banner and in a rather orthodox communist direction. The attempt to 
reconstruct the historic PCI will be dealt with during the party competition factor. 
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the dramatic (and dangerous) situation that Gramsci described with the words: ‘the old 
is dead and the new cannot be born’” (Rifondazione, 2013g, p. 2).  
 The crisis of legitimacy of the country’s political class leads the proponents of the 
document to revaluate the party’s stance towards its institutional role. Indeed, the 
document underlines that the national parliaments, albeit their limited jurisdiction 
given the increasing role of supranational institutional and extra-institutional centres, 
maintain their role as the voice of class domination. As a result, the document finds 
that the parliament should be a means and not the end for the PRC. In fact, it argues 
that a correctly utilised institutional presence, can and should reinforce the popular 
struggles and represents an important, but not central, articulation for the advancement 
of the party’s political project (Rifondazione, 2013g, p. 4). The arguments made, here, 
could be viewed as an incorporation of Leninist elements in the group’s ideological 
analysis.  
 The display of Leninist elements was even clearer during the thesis relating to the 
party and the question of power. The document, indeed, finds that the Italian Marxists 
have been facing not only an organisational problem, but also a problem of theoretical 
setting, as “the revolutionary ideals of the October Revolution have not been utilised 
as a point of reference of the lower classes, mainly, because the communists have not 
been able to give continuity and to fulfil the process of refoundation of a party inspired 
by the theory of Marx, Lenin, and Gramsci” (Rifondazione, 2013g, p. 9). Because of 
this failure, the proponents find that the PRC has displayed over the years a 
‘parliamentarism’ that has brought the party to its current critical status. It, then, 
carries on criticising the party’s tendency to vaguely refer to the overcoming of 
capitalism, without, nevertheless, providing a concrete plan involving the necessary 
revolutionary consciousness of the working class. Concurrently, the party criticizes 
once again the majority’s tendency to accept reformist theses or ambiguous bourgeois 
theories, such as the vague ‘redistribution of wealth’. Instead of this, the document 
proposes that the party should provide with a class analysis of capitalism and lay the 
foundations for the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism (Rifondazione, 2013g, p. 9). 
In addition to the critique directed to the party’s majority, the document identifies 
displays of left-wing populism and opportunism in its tactics, which thwart it from 
achieving a real hegemony amongst the masses. Indeed, it states that the PRC has been 
obsessed with the aesthetics of conflict and has failed to ignite it amongst the lower 
classes in the streets (Rifondazione, 2013g, p. 9). As a matter of fact, the proponents 
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consider that the party’s involvement in the various social movements has been a 
display of solidarity to a variety of causes, instead of a conscious choice deriving from 
a political analysis of the balance of social powers. It, thus, proposes that the party 
instead of removing the works of Marx, Lenin, and Gramsci from its ideological 
arsenal, should initiate a process of putting them into practice considering the 
parameters of contemporary class struggle (Rifondazione, 2013g, p. 9).  
 With regards to the EU, the document presents an analysis similar to the one displayed 
by the majority’s document. Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty is considered to be laying 
the foundations for the creation of an imbalanced Union that tends to benefit countries, 
such as Germany, at the expense of the countries of the European South 
(Rifondazione, 2013g, p. 13). In such a context, the group, criticizing the party’s 
majority, argues that talking nowadays of a ‘Europe of the peoples’ blurs the real role 
of the EU. The party should, instead, focus on heavily criticizing the very basis of the 
current EU, by providing clear cut alternatives to the currency union that would allow 
for the return of monetary sovereignty to the peoples of Europe (Rifondazione, 2013g, 
p. 13). In addition to this, the group finds that the European institutions have always 
displayed un-democratic decisional models led by European elites. Thus, it views the 
EU as a “[…] true and real business committee of the bourgeoisie” (Rifondazione, 
2013g, p. 13). For this reason, the PRC cannot and should not be interested in the mere 
discourse of a European cultural integration, but on the bringing the economic power 
under social control. The only way, thus, towards achieving this objective is the 
recovery of popular sovereignty via the exit from the Eurozone and the abolition of 
the Maastricht Treaty and the ones that followed and not the unilateral disobedience 
to them, as proposed by the party’s majority (Rifondazione, 2013g, pp. 13-14). In 
order to achieve this objective, the document argues in favour of a unified pan-
European class movement that also involves parties beyond the EL, such as the 
Communist parties of the European South.  
 In conclusion, we could argue that the document proposed by this rather loose group 
that was formed at the party’s 9th Congress displays a range of interesting 
characteristics. Whilst providing an analysis similar to the majority’s, it reaches 
different and arguably more radical, in the sense of more critical, conclusions 
regarding both the party’s strategy as well as its stance towards the EU. Indeed, the 
document proposes the integration of Leninist elements in the party’s discourse, 
strategy, and tactics. As a result, it highlights the need for a change in the party’s 
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‘parliamentarism’ and a re-launch of the party in the role of a leading force of the class 
struggle. Because of this view, the group concludes that an exit from the current 
Eurozone cannot continue to constitute a taboo for the party. Indeed, the document 
calls for an exit from the common currency and an abolition of the Maastricht Treaty, 
alongside the creation of a pan-European working class movement. It is important to 
highlight that the group views the Communist Parties of Greece and Portugal as 
potential allies for the PRC, without, nevertheless, criticizing the party’s strategic 
membership in the EL. This demonstrates that the group’s Leninist perspective brings 
them closer to the much more orthodox communist parties of the European South, 
which have historically kept their distance from both the EL and lately of GUE/NGL.  
 In attempting an initial evaluation of the factionalism’s influence in the party’s stance 
towards the EU, we could argue the following. Following the split of the Rifondazione 
per la Sinistra faction and the subsequent creation of SEL, the PRC’s internal debate 
has been constantly becoming increasingly critical towards the EU. Indeed, all factions 
appear to accept a scenario that would see the country exiting the Eurozone, in an 
attempt to regain sovereignty and address the grave issues affecting Italian society. 
Moreover, as demonstrated above, there is an increasing minority inside the 
majoritarian faction that believes that a left-wing exit from the Eurozone is the only 
viable solution for the creation of another Europe that taking the form of a 
confederation could re-establish the full equality of its Member States. At the same 
time, the party’s residual faction appears even more critical and reaches considerably 
more radical, in the sense of the emphasis placed on revolutionary practice, 
conclusions regarding the EU. In fact, the loose group, which presented the document 
analysed above, places considerable emphasis on the party’s role in the avant-garde of 
a working-class movement that could bring about the exit from the Eurozone and the 
abolition of the EU’s neoliberal treaties. As a result, we could argue that the existence 
of those factions inside the PRC, leads the party to maintain a significantly more 
radical view towards the EU in comparison to the stance held by its European allies in 
Greece and Spain, even though the effects of the financial crisis have been much more 
severe. 
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e. Party Leadership 
 
 Moving forward towards the framework’s fourth factor, we come across party 
leadership. During the period under study, the PRC has gone through the leadership 
of Fausto Bertinotti, his successor Franco Giordano, and the current Secretary Paolo 
Ferrero. As outlined in the introduction of the chapter, Bertinotti’s last year as the 
party’s secretary was characterised by an increasing polarisation between its factions. 
Upon Bertinotti’s resignation, Giordano’s brief spell could be viewed as displaying a 
certain degree of continuity regarding the party’s strategy, given that he was supported 
by the faction closer to Bertinotti. Nevertheless, the party’s electoral demise in 2008 
led Giordano to resign from his position and paved the way for the PRC’s 7th Congress, 
which was characterised by the intense polarisation between the candidacy of Paolo 
Ferrero and Nichi Vendola.  On the one hand, Ferrero’s candidacy was supported by 
a small part of the high-ranking officials close to Bertinotti and by the totality of the 
party’s minoritarian factions. On the other hand, Vendola was supported by the clear 
majority of the officials close to Bertinotti, as well as by Giordano himself. Ferrero’s 
victory served as a catalyst for the split of the group led by Vendola and Giordano and 
signalled the creation of a novel left-wing formation, which took the name SEL and 
had the moral support63 of Bertinotti himself. 
 Given the split and the massive exodus of high ranking officials from the PRC, we 
could argue that any influence that Giordano’s leadership had on the party was to a 
large extent eradicated. As a result, we could aim on testing the argument of a 
radicalisation or lack thereof of the party’s stance towards the EU in the following part 
relating to party competition, where a comparison between SEL and the PRC will be 
carried out. With regards to Bertinotti’s leadership, we could argue that his decisive 
role in the creation of the EL, as well as the Euro-party’s ideological base, constitutes 
proof of his conviction that the EU, despite its deficits, was the most appropriate field 
of battle for the radical left’s political forces. In addition to his role in the party 
becoming a founding member of the EL, Bertinotti’s era was characterised by the 
increased influence of Ingrao’s political thought and the subsequent attempts of the 
PRC to create links with the social movements that emerged during the end of the 
                                                
63 Indeed, Bertinotti chose not to become a member of SEL himself, although he openly supported the 
creation of the party. 
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1990s. In addition to this, Bertinotti’s era was marked by a harsh critique to the 
socialist experiments of the East that went beyond the anti-Stalinism that characterises 
the parties of the European radical left family, as during that time Bertinotti attempted 
to denounce Leninism64. To be able to trace the continuity or lack thereof of those 
elements in the party’s current leadership, a few articles written by Paolo Ferrero will 
be analysed. This will serve in testing the argument that following Ferrero’s election 
the party has been moving towards the direction of proposing much more radical 
solutions in relation to the EU, whilst maintaining almost intact its radically critical 
stance towards it. Ferrero’s interest to this end led him to author several articles 
following Syriza’s capitulation in July 2015.  
 It would appear from Ferrero’s blog in the Italian newspaper Il Fatto Quotidiano as 
if the EL and its party members constitute for Ferrero an inspiration and at the same 
time a model for reuniting the Italian left. In an open letter to Tsipras’ supporters in 
Italy published on January 2014, Ferrero stresses the support that his candidacy has 
received by the PRC at a European level. Concurrently, he states his support for the 
creation of Unitary electoral list that would support his candidacy in the 2014 EP 
elections (Ferrero, 2014a, p. 1). Moreover, he reiterates his conviction that Syriza 
could serve as a role model for the reunification of the Italian radical left under the 
banner of the opposition to austerity. As Ferrero states, “the different [ideological] 
positions that exist in Italy are present inside Syriza as well as in all the aggregations 
of the European Left but in those cases, it does not impede them from coming together 
in a common battle” (Ferrero, 2014a, p. 2). Three months after the letter addressed to 
Tsipras’ Italian supporters, Ferrero authors an article entitled ‘Elections for the EP 
2014: alongside Tsipras, to change Europe and our future’ (Ferrero, 2014b). In this 
article, Ferrero argues that the creation of the electoral list ‘L’altra Europa’ creates a 
twofold opportunity for the European and Italian left. On one hand, this candidacy 
changes the perspective of how to explain and exit from the crisis. Ferrero views that 
the traditional parties are divided between those that support the EU and those that 
                                                
64 The PRC had already broken with Leninist organisational principles, such as the idea of democratic 
centralism, ever since its creation. Bertinotti’s attempt to eradicate what remained in terms of the party’s 
revolutionary prospect, alongside the denouncement of violence as means to conquer the power were 
amongst the factors that led to the internal turmoil that characterised his final years as the PRC’s 
secretary, as the opposition viewed this attempt as a clear attack on the party’s communist legacy and 
identity.  
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oppose it and to this end they base their campaigns on fear. This discourse is radically 
transformed by Tsipras’ candidacy as this campaign does not adhere to the dilemma 
of the common currency, but instead bases its campaign on the dilemma of either more 
or no austerity. This results to an alternative political proposal that instead of focusing 
on fear, focuses on the principle of hope (Ferrero, 2014b, p. 1). Moreover, the creation 
of this electoral list paves the way, according to Ferrero, for the creation of a public 
space for the left in the country, as a possible electoral success could constitute the 
foundation upon which to build a unitary political subject (Ferrero, 2014b, p. 2).  
 Ferrero’s urge to create a unitary political subject of the Italian left was strongly 
reiterated immediately after the referendum of July 2015 that took place in Greece. 
Indeed, Ferrero reproduced, in the form of an article, his intervention in the PRC’s 
National Directorate entitled ‘We need to create the Italian Syriza’ (Ferrero, 2015a). 
In his intervention, Ferrero argues that the victory of the NO in the Greek referendum 
represents the victory of democracy against the EU’s financial terrorism and highlights 
the necessity of creating a popular left front in Italy, to be able to support the Greek 
people. In Ferrero’s opinion, the result of the referendum constitutes the first time ever 
since the creation of the EU that the latter was so openly questioned. The battle taking 
place in Europe between the European elites supported by the conservatives and the 
socialists alike on one side, and the Greek government and the EL on the other, 
renders, for Ferrero, the active and effective participation of the Italian left “[…] a 
moral and political imperative” (Ferrero, 2015a, p. 2). Ferrero’s conviction is so strong 
that it leads him to compare this struggle to the resistance to Nazism and Fascism 
(Ferrero, 2015a, p. 2). For the EL to live up to this task, Ferrero believes that there is 
a great need for the creation of a mass movement against austerity, the reinforcement 
and enlargement of the EL and of every radical left party in every single EU Member 
State (Ferrero, 2015a). With regards to the Italian left, Ferrero reiterates his belief that 
the current situation calls for the immediate creation of a unitary political subject. As 
a result, he called for the initiation of a series of debates amongst the radical left forces 
of the country, including SEL (Ferrero, 2015a, p. 3).  
 As mentioned above, it is of importance for the present thesis to investigate the effect 
that Syriza’s capitulation in July 2015 had on Ferrero’s and subsequently the PRC’s 
stance towards the EU. As a result, Ferrero’s intervention in the party’s National 
Directorate in July 2015 relating on the events that took place in Greece will be 
thoroughly analysed. In the opening of his intervention, Ferrero argues that the events 
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that led to Syriza’s capitulation prove that the EU is completely immune to the 
legitimate requests of the Greek people and the Greek government. The EU, thus, 
proved itself to be no place for a constructive dialogue, but rather an enemy territory 
for the radical left and alternative political forces (Ferrero, 2015b, p. 1). Ferrero 
depicts the EU as a cage in which Germany imposes its imperialist and, to an extent, 
neo-colonialist will over the other Member States. Because of such an open and public 
display of its power, Ferrero believes that most of the European peoples have realised 
that the problem is not Greece, but the EU and more specifically Germany (Ferrero, 
2015b, p. 1). The conclusion that he reaches regarding the EU is, thus, that the EU is 
not modifiable via the reformist plan to change the balance of powers, but must be 
unhinged to be able to construct the Europe of the peoples (Ferrero, 2015b, p. 1).  
 In this context, Ferrero attempts to evaluate the role of Syriza. He argues, thus, that 
there is no doubt that the Greek party’s capitulation to the diktat of the EU is a loss. 
Nevertheless, he reiterates his support to the Greek PM Tsipras65, as in his view the 
true reason behind this capitulation was not the inability or unwillingness of Syriza, 
but the disadvantageous balance of powers at a European level. The blame is, thus, to 
be placed upon the European left forces that proved to be unable to create a mass 
protest movement in support of the Syriza-led government (Ferrero, 2015b, p. 1). 
Moreover, Ferrero argues that Syriza’s capitulation is a battle lost, which may prove 
beneficial in the long term, as it has deconstructed Germany’s image and has rendered 
evident its hegemonic role inside the EU. Concurrently, the events leading to the 
capitulation have demonstrated the need for a pan-European solution to the issue of 
sovereign debts, and, above all, they have proved that the EU’s diktat is not based on 
economic rationality, but is a reaction to a rebellion that resembles the Nazis’ reactions 
to the resistance movements (Ferrero, 2015b, p. 1). The events have, as a result, shown 
to the whole of Europe the classist, reactionary, and anti-popular character of the 
current German-led EU (Ferrero, 2015b, p. 1).  
 Following the demonstration of solidarity to Syriza and Tsipras, Ferrero briefly 
argues against a multiplicity of alternative plans that saw Greece exiting the Eurozone, 
on the base that this would mean a further devastation of the quality of life of the 
Greek people and a clear victory of the German side, which preferred a Grexit 
                                                
65 A support that he initially declared via an article published in his blog in the newspaper Il Fatto 
Quotidiano in July 13th, 2015 entitled ‘Standing next to Tsipras’ (Ferrero, 2015c).  
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(Ferrero, 2015b, p. 2). In addition to this, Ferrero draws a number of conclusions 
relating to the PRC’s thesis regarding the country’s Eurozone membership. He argues 
that even though the party considered that entering the Eurozone was a mistake, the 
debate on a possible exit is much more complicated and has led to a series of 
ambiguities. As a result, he states that controlling the currency does not automatically 
provide a state with a complete economic autonomy, given the growing 
interconnectedness of the global economies. It would, thus, appear that Ferrero finds 
that a possible exit from the Eurozone is not per se a solution, especially from an 
economic point of view.  Concurrently, he notes that the Italian public opinion has 
demonstrated a certain discontent towards the EU that, nevertheless, has not been 
translated into an increase of the percentage of Italians that would like to see the 
country exiting the common currency. (Ferrero, 2015b, p. 2). Consequently, he argues 
that the party should try to defend the citizens from the EU, without posing as a 
primary objective the country’s exit from the Eurozone. 
 In the final part of his intervention, Ferrero repeats his firm belief that the construction 
of a Europe of the peoples depends on breaking free from the current EU’s cage. The 
only way that this would happen is, according to Ferrero, by working at the same time 
both at a European and national level towards re-launching the concept of class 
consciousness. This would be achieved by creating a pan-European movement against 
austerity that would unite most of the European peoples. Ferrero’s core position is, 
thus, that while the European RLPs, via the EL and the GUE/NGL should work harder 
to create the necessary pan-European movement, the Member States should reinforce 
their sovereignty and autonomy, to be able to defend themselves from the neoliberal 
diktats of the current EU. The Europe of the peoples will be achieved once the balance 
of power will be such to allow for the refoundation of the EU on socialist bases.  
 In concluding the leadership factor of the framework, we could argue that the change 
in the party’s leadership appears to have played a role in its stance towards the EU. 
Bertinotti’s influence over the PRC was leading the party into a rupture, to an extent, 
with its communist and anti-capitalist identity. We could argue that if there was no 
change in leadership the PRC would have become a left-wing formation that does not 
identify itself with the communist tradition, much like SEL. This makes even more 
interesting and timely the brief comparison between SEL and the PRC below that will 
follow even more interesting and timely. With regards to testing the continuity 
between the PRC under Bertinotti and Ferrero, we could argue that there are indeed 
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significant differences. Ferrero’s election thanks to the support of the party’s 
minoritarian left-wing fractions meant that those groups had more influence over the 
party’s direction both ideologically as well as strategically. While the PRC remained 
firm in its EL membership and support of the pan-European initiatives, it appeared to 
have sharpened its critique towards the EU especially when the hopes raised after 
Syriza’s election were crashed in July 2015. Despite Syriza’s capitulation, the party 
and Ferrero himself continued to support Syriza and its leader. Indeed, it would appear 
as if Ferrero viewed the capitulation as a verification of his political theses and was, 
thus, an event that served as a catalyst for the intensification of the process that could 
lead to the creation of a unified political subject of the left in Italy.  
 
f. Party Competition 
 
Introduction 
 
 As regards the factor that involves party competition, we must note that the PRC is 
currently surrounded by two parties that could be argued to constitute outcomes of the 
various splits that took place inside the party itself. On one hand, one comes across 
SEL, the party founded primarily by Nichi Vendola upon his split from the PRC 
following the party’s 7th Congress. It is important to note that SEL has launched a 
project named Sinistra Italiana (SI) [Italian Left]66. On the other hand, the PCdI, 
founded by Armando Cossutta upon his split from the PRC in 1998. As mentioned in 
the previous part, the PCdI will be holding a founding congress to re-construct the 
PCI. As demonstrated in the previous parts, the PRC has been constantly arguing in 
favour of the unification of the Italian radical left, following the examples of its 
European allies, such as Syriza, Front de Gauche, Izquierda Unida and so on. 
Nevertheless, up until the day writing of the present thesis it has not officially opted 
for taking part in PCd’I’s process of reconstructing the PCI. Despite the party’s 
unwillingness to participate, several party officials, especially the ones of the Essere 
Comunisti fraction, have already become signatories of PCd’I’s attempt. As a result, 
we could argue that the PRC is currently operating in a highly competitive political 
                                                
66 Named after the group in the Italian Parliament that involves MPs and Senators deriving from SEL, 
former PD, and former M5S (Beppe Grillo’s Movement).  
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environment, with pressure coming both from its right67, by SEL, as well as its left, 
by the PCdI and its attempt to re-construct the PCI. To be able to evaluate the 
importance of party competition on the PRC’s stance towards the EU, an analysis of 
the political documents of SEL, PCdI, and of the new PCI will be taken into 
consideration.  
 
SEL 
 
As mentioned in the previous parts of this chapter, SEL was created upon Vendola’s 
decision to leave the PRC, alongside most of the party’s old guard of Bertinottiani. It 
was in January 2009, thus, that Rifondazione per la Sinistra, the PRC-faction led by 
Vendola, became the Movimento per la Sinistra (MpS) [Movement for the left]. As 
mentioned in the previous sections, the split from the PRC involved a significant 
number of high ranking officials of the PRC, alongside the interconnected number of 
party members and supporters. SEL, nevertheless, involved the fusion of more 
political formations, including the PdCI-faction Unire la Sinistra [Uniting the Left], 
the PD-faction Sinistra Democratica [Democratic Left], and the independent 
formation Associazione Ecologisti [Ecologists Association]. Achille Occhetto’s 
decision to join the party, stating that there is a certain continuity between his vision 
of the PCI following the Bolognina turn and the newly founded SEL, was important 
on the SEL’s ideological direction. The party’s first congress elected Vendola as 
president and outlined the party’s fundamental principles as being those of “peace and 
non-violence, work and social justice, education and an environmental reconversion 
of the economy and the society” (SEL, 2010, p. 3).  
 Ever since its creation, SEL has been presenting itself as a force of the left open to 
wider centre-left coalitions, and especially the PD. Indeed, SEL’s strategy to continue 
to take part in the PD electoral coalition rendered it the only party of the Italian left to 
                                                
67 In this case, defining the left and right relates primarily to the party rhetoric. Indeed, SEL and SI 
could be labelled as formations of the new left, blending several left-wing currents with democratic 
socialism. Moreover, SEL’s electoral coalition with the PD, as well as its request to adhere to the Party 
of the European Socialists (PES) constitutes one more reason for its collocation on the PRC’s right. On 
the other hand, the PCd’I’s rhetoric, and more importantly the new PCI’s initial political documents 
demonstrate a great turn towards a rather orthodox communist identity, appearing, thus, prima facie as 
more radical in respect to the PRC.  
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achieve parliamentary representation in the most recent general elections in 2013. 
Regardless of the relative electoral success, SEL’s decision to ally with the PD has 
thwarted arguably the ability to forge wider coalitions with political formations that 
place themselves on the party’s left, including the PRC, and the PCdI. Another 
decision that demonstrates SEL’s willingness to open both to its left and right has to 
do with its request to become part of the PES. The party believed that it could 
contribute to the cultural, political, organisational renewal of an important party family 
in front of the decline of Europe and its ineffective policies against the crisis. It 
believed, thus, that there is a need inside the PES for fusion with political forces that 
have a new and diverse vision of Europe and its institutions that have failed to promote 
democratic solutions to the issues raised by the crisis (SEL, 2014b). Concurrently with 
its request to join the PES, nevertheless, the party’s second congress in 2014 decided 
to not support PES’ candidate for the Presidency of the EC, Martin Schulz, but instead 
to stand for the EL’s candidate, Alexis Tsipras (SEL, 2014a). Indeed, SEL was part of 
the L’Altra Europa electoral list during the 2014 elections for the EP, alongside 
amongst others the PRC. The party’s slogan regarding its support to Tsipras reveals 
arguably a lot regarding the party’s stance. Indeed, the slogan read ‘with Tsipras, but 
not against Schulz’. We could, thus, argue that SEL is constantly seeking to approach 
both the social democrats, due to the ability to directly influence the political 
decisions, whilst actively supporting the radical left that represent the ideas that 
Europe needs to exit the crisis. This will be made clearer in the following paragraph, 
through a brief analysis of the party’s political document produced by its National 
Assembly in July 2015, a few days after the referendum that took place in Greece.  
  Indeed, the analysis of SEL’s political document presents a high degree of 
convergence with the analysis carried out by the PRC. It affirms that the German-led 
EU is unable to respond to the multiplicity of issues that are affecting the Union, 
including the humanitarian crisis in the Middle East. In such a context, the party 
expresses its respect for Syriza’s protagonism that gave the people of Greece the 
possibility to demonstrate its courage. It considers, thus, that the Greek vote opens a 
tenacious political clash between politics and democracy on one hand, and the 
economy and oligarchy on the other (SEL, 2015, p. 1). As a result, SEL regards that 
the Greek referendum constitutes the first genuine breaking point with the “[…] 
suffocating hood of the oligarchic and technocratic hegemony of the EU of the wide 
political alliances and of austerity” (SEL, 2015, p. 1). The referendum’s result 
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represents for SEL a decisive blow to regressive nationalisms, whilst posing an end to 
the social-democracy’s inability to initiate a battle against the neoliberal leitmotif of 
the EU. To continue the battle, the party believes that there is a need for the creation 
of a Europeanist political platform founded on the aspiration to create the United 
States of Europe, “[…] whose political and democratic unity will render even more 
clear and perceivable the discontinuity with the policies of austerity of this Europe that 
quickly changed from a dream to a nightmare” (SEL, 2015, p. 2). The party’s 
document concludes with a call to all the left-wing forces in Italy to unite and create 
a unitary political subject that could promote such an alternative at a national level, 
while coordinating with the forces of the European left to develop a fight at a 
continental one.  
 In conclusion to the above, we could argue that SEL has maintained a rather balanced 
and opportunistic stance ever since its creation in 2009. It has chosen to electorally 
ally itself with the centre-left coalition, which has given the party the possibility to 
gain a significant number of seats in the Italian parliament. The ability of the party to 
choose its alliances in this manner could be viewed as a result of its ideological 
background. Indeed, SEL is a party of the new left that has since its creation broken 
with the communist tradition, both from a rhetorical/ideological point of view, as well 
as from an organisational one. With regards to its stance towards the EU, we could 
argue that SEL has maintained a strong critique of the current European edifice. 
Indeed, especially after the explosion of the Syriza phenomenon in Greece, the party 
has been actively supportive of the wider European left’s attempts to grasp the 
opportunity and promote changes at a European level. Despite its harsh critique and 
analysis that resembles the one carried out by the PRC, SEL has not outlined scenarios 
that transcend its traditional calls for Europe’s democratisation via its Federalisation.  
 
PCdI 
 
 As mentioned in the introductory part of this chapter, the PCdI or PdCI as it was called 
prior to that, was founded by Armando Cossutta upon his exit from the PRC that 
followed the rupture between Cossutta and Bertinotti. Nevertheless, the current PCdI 
cannot be viewed as the party reflecting Cossutta’s more orthodox communist views. 
Indeed, a series of splits inside the PCdI led to the creation of yet another Communist 
Party, named Partito Comunista (PC) [Communist Party], which is currently under the 
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leadership of one of Cossutta’s most trusted collaborators at the time of his leadership, 
Marco Rizzo. The PC is advocating a complete rupture with the EU and NATO and is 
part of the network of Communist and Workers’ Parties led by the Greek KKE. 
Despite the split of arguably its most orthodox fraction, the PCdI maintains its distinct 
communist identity, which will be rendered clearer by the analysis of the manifest 
presented on the attempt to re-construct the PCI.  
 Prior to launching this campaign that has attracted, as mentioned in the previous part, 
the attention of a good number of PRC’s officials, the PCdI was initially part of the 
L’Altra Europa platform, alongside both the PRC and SEL, but following several 
disputes relating to the exclusion of PCdI representatives from the electoral lists it 
decided to opt out. Indeed, the party’s General Secretary, Cesare Procaccini, expressed 
in February 2014 the decision of the Party’s Central Committee to stand next to 
Tsipras during the elections for the EP that took place in 2014. The decision was based, 
according to Procaccini, on the great respect that the party has for Alexis Tsipras for 
his strenuous opposition of the neoliberal policies that are leading the peoples of 
Europe to poverty (PCdI, 2014a). Nevertheless, following the exclusion of PCdI 
members from the electoral lists, the party attempted to remedy the issue via several 
meetings with the coalition’s guarantors. Following the unfruitful meetings with the 
representative of the coalition’s guarantors, the party declared the suspension of its 
active support of the coalition. It is important to note that the PCdI viewed its exclusion 
as an attack “ […] not only to the party, but to a political and programmatic orientation 
similar to ours, shared amongst others by communist and left-wing forces that 
constitute the Lista, which are seen by a part of the promoters as incompatible with a 
Euro-Atlantic line that is  bringing back war and fascism in the heart of Europe” (PCdI, 
2014b, p. 1). The party, thus, decided to opt out of the L’Altra Europa, even if several 
of the coalition’s candidates were amongst the signatories of the party’s resolution 
regarding the European elections. The PCdI viewed, as a result, its exclusion as a sign 
that its positions regarding the EU, and especially the denouncement of the 
intervention in Ukraine were too radical to be included in a coalition that rejected such 
harsh criticisms of the European status quo (PCdI, 2014c, p. 1). Despite the rupture 
taking place in the months prior to the elections for the EP, the PCdI took part in the 
National Assembly of the Lista Tsipras, which was meant to establish its continuity as 
a pole for the unification of the radical left in Italy. This could be viewed as an 
indication of the importance that the party placed on the unity of the Italian left, 
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especially at the time of the hope that was evident amongst the European left following 
the explosion of the Syriza phenomenon.  
 Syriza’s capitulation, nevertheless, in July 2015 has arguably had a significant effect 
on the PCdI’s stance towards the EU. The PCdI was amongst the parties that viewed 
Syriza’s electoral victory in 2015 as a decisive step towards the active opposition of 
the neoliberal policies of the EU. Under the same lens, the Greek referendum was seen 
to be “re-bringing sense to politics” (PCdI, 2015a, p. 1), as the president of the party’s 
Central Committee, Manuela Palermi, stated in the aftermath of the vote. 
Nevertheless, the party’s capitulation to the diktat of the EU served as a catalyst for 
the radicalisation of the party’s stance seen as a change in the rhetoric towards the EU. 
Indeed, in November 2015, the PCdI held a national assembly bearing the name, “No 
Euro, No EU, No NATO” (PCdI, 2015b, p. 1). The assembly’s political document 
argues that all European governments are implementing austerity and as a result are, 
attacking workers’ rights, whilst limiting democratic participation. The party views 
that “the brief season of heresy in Greece has for the time being ended with the 
capitulation to Troika and with the acceptance of the memorandum that brings the 
country under its complete control” (PCdI, 2015b, p. 2). This leads the party to 
conclude that there are no signs of alternative ways within the EU, which is found to 
constitute a system where the power is in the hand of finance and multinational 
capitals. Thus, the EU is found to share none of the democratic values of the anti-
fascist Europeanists of the past, as its authoritarian construction is becoming 
increasingly visible. In addition to this, the party considers that the EU is not 
representative of the pacifist ideals, as demonstrated by its aggressive militarism 
evident in the cases of Ukraine, Libya and the Middle East (PCdI, 2015b, pp. 1-2). 
The European power system is ultimately found by the PCdI to not be ‘reformable’, 
but can only evolve in an authoritarian and unfair sense. It is important to highlight 
that the PCdI presents a very important rupture in this document. The narrative 
proposed by the EL and most of its member parties views the EU as primarily a market 
and not as a polity. Its response is, as a result, the struggle for the supremacy of politics 
over the economy. The PCdI underlines that “it is not true that this Europe is a market 
without politics, contrary to that [belief] the EU is a monstrous political system that 
imposes step by step the absolute privilege of the markets before the peoples’ rights” 
(PCdI, 2015b, p. 3). Because of this analysis, the party argues that it is in the best 
interest of all European peoples to break free of the EU. To this end, the PCdI declares 
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its commitment for the coordination with all the European political forces that hold a 
radical critique to both the EU and the euro, seen as the most important instrument for 
blackmailing the European peoples (PCdI, 2015b, p. 3). The PCdI’s analysis, thus, 
although similar to the PRC’s leads the party to reach conclusions that do not only 
relate to the possible exit from the euro, but to the immediate exit from both the EU 
and the euro, via the cancellation of the Union’s treaties and the return to democratic 
and popular sovereignty (PCdI, 2015b, p. 4).  
 The ideological gap between the PCdI and the PRC can be highlighted in the open 
letter sent to the PRC’s directorate by Bruno Steri, a former member of the party’s 
CPN as well as editor of the Essere Comunisti review. Steri’s open letter heavily 
criticizes the epistemological relativism of the analysis carried out by the PRC, as well 
as by a significant part of the radical left in the country. Steri, indeed, argues that this 
relativism has served as a ‘mincer’ promoted by the party’s class enemies influencing 
its evaluation of the 1900s and Stalin (Steri, 2016, p. 3). As a result, alongside Stalin, 
the PRC has ended up liquidating Lenin’s legacy and the entire communist history. It 
argues, thus, that the PRC has liquidated the solid ideological and historical tradition 
upon which a modern Communist party should operate. The anti-Stalinist mantra is, 
according to Steri, amongst the reasons for the overly simplistic analyses that the PRC 
has being carrying out, and its inability to draw the necessary conclusions from the 
“[…] dramatic defeat of the equidistant68 reformism of Alexis Tsipras” (Steri, 2016, 
p. 3). For Steri, as well as the other officials of the PRC that left the party and became 
signatories of the project for the re-construction of the PCI, the PRC’s insistence on 
building the Italian version of Syriza, or Izquierda Unida, will result in the party’s 
gradual extinction, ending up, thus, exactly as the Greek Syriza (Steri, 2016, p. 4).  
 A similar narrative is also utilised in the political document that served as the basis 
for the re-construction of the PCI. Indeed, the ‘manifesto of the Italian Communist 
Party of the 21st century’ is a political document that aims on reinstating Leninist 
notions, ranging from organisational elements such as democratic centralism to the 
role of the party as being in the vanguard of the working-class movement. In addition 
                                                
68 Equidistant in that Syriza and the PRC sought to maintain an approach that kept its distances from 
the communist tradition, not taking, thus, full advantage of the theoretical tools of Leninism and 
scientific socialism to provide with an accurate analysis of the status quo, both at a global and European 
level.  
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to this, the document argues that “[…] a long historical phase of more than thirty years 
and accompanied by the bourgeois narrative of the unlimited and pacified progress of 
humanity, is witnessing its dramatic and contradictory epilogue […]” (PCI-Re, 2016, 
p. 1). The current state of affairs in Europe proves without any doubt, for the new PCI, 
that the bourgeois narrative intended to lead the working class to lose its class 
consciousness and its own historic role. Instead of progress, it has produced a society 
affected by poverty, without social justice and in a permanent state of war (PCI-Re, 
2016, p. 2). With regards to the EU, the party considers that the European treaties, 
imposed by the supranational European capital, are attacking the basis of the Italian 
Constitution. The response is, thus, for the new PCI the defence of a progressive 
democracy and the recovery of national sovereignty, to be able to create a new 
working class internationalism, based on anti-imperialism (PCI-Re, 2016, p. 4). A 
final important note relating to the new PCI’s stance towards the EU can be made 
regarding several attachments to the founding political document. Amongst other 
political analyses on a variety of subjects, we come across a brief article authored by 
Stefano Fassina, former Minister under the PD-led government and MP for the SI as 
well as a promoter of SEL’s project of unification. In his brief analysis, Fassina draws 
several conclusions from Syriza’s capitulation in July 2015. According to Fassina, the 
events in Greece have managed to “[…] rip the veil of the Europeanist rhetoric and 
technical objectivity used to cover the balance of powers inside the Eurozone” 
(Fassina, 2016, p. 30). Following the unveiling of the true character of the EU, Fassina 
argues that it is evident that the liberal mercantilism of the EU demands the 
transformation of democracy and politics to an administration on behalf of third 
parties. As a result, Fassina argues that insisting on calling for a United States of 
Europe based on the rewriting in a social-democratic direction of the founding treaties 
is pointless, as proven by the Syriza-led government’s capitulation. He, thus, argues 
that a rupture with the Eurozone and a strengthening of the Republican Constitution 
is the only way, which despite the interconnected uncertainties, can lead to an exit 
from the current critical state (Fassina, 2016, pp. 30-31).  
 
Conclusion 
 
In an attempt to reach some initial conclusions from the analysis of the party 
competition factor, we could argue that the PRC operates in a very volatile political 
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system, which is characterised by ever-changing electoral coalitions and alliances. The 
state of affairs of the hyper-fragmented Italian radical left is evident from the 
innumerable splits that have affected the parties commencing with the end of the PCI 
in the early 1990s. As demonstrated in the previous paragraphs, the PRC is surrounded 
by SEL on its right and the PCdI/new PCI on its left. While SEL, albeit with exceptions 
as evidenced by Fassina’s article, maintains a reformist stance towards the EU and 
calls for the creation of the United States of Europe, the PCdI and new PCI have 
reached much more radical conclusions and argue, thus, in favour of Italy’s exit both 
from the EU and Eurozone. This could be seen, consequently, as pressure exerted on 
the PRC that must maintain a distinct stance balancing between a left-wing reformism 
and the rejection of the EU. The lack of a unifying left-wing pole inside the Italian 
party system appears, thus, to have played an important role in shaping the PRC’s 
stance in its attempt to maintain a certain degree of political distinctiveness from the 
myriad of left-wing formations that the party must compete.  
The application of the theoretical lens of the communist dilemma to the patterns of 
party competition, enables us to reach several important conclusions. As mentioned in 
the introductory part of the present thesis, the issue here concerns the party’s profile 
on European integration and its interaction with their propaganda against or in favour 
of the other indigenous political forces. According to the present thesis this could, 
highlight both how such moderation, or lack thereof, manifests itself in the context of 
domestic party competition, as well as whether electoral opportunities or changes in 
overall strategy are the main driving factors of change on the issue. Subsequently, as 
Charalambous (2013) summarizes, the analysis of a party’s approach towards other 
parties’ policies can be summarized by the following questions: 
a. Have a party’s main opponents or electoral strategy changed, 
thus explaining attitudinal or salience changes in its profile on 
the issue of European integration? 
b. Through their general views on European integration and EU-
related matters, do communist parties differentiate themselves 
from other left or non-left actors and, if so, how they achieve 
this? 
(Charalambous, 2013, p. 46) 
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 Consequently, three possibilities can be hypothesized in respect to the parties’ 
responses. The first one views the parties projecting EU-related matters in their public 
discourse or emphasize them in a way that highlights that they have become more 
moderate than before. The second possibility views the parties as utilising the same 
mechanisms to present themselves as more radical in a way that they move more 
closely towards their ideological identity. The third one views the parties as utilising 
the same mechanisms in their effort to reconfirm their existing ideological profile. 
Following the analysis of the party competition factor, we could attempt to respond to 
the questions. With regards to the first one, we could argue that there has been a rather 
substantial change regarding the PCdI’s stance towards the EU, which turned from 
that of a radical and constructive critique into a quasi-Euro-rejectionist. In respect to 
the second question, we could argue that the second argument can be verified. Indeed, 
it would appear as if the PRC in its attempt to address the changes taking place inside 
the Italian radical left family, amongst the other events affecting the European left, 
chose to place more emphasis on its sharp critique towards the EU; a critique that has 
led the PRC to contemplate the possibility of a partial rupture with the Union.  
  
g. Transnational Links 
 
The framework’s next conditioning factor involves the PRC’s transnational links. As 
mentioned in the introductory part of the present thesis, the need for a more coherent 
political formation of the radical left at a European level was addressed in 2004. This 
was when several RLPs, with the PRC holding a primary role in the process, gave 
birth to the first radical left Europarty and elected the at the time Secretary of the PRC, 
Fausto Bertinotti, as its first ever President (EL, 2013). The following analysis will 
involve the EL’s major political positions and the degree of coherence between the EL 
and the PRC. To be able to assess said convergence, the analysis of the EL’s political 
theses adopted by the party’s 2nd Congress held in November 2007 is necessary. 
Furthermore, the agenda for a social Europe as approved by the party’s 3rd Congress 
in December 2010 presents us the necessary post-crisis perspective. Finally, the 
political decision of the Europarty’s 4th Congress held in Madrid in 2013 will present 
us with EL’s analysis as the crisis inside the European edifice was deepening.  
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 EL’s political theses present a high degree of coherence both ideologically and 
programmatically. Indeed, EL’s political document opens thus, “the contradiction 
between capitalism and the emancipation of the individual, armament and war, climate 
change and environmental disasters, and the privatisation of all spheres of life lead us 
to ask once again ‘socialism or barbarism’? (EL, 2007, p. 1). This reference to 
Friedrich Engels’ famous motto is the exact same that we came across in the PRC’s 
political decisions. Following this opening statement, the EL draws a very negative 
picture of the current nature of the European edifice. Indeed, the party considers that 
the increasing neoliberal influence in the Union’s institutions have altered the model 
into an “undemocratic, neoliberal, patriarchal and militaristic model of the European 
construction” (EL, 2007, p. 5).  
 The party’s alternative vision of Europe is presented as the complete antithesis of the 
current one. Indeed, the EL proposes an alternative to the current EU structure based 
on the principles of welfare and labour rights. In addition to this, the importance of the 
public nature of the most important social services is highlighted. Moreover, the EL 
stresses the importance of ecology and sustainable development as opposed to the 
global capitalism’s intensification of the ecological crisis (EL, 2007, pp. 13-17). In 
order to achieve is professed vision the party believes that “a deep democratic 
reconstruction of the European institutions is an indispensable component of our 
whole strategy. In this field the European Left Party, and our large social and political 
alliance, take the historical responsibility to change the political balance and the 
political orientations in Europe” (EL, 2007, p. 18). Because of the above, we could 
argue that the major ideological positions of the EL echo the PRC’s ideological pillars 
of ecology, feminism, as well as of a peaceful and democratic path towards socialism. 
 In the EL’s ‘Agenda for a Social Europe’, we come across a document heavily 
influenced by the financial crisis, which was deepened very much inside the Eurozone. 
The party finds that the troika made of the EC, ECB, and IMF has imposed several 
unacceptable sacrifices to the peoples of Europe. As a result, the EL views the current 
crisis as posing a risk of “economic collapse, massive exacerbation of poverty and 
precariousness, and the destruction of the social model and European civilisation 
itself” (EL, 2010, p. 1). To avoid such destructive consequences, the EL believes that 
the EU should bring about a radical change in its policies switching from the “logic of 
profit into the new logic of human development” (EL, 2010, p. 2). Moreover, the crisis 
is found to have been influenced by the Union’s democratic deficit, which needs to be 
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addressed. In terms of actual measures to tackle the effects of the crisis, the EL 
proposes the regulation of the banking sector under social ownership and its 
consequent democratic control (EL, 2010, p. 8). In addition to that, the EL calls for 
the cancellation of a significant part of the affected countries’ sovereign debt, as well 
as for a European wide minimum income for the unemployed, shorter working hours, 
and a European wide minimum wage (EL, 2010, pp. 8-12). With regards to the party’s 
alternative vision, the EL reinstates its firm belief in “radically different world, 
democracy, peace and socialism […] we aspire to a world of freedom, justice, and 
equality, without repression, exploitation, wars, hunger or need” (EL, 2010, p. 16). 
 The party’s latest political decision is a political document heavily influenced by the 
deepening European crisis, which is characterised as the “worst crisis in its history 
since the Thirties and the Second World War” (EL, 2013, p. 1). Indeed, the EL opens 
its political document with a frontal attack to the European status quo, “according to 
the promises of the forces that dominate Europe, the European project was to be one 
of peace and social progress; it is now being transformed into a nightmare where the 
only horizon offered to the peoples of Europe is one of brutal and generalised social 
regression. Europe as a whole has been thrust into this turmoil by the crisis of the 
financialised capitalist system, the social and ecological consequences of which have 
hit humanity and the planet with unprecedented violence, as well as by the crisis of a 
model of the European Union that has cast in an ultraliberal mould, under the 
supervision of the financial markets” (EL, 2013, p. 1). The EL reinstates its view of 
the crisis as an existential threat, and adds that the devastating effects that the crisis 
has had on most countries’ economy and society could bring about the re-emergence 
of nationalisms and xenophobia. In such dark times, the EL believes that it is its 
historical role to create a “new European project, one which is based on the interests 
of the peoples and on the respect for their sovereignty, to restore a sense of meaning 
to European integration” (EL, 2013, p. 3).  
 The EL highlights the importance of the neoliberal political forces’ role in shaping an 
EU based on market deregulation and decreasing social welfare. The party considers 
that these forces are to be blamed not only for the degree that the global financial crisis 
has influenced the European economy, but also for the inability of the EU to provide 
a sustainable solution to the deepening of the crisis. Moreover, the party argues that 
the crisis has provided with “an opportunity to speed up a brutal process of structural 
adjustments” (EL, 2013, p. 5). Against this process, the EL proposes several measures, 
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which could help in the shaping of a novel European edifice. The measures that the 
party proposed are divided in four pillars. The first one concerns employment, social, 
ecological, and solidarity development. The second relates to the emancipation of the 
European economy from the financial markets. The third one involves the respect for 
popular sovereignty and democratic development. The fourth and final one regards 
peace and cooperation among peoples. The final section of this chapter will deal with 
the specific programmatic position of the EL to compare them with the PRC’s 
positions.  
 In an attempt to apply the theoretical lens of the communist dilemma to the PRC’s 
transnational affiliations we could reach the following conclusion. The PRC has been 
steadily emphasizing its membership in the EL. Ever since the creation of the Euro-
party, the PRC has been displaying its banner on its symbol. In addition to this, the 
PRC was amongst the proponents of the highly Europeanised political campaign 
involving the L’Altra Europa con Tsipras electoral list, which the party attempted to 
transform to a unifying pole for the Italian left. The fact that despite its limited national 
vote share the PRC is regarded as an important member of the EL and is, constitutes 
proof of the PRC’s importance for the EL and vice versa. Moreover, the PRC has 
chosen to actively support Syriza’s electoral campaign throughout the 2015 legislative 
elections. Indeed, high ranking officials of the PRC were constantly amongst the EL 
emissaries in Greece and have been taken the stage in Syriza’s political rallies, 
demonstrating their solidarity with the Greek party. Therefore, we could argue that the 
third argument formulated in previous chapter can be verified. It appears, thus, as if 
the PRC chose to place more importance to its European affiliations so it can reconfirm 
and further establish its existing ideological profile as a European force of the radical 
left.  
 Comparing the analyses of the two parties, we could argue that there is high 
convergence amongst their analyses. The Union’s current state is found by both the 
EL and the PRC to have reached an unprecedented low. Both parties believe that the 
European neoliberal political forces are to be blamed for the Union’s state. The 
peaceful and democratic path to socialism remains a constant ideological pillar that 
can be traced back to the Eurocommunist era and appears to apply to both the PRC 
and the EL. The importance of the EL in PRC’s stance vis-à-vis the EU is of major 
significance. The existence of a Europarty is per se a significant theoretical advantage 
in the PRC’s discourse, as it renders PRC’s goals much more politically achievable 
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and realistic. The EL, thus, constitutes the PRC’s response when faced with the issue 
of creating pan-European alliances to promote the European solutions dictated by the 
party’s distinct left Europeanism. Indeed, given the PRC’s view of the European 
project as a step towards the transcendence of the national divisions of the working 
class, the EL provides the necessary vehicle for the necessary changes. Moreover, 
given the highly-fragmented status of the Italian radical left, the EL constitutes a pole 
around which the PRC has attempted to unify the various political formations that 
surround it. We could, thus, conclude that the EL has played and continues to play a 
pivotal role in shaping the PRC’s stance towards the EU.  
  
h. European Integration 
 
 The integration process per se constitutes the last conditioning factor. To be able to 
efficiently understand the PRC’s overall response to the process, a comparative 
analysis of the above factors is deemed necessary. This will arguably enable the 
present thesis to reach some final conclusions as to the party’s overall stance vis-à-vis 
the EU over the period under study here.  
 Given the PRC’s Eurocommunist ideological heritage, its stance towards the 
integration process has been critical but constructive throughout the party’s history. 
The party, on one hand, heavily criticizes the neoliberal leitmotif of the process. On 
the other hand, it supports Italy’s permanence inside the EU, while actively seeking 
its refoundation according to the party’s socialist standards from within. For the PRC, 
as well as for the rest of the parties analysed by the present thesis, the peaceful and 
democratic path towards socialism can only be achieved through permanent struggle 
both at a national as well as at a European level. As a result, PRC’s distinct left 
Europeanism renders the party’s responsive mechanism much easier to operate than 
communist parties of the Eastern tradition. Indeed, the devastating effects of the crisis 
have arguably solidified the PRC’s criticism towards the neoliberal structure of the 
European edifice. Even though the party’s criticisms appeared to have been to an 
extent verified by the financial crisis, the high degree of fragmentation amongst left-
wing forces has created a party system in which the PRC has found significant 
difficulties in gaining momentum from an electoral point of view. With regards to the 
third unit of analysis, the PRC’s internal debate appears to have played an important 
role in the slight radicalisation of the party’s stance towards the EU during the period 
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under analysis. Indeed, the internal balance of the PRC can be viewed as a mimicking 
the state of the Italian left. The European question has taken a primary role in the 
party’s internal debate, especially after Syriza’s agreement with the European 
institutions that has led a substantial part of the PRC and much of the Italian left to an 
almost Euro-rejectionist stance.  
 Considering the above, we could arguably suggest that the PRC as most RLPs faced 
and continues to face dilemmas. The party’s Europeanism rendered its response to the 
dilemma less difficult than RLPs of the Eastern Communist movement. The 
devastating effects that the financial crisis has had on Italy’s economy and society 
solidified even more PRC’s critical stance vis-à-vis the integration process. Seen the 
high degree of fragmentation of the Italian left and the continued electoral demises, 
the process of European integration can be argued to have played an important role. 
As mentioned in the previous part, the creation of the EL has presented the PRC with 
a landmark that could promote not only the party’s presence at a European level, but 
also the long-awaited unity at a national one. The numerous attempts to use the EL as 
a pole of the Italian left culminated with the highly Europeanised electoral list L’Altra 
Europa and its relative success. Nevertheless, the capitulation of Syriza in 2015 and 
the events that followed have led to another round of splits inside the PRC. Overall, 
we could argue that the party throughout the period under study has, to an extent, 
remained faithful to the vision of the Europe of the peoples, regardless of the 
significant changes that the European integration process has undergone in recent 
years. 
 
i. Programmatic Policies; the PRC and the EL under the Lens of the 
Communist Dilemma 
 
 As suggested in the previous chapter of the present thesis, the theoretical lens of the 
communist dilemma will be applied in three areas of investigation. The first one relates 
to party competition, the second involves the party’s transnational affiliations. The 
third and final one concerns the party’s programmatic policies. For the needs of this 
area of investigation, the present thesis will examine the degree of convergence or lack 
thereof between the party’s political documents, as examined above, and the party’s 
detailed political positions in the field of EU-related issues. Moreover, the present 
thesis views that several useful conclusions could be reached if we were to provide 
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with a comparative analysis of the PRC and EL’s proposed policies. Given that the 
PRC has not stood on its own in any election during the last years, the comparison will 
be made between the policies proposed by the L’Altra Europa electoral coalition and 
those proposed by the EL during its congress in 2013.  
 To be able to compare the policies of the PRC to the ones proposed by the EL, the 
present thesis will analyse the Europarty’s programmatic positions, as published 
during its latest congress. Indeed, EL’s political decision concludes by proposing four 
policy pillars sought to address the devastating effects that the crisis has had on the 
European project. The first pillar relates to employment, social, ecological and 
solidarity development. Defending and developing the public-sector features amongst 
the proposed policies of the EL, alongside the launching of new employment 
programmes sought to tackle unemployment. In addition to this, the EL proposes the 
restoration of minimum wages and pensions. Furthermore, the party states that “every 
single country should be able to increase wages and the level of social protection” (EL, 
2013, p. 11). The second pillar regards the emancipation from the financial markets. 
Under this pillar, the EL “advocates the immediate organisation of a European 
convention on public debt, which will decide on the cancellation of the biggest part of 
the – unsustainable – public debts of over-indebted countries, along with revised 
repayment terms, such as a growth-clause” (EL, 2013, p. 12). Following its proposal 
regarding the European sovereign debts, the EL calls for the democratisation of the 
ECB, as well as the creation of a novel European institution, which would have the 
role of promoting public investments. Moreover, the EL proposes several radical 
changes in the European tax system. Such changes would aim at addressing issues of 
social justice in the Union. The third pillar relates to issues of popular sovereignty and 
democratic development. Here, the EL proposes several policies sought to promote 
institutions of participatory democracy at a European level. In addition to this, the EL 
proposes the further development of the European Citizens’ Initiative. The fourth and 
final pillar relates to peace and cooperation among peoples. Here, the EL calls for the 
abolition of the Schengen Treaty, as well as the abolition of FRONTEX. Furthermore, 
it calls for new economic and trade relations with the rest of the world, based on EL’s 
firm belief that “security is built through development” (EL, 2013, p. 13).  
 The policy proposals of the PRC will be analysed indirectly, given that throughout 
the period under study the party has stood in elections only as part of a wider coalition. 
Nevertheless, the PRC was arguably the most influential political force inside the 
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L’Altra Europa rendering, thus, the analysis of the coalition’s policy proposals an 
acceptable point of comparison. The document commences with the proposal of a 
radical modification of the European treaties from Maastricht onwards. The treaties’ 
modification is viewed as an attempt to address the growing disparities both within 
the Member States and between them, which are the direct result of the austerity that 
is inherent to the current EU’s architecture (L'Altra Europa, 2014, pp. 4-5). With 
regards to the issue of sovereign debt, the coalition proposes a European debt 
conference like the one that took place in London in 1953 regarding the sovereign debt 
of post-War Germany (L'Altra Europa, 2014, p. 5).  
 Moving onwards the coalition argues in favour of the democratisation of the ECB and 
calls for a radical redefinition of its role. Indeed, the document finds that the ECB 
should be able to be an in-extremis lender for the Member States, preventing, thus, 
attacks from financial speculators to Member States. Moreover, the document argues 
that the ECB should switch from fighting inflation to fighting unemployment. It 
proposes, thus, the modification of the statute of the ECB, so that the objective of full 
employment will become amongst the Union’s and the financial institutions’ core 
objectives (L'Altra Europa, 2014, p. 6). Like other RLPs, the L’Altra Europa argues 
in favour of the creation of Eurobonds, seen as a material display of solidarity towards 
Member States in financial distress (L'Altra Europa, 2014, p. 6). With regards to the 
policies regarding the welfare system, the coalition proposes the creation of a pan-
European social security system that will promote the harmonisation of the national 
policies and will guarantee a European wide basic income (L'Altra Europa, 2014, p. 
19).  
 The final section of the coalition’s policy proposals is of great significance, as it 
presents its vision for the alternative Europe. Indeed, the document states that the 
“final objective is that of a Federal Europe” (L'Altra Europa, 2014, p. 28), inspired by 
the ideals of Spinelli’s Manifesto di Ventotene. In addition to Spinelli’s ideals, the 
coalition utilises the work of Gramsci to highlight the importance of a united Europe 
that if created would render the term nationalism obsolete (L'Altra Europa, 2014, p. 
28). In terms of specific policies, the coalition argues in favour of the radical 
amplification of the powers of the EP that would be made of MEPs elected not from 
national electoral lists, but European ones. The EP would subsequently have the power 
to vote on the confidence of a real European government, much like the national ones. 
This would bring about the overcoming of the non-elected organs of the EU that are 
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currently in control of the Union. Finally, the document calls for the empowerment of 
the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), which would enable the European citizenry a 
direct influence in European politics (L'Altra Europa, 2014, p. 28).  
 In attempting an evaluation to PRC’s response to the communist dilemma, we could 
argue that the PRC’s positions appear to be rather coherent to the party’s political and 
ideological texts, in regards especially to the core objectives. The measures sought to 
work towards them, nevertheless, appear slightly more rounded. This could arguably 
be the case of the document being the result of a negotiation between the PRC and 
other political formations, such as SEL, that were part of the L’Altra Europa coalition. 
Regardless of the more rounded rhetoric, the document displays the PRC’s 
constructive critique towards the European edifice and we could subsequently verify 
that the party has chosen ideological consistency over moderation/pragmatism. In 
relation to the degree of harmonisation between the policies proposed by the EL and 
the PRC, we could argue that it appears quite high. The programmatic positions of the 
two parties appear almost identical with regards to the democratisation of the ECB, 
the empowerment of the EP, the question of the sovereign debt, and the intensification 
of the ECI. This harmonisation can be argued to be the outcome of the overly 
Europeanised campaign of the L’Altra Europa, as well as the direct role of the EL and 
Alexis Tsipras in the creation of the electoral coalition. We could, thus, conclude that 
the PRC displayed once again its need to turn to the EL seen as a unifying pole for the 
Italian left.  
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VII. The French Communist Party 
 
 
 
1. From the Rapprochement with the Socialists of the 1970s, to the 
Contemporary Front De Gauche. The Historical Path of the PCF and the French 
Radical Left 
 
 
a. Introduction 
 
 Among the party-members of the EL in France, one comes across the French 
Communist Party (PCF), the Left Party (PG), and the Unitary Left (GU), until 
September 2015 when the GU decided to merge with the PCF and end its autonomous 
political existence. Prior to the merging, the GU was alongside PCF and PG the 
founding members of a coalition bearing the name Front De Gauche (FG). The FG is 
a recently formed coalition, which was emerged as a result of the combination of 
various political elements. The first one was the development that took place before 
the French referendum on the European constitution in 2005. On that occasion, the 
totality of the components of the French radical left, alongside a small part of the 
Socialist Party (PS) decided to create a joint campaign that could be labelled as ‘the 
left No’ to the European constitution. This joint campaign has allowed for a 
rapprochement amongst the country’s political forces on the left of social democracy. 
The second element was the inability of the PCF to establish itself as a dynamic 
political force following its electoral demise that started in the 1980s. Finally, the third 
element was constituted the political developments following the decision of Jean-Luc 
Melenchon and of the current ’The New Social Republic’ [La Nouvelle Republique 
Sociale] to leave the PS and create the PG. Despite the relative success that the 
coalition has had, the PG decided to leave the FG and continue its political path 
independently. The reasons behind this move could be initially traced to the difference 
of opinions that the majority of the PCF and the PG have regarding the strategy vis-à-
vis the EU. Indeed, it would appear as if Melenchon and the PG reached several 
important conclusions following the stance of the EU towards the Syriza-led 
government and subsequently decided to alter their strategic and tactical choices. This 
fact in addition to the disappointing results of the coalition during the recent elections 
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led to the present situation. Nevertheless, at the time when this thesis was being 
drafted, the PCF had decided to autonomously support Melenchon’s candidacy for the 
presidential election in 2017, following, thus, an autonomous political campaign, with 
its own autonomous communist lists for the legislative elections. 
 Amongst the member parties of the EL the PCF, as commonly accepted, constitutes 
the most recognisable and stable political organisation. The party’s importance for the 
country’s political life and social life can be seen in the party’s involvement in the 
French Resistance during the German occupation, as well as in its role in the building 
of post-war France. The PCF was amongst the forces that created the so-called 
Eurocommunist movement during the 1970s that embraces the PCI, PCE, and the 
KKE-Interior party amongst others. Despite the initial shared ideological positions, 
the PCF was the most hesitant to renounce the socialist experiments of the 20th Century 
and can be viewed as the force that opposed the most the process of further political 
integration amongst the members of the EC, despite the change of stance demonstrated 
by the party during the 1990s. To be able to assess PCF’s response to the process of 
European integration, it is necessary to present a historical introduction to the political 
framework in which the party formed its position on the European integration. Thus, 
the proceeding historical overview will involve the PCF from the late 1960s up until 
2008-2009, when the PG and the FG were founded. The historical overview could be 
synthesised in the following manner: 
a. PCF and Gaullism 1958-1967 
b. The PCF amid changes; the effects of 1968 
c. PCF between the 1980s and the early 2000s: Electoral decline and ideological 
renovation 
d. PG, PCF, and GU: The creation of the FG 
 
b. PCF and Gaullism 1958-1967 
 
Ever since 1958, the PCF had to come to terms with the return of General de Gaulle 
in French political life. Indeed, de Gaulle became the president of France’s Fifth 
Republic and paved the way to the third and last phase of the so-called Gaullism. The 
party immediately sought to portray the new government as one displaying the 
characteristics of a personal dictatorship based on the most retrograde, militaristic, 
colonialist elements of the French bourgeoisie, paving, thus, the way to fascism. De 
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Gaulle’s overwhelming ‘victory’ in the referendum on the constitutional amendments 
that paved the way for the creation of the Fifth French Republic delivered another 
blow to the PCF, which was amongst the few political forces to oppose the 
amendments. The following general election proved to be yet another defeat for the 
PCF, which lost almost one out of five electors and was blamed primarily on the 
inability of the party’s leadership to provide a solution to the problem of 
decolonisation, as well as to create unity with the socialists.  
 Because of this discontent, at the party’s 15th Congress held in 1959, Waldeck Rochet 
succeeded Maurice Thorez as the PCF’s General Secretary. During the congress, the 
party highlighted that the economic policies of De Gaulle’s regime sharpen 
exploitation and create, thus, the conditions for a large political and social alliance 
against capitalist monopolies. At the same time, the party analysed the crisis of the 
French Section of the Workers’ International (SFIO)69 and drew the initial strategic 
perspectives, which consisted of uniting the totality of the republican forces in the 
country under “a common program for the restoration and renovation of democracy” 
(Tartakowsky, 2015, p. 79).  
 Following the party’s congress in 1959, the PCF had to come to terms with the 
ongoing war in Algeria and de Gaulle’s national policies. In addition to the ‘external’ 
issues, the PCF had to face increasing internal divisions relating to the events inside 
the International Communist Movement. Such internal divergences, both theoretical 
and tactical, multiplied considering the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the Chinese-
Soviet conflict that arose during the international conference of the communist parties 
of 1957, which was asserted in 1960 during the meeting of 24 communist and workers’ 
parties in Moscow. Indeed, several PCF high ranking officials adopted a few theses 
originating from the PCI relating to the ‘perversion of the party [CPSU]’ and the 
’degeneration of the Soviet system’, as well as to the negative influence of Stalin. 
Despite the decision of the 21st Congress of the CPSU, the PCF decided to silence the 
voices of criticism to Stalinism and publicly condemned the Chinese positions of 
1961. We could note, thus, at this point the almost identical reaction of the PCI that 
during the same period decided not to condemn publicly Stalinism. The PCF, thus, 
                                                
69 The SFIO was founded in 1905 after the merge of the French Socialist Party and the Socialist Party 
of France. In 1969, it was replaced by the current Socialist Party [Parti Socialiste] (PS).  
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adopted the conclusions of the Moscow Conference that reaffirmed the unity of the 
international communist movement and the leading role of the CPSU.  
 Upon the de-escalation of the Algerian conflict, the PCF sought to reopen the party’s 
dialogue with the socialists. To this end, the PCF proposed the idea of a union based 
on a common program capable of defining the political perspectives that could open 
the way to a real democracy (Tartakowsky, 2015, p. 83). On this front, the positions 
of the PCF and the socialist party regarding the EEC were of great importance. Indeed, 
in 1964 the PCF found that the common market not only cannot abolish the tensions 
and social discrepancies among the capitalist nations, but on the contrary it 
significantly aggravates them (Lange & Vannicelli, 1981, p. 330). In addition to this, 
the common market was held responsible for the economic reinforcement of West 
Germany at the expense of many French regions. The harsh criticism of the European 
architecture and the interconnected Paris-Bonn axis, seen as the direct creation of De 
Gaulle, united the PCF and the socialists. Indeed, during the PCF’s 17th Congress in 
1964 Rochet stated that, “ […] we Communists – without modifying our position, but 
by taking into account the existence of the common market – hold that it is possible 
and necessary to establish a collaboration between our party, the Socialist Party and 
other advocates of European institutions, so as to struggle, together against the anti-
social and anti-democratic policy of the monopolies dominating the Common Market, 
and for an alternative policy which considers the workers’ and people’s interests” 
(Lange & Vannicelli, 1981, p. 330).  
 The rapprochement between the PCF and the socialists was in a sense officialised 
when the PCF decided to support the candidacy of Francois Mitterrand during the 
Presidential elections of December 1965: an event that progressed, thus, the idea of a 
political union between the socialist and communist political forces. Indeed, prior to 
the general elections of 1967, the PCF signed a preliminary programmatic agreement 
with the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left (FGDS). Following the 
elections, the PCF and the FGDS ratified this agreement by signing a common 
platform, which was characterised by several convergences as well as divergences, 
especially with regards to foreign policy and nationalisations (Tartakowsky, 2015, p. 
86). The following section will refer to the effects that May 1968 had on the PCF and 
the identity crisis that the party underwent as a result.  
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c. The PCF amid Changes; the Effects of 1968 
 
 The explosion of the student movement of May 1968 caught the PCF by surprise. The 
party, indeed, recognised the democratic potential of the youth. Nevertheless, it openly 
condemned the distinct leftism characterising the movement, seen as a threat to the 
strategy for the seizure of power by the working class, led by the PCF. The 
interconnected working class movement that exploded in parallel to the student one 
was much more familiar to the PCF. As a result, the party provided an active support 
to the workers’ movement that brought about several important advancements for the 
amelioration of the conditions of the working class. The explosion of the student and 
working class movements were not the only significant events for the PCF in 1968. 
The events of the summer in Prague and the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, 
led to the intensification of the theoretical research into peaceful and democratic paths 
to socialism. The party, for the first time in its history, publicly criticized a major 
political decision of the USSR, when it expressed its surprise and disapproval for the 
intervention in Czechoslovakia. The party’s’ decision to publicly condemn the actions 
of the USSR led to some internal tensions, as many important figures resigned from 
their positions in its Central Committee. 
 In its analysis of the events of 1968 the PCF concluded that it was the first big 
confrontation between the big mass of workers and the power of the monopolies 
considering the contradictions that capitalism cannot address. According to the 
analysis of the party, the spring of 1968 was the first symptom of the crisis of 
monopoly capitalism, as well as the beginning of the third imperialist crisis. This crisis 
created the conditions for a large social alliance against the power of the monopolies. 
The explosion of the social movements uniting different social strata were seen by the 
PCF as favouring the election of a government that would fight the power of the 
monopolies and pave the way to socialism. As mentioned in the previous section, the 
PCF had already incorporated in its ideological core the idea of a peaceful transition 
to socialism, excluding thus the armed struggle, and the idea of democratic socialism. 
Despite those core positions, the PCF during this period reaffirmed the primal role of 
the USSR in the fight against imperialism, but maintained certain distances vis-à-vis 
certain Soviet political decisions.  
 At a national front, the PCF carried on with its strategic target of creating an alliance 
with the new Socialist Party (PS). It was, thus, in 1971 that the two parties signed a 
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common governmental program based on the shared objectives of democratising the 
economy and the institutions, developing the public sector, developing civil liberties, 
and contributing to peace and international cooperation. The ratification of this 
common governmental program constituted arguably a great strategic victory for the 
party, which managed to a certain extent to capitalise on the quasi-defeat of Gaullism. 
Despite the ratification of the common program with the PS, George Marchais, who 
was already at the leadership of the party following the illness of Rochet, highlighted 
the difficulties that the PCF had faced during its negotiations with the PS. As a matter 
of fact, Marchais believed that the PS aimed at reinforcing its policies at the expense 
of the PCF. The PS was thus, according to Marchais, seeking to exploit the aspiration 
for social progress, democracy, and socialism that was increasingly expressed in the 
country, but manage the future in a way that would avoid a decisive rupture with the 
big capital both nationally and internationally. Despite this decisively negative 
analysis, the PCF maintained its alliance with the PS for the rest of the decade.  
 The crisis in Chile, nevertheless, and the coup d’état that brought about the Pinochet-
led dictatorship rendered the internal debate inside the PCF on the peaceful transition 
to socialism even more heated and timely. Nevertheless, the PCF supported once again 
Mitterrand during the presidential elections of 1974 (Tartakowsky, 2015, p. 95). These 
elections were decisively different from the ones held in 1965, given that Mitterrand 
was at the time the leader of a fast expanding party, the PS, that had already absorbed 
a not negligible part of the working class (Mischi, 2007, p. 20). If the PCF’s support 
of Mitterrand’s candidacy in 1965 highlighted its role as a pillar for the construction 
of an alternative to De Gaulle, 1974 can be viewed as a clear indication of the 
secondary role that the party was acquiring inside the French left. Despite the electoral 
losses, the support that Mitterrand’s candidacy received, 49.33 %, led the PCF to the 
conclusion that almost half of the French citizenry supported a change that could bring 
about the transition to a new society (Tartakowsky, 2015, p. 95).  
 The electoral stagnation of the PCF that was evident in the general elections ever 
since 196870 led the party to revaluate its stance towards the PS. Indeed, starting with 
the PCF’s congress in 1974, the party reintroduced a critical stance vis-à-vis the PS 
and the radical left. Indeed, the PCF did not regard the union of the left-wing forces 
                                                
70 See the graphs with the PCF’s electoral results between 1962-2007 in the final part of the present 
chapter.  
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as a conditio sine qua non. In addition to that, the PCF stated that fighting the 
establishment, in the sense of opposing the government, was not a means in itself. The 
party’s objective was thus, “making sure that the country will be profoundly reformed 
in a way that would create the necessary conditions for the creation of sufficiently 
wide social movement for realising the socialist transformation of France” 
(Tartakowsky, 2015, p. 97).  
 This change of direction towards Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy was rendered even more 
clear at the party’s 22nd Congress held in February 1976. The party, indeed, placed 
emphasis on its specific strategy to highlight its differences with the PS. Thus, its 
political decision posed as the party’s primary strategic objective the construction of 
socialism in French colours, while identifying the peaceful way as the only possible 
for the country (Tartakowsky, 2015, p. 97). This objective would be possible, 
according to the PCF, thanks to the combination of four important factors. The first 
one relates to the democratic struggle, seen as the most complicated and most 
important class struggle. The second one involves the key role of the working class in 
the process of socialist transformation due to the working class’ direct exploitation 
from the capitalist system. The third factor is expressed by by the vanguard role of the 
PCF seen as the sole expression of the working class. The fourth factor is the outcome 
of the aforementioned three and relates to the political union that would lead to the 
victory over the bourgeoisie and would pave the way to the democratic path to 
socialism (Tartakowsky, 2015, p. 98).  
 This ideological aspect of the PCF was reflected on the party’s stance towards the 
EEC and led to significant divergences between the party and its ‘Eurocommunist 
allies’ in Italy and Spain.  Indeed, the PCF’s positions on the EEC demonstrate that 
the party placed the highest importance on the nation’s independence. According to 
Georges Marchais, France must have a double objective when it comes to its 
involvement in the EEC. On one hand, to preserve the nation’s independence and 
freedom of action. On the other hand, to bring about the complete democratisation of 
the European institutions as well as their liberation from the domination of big capital 
(Lange & Vannicelli, 1981, p. 331). In this way, France would contribute to the 
creation of a democratic Europe of the workers and of the people that would establish 
“[…] co-operative relations based on strict equality of rights in the people’s interests, 
with the United States as well as with the socialist nations” (Lange & Vannicelli, 1981, 
p. 331).  
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 These core positions are being reiterated in an article in the party’s newspaper 
L’Humanite bearing the title ‘the Europe that we want’ (Lange & Vannicelli, 1981, p. 
332). Here the PCF presents the country’s membership in the EEC as having formed 
a web of interconnections between France and its partners that if unilaterally severed, 
would significantly damage the national economy. Thus, the party reiterates its 
positions of transformation and not liquidation of the common market. Nevertheless, 
the proclaimed transformation of the PCF is different from that proclaimed by the 
quasi-federalist PCI. Quite the contrary, the PCF calls for blocking any attempts for 
further integration that would lead the country to renounce essential prerogatives on 
which its sovereignty is based. The PCF is, thus, in favour of maintaining the current 
framework, as any attempt to unilaterally disengage would produce more negative 
than positive effects to the national economy. It is, nevertheless, firmly against any 
attempt to further integrate both politically and economically, as the required 
renouncement of popular sovereignty in favour of the European institutions would 
negate the right of the French people to choose their own destiny (Lange & Vannicelli, 
1981, p. 332). For the PCF, the further integration would only be possible only in the 
case of nations that were already in the process of socialist transformation, but even 
then, the respect for national independence should be the most important principle 
(Lange & Vannicelli, 1981, p. 333).  
 The PCF’s stance towards the process of European integration is also reflected in its 
position regarding the election of the European Assembly. Indeed, prior to the very 
first election for the EP, the PCF, contrary to its Italian ally, highlighted the serious 
consequences of such an advancement and introduced a completely different 
perspective of the matter. Whereas the PCI saw in the EP a possibility for 
federalisation and democratisation of the EEC, the PCF saw the universal elections for 
the EP as an attempt by big capital to create “[…] a democratic alibi to mask the failure 
of the Common Market and to try to impose austerity policies on everybody” (Lange 
& Vannicelli, 1981, p. 333). The PCF’s fear was that the European reactionary forces 
had found in the universal elections for the EP a perfect way to give it more powers 
surpassing once again the power of the nation state (Lange & Vannicelli, 1981, pp. 
333-334). For the PCF, any limitation of national sovereignty was to be a priori 
rejected, as it would mean an abandonment of the nation state. The divergence 
between the PCF and the Spanish and Italian CPs, could be also traced in the PCF’s 
stance against the accession of Greece, Spain, and Portugal to the EC, as the party 
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found that the condition of the Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese workers would 
significantly worsen upon the accession of those countries in the EC (Souske, 1977).  
 We could conclude, thus, that during the second half of the 1970s, the PCF underwent 
a process of partial transformation of its identity. Despite the socio-economic changes, 
the Soviet Union and the working class became once again its most important 
references, in an attempt of the PCF to reinstate its role as the prominent representative 
of the working class, inside an increasingly competitive national party system. The 
innovative approaches that initiated during the late 1960s regarding the idea of 
communism, the essence of the PCF, the analysis of the USSR and the socialist 
republics, Eurocommunism, and on the governmental program were in a sense 
discontinued (Adler, et al., 1978). A primary example of this mutation of the party’s 
identity can be seen in one of Marchais’ interview in 1980, during which he 
passionately defended the intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (Delwit, 
2015, p. 65). Arguably, those changes along with the electoral success of the PS put 
an end on the PCF’s central role in French political life. Indeed, the PCF starting from 
the presidential elections of 1981 entered an electoral downward spiral that has lasted 
up to the present day. The following section will relate to the crisis of the party during 
the 1980s and the 1990s and will lead to the rapprochement between the PCF and parts 
of the PS that resulted in the creation of the contemporary FG. 
 
d. The PCF between the 1980s and the early 2000s: The electoral Decline and 
Renovation 
 
 During the presidential elections of 1981 the PCF had to face yet another series of 
dilemmas regarding its tactical relationship with the PS. Indeed, during the 1981 
presidential election George Marchais only received 15.35% and did not manage to 
enter the second round of the elections (PCF, 1981, p. 56). This presented the PCF 
with a great dilemma in relation to the second round of the elections between 
Mitterrand and Giscard d’Estaing. The PCF finally decided to avoid both the strategy 
of isolation as well as the supporting a political management of the crisis of capitalism, 
by calling its electorate to support the Socialist candidate in the second round and be 
part, to the extent of the party’s possibilities, in this new era of change (Tartakowsky, 
2015, p. 118). Mitterrand managed to win the second round, securing 52% of the vote-
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share during the second round. An electoral triumph to which the PCF had arguably 
contributed quite significantly71.  
 Following his electoral victory, Mitterrand called for general elections, during which 
the PCF and the PS decided to ratify an electoral agreement. In this agreement, the 
two parties reiterated their common willingness to constitute a coherent and durable 
majority and agreed to conclude a finalised governmental accord in the aftermath of 
the elections, with the possibility therefore that communists might actively participate 
in a future PS-led government. Indeed, the PCF during the campaign highlighted that 
if the left wants to be successful it needs all its assets (Tartakowsky, 2015, p. 119). 
The electoral result found the PS winning the absolute majority in the National 
Assembly (PCF, 1981, p. 46).  
 This new balance of powers constituted a setback for the PCF that found itself weaker 
in parliament. Despite the PS securing the overwhelming majority of the parliament, 
a governmental agreement was ratified and the PCF declared its intention to display 
solidarity, and support the new policies that the French had chosen by electing 
Mitterrand as the President of the country (Tartakowsky, 2015, p. 120). The new 
balance of powers, thus, led the PCF to a compromise and to the acceptance of the 
notion that the change will be carried out in stages. Following the formation of the 
Mauroy cabinet, the PCF obtained four ministries (Tartakowsky, 2015, p. 120). 
Despite the initial intention to support the PS-led government, in September 1984 the 
PCF decided to leave the government and become an opposition force (INA, 1984). 
The reasons behind this choice of the PCF can be traced on one hand to the policies 
pursued by the government, especially in terms of the financial policies of austerity 
imposed by the Minister Jacques Delors, and on the other on the negative electoral 
results of the PCF during the elections for the EP in 1984 (INA, 1984). It is important 
to note that the change of direction of the PS and Mitterrand vis-à-vis European 
integration was arguably of great importance. Indeed, following 1984, Mitterrand and 
the PS abandoned the slogan of ‘social democracy in one country’ and placed more 
faith on the European Union. The appointment of the French Finance Minister Jacques 
Delors as the head of the European Commission was a clear indication of this change 
                                                
71 According to sources 88% of the PCF’s electorate voted for Mitterrand during the second round 
(Tartakowsky, 2015, p. 118). 
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of stance. This ‘Europeanisation’ of the PS could be viewed as a key factor in the 
decision of the PCF to leave the government.  
 Following this decision, the party’s electoral results entered a downward electoral 
spiral that was evident in the general elections of 1986, the presidential elections of 
1988, and the elections for the EP of 1989 (Delwit, 2015, p. 66). The fall of the Berlin 
wall in 1989 and the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 found the PCF looking as a 
shadow of itself. As a result, the PCF underwent several important organisational 
mutations, as well as an ideological renovation that will be dealt with in the following 
paragraphs.  
 The beginning of the 1990s represented for the PCF another period of electoral 
defeats. Arguably, the most significant has been the marginal victory of the ‘yes’ vote 
during the Referendum for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty held in 1992. The 
PCF was amongst the forces that firmly opposed the ratification of the treaty. The 
reasons behind the party’s opposition to the Maastricht Treaty can be traced back to 
its firm position against the further weakening of the powers of the French people and 
the interconnected strengthening of the European institutions. The party, indeed, 
advocated an alternative Europe that would promote justice, peace, democracy, and 
friendship, but stated that the dilemma ‘Maastricht or nothing’ imposed by European 
and French mainstream political forces was seeking to entrap the citizenry (PCF, 1992, 
p. 1). The PCF, thus, stated its intent to transform the European edifice based on the 
aspirations of peace and friendship amongst the peoples of Europe and considered that 
the Maastricht Treaty “[…] aggravated all the negative traits of the European 
construction whose aim was to create a supranational Europe that would be able to 
impose the interest of multinational corporations to the peoples” (PCF, 1992, p. 1). A 
final important point regarding the PCF’s stance towards the Treaty of Maastricht is 
the party’s firm belief that the national parliaments should retain, at all costs, the power 
to oversee the political decisions of the Union, to guarantee that the principle of 
popular sovereignty remains in place (PCF, 1992, pp. 1-2).  
 The acceptance of the Maastricht Treaty by the French electorate combined to the 
continuing loss of electoral support, demonstrated during the 1993 general elections, 
led to the election of a new General Secretary, Robert Hue, and several very important 
organisational changes that were decided at the party’s 23rd Congress in 1994. Indeed, 
the PCF decided to abandon the Leninist principle of democratic centralism in relation 
to its internal organisation. That meant that the party’s internal factions could now 
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officially form and compete for the leadership of the party (Delwit, 2015, p. 66). The 
party, thus, underwent a period of renovation of its ideological pillars that can be 
reflected in some symbolic choices, such as the removal of the hammer and sickle 
from the party’s logo. In addition to this, the party’s new General Secretary took 
distances from the party’s former assessment of the Soviet Union. Indeed, contrary to 
the declarations of Marchais, Hue declared that the “[…] overall balance [of the Soviet 
era] is definitely not positive […]” (Virot, 1995).  
 As regards the renovation of the party, the PCF decided to take part in yet another 
electoral coalition with other left-wing forces. Indeed, at the general elections of 1997, 
the PCF was part of the Plural Left (GP), along with the PS, the Greens, the Left 
Radical Party (PRG), and the Citizens’ Movement (MC). The coalition was successful 
and managed to receive 46.58% of the vote-share, leading to the formation of a PS-
led government that included members from all the parties of the coalition (Becker, 
2005, p. 297). The PCF that managed to elect 36 MPs was, thus, represented in the 
government with three ministers.  
 Despite the initial euphoria that was created by the defeat of the right-wing, the PS-
led coalition government revealed its fragile character already at the end of 1997 
(Becker, 2005, p. 299). Indeed, Robert Hue, who was in favour of the party’s 
participation in this coalition, was constantly under attack from the PCF’s internal 
opposition, as issues relating to the government’s policies on employment were 
making their appearance and were dividing the parties of the coalition (Becker, 2005, 
p. 300). In addition to the tension between the government and the major labour 
unions, the Kosovo intervention, and several important social fronts led to more intra-
government tensions and resignations of key ministers (Becker, 2005, pp. 301-306). 
Apart from the controversial issues, the coalition had to face the regional elections of 
1998, the elections for the EP of 1999, the local elections of 2001, and most 
importantly the Presidential elections of 2002. The changes in the electoral support of 
the parties that supported the government led to a significant change in the internal 
balance of powers and forced some of the parties, especially the PCF to a change of 
direction (Becker, 2005, pp. 306-208). The combination of the above issues led finally 
to the end of the coalition and paved the road for a new strategy for the PCF.  
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The PCF, which at the meantime had followed the Italian and Spanish model of 
collective leadership,72 had to face an intense internal struggle between the opposing 
factions, which was determined during the party’s 32nd Congress in 2003. The 
objective of the 32nd of the PCF Congress was to pave a new way for the party after 
the resignation of Robert Hue in the aftermath of the presidential elections (PCF, 
2002). During the congress the three biggest factions presented their different views 
on the party’s future. Firstly, the conservatives also known as the orthodox faction, 
proposed a return to the Marxist-Leninist model of the party. Secondly, the refounding 
faction that called for a complete reorganisation of the party. Thirdly, the majoritarian 
faction led by the party’s National Secretary, Marie-George Buffet that proposed an 
opening of the PCF to social movements and other left-wing political formations 
(PCF, 2003). The end of the congress found Buffet re-elected as the party’s National 
Secretary supported by the overall majority of the party delegates (PCF, 2003).  
 Indeed, the leadership of Buffet led the party to a strategy of opening to social 
movements and left-wing coalitions, a tendency which is evident in the party’s 
decision to be present in the EL’s founding congress and in its subsequent decision to 
become one of its founding members, alongside Synaspismos, PRC, and the PCE 
(Mayer, 2004). In addition to the party’s participation in the founding congress of the 
EL, the PCF demonstrated the same openness inside France, responding to the appeal 
of several important figures of the French radical left for the creation of a left 
alternative. Indeed, the objective was the creation of a permanent coordination of all 
the anti-neoliberal political forces on the left of the PS (Delwit, 2015, p. 66). An 
arguable catalyst for the creation of such a wide coalition was the 2005 referendum on 
the Constitutional Treaty of the EU (Coquerel, 2012, p. 37). The first crystallisation 
of such a grand coalition was carried out during the campaign against the EU 
constitutional treaty. The PCF played, thus, an important role of coordination of the 
‘left No’ to the treaty and gained several new members especially after the victory of 
the ‘No’ campaign at the referendum (Delwit, 2015, pp. 37-38) . Despite the victorious 
result of the referendum campaign, the coordination of the left-wing forces was unable 
to decide upon a single candidacy for the presidential elections of 2007. As a result, 
the left presented itself more divided than ever during the elections, with five 
candidates running the elections on the left of the PS.  
                                                
72 The party was, thus, led by the National Secretary alongside the President. 
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 The electoral results of both the presidential and general elections were the lowest in 
the party’s history, resulting in the party losing 6 MPs and finding itself unable to form 
a parliamentary group (Ministère Intérieur, 2007). The abysmal electoral result of the 
PCF led the party to call for an extraordinary assembly that was held in December 
2007. We could argue, thus, that the disappointing results of the PCF in the aftermath 
of the very positive referendum result, achieved via the coordination of the wider left, 
paved the way for the creation of the FG in 2008.   
  
e. PG, PCF, and GU: The Creation of the Front de Gauche 
 
 While the PCF was trying to establish the reasons behind the grave electoral defeat 
of the 2007 presidential and general elections, the PS was also undergoing a period of 
internal turmoil. The referendum on the European Constitution had actually signified 
a moment of pre-rupture of the left-wing faction of the PS, as well as a catalyst for the 
rapprochement of the political forces on the left of the PS (Escalona & Vieira, 2014, 
p. 73). The opposition to the European Constitution was, thus, utilised by the left-wing 
of the PS and its most prominent member, Jean-Luc Melenchon, as an ideological 
position of demarcation between the PS and the rest of the left in the county. The split 
inside the PS took place after the party’s congress held in Reims in 2008. Certainly, 
the moment of rupture and the subsequent creation of the PG were related to the 
elections for the EP in 2009. In view of the elections the left-wing of the PS arguably 
felt unable to side with the PS and its decision to support the Lisbon Treaty (Escalona 
& Vieira, 2014, p. 78). Hence, the perspective of the elections for the EP was part of 
a window of opportunity that arguably arose in light of two events. The first one was 
related to the aforementioned Congress of the PS, where the left-wing received a mere 
18.5%, in a sense ostracising this faction (Escalona & Vieira, 2014, p. 78). The second 
one was related to the positive signal sent by the PCF, which stated for the first time 
its consent to a united left front alongside personalities and political organisations 
(Allemagna & Allies, 2012, pp. 275-311). Indeed, the PCF declared in 2008 that “the 
PCF proposes the constitution of a front of progressive forces that share the ambition 
of a novel social European model […]” (Mathieu, 2012, p. 14).  
 The creation, thus, of the PG and the rapprochement with the PCF led to the first 
appearance of the FG during the elections for the EP in 2009 under the name ‘Left 
Front for changing Europe’. The result is considered relatively positive, securing 6.4% 
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of the vote share. As a consequence, representatives from both the PG and the PCF 
called for further discussion aiming towards a more profound cooperation and a 
possible enlargement of the coalition (Equy, 2009). Following the elections for the 
EP, the FG continued an electorally promising path in the regional and cantonal 
elections of 2010 and 2011, during which the coalition managed to secure 6.95% and 
10.38% of the vote share respectively (Delwit, 2015, p. 67). The PCF, at its 35th 
Congress, called for a new era for the FG and the constitution of a pact of popular 
union. At the same Congress, Marie-George Buffet stepped down from her position 
and supported Pierre Laurent, who was subsequently elected to the position of 
National Secretary of the party (De Ravinel, 2010). This new era was crystallised in 
the joint decision of all constituent parties of the FG to support the candidacy of 
Melenchon for the 2012 presidential election. The candidacy of Melenchon was very 
successful as it managed to secure 11.1% of the vote-share during the first round, and 
was viewed as another positive step towards the return of the radical left to the 
electoral influence of the pre-Mitterrand era (Delwit, 2015, p. 67). Despite the relative 
success of the Melenchon candidacy, the FG did not manage to repeat an analogous 
performance in the general elections of the same year. In fact, the coalition managed 
to secure a mere 6.91 of the vote-share, electing 10 MPs (Delwit, 2015, p. 67).  
 The internal turmoil caused by the negative electoral result in the general elections of 
2012 and the issues raised during the municipal elections of 201473 led the FG to the 
elections for the EP. The FG, thus, took part in the elections for the EP of 2014 without 
one of its founding parties: the GU. As a matter of fact, in April 2014 the GU decided 
to suspend its participation in the FG due to the unfair treatment that the party had 
experienced during the creation of the electoral lists (GU, 2014). Despite the GU’s 
decision, the FG took part in the elections for the EP supporting the candidacy of 
Alexis Tsipras for the presidency of the EC. The FG did not manage to capitalise on 
the decline of the PS’s electoral support. In reality, the electoral result of the FG was 
disappointing, with 6.61% of the vote share and 4 elected MEPs (Ministère Interieur, 
2014). While the FG managed to minimally, by a mere 0.13%, raise its vote-share, it 
clearly failed the objective to surpass the PS. This disappointing electoral result led to 
                                                
73 Indeed, the PG, the PCF, and the GU had to face several dilemmas relating to the support for 
candidates from the PS. A primary example is constituted by the Paris mayoral elections, where the 
PCF decided to support the PS candidate Anne Hidalgo (Liberation, 2013). 
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another period of major internal turbulences that were arguably rendered even greater 
by the stance that Melenchon and Pierre Laurent have demonstrated with regards to 
the Syriza-led government’s accord with the European institutions of July 201574.  
 The electoral result of the 2014 elections for the EP was actually characterised by 
Melenchon as a failure (BFM, 2014). Moreover, Melenchon argued that the whole 
project of the FG was jeopardised by the PCF’s accords with the PS during the 
municipal elections of the same year (BFM, 2014). The tension between the PG and 
the PCF was further developed considering the Syriza-led government’s capitulation 
in July 2015. On one hand, Pierre Laurent, on his capacity both as the National 
Secretary of the PCF and the President of the EL, supported the Greek government’s 
decision and stressed the importance of a pan-European support to create the 
conditions for an alternative exit from the crisis. On the other hand, Melenchon was 
much more critical of the Syriza-led government’s decision to sign the agreement with 
the EU. Indeed, after Syriza’s capitulation, Melenchon and the PG organised a panel 
discussion between Yanis Varoufakis, Oskar Lafontaine, and Stefano Fassina that 
called for a European Summit developing a Plan B for Europe (Mélenchon, 2015). 
Indeed, Melenchon would appear to have reached different conclusions vis-à-vis the 
EU following Syriza’s capitulation, something that was reflected in the invitation 
extended to Varoufakis, who at the time had resigned from his position as Finance 
Minister of Greece and had initiated his firm critique of the government’s stance. As 
a result, one may argue that the unity of the FG is in grave danger as the most important 
nodal ideological position, the stance towards the EU, is currently being contested by 
the coalition’s most important members. At the time when this thesis was being drafted 
Melenchon’s relations with the PCF were abysmal and it appeared very likely that the 
FG may pass under the control of the PCF. Despite this rather problematic relationship 
the PCF has decided to support Melenchon’s candidacy for the Presidential elections 
of May 2017. Indeed, it would appear as if the PCF finds itself in a subaltern position 
on the question of its stance towards the EU. A more detailed analysis of the turmoil 
inside the FG will be carried out in the following section of the present chapter, during 
the analysis of the ideology and factionalism factor.  
  
                                                
74 More on the effects of Syriza’s ‘capitulation’ on the PCF and the French radical left in the proceeding 
part of this chapter. 
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Figure 8: PCF’s vote-share evolution from 1968-2012. 
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a. Introduction 
 
 To be able to assess PCF’s stance towards the EU, the present thesis will apply the 
Johansson and Raunio theoretical framework, alongside the Communist dilemma as 
proposed by Charalambous (2013). The time frame involves, as per the other case 
studies, to the period following the creation of the EL in December 2004 until the 
present day. The framework relates to the close analysis of seven conditioning factors: 
party ideology, public opinion, party factionalism, leadership change, party 
competition, transnational links and finally the integration process per se. The 
ideology factor will include an analysis of the political decisions of the party’s 
congresses that took place during the thesis’ timeframe. The public opinion will 
involve the comparative analysis of several Eurobarometers between 2004-2015. The 
party factionalism factor will primarily relate to a comparative analysis of the 
alternative texts that resurfaced75 during the party’s most recent congress that took 
place in June 2016.  With regards to the leadership change, the differences or lack 
thereof between George-Marie Buffet and Pierre Laurent will be investigated by a 
careful analysis of their statements during the party congresses. When it comes to the 
party competition, the analysis will involve the former ally of the PCF, Parti de Gauche 
(PG), as well as the New Anticapitalist Party (NPA). Regarding the transnational links, 
the analysis will involve EL’s congress documents. As to the integration process, an 
initial comparative analysis of the above-mentioned factors will be attempted. Finally, 
the thesis will provide a comparative analysis of the PCF’s and the EL’s policy 
proposal vis-à-vis the EU.  
 
b. Ideology 
 
 To assess the ideology factor in the PCF’s stance towards the process of European 
integration, several documents adopted by PCF congresses will be considered. The 
analysis will commence with the party’s 35th Congress held in March 2006. In addition 
to this, the political documents produced by the party’s 34th, 35th, 36th, and 37th 
Congresses will be analysed. 
                                                
75 Indeed, it was only during the most recent congress that the heated internal debate returned inside the 
PCF, whose internal balance was quite stable during the timeframe of the present study.  
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PCF’s 33rd Congress 
 
 The first document under analysis here is the political document ratified by the 
overwhelming majority of the congress delegates, 80.15%, in 2006, which saw Marie-
George Buffet being re-elected as National Secretary of the PCF (PCF, 2006, p. 13). 
The document’s first part bore the title ‘the Communist Vision’ and outlined the 
party’s core ideological profile, as well as its stance towards the socialist experiments 
of the past century. Following the theoretical analysis, the party identified the path that 
this vision of communism opens, as well as the implications that such a vision might 
have for the revolutionary process. Indeed, the first paragraph of this part is entitled 
‘the topicality of communism’ and commences with a heavy critique of the ‘really 
existing’ socialism of the 20th Century (PCF, 2006, p. 14). As the document stated, the 
fall of the Berlin wall marked the end of the anti-democratic conception of 
communism, which was unable to positively respond to the aspirations of the 
individuals and the peoples (PCF, 2006, p. 14). The end of that era, nevertheless, 
signified for many the end of history and the overall victory of globalising capitalism. 
This new vision of the victorious global capitalism is seen by the PCF as threatening 
the aspirations of the clear majority of people, whose objectives are fought for in a 
class struggle that nowadays manifests itself in multiple forms (PCF, 2006, p. 14). The 
PCF’s ambition is, thus, to contribute to this multidimensional class struggle as a 
representative of the peoples’ aspirations and hopes. The PCF’s critique to the ‘really 
existing’ socialism continued when the party declared that its communist project is not 
one that is based on a prefabricated model that poses its own version of the end of 
history, but is a tool for the overcoming of capitalism and the transformation of society 
(PCF, 2006, p. 14).  
 From a theoretical perspective, the PCF declared its loyalty to the principles of Marx, 
regarding the analysis and the utilisation of the emancipatory movements of the 
modern era, as the party still envisions itself as the representative of the interests of 
the working class (PCF, 2006, p. 14). Those interests are nowadays heavily threatened 
by the capitalist forces that managed to launch an important ideological war. This was 
made possible, per the PCF, due to the violations of human rights and the lack of 
democracy in the countries of ‘really existing’ socialism and their inability to address 
the economic, cultural, and social challenges (PCF, 2006, p. 14). It is, thus, per the 
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PCF due to these shortcomings of the socialist experiments that the reactionary forces 
managed to launch such a destructive ideological war against the left (PCF, 2006, p. 
14). Those grave mistakes that took place in the countries of the East were, thus, both 
amongst the reasons for the fall of the Eastern bloc, as well as a reason behind the 
demise of the Western Communist movement, and the subsequent strengthening of 
the neo-liberal reactionary forces. For these reasons, the PCF found that a communist 
vision, liberated from the mistakes of the past, is what the modern society needs in 
order to combat the destructive effects of the globalising capitalism.  
 The second paragraph of this section relates to the path that this vision leads to and 
aims at demonstrating how this new vision encompasses the most important social 
movements of the 21st century. Indeed, communism is seen, by the PCF, as the guiding 
force against any form of exploitation, as is a feminism that envisions parity of genres 
and fights all forms of sexism, as is radical ecology, antiracism, pacifism, and 
secularism (PCF, 2006, p. 14). Contrary to the orthodox Marxist belief, the PCF 
believes that the overcoming of capitalism will not automatically put an end to all 
dominations, discriminations, and alienations. Indeed, the party considered that some 
of these dominant relationships, such as patriarchy, preceded capitalism, which 
nourished and utilised them to its own advantage (PCF, 2006, p. 15). Based on this 
ideological position, the PCF declared its communist vision, which breaks with the 
statist conception of communism. Indeed, PCF’s path to communism relates to the 
democratisation of the state, the enterprises, the institutions, and the complete citizen 
control until the disappearance of the state (PCF, 2006, p. 15). The PCF’s communist 
vision is thus an important ideological element that leads the party to a very inclusive 
internationalism, as well as to an openness to political formations that share the party’s 
objectives to end the exploitation of capitalism. This is arguably reflected in the party’s 
choice to create the FG alongside the PG at a national level, as well as in its choice to 
play a very active role inside the European left.  
 Moving towards the party’s view of the EU and the process of integration, we come 
across a document heavily influenced by the referendum on the European Constitution 
that took place in 2005. Indeed, the PCF underlined that the result of the referendum 
should not be viewed as rejecting Europe, but as a clear message of the people against 
the neo-liberal character of the EU (PCF, 2006, p. 19). As a result, the referendum 
called, according to the PCF, for several actions aimed to change Europe, which the 
PCF calls “actions for a social, democratic, solidarity, feminist, ecologic, and peaceful 
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Europe” (PCF, 2006, p. 19). The first and most important exigence is the promotion 
of a social solidarity model that opposes the logic of competing peoples of the current 
EU (PCF, 2006, p. 19). Therefore, the Lisbon agenda based on competitiveness 
amongst the peoples, the territories, and the workers should be stopped, alongside the 
austerity policies, the precariousness, the deregulation, and the privatisations should 
be abandoned (PCF, 2006, p. 20). Instead of this agenda, the EU should, according to 
the PCF, aim to harmonise social protection policies across the Member States from 
the top down (PCF, 2006, p. 20). That would bring about, thus, a change of the 
relationship between national and European legislations that would enable the citizens 
to seek protection according to the most socially favourable one (PCF, 2006, p. 20).  
 The second exigence for the PCF relates to the promotion of equality of rights in 
Europe. The party considered that the EU should launch an offensive against poverty, 
exclusion, divisions, and discriminations (PCF, 2006, p. 20). On this instance, the 
party focused on the stigmatisation of migration, both intra and extra-European, as 
well as the necessity for the gender equality to become a fundamental value of the EU 
(PCF, 2006, p. 20). The third exigence relates to the radical democratisation of the 
EU. The party finds that there is a great need for a new European order based on 
liberty, equality, pluralism, and secularism. This order should be introduced by the 
expansion of the powers of the European parliaments and the subsequent restriction 
of the powers of the Commission (PCF, 2006, p. 20). Indeed, the PCF found that the 
EP should have broader rights of co-decision, legislative initiatives, and overall 
control over the decision of the European executive (PCF, 2006, p. 20). The PCF’s 
unique, for the left-Europeanist Communist parties, relationship with national 
sovereignty is reflected here, as the party argues in favour of the empowerment of 
national parliaments, alongside the European one, based on the right of each European 
people to national sovereignty (PCF, 2006, p. 20). The fourth and final exigence 
relates to an alternative globalisation of solidarity, which would aim at putting an end 
to European policies of neo-colonialism (PCF, 2006, p. 20).  
 The remaining paragraphs of the section dedicated to European and global changes 
related to the need of the EU to become a force that would promote the fight against 
global poverty and would, thus, aid developing countries worldwide (PCF, 2006, p. 
20). In addition to this, the EU should aim at becoming an independent international 
player that will oppose US militarism and interventionism, seeking, thus, its 
emancipation from NATO (PCF, 2006, p. 20). For the PCF, the US militarism, and its 
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implications in the post-9/11 era signify a premier opportunity for the EU to present a 
new conception of collective security founded upon a culture of peace and struggle 
against global inequalities and poverty (PCF, 2006, p. 21).  
 The aforementioned objectives and core positions are placed, by the PCF, in the 
framework of a global movement for an alternative globalisation that is 
counterbalancing the globalisation as promoted by the IMF, the World Bank, and the 
huge corporations globally. To this end, the PCF highlights the importance of the EL 
and the GUE/NGL seen as they “[…] constitute an advantage for the amplification of 
the movements and parties that are proposing an alternative to capitalist globalisation” 
(PCF, 2006, p. 21). The EL could be argued, thus, to constitute an important aspect of 
the party’s internationalist perspective as emphasised in the party’s communist vision. 
Indeed, the PCF finds that “more than ever, the objective of surpassing capitalism […] 
appears as the big political question of the century that is coming” (PCF, 2006, p. 21).  
  
PCF’s 34th Congress 
 
 The document that managed to gain the support of the overwhelming majority of the 
delegates, 68.70%, is heavily influenced by the financial crisis that initiated in 2007-
2008 in the US. The title could be argued to reflect the opportunity that the PCF saw 
in the crisis, as it clearly read “wanting a new world, built in a daily basis” (PCF, 2008, 
p. 16). Indeed, the party’s opening paragraphs painted such a picture. The PCF found 
that this new era is bringing about four important challenges. Firstly, it signified an 
end of an era that will mutate the environment in which the communists are struggling 
for their agenda (PCF, 2008, p. 16). Secondly, the neoliberal policies that are being 
applied nationally are hurting the people jeopardising, thus, the country’s future (PCF, 
2008, p. 16). Thirdly, the deepening of the crisis inside the French left is aggravating. 
The socialists’ gradual acceptance of neoliberal policies is proving itself as an 
important factor in the right-wing winning the overall majority in society (PCF, 2008, 
p. 16). Fourthly, the party found that the originality of French communism is such that 
would render the creation of novel ideas possible, to be able to lead the necessary 
societal transformations in this new era (PCF, 2008, p. 16).  
 In the proceeding part of the document, the PCF stated that the financial crisis had 
been transformed into a social, economic, and environmental one (PCF, 2008, p. 16). 
In its evaluation of the crisis, the PCF found that a simple moralisation, or further 
 258 
regulation of the financial sector will not suffice. Instead, the open questioning of the 
fundamental rules of capitalism and the subsequent emancipation from them via a 
series of radical transformations of the economy and polity is seen, by the PCF, as the 
only viable alternative (PCF, 2008, p. 16). It is, thus, clear according to the party’s 
analysis, that the question is now more than ever the overcoming of capitalism. The 
crisis has, thus, opened a new chapter of the class struggle in France, Europe, and 
globally (PCF, 2008, pp. 16-17).  
 Indeed, the EU finds itself amid this crisis, due to its inability to re-found itself in a 
more democratic manner. The PCF, thus, found that the European neo-liberal model, 
its democratic deficit, its willingness to be led by the NATO has led it into a structural 
crisis, as well as a crisis of legitimisation (PCF, 2008, p. 18). To this end, the PCF 
argued that the opposition of the European citizenry to the Constitutional Treaty in 
France, Netherlands, and Ireland constituted a clear indication of this malaise and 
poses as an exigence the refounding of the European project that will correspond to 
the needs and will of the European peoples (PCF, 2008, p. 18). The alternative, thus, 
for the PCF is the drafting of a new founding treaty, which could be initiated by a 
progressive pan-European front (PCF, 2008, p. 21). To achieve such a pan-European 
front the PCF is working inside the EL, the GUE, as well as with several progressive 
personalities around Europe (PCF, 2008, p. 21).  
 The core positions of the PCF vis-à-vis the EU are echoed once again when the 
document discusses the elections for the EP of 2009. Indeed, the party stated its 
candidates will be advocates of a real project of profound transformations, of a 
refoundation of the European edifice in favour of the working class, of social progress, 
of ecology, of solidarity, and peace (PCF, 2008, p. 23). Proposing, thus, a series of 
European policies aimed on the guaranteeing the security of labour and of education, 
the extension of the public services through the financing from the ECB of projects of 
social development (PCF, 2008, p. 23). The party, indeed, stated its firm decision to 
highlight the European dimension and the party’s European affiliation during the 2009 
electoral campaign, to illustrate the progressive European front that it aims to construct 
(PCF, 2008, p. 23). During this new era, thus, the PCF found that the intensification 
of the attempts for the creation of a solid pan-European front is the only way towards 
the overcoming of capitalism and the refounding of the European project according to 
a socialist agenda.  
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PCF’s 35th Congress 
 
The PCF’s 35th Congress was held in 2010 and saw Pierre Laurent being elected as 
the party’s National Secretary, securing the overwhelming majority of the delegates. 
The congress only produced a very brief resolution that took the shape of an appeal 
for the creation of an amplified political response to the policies imposed by the 
country’s right-wing government (PCF, 2010, p. 18). Indeed, the resolution’s first 
paragraphs involved a sharp critique of the capitalist system and the destructive effects 
that its crisis has had on the French and European people (PCF, 2010, p. 18). The 
critique is subsequently redirected towards the French and European governments that 
decided to make the citizens pay for a crisis that their own policies have created, by 
imposing austerity policies, precariousness, and massive poverty across the continent 
(PCF, 2010, p. 18). Indeed, the PCF argued that despite the major technological 
advances that could have brought about new advancements for the whole of humanity, 
capitalism demonstrated its inability to address the challenges and its unique ability to 
generate social violence (PCF, 2010, p. 18). This led the party to the conclusion that 
the question of communist emancipation is more necessary than ever before and poses 
this emancipation as its primary objective (PCF, 2010, p. 18).  A conditio sine qua 
non for the communist emancipation is, per the PCF, the creation of a wide radical left 
front both in France and in Europe, which will open a new political era of structural 
and durable changes (PCF, 2010, p. 18). With regards to the national front, the PCF 
declared its firm support of the FG experiment, which should continue to grow and 
become a popular union for the radical change (PCF, 2010, p. 18).  
 With regards to the European front, the PCF called all progressive European forces 
to a firm struggle against the policies of austerity that are being applied by the EU and 
the IMF (PCF, 2010, p. 19). Indeed, the party considered that the European 
governments had decided to burden the working class with the losses suffered due to 
the sovereign debt crisis. A crisis that is, according to the party’s analysis, a direct 
result of their surrender to the demands of the market (PCF, 2010, p. 19). The PCF 
regarded that the austerity policies constitute an immense social and democratic 
regression that will ultimately only aggravate the crisis (PCF, 2010, p. 19). As a result, 
it proposed the deconstruction of the EU’s founding treaties, and especially the Lisbon 
treaty, whilst reiterating the rejection of the content of the latter by the totality of the 
peoples that were consulted across the EU (PCF, 2010, p. 19). At the same time, it 
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proposed a direct financing of the Member-States national banks from the ECB, as a 
means of defending the countries’ economies from the speculative forces of the market 
(PCF, 2010, p. 19). Finally, the PCF declared its firm support for the efforts of the EL 
and called for amplifying its convergences during the Euro-party’s forthcoming 
Congress, which was to be hosted at that time in Paris (PCF, 2010, p. 19).  
  The resolution’s final part enunciated several important organisational changes 
aimed at the further democratisation and openness of the party. The party, thus, viewed 
itself as being in the beginning of an important era for the country and for Europe. It 
saw in the crisis an opportunity for the creation of a popular front both nationally and 
at a European level, and concluded to be able to seize this opportunity, it should both 
intensify the attempts for a pan-European convergence via the EL, as well as become 
more open and supportive of the FG experiment.  
  
PCF’s 36th Congress 
 
The party’s 36th Congress was held in 2013 and approved a vast and analytical political 
decision that provides us with several useful and interesting points with regards to the 
party’s strategy, ideology, and stance towards the EU. Indeed, the document, which 
managed to secure a great majority of the party delegates, commenced its analysis by 
stating its outmost objective, “we want to change the world” (PCF, 2013, p. 11). The 
PCF, thus, found that the unprecedented crisis presented a historic opportunity to 
overcome capitalism, something that the party views as an immense challenge for the 
European left (PCF, 2013, p. 11). The PCF, thus, painted a very dark picture of the 
post-crisis Europe, but nevertheless concluded that the destiny of humanity is in the 
hands of the citizens of Europe (PCF, 2013, p. 11). According to the PCF, the only 
viable alternative for the citizens of Europe is the overthrowing of capitalism. The 
party, indeed, heavily criticized those that propose the moralisation of capitalism, as 
it considers that capitalism’s inherent contradictions render it incompatible with 
democracy, social prosperity, and peace (PCF, 2013, p. 12). The means of achieving 
the overcoming of capitalism is an issue that the PCF reflected upon in the document 
under study. Indeed, the party used the term revolution, making sure to highlight that 
it is a social, citizen-led, peaceful, democratic revolution, and not the coup d’état by a 
minority (PCF, 2013, p. 12). This peaceful revolution is, thus, for the PCF a by-product 
of the party’s modern notion of communism. The document subsequently analysed 
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the crisis, which is characterised as the most severe of the Post-War era (PCF, 2013, 
p. 12). The root cause of the crisis was found in the domination of the forces of finance 
that resulted in an ever-growing exploitation of the working class (PCF, 2013, p. 12). 
The European answer to the crisis was destructive, according to the PCF, as the 
austerity imposed to the European peoples resulted in a significant loss of popular 
sovereignty (PCF, 2013, p. 12). Indeed, the party found that this loss of sovereignty 
led to a cycle of democratic regression, which took the form of expert technocratic 
governments supported by the national oligarchies, the media, and lobbying groups 
(PCF, 2013, p. 12).  
 Following its analysis of the crisis, the PCF presented its view of the class struggle in 
the modern era. Indeed, while discussing the notion of the class struggle, the PCF 
stated that the mainstream modern discourse aims at hypnotising the citizens by 
presenting the class struggle as disappearing (PCF, 2013, p. 13). The crisis, 
nevertheless, had the effect of revealing that the class struggle exists and that the ruling 
class is about to win it (PCF, 2013, p. 13). As a result, the PCF aimed at creating the 
necessary conditions for the emergence of a new class consciousness (PCF, 2013, p. 
13). The PCF believed that there is indeed a new class consciousness emerging and 
utilises the examples of the ‘indignados’ movement, the Greek Syriza, and the French 
FG as examples of such a process (PCF, 2013, p. 14).  
 While attempting to present a blueprint of the party’s political project, the PCF stated 
that its ideological foundation is based upon the Enlightenment, the French 
Revolution, the Paris Commune, and the works of Marx (PCF, 2013, p. 14). The party, 
here, reiterated the importance of democracy, liberty, and protection of human rights, 
emphasising, thus, on the negative critique of the 20th Century socialist experiments 
(PCF, 2013, p. 14). That is the reason, why the PCF’s political project is not based on 
prefabricated notions, but is a permanent and open construction based on the party’s 
notion of communism seen as “ the perpetual democratic movement that leads to the 
appropriation of the world by the citizenry, that shares the assets, the knowledge, and 
the powers, that will send the ancient regime of capitalism to oblivion, and that will 
make the human grand inside humanity” (PCF, 2013, p. 14) .  
 Considering these ideas, the party found that the EU is currently facing an existential 
crisis that calls for fundamental transformations (PCF, 2013, p. 15). Indeed, the PCF 
reiterated its core belief of a critical refounding of the EU, a social, humane, and 
ecologic Europe of the peoples, which should liberate itself from the financial markets 
 262 
(PCF, 2013, p. 15). To be able to do that, the PCF proposed a series of measures vis-
à-vis the function of the ECB. The ECB’s independence is, for the PCF, a grave 
mistake and proposes it being placed under the democratic control of the EP and the 
national parliaments (PCF, 2013, p. 15). In addition to this, the ECB is thought to 
finance public investments across the Union, as well as favouring the reduction of 
inequalities between Member States, whilst it should liberate Member States from 
odious debts (PCF, 2013, p. 15). In addition to the status of the ECB, the PCF 
presented its view of the Eurozone and positions itself on the opposite side of those 
that want to change Europe by dissolving the Eurozone (PCF, 2013, p. 17). Indeed, 
the party found that dissolving the Eurozone would mean that the peoples of Europe 
would have to face on their own the same financial war (PCF, 2013, p. 17). Thus, the 
party argued that maintaining the union is indispensable in order to fight against 
nationalist divisions, and construct solidarity relationships amongst the peoples of 
Europe, to emancipate the continent from the financial markets (PCF, 2013, p. 17). 
 Following the proposals on the function and role of the ECB as well as the question 
of the common currency, the PCF argued in favour of a more inclusive democratic 
process at a European level, one that will nevertheless respect the popular sovereignty 
of the Member States (PCF, 2013, p. 15). The PCF, then, suggested that the national 
political scenes are becoming increasingly Europeanised, which led the party to 
intensify its participation inside the EL and the GUE/NGL (PCF, 2013, pp. 16-17). 
Indeed, the party declared its willingness to develop the dynamic of the EL and 
favoured at the same time the spaces of cooperation of progressive political forces at 
a European level and promote their alternative agenda for Europe (PCF, 2013, p. 17).  
 The political document of the party’s 36th Congress could be characterised as quite 
important in shedding light to the party’s ideological underpinnings, as well as to some 
core and raw positions vis-à-vis the EU. Indeed, the party appears to reiterate its core 
ideological positions that revolve around the Marxist tradition, taking nevertheless a 
very critical approach regarding the socialist experiments of the 20th Century. The PCF 
after a period of intense debate elaborated a modern version of communism, which 
views the principles of liberty and democracy as a conditio sine qua non for the 
successful passage to socialism. In addition to this core ideological positions, the PCF 
reiterates and to an extent places more emphasis on the respect of national sovereignty 
that the project of refounding the EU should demonstrate. In fact, it appears as if the 
austerity measures imposed to several Southern European countries and the way that 
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the EU dealt with the sovereign debt crisis, ‘reignited’ a characteristic of the PCF’s 
historic stance towards the EU.  
  
PCF’s 37th Congress 
 
 The PCF’s 37th Congress was held in 2016 and was characterised by a heated debate 
between factions of the party that proposed several documents with differing proposals 
and analyses. Indeed, it would appear as if a considerable, albeit still minoritarian, part 
of the party was ready to reject the European project altogether, given the conclusions 
that it has reached following the agreement between the Syriza-led government and 
the EU in July 2015. Indeed, the document adopted by the majority of the party 
appears to have been influenced both by the intra-party debate, as well as by the events 
that exacerbated, to a certain extent, the effects of the crisis across the EU, including 
the refugee crisis. As a result, the document under analysis here presents us with the 
PCF’s unique approach to the alternative vision of the European project, an approach 
that arguably differentiates, alas slightly, the PCF from the rest of its European allies.  
 The document opened with the dilemma that the crisis had posed to the peoples of 
France and Europe. Indeed, according to the PCF the people are about to decide 
whether to follow the path of social and ecologic disaster, or the path that leads to the 
era of human emancipation (PCF, 2016a, p. 6). To this end, the PCF argued in favour 
of a revolutionary horizon that would bring about the overcoming of capitalism, which 
is now timelier than ever before (PCF, 2016a, p. 6). It then carried on with several 
proposals for the effective creation of such a horizon in France, relating to labour 
relations, social protection, gender equality, constitutional amendments, as well as 
policies to protect the environment (PCF, 2016a, pp. 6-10). Despite of the importance 
of those core positions, the present thesis’ focus will remain on the proposals relating 
to the EU and the party’s stance towards it.  
 Indeed, the document in its final part deals with the critical status of the EU. The title 
is a clear indication of the party’s position and it reads, “against the Europe of capital, 
a solidarity project for a union of free, sovereign, and associated peoples” (PCF, 
2016a, p. 10). The PCF opened this part by clearly stating that the neoliberal EU is not 
something acceptable (PCF, 2016a, p. 10). The party considered that the underlying 
logic of the EU treaties that led the European peoples to compete with one another has 
exacerbated the effects of the crisis, whilst destroying the founding principle of 
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solidarity (PCF, 2016a, p. 10). In fact, the party argued that the austerity imposed to 
the European peoples had only led to precariousness and massive poverty (PCF, 
2016a, p. 10). In addition to this, the party maintained that the Greek example 
highlights the authoritarian current amongst the European leaders, as well as the 
exorbitant powers conceded to the financial institutions (PCF, 2016a, p. 10). The PCF, 
thus, viewed the capitulation of the Syriza-led government as the result of “[…] 
violence, blackmail, and financial asphyxiation […]” (PCF, 2016a, p. 10),  something 
that the PCF viewed as a clear attack to popular sovereignties across the EU. 
 The PCF concluded, thus, that the time for the refoundation of the EU has come, as it 
is massively and systematically rejected by the European peoples (PCF, 2016a, p. 10). 
The party here stated clearly that it opposes both the nationalist-rejectionist voices, as 
well as the authoritarian federalist ones, as the solution lies within an alternative 
project that would combat the capitalist interests in Europe and would thus permit a 
true social transformation at the service of the peoples (PCF, 2016a, p. 10). The PCF, 
indeed, highlighted the importance that the entrance of France in such a battle would 
have, a battle that would undoubtedly change the balance of powers (PCF, 2016a, p. 
10). In trying to address the issues affecting the EU, the party proposed three essential 
axes. Firstly, a Europe of shared development should be able to support the Member 
States in difficulty, whilst spreading a new productive model (PCF, 2016a, p. 10). In 
order to be able to do this, the EU should break with the austerity and regain control 
of the monetary system, as well as the ECB, which should serve the interests of the 
peoples via a program of vast public investments (PCF, 2016a, p. 10). Secondly, the 
PCF argued in favour of a Union of free, sovereign, and associated peoples and nations 
(PCF, 2016a, p. 10). This could only be achieved, according to the PCF, if the 
European edifice is constructed in a manner that allows the sovereign peoples the 
possibility to choose the fields where they wish to maintain their national sovereignty, 
and those where national sovereignty would be shared under the fundamental 
guarantees of the EU (PCF, 2016a, p. 10). Thirdly, the PCF called for a EU that would 
promote peace, cooperation with developing countries and break with the dominant 
Atlanticism (PCF, 2016a, p. 10).  
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Conclusion 
Concluding on the PCF’s ideology as a conditioning factor towards the party’s stance 
towards the EU, we could argue that it has, indeed, played an important role. In reality, 
it would appear as if the modern PCF has maintained quasi-unaltered the unique left 
Europeanism of the historic PCF, which views the European project as an important 
aspect of building socialism. Indeed, the European project constitutes the necessary 
field for the creation of an international citizens’ movement that would overthrow 
capitalism, as well as a necessary defence against neo-fascism and the re-emergence 
of dangerous European nationalisms. Nevertheless, the French party does not share 
the federalist views of most its European allies, as the defence of popular sovereignty 
is of the outmost importance. Based on the analysis of the party documents, we could 
argue that the importance of popular sovereignty was always present as a leitmotif. 
Nevertheless, the crisis and the destructive effects that it brought about inside the EU, 
including the significant re-emergence of neo-fascist parties,76 have led the party to 
place more emphasis on this unique notion of French Communism, as was seen in the 
party’s latest political decisions. Finally, we could argue that the PCF relies a lot in 
the EL, as it sees in it the necessary platform for the creation of a popular front that 
would bring about the overthrowing of capitalism, and the interconnected radical 
transformation of the European edifice. 
 
c. Public Opinion 
 
 To be able to assess the role of the French public opinion in the stance of the PCF 
towards the EU, the present thesis will utilise the data published by the standard 
Eurobarometer. More specifically, a comparative analysis of the findings of the 
Eurobarometer of fall 2004, 2008, 2013, and 2015 will be attempted. Moreover, 
several highly interesting findings presented in the Eurobarometer’s special report on 
the financial crisis published in 2012 will be analysed, providing for a better insight 
on the key opinions of the French citizenry on the role of the EU in combatting the 
                                                
76 In the case of France, the recent electoral successes of the Front Nationale (FN) could be argued to 
constitute a very important element for the FG and the PCF.  
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crisis. The data will be initially examined separately. A final comparative analysis will 
serve as the conclusion of the public opinion factor.  
 Commencing with the data relevant to 2004, we come across several important 
markers relating primarily to the outlook of the citizenry for the country’s future, the 
trust towards national and European political institutions, the citizens’ perception of 
the EU, and finally their opinion on the European Monetary Union and the European 
constitution. The French citizenry keep pace with the EU average. Indeed, 35% of the 
French citizenry felt that their life would improve in the next year, same as the EU 
average of 35% (EC, 2004c, p. 14). As regards the trust towards political institutions, 
it is important to note that traditional and, in a sense, conservative institutions, such as 
the Army and the Police score extremely high amongst the French citizenry, scoring 
70% and 60% respectively. The EU scores quite high, 50%, especially if we consider 
the trust towards national political institutions is quite abysmal. Indeed, the trust 
towards political parties and the government amount to 13% and 29% respectively 
(EC, 2004c, p. 2). Amongst the European institutions, the Parliament, Commission, 
Council, and Court of Justice are the only institutions recording levels of trust 
exceeding 50%. It is worthwhile noting that 54% of the French citizenry appears to 
trust the EC, a relatively higher percentage than the European average of 52% (EC, 
2004c, p. 3). In respect to the support for France’s EU membership, 56% of the French 
sample appeared to support it. This places France precisely at the same level with the 
EU average of 56% (EC, 2004c, p. 3). Concurrently, 54% of the French interviewees 
stated that the country has benefited from the EU membership. This places France 
above the EU average of 53% (EC, 2004c, p. 3). The final markers relate to the support 
or lack thereof vis-à-vis the European Monetary Union, and the prospect of a European 
Constitution. With a figure of 78%, the percentage of French in favour of European 
Monetary Union with a single currency is significantly higher than the EU average of 
63% (EC, 2004c, p. 8). The French sample scores higher than the EU average, in 
respect to the prospect of a European Constitution77. Indeed, 70% of the French sample 
is in favour of this prospect, compared with a 68% of EU average (EC, 2004c, p. 8).  
Moving onwards to the Eurobarometer of 2008, we come across a more preoccupied 
and slightly pessimistic picture. Contrary to the, relatively optimistic, outlook towards 
                                                
77 Indeed, the question related to the idea of a European Constitution and not the specific one that was 
rejected by most of the French citizenry in the referendum held in 2005. 
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the future, only 19% of the French felt that they would be in a better condition in the 
next 12 months. A percentage that ranks France slightly higher than the EU average 
of 15% (EC, 2008c). In regards to the citizens’ support towards the country’s EU 
membership, the decline is quite significant compared to previous data, with 46% of 
the respondents considering France’s EU membership positively (EC, 2008c, p. 2). In 
addition to this, 51% of the French sample also believe that France has benefited from 
the country’s EU membership. Although this figure represents the relative majority of 
the sample, it is amongst the lowest percentages recorded across the EU. The negative 
trend of trust towards political institutions is reiterated in this study. Indeed, only 13% 
of the sample claim to trust political parties, 31% the French government, and 36% 
the French Parliament. Now, this distrust has extended towards the EU, with only one 
European institution, the EP, gaining the trust of the French citizenry’s majority at 
52%. Regarding the Euro and the European Monetary Union, the French citizenry 
appears rather positive. Indeed, 73% of the French respondents are favourable to the 
European common currency. Thus, we could conclude that the data from 2008, 
gathered amid a financial crisis, show the high degree of preoccupation that it has 
generated amongst the French citizenry. Despite the negative outlook, it appears as if 
the French citizenry maintain their trust to the EU and its ability to tackle the effects 
of the upcoming crisis. Nevertheless, the French public opinion presents a certain 
discontent when it comes to the general orientation of the European construction, and 
more specifically to the enlargement of the EU, which are increasingly seen as 
affecting the process of European integration in a rather negative manner.  
 The severe effects of the financial crisis made their initial appearance in Europe in 
2010. This renders the post-2010 era quite important regarding the citizens’ view on 
the EU and its future. As we have established in the previous section, the PCF reached 
important conclusions in the post-crisis era. Thus, it is important to verify whether 
such a change could potentially echo societal needs. The special Eurobarometer of 
2012 regarding the financial crisis that affects the EU provides us several interesting 
markers that could help us map the change or lack thereof in the French society’s 
stance towards the EU.  
 Amongst the very important markers present in the Special Eurobarometer, one 
comes across the lack of trust in the EU’s and national government’s ability to tackle 
the effects of the crisis. Indeed, only 21% of French appear to believe that the EU can 
take effective actions against the crisis, whereas 23% have faith in the abilities of the 
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national government (EC, 2012, p. 15). In comparison to the EU average, France 
scores in par in terms of the faith in the EU, while the results reiterate the relative trust 
towards the national government, which is two per cent higher than the EU average 
(EC, 2012, p. 15). With regards to the evaluation of the attempts to tackle the crisis, 
53% of the French sample found that the national government has been completely 
ineffective, while 57% expressed the same opinion with regards to the European 
attempts (EC, 2012, p. 19). It is worthwhile noting that both scores are slightly below 
the EU average. Another important marker relates to the evaluation of several 
measures thought to tackle the crisis’ effects on the European economy. The clear 
majority of the French interviewees appear to be favourable to a stronger coordination 
of economic policy among all the EU Member States, as well as the countries of the 
Eurozone by 80% and 82% respectively, while 78% appear favourable to a more 
important role for the EU in regulating financial services (EC, 2012, p. 26). In addition 
to those generic measures, respondents have also indicated their opinion in relation to 
specific policies. Once again, the clear majority of the French citizenry appear to be 
in favour of tougher rules on tax avoidance and tax havens, the introduction of a tax 
on profits made by banks, tighter rules for credit rating agencies, with 83%, 76%, 73%, 
respectively, but were not in favour of the introduction of Eurobonds (EC, 2012, p. 
34).  The final set of markers that are deemed of importance for the present study 
include questions relating to the future of the EU and to the degree of European 
solidarity perceived by the French citizenry. More specifically, 55% of the French 
sample appears to believe that because of the crisis the EU will be stronger in the long 
run. On this instance, France scored two points above the EU average (EC, 2012, p. 
37). The final marker involves the degree that the French citizens feel closer to other 
European countries due to the crisis. France scored slightly higher than the EU average 
of 42%. Indeed, with 43% the French citizenry appears not to follow the trend of the 
Greek, Spanish, and Italian citizenry (EC, 2012, p. 37).  
 Following the Special Eurobarometer on the crisis, the analysis will resume with the 
two final reports. The Eurobarometer of fall 2013 reiterates the negative trends with 
regards to the French citizens’ stance to the EU. Indeed, the French citizenry is 
amongst the most pessimistic ones when it comes to their countries future economic 
prospect, as only 7% of the interviewees have a positive outlook, which is 24% lower 
than the EU average and can be only matched by the countries of the European South 
(EC, 2013c, p. 3). As to the role that the EU has played in this negative outlook, 65% 
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of the French sample finds that the EU is responsible behind the austerity measures 
applied in the country (EC, 2013c, p. 7). In addition to this, the EU is seen as unable 
to create better employment opportunities for its citizens, as well as protect them from 
the negative effects of globalisation (EC, 2013c, p. 7). Nevertheless, a clear majority, 
63%, of the French society appears favourable to the euro (EC, 2013c, p. 9).  
 The French citizenry’s outlook over the future of the EU is proven once again 
pessimistic, as 56% of the citizens declare themselves rather pessimistic, close only to 
the countries of the European South (EC, 2013c, p. 8). This classifies the French 
citizenry amongst the most pessimistic, given that France scored well above the EU 
average of 43% (EC, 2013c, p. 7). The growing disaffection towards the EU could be 
argued to hide, nevertheless, a request for more integration and a desire for a 
qualitative change for the EU. The overwhelming majority of the French sample, 61%, 
does not see a better future for the country outside of the EU (EC, 2013c, p. 9), 
something that could be explained the fact that the clear majority of the French 
interviewees, 70%, find that the EU’s voice is important in the international arena. 
Moreover, the French citizenry is in favour of both a common foreign policy, as well 
as a common security (EC, 2013c, p. 10). An additional marker that relates to the 
critical support of the EU relates to the identification of the people with the EU. 
Indeed, most French interviewees, 57%, declared that they feel citizens of the EU. A 
marker that places France close to the EU average (EC, 2013c, p. 10).  
 The final Eurobarometer that was published in the second semester of 2015 presents 
yet another very pessimistic picture. The first marker that would be of interest to the 
present study relates to how citizens view the situation of their country’s national 
economy. Here, the French interviewees scored well above the EU average, 59%, with 
84% judging the situation of the French economy as totally bad (EC, 2015c, p. 1). The 
opinion held by the French citizenry is not the outcome of the abysmal state of their 
job situation or the financial situation of their household. Indeed, it is evident from the 
data that the French interviewees’ financial and job situation are in par with the EU 
average of 68% and 53% accordingly (EC, 2015c, p. 1). In terms of the citizenry’s 
outlook towards the future, we come across the marker that indicates that the French 
tend to be as pessimistic as their European counterparts when it comes to the economic 
short term amelioration of the economic situation of both their national economy, as 
well as the state of the European economy (EC, 2015c, p. 1).  
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 In relation to the citizens’ trust towards the political institutions, the negative trend 
vis-à-vis the EU is continued, as the French scored well below the EU average of 40%, 
with 32% of the respondents stating their trust to the EU (EC, 2015c, p. 2). The 
national political institutions constitute yet another indicator of the profound 
discontent of the French citizens. Indeed, a mere 19% tend to trust the government, 
whereas 21% tend to trust the parliament (EC, 2015c, p. 2). While the discontent seems 
to be rather widespread amongst the EU, the French score is well below the EU 
average of 31% for both the national governments and parliaments. Another marker 
that echoes the citizens’ pessimism is a question that relates to the crisis on the job 
market and if that has reached its peak. The clear majority of the interviewees stated 
that the worst is still to come, 55%, something that places them amongst the most 
pessimistic in the EU (EC, 2015c, p. 3). When it comes to the EU’s image, the French 
citizens appear close to the EU average with 37% having a positive image and 40% 
having a neutral one (EC, 2015c, p. 3). The final markers of the 2015 report relate to 
the European identity and the most positive outcomes of the EU. Regarding the 
European identity of the French citizenry, 61% of French feel a citizen of the EU; a 
percentage slightly lower than the 67% of the EU average (EC, 2015c, p. 4). As to the 
most positive results achieved by the EU, the French citizenry finds that free 
movement of people, peace among the Member States, the euro, the student exchange 
programmes, and the economic power of the EU constitute the most important ones 
with the percentages ranging from 45%, 62%, 30%, 26%, and 13% respectively (EC, 
2015, p. 4).  
  An initial comparative analysis of the data provided by the Eurobarometer suggests 
that the French public opinion towards the EU has been greatly influenced by the 
crisis. Indeed, during the 2008-2013 period the distrust towards the EU had been 
gradually increasing. This negative trend appears nevertheless to be losing 
momentum. The influence of the austerity measures and growing unemployment and 
the fact that the Eu is held responsible for them could be seen as an initial reason 
behind this. We could argue, thus, that the PCF’s narrative vis-à-vis the European 
edifice is rather coherent with the majoritarian tensions inside French society. In 
addition to this, the complete distrust towards the national political institutions could 
be argued to be reflected in the PCF’s positions regarding radical constitutional 
amendments. With regards to the measures sought to tackle the crisis’ effects, the 
stricter regulation of the financial sector, and the role of the ECB present a high degree 
 271 
of coherence between societal beliefs and core policies of the PCF. Another important 
common element can be seen in the majority’s belief that there would be no better 
future for France outside of the EU. Indeed, despite the highly critical stance of the 
French citizenry vis-à-vis the EU, the people appear to be unable to view a future 
outside the EU and the Eurozone, something reflected on the PCF’s core position. An 
important element here is the high degree of identification of the French people with 
the EU and the fact that despite the negative trend of EU’s image they continue to see 
themselves as citizens of the EU. Thus, we could conclude that the PCF’s core 
ideological positions appear to echo the key opinions of the French citizens. The 
sharpening of the critique of the PCF appears also to have followed the trend in public 
opinion.  
  
d. Party Factionalism 
 
As mentioned in the short introduction of the present chapter, the party factionalism 
factor will relate to the analysis of the alternative political documents presented by the 
party’s factions during the most recent congress. Indeed, the PCF’s internal debate 
became rather heated after a long period of relative calm. The initial proposal of the 
party’s presidency that wanted the PCF to take part in the primary election of PS, to 
push the PS to the left, caused serious internal imbalances and led to the emergence of 
four alternative documents during the most recent congress. The first one presented 
by the faction united around the communist publication ‘La Riposte’ was entitled ‘For 
a communist policy’ [Pour une politique communiste] and obtained 5.40%. The 
second was presented by the faction ‘Faire Vivre le PCF’ [Animate the PCF] led by 
the federal secretary of Pas-de-Calais Herve Poly, and the mayor of Venissieux, 
Michele Picard bore the title ‘Unite the communists. The renewed challenge of the 
Communist Party!’ [Unir les communistes. Le defi renouvele du Parti Communiste!] 
and received 12.87%. The third one was presented by the ‘federation’ of the orthodox 
factions led by Emmanuel Dang Tran was entitled ‘Reconstruct a class party! Prioritise 
the struggle’ [Reconstruisons un parti de classe! Priorite au rassemblement dans les 
lutes] and managed to secure 6.86%. The fourth and final one was presented by 
historical figures of the party such as Michel Duffour and Roland Leroy and was 
supported by several young intellectuals and members of minor formations of the 
Front de Gauche. It bore the title ‘The communist ambition for a popular left front’ 
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[L’ambition communiste pour un Front de gauche populaire et citoyens] and obtained 
23.68%.  
 
For a Communist Policy 
 
The first alternative document submitted by the faction ‘la riposte’ commences with 
a heavy critique of the socialist government, which is viewed as aiding the capitalists 
to launch an attack on the rights and social and political achievements of the people 
(PCF, 2016b, p. 15). In addition to this, the document underlines that the state is also 
becoming increasingly repressive, using the pretext of the fight against terrorism. 
Social regression is, according to the document, affecting all aspects of life such as 
employment, health, education, public services, and labour rights, as the socialist 
government is sacrificing everything for profit (PCF, 2016b, p. 15). The document 
assesses that the EU is playing a very important role in that, as it is imposing austerity 
and is supporting the capitalist interests at any cost. Here, the example of Greece is 
utilised to show the exact role played by the leaders of the EU (PCF, 2016b, p. 15). 
As a result, the faction calls for a programme of action, to take the country out of this 
critical situation. 
 Prior to enunciating their alternative programme of action, the document reiterates 
the important of the events in Greece, which serve to highlight the reality inside the 
EU. Indeed, the faction argues that the leaders of the EU are not willing to respect the 
expression of popular sovereignty, as demonstrated by their refusal to consider the 
will of the Greek people following the elections of January 2015,78 as well as the 
referendum of July 201579. In addition to this, the document argues that the same holds 
true in relation to the referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty that took place in 
France in 200580. Following their heavy criticism of the European leadership, the 
faction sharpens its critique towards the leadership of the PCF. As, the document states 
that the leadership of the party proposes several changes to the functioning of the EU, 
                                                
78 When Syriza won the elections, and managed to form a coalition government. 
79 The referendum related to the EC proposed structural reform programme that the Greek people 
overwhelmingly rejected. 
80 In that sense, the Constitutional treaty was not ratified, but for the European radical left the Lisbon 
Treaty constitutes a similarly unacceptable Treaty that was in a sense imposed to the peoples of Europe, 
despite the rejection of the Constitutional treaty by several countries. 
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without considering that the working-class has no appreciation for the EU, as it is at 
the exclusive service of the capitalist class (PCF, 2016b, p. 15). Indeed, as the 
document states any attempt to break with austerity is openly rejected by the EU. As 
a result, the faction finds that maintaining a European reform is an illusion. Thus, the 
PCF needs to enunciate a struggle against the EU, based on a programme that targets 
the heart of the capitalist interests, which the EU represents (PCF, 2016b, p. 15).  
 The document virtually utilises the definition of reformism as presented by Marx and 
Engels in their Manifesto of the Communist Party that mentions, “[reformism aims] 
to cure social infirmities by means of all kinds of re-plastering” (PCF, 2016b, p. 16). 
The faction, thus, follows the Marxist definition that views reformism as founded on 
the premise that it is possible to solve the problems created by capitalism within 
capitalism itself. According to this faction, a revolutionary party cannot negate the 
need to defend, and if possible extend, the gains of the past, but should also focus on 
concrete struggles. As a result, the document concludes that the PCF’s programme 
cannot limit itself on simply claiming the return of rights gained in the past, but should 
make sure to pave the way towards the complete rupture with capitalism (PCF, 2016b, 
p. 16). For this reason, the document calls for the nationalisation or socialisation of 
the banks, the big industrial and commercial enterprises, as well as workers control 
over most enterprises (PCF, 2016b, p. 16).  
 Moreover, the document heavily criticises the party leadership for the decision of 
electoral alliances with the PS. This is seen, by the present faction, as a very important 
problem, as the PS’ leadership and ministers are actively defending capitalist interests. 
The document, hence, concludes that there is absolutely no difference between the PS 
and the right-wing parties. Finally, the document calls for several reforms considered 
to lead to a further democratisation of the internal functioning of the PCF. These 
reforms are thought to limit the risk of decisions which are being taken from party 
elites and contradict the ideas and aspirations of the party members, such as the 
electoral coalition with the PS (PCF, 2016b, p. 17).  
 
Unite the Communists. The renewed Challenge of the Communist Party 
 
 
 The second alternative document submitted by the ‘Faire Vivre le PCF’ faction opens 
with a quote from Karl Marx’s German ideology on the individual. Then, the 
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document highlights the importance of the PCF, seen as an historic exigence (PCF, 
2016b, p. 17). Indeed, the faction finds that the communists are faced with a historic 
challenge. They argue that capitalism seizes all aspects of human life, pushes to the 
paroxysm of exploitation and profit, provokes social and political crises, imposes wars 
and destroys nations, in order to better to expand its domination. Indeed, the document 
argues that the events in Greece prove exactly that. As it clearly mentions “[the events 
in Greece] have confirmed the true nature of the EU and the Eurozone, a true 
dictatorship against the people” (PCF, 2016b, p. 17). As a result, the document argues 
that the French people need the PCF, which, according to this faction, is threatened by 
a strategic renouncement and a short-term and inefficient electoral tactics (PCF, 
2016b, p. 17).  
 The document, then, follows with an examination of the party strategy and calls the 
leadership to revoke their proposed participation in the PS primary election. Instead, 
the faction calls for the continuation of the struggle through the FG as a vehicle, 
including as many anti-neoliberal and communist political forces as possible (PCF, 
2016b, p. 17). Subsequently, the document enunciates several important themes that 
the party’s internal debate should focus on. The most important for the present thesis’ 
analysis are the following. Firstly, the immediate withdrawal of France from NATO. 
Secondly, the withdrawal of France from the EU and the euro, to be able to overcome 
capitalism (PCF, 2016b, p. 17). Following those important themes, the documents 
calls for another grand debate that should lead to a solid ideological background of the 
party based on the Marxist tradition. Indeed, the faction finds that the criminalisation 
of socialism and communism, the rejection of Leninism’s contribution, the 
abandonment of Marxism as a theoretical reference, and the contempt towards the 
socialist experiences have led the PCF to an ideological breakdown, rendering it 
incapable of seizing the power and revolutionarily transforming a developed capitalist 
society (PCF, 2016b, p. 17). Indeed, the document in its final part presents several 
immediate measures that could bring about the rupture with capitalism. Those include 
the nationalisation of key sectors of the French economy, the massive reduction of the 
working day and the parallel rise of wages, the withdrawal from NATO and the 
disobedience to the European treaties, as well as the cancellation of the country’s 
sovereign debt that is regarded as odious (PCF, 2016b, p. 18). Those measures are 
thought to create the necessary conditions for the creation of a popular front that would 
lead towards socialism.  
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Reconstruct a Class Party! Prioritise the Struggle 
 
The document submitted by the orthodox factions of the PCF opens with a heavy 
accusation of the party’s leadership. Indeed, the document in its opening paragraph 
states that the members of the faction would like to express their complete opposition 
to the leadership and voice their choice of rupture with the reformist line of the party. 
Indeed, the document states its complete opposition to the participation, as announced 
by the leadership, in the primary election of the PS, as well as the involvement in 
Melenchon’s candidacy (PCF, 2016b, p. 18). The orthodox factions, thus, reject the 
electoral illusions and the participation of the PCF in a leftist bloc of political forces 
aiming at managing capitalism. Instead of the illusory participation in electoral blocs, 
the document calls for the active involvement of the party inside the class struggle, as 
it finds that the party has completely erased every element of class struggle from its 
political analysis (PCF, 2016b, p. 18).  
 Following this initial analysis of the party’s strategic and tactical positions, the 
document argues that the policies of the Socialist government have been constantly 
serving the interests of the capitalist class, exacerbating, thus, the destructive effects 
of the capitalist crisis (PCF, 2016b, p. 18). In such critical times the document finds 
that the PCF remained trapped in its electoral compromises with the PS, as well as the 
FG, which it characterises as a politicking union. Thus, the orthodox factions conclude 
that the party lost even more credibility and political influence. Moreover, the 
document argues that through its alignment with Tsipras, whose austerity policies and 
example of resignation continue to harm the Greek people, as well as its obsessive 
support of the European integration, the party has turned away from the popular anger 
and the expectations of the revolutionary labour unions (PCF, 2016b, p. 18).  
Following the heavy critique towards the party’s leadership, the document introduces 
several important issues to the intra-party debate. The document, thus, brings forward 
proposals of rupture with capitalism and the EU. Indeed, it claims that the big battles 
that are awaiting the party call for strong political positions for social security, public 
services, the defence and the reconquest of the public monopolies, the withdrawal 
from NATO, as well as for the reclaiming of the democratic nationalisations (PCF, 
2016b, p. 18). Finally, the document calls for a radical reorganisation of the PCF, to 
allow for it to be “[…] re-appropriated by those that need a historic revolutionary party 
of the working class in France […]” (PCF, 2016b, p. 18).  
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The Communist Ambition for a popular Left Front 
 
The fourth and final alternative document presented during the PCF’s 37th congress 
was submitted by a rather loose group of members that does not really constitute a 
faction, since it does not bear the necessary characteristics81. Indeed, the alternative 
document presented echoes primarily the positions of the leadership’s document, as 
presented and analysed in the first section of this chapter. As regards the group’s 
stance towards the EU, which is the scope of the present thesis, we could argue that 
the positions are practically identical with the ones presented in the adopted document. 
Indeed, the group finds that the current European architecture influenced by its 
neoliberal leitmotif has transformed the EU into a project that is serving the capitalist 
interests of exploitation (PCF, 2016b, p. 46). The group, thus, proposes the idea of an 
alternative EU based on a flexible structure of shared sovereignties and shared 
competences between the EP and the national parliaments, as well as the active 
participation of the citizenry in the political life (PCF, 2016b, p. 46). It is evident, thus, 
that this group of members shares the idea of the PCF’s majority that this alternative 
structure of the EU could constitute the way towards the overcoming of neoliberalism 
and eventually capitalism at a European and a national level.  
 The document presented at the congress adds to the intra-party debate several notions 
and proposals that primarily relate to the party’s role in society, as well as the party’s 
organisation. Indeed, it would appear as if this group aims at achieving an even more 
open structure that would enable the citizens to participate without having to face the 
increasing difficulties posed by the party’s bureaucratic mechanisms (PCF, 2016b, pp. 
15-16). Moreover, the group criticizes, even if not as heavily as the other factions, the 
leadership’s proposal to participate in the primary election of the PS, as it finds that 
the “[…] search for a shared candidacy alongside a discredited PS reproduces the old 
ways of the Gauche Plurielle” (PCF, 2016b, p. 16)82. Indeed, the group considers that 
this strategy is unable to produce different results than in the past and calls, thus, for 
the strengthening of the FG and its transformation into a popular front that will unite 
                                                
81 Those could be argued to be constituted by a continuous presence inside the party, a homogeneous 
ideological stance, common history, and some degree of internal organisation. 
82 The Gauche Plurielle, as mentioned in the first part of this chapter, constituted one of the many 
attempts of unity of the French left, including the PS. Indeed, it led to a Socialist government with 
several communist ministers, which was nevertheless rather short lived.  
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all the citizens that seek a rupture with neoliberalism (PCF, 2016b, p. 16). To this end, 
the group utilises the examples of Syriza in Greece and IU in Spain which managed 
to mobilise most of the working class and unite them under the banner of the struggle 
against neoliberalism (PCF, 2016b, p. 16). 
 
Conclusion 
 
 An initial conclusion that could be drawn from the analysis of the factionalism factor, 
is that the PCF is undergoing a period of internal tension. The initial choice of the 
leadership to partake in the primary elections of the PS served as a catalyst for the 
‘awakening’ of the factions and triggered a heated internal debate. Indeed, as 
evidenced by the analysis of the first three documents, a considerable part of the PCF 
has reached rather decisive conclusions from the events in Greece. The rupture with 
the EU constitutes for the first three factions a conditio sine qua non for the rupture 
with capitalism and the only way out of the capitalist crisis that is regarded as a 
destruction of the social and political rights of the working class. Consequently, the 
majority’s Europeanism is seen by the first three factions as a version of reformism 
that needs to be combatted so that the party regains its communist identity. We 
conclude, thus, that the presence of such a heated internal debate the country’s EU 
membership indicates that it is a factor conditioning the majority’s stance vis-à-vis the 
EU to an extent, as the leadership must balance between rather contradicting views. 
The importance of such a divergence cannot be underestimated, as the factions 
together make up for almost one third of the party’s delegates.  
  
e. Party Leadership 
 
During the period under analysis, the PCF has undergone a smooth transition in 
leadership. This is expressed by the election of Pierre Laurent, who took the place of 
Marie-George Buffet as the party’s national secretary in 2010. The transition was 
indeed smooth as Laurent was in a sense the candidate that Buffet prepared for the 
leadership during her time in the party’s leadership. The analysis of the present factor 
will relate to a brief comparative analysis of Buffet’s final intervention as a national 
secretary and Laurent’s first as a national secretary at the PCF’s 35th Congress held in 
2010.  
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 Buffet during her final intervention as the party’s secretary attempted to review the 
victories as well as the defeats that the party has undergone during her time in the 
leadership. Indeed, she emphasised on the grandiose victory of both the party and the 
French people on the occasion of the referendum on the European Constitutional 
Treaty in 2005 (PCF, 2010, p. 10). Buffet, thus, utilised the example of the referendum 
as an example of the effectiveness that the unity of the left-wing forces in France can 
achieve. In addition to this, Buffet declared that there is indeed a great need for the 
‘morality’ that the left-wing brings to the political scene. As a matter of fact, Buffet’s 
position resonates Berlinguer’s notion of the moral question (questione morale), when 
she states that during the crisis the political life has been affected by an accelerated 
degradation of public morality, seen as “[…] the capacity of those invested with a 
political responsibility to exercise their function in the name of the greater good” 
(PCF, 2010, p. 10). According to Buffett this has resulted in political decisions that 
have allowed to the financial companies to colonise both France and Europe, 
something that the PCF and its European allies should stop at all costs (PCF, 2010, p. 
10).  
 In addition to stopping the aforementioned process, Buffet calls for a left-wing exit 
from the crisis that can be achieved via the opening of the party to social movements 
and citizens that are being increasingly impoverished by the neoliberal policies 
imposed by the EU and the national government (PCF, 2010, p. 10). For the party to 
open up even more to society, Buffet believes that the vehicle of the FG should be 
utilised more intensively, so as to attract even more social and political forces that 
share the aspirations of the PCF and its allies. This constitutes for Buffet the only 
possible way for the party to manage to reactivate the people who have massively lost 
their faith in any form of political opposition. Following the exposition of her core 
idea of openness, which has to an extent been the guiding force behind the FG 
experiment and the overall PCF’s strategy, Buffet states the party’s openness is not in 
any way harming the party’s identity. Indeed, she states that the more the PCF is 
promoting a project of overcoming capitalism with a vision of an emancipatory 
socialism, the more it will contribute to the reinforcement of the left in the country 
(PCF, 2010, p. 10).  
 To this end she adds that the divergences between the PCF and its allies inside the FG 
can be easily overcome by maintaining the focus on the construction of a new popular 
front for the 21st century (PCF, 2010, p. 10). In order for the PCF to be able to achieve 
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this objective, Buffet calls for a process of additional democratisation and 
experimentation inside the party, as its transformation is not giving in to the air of 
time, but a passionate anticipation of the future of the communist battles (PCF, 2010, 
p. 11). Moreover, she argues that the PCF under her leadership has renounced the 
principles of democratic centralism so that the majoritarian decisions could be taken 
with respect for the sovereignty of every individual communist, taking advantage of 
the party’s internal divergences that enrich its ideological arsenal. Indeed, for Buffet 
a possible return to past organisational patterns would be suicidal (PCF, 2010, p. 11). 
For Buffet, thus, the unity of the French and European left-wing forces is the key for 
the creation of wide enough popular front that could launch an offensive against 
capitalism and bring about the necessary changes for the socialist transformation of 
the society, economy, and polity.  
 Finally, Buffet’s intervention relates to the communist identity, which is based on the 
party’s profound conception of humanity. Indeed, Buffet’s statement here is of great 
significance for the understanding of the PCF’s notion of socialism, as well as its core 
position vis-à-vis the EU. Buffet, thus, states that “declaring oneself a communist is 
seeing in everyone this possibility, this potential of realisation, this immense force that 
is the free cooperation of equal and associated human beings. This is a radical choice. 
In my eyes this is the fundamental choice of human freedom” (PCF, 2010, p. 11).  This 
radical choice should, thus, according to Buffet be in the core of the PCF’s project. 
This idea, indeed, could be argued to be the basis of the PCF’s position towards the 
EU, as the party’s alternative architecture is based precisely on the free association of 
sovereign states, which will be able to coordinate and realise their potential not by the 
means of imposition of rules, but by freely choosing the extent of the powers that the 
EU will have over their state.  
  Pierre Laurent argues that the current situation both in France and in Europe calls for 
profound changes and ruptures, but the main political parties are completely unwilling 
to promote the interest of the citizenry (PCF, 2010, p. 22). Indeed, Laurent heavily 
criticized the PS by stating that the ‘end of history’ discourse has led “[…] this 
important party of the left to abandon this idea [of rupture], and has reduced its 
[political] ambition, in the name of realism, in a simple ‘regulation’ and ‘moralisation’ 
of the system” (PCF, 2010, p. 23). But this realism is, according to Laurent nowadays 
unrealistic. As a result, Laurent stated that today there is great need for an alternative 
to capitalism, an alternative that after having considered the lessons of the past would 
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be able to respond to the challenges of the 21st century and bring humanity to the centre 
of the decision-making (PCF, 2010, p. 22). As to the means of achieving this, Laurent 
argues that this could not take place in the name of absolute truth imposed by a 20th 
century type revolution. Indeed, he adds that nobody would believe in such a process 
in the modern society (PCF, 2010, p. 22). Instead of that, Laurent proposes a 
‘revolutionary evolution’,83 where every stage is dependent on the democratic will of 
the majority of the people and consists of the decisive ruptures with the capitalist logic 
(PCF, 2010, p. 23).  
 More specifically, Laurent enunciates the main axes of a project that could lead to 
such a rupture with capitalism. Firstly, he argues in favour of a communist way of 
production and development, a development that will not be consumerist and will be 
able to provide equality and justice with regards to social needs (PCF, 2010, p. 23). 
Secondly, Laurent refers to the public services, which are subject to a process of 
privatisations led by the national government and the EU. Indeed, he calls for the 
social appropriation of the public services and public goods (PCF, 2010, p. 23). 
Thirdly, the PCF’s secretary refers to the banking system and calls for the 
nationalisation of the banks to form a public banking sector that will serve the national 
economy and the citizens instead of the big financial interests (PCF, 2010, p. 23). 
Fourthly, in relation to the question of labour, Laurent stresses the importance of 
launching an offensive in order to reconquer the power on the content and the purpose 
of labour.  
 In the final part of his intervention, Laurent presents his vision for the new chapter of 
the FG. Indeed, he states that this new chapter will be very important for opening a 
political alternative (PCF, 2010, p. 23). To create this alternative, Laurent calls for the 
FG to become a permanent political organisation that would be able to provide the 
necessary continuity and stability to coordinate the action of the political forces, both 
at a national and European level (PCF, 2010, p. 23). With regards to the European 
level, Laurent stresses the importance of the EL and states that the PCF will continue 
to work towards more convergence of democratic and progressive political forces 
                                                
83 The idea of the ‘revolutionary evolution’ is inspired by the work of the French proto-socialist Jean 
Jaures. For more regarding Jaures’ work see Pare (2013).  
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(PCF, 2010, p. 23). As to the EL’s future, Laurent84 states that it should aim to amplify 
its voice and create even more convergence amongst its member parties (PCF, 2010, 
p. 23). With regards to the national political arena, Laurent argues that the party should 
continue the path that was opened in 2005. Indeed, he utilises the example of the 
referendum as a moment in the history of the French radical left that should serve as 
a constant reminder of the power of unity.  
In attempting an initial evaluation of the change in leadership as a conditioning factor 
for the PCF’s stance towards the EU we could argue that it appears as rather 
unimportant. The high degree of convergence between the two leaders’ core positions, 
alongside the smooth transition of power created a certain continuity in terms of the 
party’s stance. Buffet’s ideas of an emancipatory communist project that would lead 
the society to overcome capitalism are present in Laurent’s core ideological beliefs, as 
well as in the party’s ideological profile. In addition to this, Laurent views the FG, 
launched and constituted under the leadership of Buffet, as the necessary vehicle for 
the creation of wide social and political alliances, as well as a constant reminder of the 
capabilities of the unity of the left forces. Indeed, it is evident from the analysis of the 
leaders’ interventions that the 2005 referendum constitutes a primary argument of the 
party’s leadership to the internal debate that saw in the FG an alliance that tends to 
alter the ideological purity of the party. A final point that needs to be raised relates to 
Laurent’s stance vis-à-vis the PS, which arguably constitutes one of the few points of 
divergence between Buffet and Laurent. Indeed, Laurent views the PS as a left-wing 
party that has gradually abandoned its socialist identity commencing in the 1990s. As 
a result, he considers that the PCF should continue its attempts of radicalising the PS, 
quite similarly to the attempts of the PRC with regards to the PD in Italy. Laurent’s 
stance, indeed, was echoed once again when he proposed the PCF’s participation in 
the PS’ primary election, something that as mentioned in the previous part led to a 
very heated internal debate during the party’s 37th conference, and served as a catalyst 
for the rupture with Melenchon and the PG, which will be dealt with in the proceeding 
part.  
 
                                                
84 Laurent was the President of the EL, elected during the party’s 4th Congress held in Madrid in 2013 
until December 2016.  
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f. Party Competition 
 
Moving towards the factor of party competition, we must note that the PCF, following 
the rupture with the PG, is currently surrounded by two political parties on the left of 
the PS. On one hand, one comes across the PG, the party that was founded by Jean-
Luc Melenchon upon his withdrawal from the PS. As mentioned in the previous 
section of this study, the PG was the PCF’s major ally in creating the FG as a means 
of uniting the French radical left. On the other hand, one comes across the New 
Anticapitalist Party (NPA). The NPA was emerged from a process of unification 
among anticapitalist political forces initiated by the Revolutionary Communist 
League85 (LCR), a Trotskyist movement born amid the 1968 student and youth 
movement. Prior to the dissolution of the LCR in 2009, the leader of one of its most 
important, alas minoritarian, faction known as Unir [Unite] decided to join the FG 
instead of the newly founded NPA. Indeed, this split gave birth to the political party 
Gauche Unitaire, which recently decided to dissolve into the PCF. We could conclude, 
thus, that the PCF, as with most of its European allies, is currently operating inside a 
highly fragmented and contentious political system, especially with regards to the 
multiplicity of the parties on the left of the social democracy. In order to draw 
conclusions as to the importance of party competition vis-à-vis the PCF’s stance 
towards the EU, the most recent political documents of the two parties will be 
analysed, in an attempt to reconstruct their theses and their possible influence on the 
PCF. 
 
Parti de Gauche 
 
As mentioned in the previous parts, the PCF and the PG worked together ever since 
the referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty in 2005. This process led to the 
creation of the FG, but despite its relative successes the PG decided to leave in late 
2016. Indeed, the FG does not exist anymore for the PG, something communicated by 
its leader, Melenchon, in an interview held in July 2016, as the “[…] the trust [between 
the PG and the PCF] is dead” (Desmoulieres, 2016, p. 10). The tension between the 
two parties was evident rising, as the divergence on a several issues was becoming 
                                                
85 For more on the LCR and its historical presence inside the French radical left see, Joshua (2004). 
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even more apparent. Indeed, the PG has been accusing the PCF of attempting to 
‘privatise’ the FG and take it over its complete control. In addition to this, the lack of 
a definitive decision as to the PCF’s participation in the PS’ primary election 
constituted one more reason and possibly the catalyst for the PG’s withdrawal from 
the coalition. Moreover, the two parties had to face the long-standing divergence vis-
à-vis the European question. Indeed, Melenchon, who personally launched a series of 
debates regarding a possible plan B for Europe alongside the former finance Minister 
of the Syriza-led government Varoufakis amongst others, has been quite vocal of his 
belief that a European RLP in the aftermath of Syriza’s capitulation should consider 
the possibility of leaving the EU. These statements come as no real surprise if we 
consider his post-Brexit declaration when he described himself as the “[…] candidate 
of an exit from the [European] treaties” (Desmoulieres, 2016, p. 11). Despite the quasi-
abysmal relationship between Melenchon and the PCF’s leadership, most of the PCF 
members, alongside important party figures, such as Buffet, are arguing in favour of 
the PCF supporting Melenchon’s presidential candidacy in 2017, as it did in 2012. A 
scenario that has been verified and has brought the PCF in a rather unique subaltern 
position especially with regards to its stance towards the EU.  
 Following this brief analysis of the relationship between the two parties, a brief 
analysis of the first programmatic contributions to the PG’s electoral programme for 
the presidential elections will attempt to shed light in the divergences between the PG 
and the PCF. The document under analysis here is divided in 7 main policy axes. The 
most important for the present thesis is the 4th axis entitled ‘exiting the European 
treaties’ and is involves two alternative plans to achieve this objective. The document, 
indeed, states its willingness to put an end to the “‘illusion’ of being able to change 
the EU, something that requires 28 simultaneous progressive governments, which are 
currently perceived as improbable or practically unfeasible” (Mélenchon, 2016, p. 5). 
Thus, the programme enunciates two alternative plans according for a European 
radical left government. The first one, named plan A, involves a programme of 
negotiation with the European institutions in multiple stages (Mélenchon, 2016, p. 5).  
 The first stage relates to the redeeming of the sovereign debt by the central bank, to 
end the pressures on the economy, alongside the change of the role of the ECB so as 
to direct its focus on developing full employment and establish the direct financing of 
the Member States (Mélenchon, 2016, p. 5). The second stage would see the end of 
the European control over the Member States’ budgets so that the peoples could decide 
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on their own the way in which the taxes and social contributions would be employed 
(Mélenchon, 2016, p. 5). The third one involves the transformation of the euro from 
being a single currency to a shared currency, to give the possibility to the Member 
States to regain some space for financial manoeuvring (Mélenchon, 2016, p. 5). The 
creation, thus, of this complementary national currency would concern exclusively the 
French productive process and will not be subject to the financial markets’ 
speculations, while the euro will remain the currency for international trades 
(Mélenchon, 2016, p. 5). The fourth stage would aim on establishing the fiscal and 
salary harmonisation in Europe, to end the practices of social dumping, alongside the 
struggle against finance, seen as means to creating space for manoeuvre for the 
Member States (Mélenchon, 2016, p. 5). Indeed, the document here states that it is 
impossible to guarantee an economic union and subsequently the free circulation of 
capitals amongst countries that maintain their status as tax havens, such as 
Luxembourg and the city of London (Mélenchon, 2016, p. 5). The fifth stage regards 
the struggle against tax havens and the restrain of capital movements, as the failure to 
regulate economic fluxes prevents the state to have any control over the national 
economy (Mélenchon, 2016, p. 5). The sixth stage aims at protecting the public 
services and the agricultural production from the financial markets and the big 
corporations respectively (Mélenchon, 2016, p. 5). The final one would focus on the 
firm opposition of France on the Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA), so as to 
protect consumer rights, as well as maintaining transparent decision making at a 
European level (Mélenchon, 2016, p. 5). Thus, this multistage negotiation would relate 
to the open questioning of the European treaties. The PG argues that by default an opt-
out for France and the other Member States that share its policy proposals is 
indispensable. To be able to achieve such a deal with the European institutions and 
not face the dilemma that the Syriza-led government faced in July 2015, the document 
argues in favour of a detailed plan B, which it should not hesitate to apply in case the 
European institutions demonstrate their authoritarianism.  
 Indeed, the document under analysis here presents a plan B that includes three stages. 
Firstly, the document calls for an exit from the EU and the Eurozone, accompanied by 
the nationalisation of the banking sector (Mélenchon, 2016, p. 5). Secondly, the 
document proposes the partial or complete restructure of the debt according to the 
international legal theory of odious debt, considering the situation of economic and 
social urgency (Mélenchon, 2016, p. 5). Thirdly, the document enunciates France as 
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taking a primary role in a struggle, from the outside, to re-found the European project 
that would be based on a new type of European cooperation based on democratic and 
not exclusively monetary principles (Mélenchon, 2016, p. 5). This analysis, thus, 
could be argued to be in quasi-complete antithesis with the PCF’s majority, while 
presenting a high degree of convergence with the minoritarian factions of the PCF, as 
suggested in the previous part, as well as with several minoritarian factions of most of 
the party’s European allies inside the EL. The fact that the PCF finally opted to support 
Melenchon’s candidacy despite these key differences leads us to argue that the PCF is 
currently facing a very important dilemma.  
 
Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste 
 
 As mentioned in the previous part the NPA was created in 2009 from the LCR, as a 
response to the growing need for further unity amongst the French anti-capitalist left. 
We could also see this move as LCR’s response to the creation of the FG. To be able 
to reach some conclusions as to the effect that the NPA could have had on the PCF’s 
stance towards the EU, the present part will present a brief analysis of the party’s 
founding principles and will focus primarily on the NPA’s stance towards the EU. The 
NPA’s document is divided in four parts and presents the characteristics of a Marxist 
analysis heavily influenced by Trotskyist ideological and tactical/strategical 
principles.  
 The first part treats capitalism and its crisis that is, according to the NPA, posing a 
vital threat to humanity as well as the planet. Indeed, the NPA finds that the 
globalisation, characterised by an offensive launched by the dominant classes against 
the workers, to maximise profits has led to a profound and structural crisis of the way 
of capitalist production (NPA, 2008, p. 1). Moreover, it argues that the current 
bankruptcy is the logical consequence of a failing system and a direct by-product of 
the contradictions inside the capitalist way of production that has led to massive 
unemployment, precariousness and reduction of salaries (NPA, 2008, p. 2). The same 
logic characterises, for the NPA, the offensive launched by the financial, business, 
banking, and speculative bourgeoisie via the international organisations that defend 
their interests against the working class both at a national and European level (NPA, 
2008, p. 2).  
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 The second part of the document relates to the party’s idea of socialism for the 21st 
Century. It argues that there is no way to transform or modify capitalism in the 
interests of the working class, and consequently presents the notions of socialism and 
eco-socialism as the only way out of the crisis for the working class (NPA, 2008, p. 
3). The NPA’s notion of socialism involves the workers’ control over all aspects of 
the political, economic, and social life (NPA, 2008, p. 3). In addition to this, the NPA 
attempts to distinguish its notion of socialism both from the social-liberal policies of 
the PS, as well as the orthodox communist ones that the NPA accuses of being “[…] 
bureaucratic dictatorships that have usurped the [socialist/communist] name and have 
created further exploitation and oppression […]” (NPA, 2008, p. 4). Finally, it adds 
the necessary internationalist element of socialism, which would bring about the end 
France’s neo-colonial relationship with parts of the developing world (NPA, 2008, p. 
4).  
 The third part relates to the institutional changes that the NPA believes necessary both 
at a national and at a European level. With regards to the national level, the NPA 
argues in favour of a complete rupture with the antidemocratic institutions of the 
French Fifth Republic and to the interconnected policies that criminalise social 
resistance  (NPA, 2008, p. 6). With regards to the European one, the NPA states that 
there is a great need for a complete rupture with the current EU. In its place, another 
Europe completely free from the current EU’s institutions would pose as a primary 
objective the satisfaction of the social needs of the European peoples and the radical 
change of the relationship between the European North and South (NPA, 2008, p. 6). 
Indeed, the struggle of the NPA against the international institutions that are defending 
capitalist interests, such as the EU, the IMF, NATO and so forth, constitutes the most 
important one, given that the capitalist classes have managed to create a web that has 
rendered any resistance from the working class increasingly hard (NPA, 2008, p. 7). 
The document’s final part provides with a sharp critique of the ‘institutional left’ as 
the NPA characterises the PS, the PCF, and the Greens [Les Verts]. Indeed, the NPA 
finds that those parties have abandoned any revolutionary and socialist perspective. In 
respect to the PCF, the NPA argues that it is increasingly becoming a political satellite 
of the PS. In addition to this, the NPA finds that despite the crisis and its destructive 
effects on the French working class, the PCF refuses to propose a rupture with the 
capitalist system and is thus unable to provide any viable alternatives to the people 
(NPA, 2008, p. 7). Nevertheless, the NPA finds that there are plenty of people inside 
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the parties of the ‘institutional left’ that are dissatisfied with their policies and overall 
stance. Thus, the party finds that there is a considerable political void that the NPA 
thus aims to fill.  
 The analysis of the NPA’s document proves the existence of an alternative anti-
capitalist political force that is openly questioning the country’s EU membership. 
Despite being electorally minimal, the presence of the NPA inside the French party 
system, as well as its presence inside the social movements, could be argued to apply, 
to some extent, political pressure over the PCF and its factions. Especially with regards 
to the some of the PCF’s minoritarian factions, except for the orthodox one, the open 
questioning of the feasibility of reforming the European edifice could constitute one 
more reason for the change of the internal balance of power.  
 
Conclusion – Communist Dilemma 
 
 To apply the theoretical lens of the communist dilemma to the patterns of party 
competition, we could reach several important conclusions. As mentioned in the 
introductory part of the present thesis, the issue here relates to the party’s profile on 
European integration and its interaction with their propaganda against or in favour of 
the other indigenous political forces. This could, according to the present thesis, 
highlight both how such moderation, or lack thereof, manifests itself in the context of 
domestic party competition, as well as whether electoral opportunities or changes in 
overall strategy are the main driving factors of change on the issue. Subsequently, as 
Charalambous (2013) summarizes, the analysis of a party’s approach towards other 
parties’ policies can be outlined by the following questions: 
a. Have a party’s main opponents or electoral strategy changed, 
thus explaining attitudinal or salience changes in its profile on 
the issue of European integration? 
b. Through their general views on European integration and EU-
related matters, do communist parties differentiate themselves 
from other left or non-left actors and, if so, how they achieve 
this? 
(Charalambous, 2013, p. 46) 
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 Consequently, three possibilities can be assumed in respect to the parties’ responses. 
The first one views the parties projecting EU-related matters in their public discourse 
or emphasize them in a way that highlights that they have become more moderate than 
before. The second possibility views the parties as utilising the same mechanisms to 
present themselves as more radical in a way that they move more closely towards their 
ideological identity. The third one views the parties as utilising the same mechanisms 
in their effort to reconfirm their existing ideological profile. Following the analysis of 
the party competition factor, we could attempt to respond to the questions. With 
regards to the first one, we could argue that there has been a rather substantial change 
particularly in relation to the stance of the PG towards the EU, which went from that 
of a radical and constructive critique to a -Euro-rejectionist one. With regards to the 
NPA, we could argue that there has been no change as the party has always been 
rejecting the EU in its current form and has for a long time argued in favour of France’s 
exit from the EU. In respect to the second question, we could argue that the second 
argument can be verified. Indeed, it would appear as if the PCF in its attempt to address 
the changes taking place inside the French radical left family, amongst the other events 
affecting the European left, chose to place more emphasis on its sharp critique towards 
the EU; a critique that nevertheless has not led the party’s leadership to contemplate 
an in-extremis exit from the EU. Something that could change possibly, especially 
given the PCF’s support to Melenchon’s candidacy.  
  
g. Transnational Links 
 
The framework’s next conditioning factor involves the PCF’s transnational links. As 
mentioned in the introductory part of the present thesis, the need for a more coherent 
political formation of the radical left at a European level was addressed in 2004. This 
was when several RLPs, with the PCF holding a primary role in the process, gave birth 
the first radical left Europarty that is currently led by PCF’s secretary Pierre Laurent 
(EL, 2013). The following analysis will involve the EL’s major political positions and 
the degree of coherence between the EL and the PCF. To be able to assess said 
convergence, the analysis of the EL’s political theses as approved by the party’s 2nd 
Congress held in November 2007 is necessary. Furthermore, the agenda for a social 
Europe as approved by the party’s 3rd Congress in December 2010 presents us with 
the necessary post-crisis perspective. Finally, the political decision of the Europarty’s 
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4th Congress held in Madrid in 2013 will present us with EL’s analysis as the crisis 
inside the European edifice was deepening.  
 EL’s political theses present a high degree of coherence both in terms of ideological 
positions as well as programmatic ones with the ones professed with the PCF. Indeed, 
EL’s political document commences with the following aphorism, “the contradiction 
between capitalism and the emancipation of the individual, armament and war, climate 
change and environmental disasters, and the privatisation of all spheres of life lead us 
to ask once again ‘socialism or barbarism’? (EL, 2007, p. 1). This reference to 
Friedrich Engels’ famous motto is the exact same that we came across in the PCF’s 
political decisions. Following this opening statement, the EL draws a very negative 
picture of the current nature of the European edifice. Indeed, the party considers that 
the increasing neoliberal influence in the Union’s institutions have altered the model 
into an “undemocratic, neoliberal, patriarchal and militaristic model of the European 
construction” (EL, 2007, p. 5).  
 The party’s alternative vision of Europe is presented as the complete antithesis of the 
current one. Indeed, the EL proposes an alternative to the current EU structure based 
on the principles of welfare and labour rights. In addition to this, the importance of the 
public nature of the most important social services is highlighted. Moreover, the EL 
stresses the importance of ecology and sustainable development as opposed to the 
global capitalism’s intensification of the ecological crisis (EL, 2007, pp. 13-17). For 
their professed vision of Europe to be achieved the party believes that “a deep 
democratic reconstruction of the European institutions is an indispensable component 
of our whole strategy. In this field the European Left Party, and our large social and 
political alliance, take the historical responsibility to change the political balance and 
the political orientations in Europe” (EL, 2007, p. 18). Because of the above, we could 
argue that the major ideological positions of the EL echo the PCF’s ideological pillars 
of ecology, feminism, as well as of a peaceful and democratic path towards socialism. 
 In the EL’s ‘Agenda for a Social Europe’, we come across a document heavily 
influenced by the financial crisis, which was very much deepened inside the Eurozone. 
The party finds that the troika comprised of the EC, ECB, and IMF has imposed 
several unacceptable sacrifices to the peoples of Europe. As a result, the EL views the 
current crisis as posing a risk of “economic collapse, massive exacerbation of poverty 
and precariousness, and the destruction of the social model and European civilisation 
itself” (EL, 2010, p. 1). To avoid such destructive consequences, the EL believes that 
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the EU should bring about a radical change in its policies switching from the “logic of 
profit into the new logic of human development” (EL, 2010, p. 2). Moreover, the crisis 
is considered to have been influenced by the Union’s democratic deficit, which needs 
to be addressed. In terms of actual measures to tackle the effects of the crisis, the EL 
proposes the regulation of the banking sector under social ownership and its 
consequent democratic control (EL, 2010, p. 8). In addition to that, the EL calls for 
the annulation of a significant part of the affected countries’ sovereign debt, as well 
as for a European wide minimum income for the unemployed, shorter working hours, 
and a European wide minimum wage (EL, 2010, pp. 8-12). With regards to the party’s 
alternative vision, the EL reinstates its firm belief in “radically different world, 
democracy, peace and socialism […] we aspire to a world of freedom, justice, and 
equality, without repression, exploitation, wars, hunger or need” (EL, 2010, p. 16). 
 The party’s political document is heavily influenced by the deepening European 
crisis, which is characterised as the “worst crisis in its history since the Thirties and 
the Second World War” (EL, 2013, p. 1). Indeed, the EL opens its political document 
with a frontal attack to the European status quo, “according to the promises of the 
forces that dominate Europe, the European project was to be one of peace and social 
progress; it is now being transformed into a nightmare where the only horizon offered 
to the peoples of Europe is one of brutal and generalised social regression. Europe as 
a whole has been thrust into this turmoil by the crisis of the financialised capitalist 
system, the social and ecological consequences of which have hit humanity and the 
planet with unprecedented violence, as well as by the crisis of a model of the European 
Union that has cast in an ultraliberal mould, under the supervision of the financial 
markets” (EL, 2013, p. 1). The EL reinstates its view of the crisis as an existential 
threat, and adds that the devastating effects that the crisis has had on most countries’ 
economy and society could bring about the re-emergence of nationalisms and 
xenophobia. In such dark times, the EL finds that it is its historical role to create a 
“new European project, one which is based on the interests of the peoples and respect 
for their sovereignty, to restore a sense of meaning to European integration” (EL, 
2013, p. 3).  
 The EL places even more salience on the importance of the neoliberal political forces’ 
role in shaping an EU based on market deregulation and decreasing social welfare. 
The party notes that these forces are to be blamed not only for the degree that the 
global financial crisis has influenced the European economy, but also for the inability 
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of the EU to present a sustainable solution to the deepening of the crisis. Moreover, 
the party argues that the crisis has provided with “an opportunity to speed up a brutal 
process of structural adjustments” (EL, 2013, p. 5). Against this process, the EL 
proposes several measures, which could help in the shaping of a novel European 
edifice. The measures that the party proposed are divided in four pillars. The first one 
relates to employment, social, ecological, and solidarity development. The second 
relates to the emancipation of the European economy from the financial markets. The 
third one involves the respect for popular sovereignty and democratic development. 
The fourth and final one regards peace and cooperation among peoples. The final part 
of this chapter will deal with the specific programmatic position of the EL to compare 
them with the PCF’s positions as present in the 2012 electoral programme.   
 To apply the theoretical lens of the communist dilemma to the PCF’s transnational 
affiliations we could reach the following conclusion. The PCF has been steadily 
emphasizing its membership in the EL, whilst its current national secretary is the 
president of the EL. The fact that despite its limited national vote share the PCF is 
regarded as an important member of the EL and is, constitutes proof of the PCF’s 
importance for the EL and vice versa. Moreover, the PCF has chosen to actively 
support Syriza’s electoral campaign throughout the 2015 legislative elections. Indeed, 
high ranking officials of the PCF were constantly amongst the EL emissaries in Greece 
and have been taken the stage in Syriza’s political rallies, demonstrating their 
solidarity with the Greek party, appearing in Syriza’s rallies and displaying their 
support even, during, and after Syriza’s capitulation in July 201586. Therefore, we 
could argue that the third argument formulated in previous chapter can be verified. It 
appears, thus, as if the PCF chose to place more salience to its European affiliations 
so it can reconfirm and establish further its existing ideological profile as a European 
force of the radical left, even if its Europeanism is quite distinct and unique in terms 
of the importance placed on national sovereignty.  
 In comparing the analyses of the two parties, we could argue that there is high 
convergence amongst their analyses. The Union’s current state is found by both the 
EL and the PCF to have reached an unprecedented low. Both parties find that the 
European neoliberal political forces are to be blamed for the Union’s state. The 
                                                
86 Indeed, the PCF’s stance towards Syriza has been the least critical one amongst the parties under 
analysis here. 
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peaceful and democratic path to socialism remains a constant ideological pillar that 
can be traced back to the Eurocommunist era and appears to apply to both to the PCF 
and the EL. The importance of the EL regarding PCF’s stance vis-à-vis the EU is of 
major significance. The existence of a Europarty is per se a significant theoretical 
advantage in the PCF’s discourse, as it renders PCF’s goals much more politically 
achievable and realistic. The EL, thus, constitutes the PFC’s response when faced with 
the issue of creating pan-European alliances to promote the European solutions 
dictated by the party’s unique left Europeanism. Indeed, given the PCF’s view of the 
European project as a step towards the transcendence of the national divisions of the 
working class, the EL provides the necessary vehicle for the necessary changes. We 
could, thus, conclude that the EL has played and continues to play a pivotal role in 
shaping the PCF’s stance towards the EU.  
 
h. European Integration 
 
The integration process constitutes the last conditioning factor. To be able to 
efficiently understand the PCF’s overall response to the process, a comparative 
analysis of the above-mentioned factors is deemed necessary. This will arguably 
enable the present thesis to reach some final conclusions as to the party’s overall stance 
vis-à-vis the EU over the period under study here.  
 Given the PCF’s distinct ideological heritage, its stance towards the integration 
process has been critical but constructive throughout the party’s history. The party, on 
one hand, heavily criticizes the neoliberal leitmotif of the process. On the other hand, 
it supports France’s permanence inside the EU, while actively seeking its refoundation 
according to the party’s socialist standards from within, with plain respect of the rights 
of every state to maintain complete control over the degree and means of integration 
and interconnected loss of sovereignty within the EU. For the PCF, as well as for the 
rest of the parties analysed by the present thesis, the peaceful and democratic path 
towards socialism can only be achieved through permanent struggle both at a national 
as well as at a European level. Thus, PCF’s distinct left Europeanism renders the 
party’s responsive mechanism much easier to operate than communist parties of the 
Eastern tradition. Indeed, the devastating effects of the crisis have arguably solidified 
the PCF’s criticism towards the neoliberal structure of the European edifice. Even 
though the party’s criticisms appeared to have been to an extent verified by the 
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financial crisis, the high degree of fragmentation amongst left-wing forces has created 
a party system in which the PCF has encountered significant difficulties in gaining 
momentum from an electoral point of view. With regards to the third unit of analysis, 
the PCF’s internal debate appears to have played an important role in maintaining a 
balance between those factions of the party that reached more radical, in the sense of 
anti-EU sentiments, following the events in Greece and the party’s leadership, whose 
core ideological position has remained unaltered in its essence, even if they appear 
rhetorically harsher. Indeed, the internal balance of the PCF can be seen as a 
mimicking the state of the French left. The European question has taken a primary role 
in the party’s internal debate, especially after Syriza’s capitulation that has led a small 
part of the PCF and the French radical left as a whole to an almost EU-rejectionist 
stance.  
 Considering the above, we could plausibly suggest that the PCF, as most RLPs, faced 
and continues to face dilemmas. The party’s Europeanism rendered its response to the 
dilemma less difficult than RLPs of the Eastern Communist movement. The 
devastating effects that the financial crisis has had on the outlook of the French 
economy and society solidified even more PCF’s critical stance vis-à-vis the 
integration process. Since the re-emergence of the massive fragmentation inside the 
French radical left and the continued electoral demises, the process of European 
integration can be argued to have played an important role. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the creation of the EL has presented the PCF with a landmark that 
could promote the party’s presence at a European level and has operated as a vehicle 
of cooperation that has led the party to follow the trends inside the European radical 
left87. Nevertheless, the capitulation of Syriza in 2015 and the events that followed 
served as a catalyst for the split of the FG and the pact between the PCF and the PG. 
Overall, we could argue that the party throughout the period under study has, to an 
extent, remained faithful to the vision of the Europe of the peoples, regardless of the 
significant changes that the European integration process has underwent in recent 
years. A final point could be made with regards to the party’s convergence with the 
majority of French society. Something that leads to the question of why the party has 
                                                
87 For instance, we could argue that the creation of the FG follows a certain pattern inside the European 
radical left that sees the creation of large coalitions of small political forces alongside one or more of 
the traditional left. Something that is common in all four countries under analysis in the present thesis.  
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remained electorally unsuccessful. A question that the final comparative part that will 
serve as a conclusion to the thesis will aim to respond to.  
  
 
i. Programmatic Policies; the PCF and the EL under the Lens of the 
Communist Dilemma 
 
As suggested in the previous chapter of the present thesis, the theoretical lens of the 
communist dilemma will be applied to three areas of investigation. The first one relates 
to party competition, the second involves the party’s transnational affiliations. The 
third and final one relates to the party’s programmatic policies. For the needs of this 
area of investigation, the present thesis will examine the degree of convergence or lack 
thereof between the party’s political documents, as examined above, and the party’s 
detailed political positions in the field of EU-related issues. Moreover, the present 
thesis views that several useful conclusions could be reached if we were to provide 
with a comparative analysis of the PCF and EL’s proposed policies. Given that the 
PCF has not stood on its own in any election during the last years, the comparison will 
be made between the policies proposed by the FG electoral coalition and its political 
programme ‘the Human first’ and those proposed by the EL during its congress in 
2013.  
 To be able to compare the policies of the PCF to the ones proposed by the EL, the 
present thesis will analyse the Europarty’s programmatic positions, as published 
during its latest congress. Indeed, EL’s political decision concludes by proposing four 
policy pillars sought to address the devastating effects that the crisis has had on the 
European project. The first pillar relates to employment, social, ecological and 
solidarity development. Defending and developing the public-sector features amongst 
the proposed policies of the EL, alongside the launching of new employment 
programmes sought to tackle unemployment. In addition to this, the EL proposes the 
restoration of minimum wages and pensions. Furthermore, the party states that “every 
single country should be able to increase wages and the level of social protection” (EL, 
2013, p. 11). The second pillar regards the emancipation from the financial markets. 
Under this pillar, the EL “advocates the immediate organisation of a European 
convention on public debt, which will decide on the abolition of the biggest part of the 
– unsustainable – public debts of over-indebted countries, along with revised 
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repayment terms, such as a growth-clause” (EL, 2013, p. 12). Following its proposal 
regarding the European sovereign debts, the EL calls for the democratisation of the 
ECB, as well as the creation of a novel European institution, which would have the 
role of promoting public investments. Moreover, the EL proposes several radical 
changes in the European tax system. Such changes would aim at addressing issues of 
social justice in the Union. The third pillar relates to issues of popular sovereignty and 
democratic development. Here, the EL proposes several policies sought to promote 
institutions of participatory democracy at a European level. In addition to this, the EL 
calls for the further development of the European Citizens’ Initiative. The fourth and 
final pillar relates to peace and cooperation among peoples. Here, the EL calls for the 
abolition of the Schengen Treaty, as well as the abolition of FRONTEX. Furthermore, 
it calls for new economic and trade relations with the rest of the world, based on EL’s 
firm belief that “security is built through development” (EL, 2013, p. 13).  
 The policy proposals of the PCF will be analysed as presented during the presidential 
elections of 2012, when the PCF took part in the elections supporting Melenchon’s 
candidacy as part of the wider FG coalition. The programme is divided in several parts 
dedicated to specific policy areas. The one relating to the EU bears the name ‘free 
ourselves from the Lisbon Treaty and create another Europe’. The part commences 
with the argument that the Lisbon Treaty concentrates all the impasses of capitalism 
of the present era. As a result, it calls for opening of a debate over a constitutional 
treaty for the EU that would bring about the necessary changes for the democratisation 
of the Union (Front de Gauche, 2011, p. 26). In addition to that, the coalition finds 
that the Lisbon Treaty is illegitimate given the result of the 2005 referendum on the 
ECT that was rejected by 55% of the French citizenry (Front de Gauche, 2011, p. 26). 
Amongst the institutional changes aiming to democratise the European institutions, 
this new European treaty would limit the powers of the EC in favour not only of the 
EP, but also the national parliaments, whose powers of democratic control and co-
decision would be further enhanced (Front de Gauche, 2011, p. 27).  
 Moving onwards, the document proposes the recasting of the statute and the role of 
the ECB. Indeed, the coalition considers that the ECB is currently thwarting the 
Member States’ exit from the crisis. Its monetary policies that do not consider each 
Eurozone member state’s financial state are seen as posing a threat to the national 
economies, while their founding principles are allowing to the international financial 
forces to speculate on the Member States’ sovereign debts (Front de Gauche, 2011, p. 
 296 
26). This has led to countries, such as Greece, to remain hostages of the international 
speculators. To this end the coalition proposes a refounding of the ECB that would be 
subject to democratic control of the EP and the Member States (Front de Gauche, 
2011, p. 27). This refounding of the ECB would allow it to directly finance Member 
States at no rate, as well as issue its own bonds to the financial markets to promote 
employment, public services, and respond overall to the environmental and human 
needs of the Union (Front de Gauche, 2011, p. 27). In addition to this, the coalition 
proposes the creation of a ‘European fund of social, ecological, and solidarity 
development’ to respond to the need of the peoples and end the European policies of 
‘flexisecurity’ and precariousness (Front de Gauche, 2011, p. 27). Moreover, the 
coalition calls for the rejection of the Euro plus act88 via a popular referendum (Front 
de Gauche, 2011, p. 26).  
 On a similar tone, the coalition calls for fiscal harmonisation across the EU, to thwart 
the process of social dumping amongst the Member States, as well as controls over 
the circulation of capitals, blocking of speculative capitals, further taxation of big 
capital and of financial transactions, the control of the activities of the banking sector, 
and finally the struggle against de-localisations of big business (Front de Gauche, 
2011, p. 27). Moreover, it proposes the creation of a public banking sector that would 
aid the development of a new-type credit (Front de Gauche, 2011, p. 27). Alongside 
fiscal harmonisation, the coalition proposes the harmonisation of social and political 
rights, as well as the instauration of European minimum wage and a process of 
convergence to the highest European level (Front de Gauche, 2011, p. 27). In addition 
to this, the document calls for public services at a European scale that will eventually 
become pillars of the European construction and guaranteed, thus, to every citizen 
(Front de Gauche, 2011, p. 27).  
Finally, the document presents its own version of the fundamental European rights, 
which will favour human dignity and will be effective in the struggle against poverty, 
exclusion, divisions, and discrimination (Front de Gauche, 2011, p. 27). Furthermore, 
it calls for the renegotiation of the Schengen Treaty that would end the policies of 
                                                
88 The Euro plus act and the European stability mechanism were adopted in 2011 and sets budgetary 
objectives to the Member States. The coalition finds that this equates with the complete surrender of 
popular sovereignty in favour of profit. It is seen, thus, as a means of imposition of the neoliberal market 
rules that have already had their destructive effects upon the European citizenry. 
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Europe ‘fortress’ and the interconnected stigmatisation of non-EU immigrants, and 
will establish new policies of international migration and co-development especially 
with the countries of the Mediterranean region (Front de Gauche, 2011, p. 27). The 
final measure proposed by the coalition relates the gender equality seen as 
fundamental value of the re-founded EU (Front de Gauche, 2011, p. 27).  
 In attempting an evaluation of the PCF’s response to the communist dilemma, we 
could argue that the PCF’s positions appear to be rather coherent with the party’s 
political and ideological texts, in regards especially to the core objectives. The policies 
proposed are in complete harmony with the ideological positions of the party, 
especially regarding the European alternatives and the emphasis on the respect of 
popular sovereignty. Thus, the document displays the PCF’s constructive critique 
towards the European edifice and we could subsequently verify that the party has 
chosen ideological consistency over moderation/pragmatism. In relation to the degree 
of harmonisation between the policies proposed by the EL and the PCF, we could 
argue that it appears quite high. The programmatic positions of the two parties appear 
almost identical regarding the democratisation of the ECB, the empowerment of the 
EP, the creation of a fund for development, the creation of a European minimum wage 
and the struggle against the policies of Europe ‘fortress’ amongst others. We could, 
thus, conclude that the EL and the PCF appear to display both a high ideological and 
programmatic convergence.  
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VIII. Syriza; the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left 
 
 
 
1. From KKE-Interior to the Present Day; the History of the Greek Coalition of 
Radical Left 
 
 
 
a. Introduction 
 
 Among the member parties of the EL in Greece, one comes across the Coalition of 
the Radical Left (Syriza). Syriza until the summer of 2013 was a coalition of various 
minor left-wing political formations around the historical party of the Coalition of Left 
and Progress (Synaspismos). The party’s roots could be traced back to the KKE-
Interior and the Greek Left (EA), formations that will be briefly considered during the 
following brief analysis of Syriza’s history. Syriza, indeed, was created in the early 
2000s following the trend amongst the forces of the Radical Left forces in Europe to 
unite into larger coalitions in an attempt to re-establish their political relevance. 
Indeed, Syriza despite struggling for almost a decade to establish itself as a viable 
alternative, managed to capitalise on the devastating effects that the financial effects 
have brought about in the Greek economy, polity, and economy. The historical 
overview could be synthesised in the following manner: 
a. The KKE-Interior era – the birth of Eurocommunism 
b. The era of Synaspismos: towards the new Left 
c. The era of Syriza; the ‘Government of the Left’ 
d. The 2015 Elections and the Government of the Left 
 
b. The KKE-Interior era – the Birth of Eurocommunism 
 
 To trace the party’s origins, we first need to go back to the events of 1968. The 
influence of the so-called May of 1968 on the Greek Communist Party (KKE), as well 
 299 
as the rest of the WECPs as demonstrated in the previous chapters, is arguably rather 
high. Even though by 1968 the military regime had already banned the KKE and 
imprisoned or exiled the majority of its officials, the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia and the subsequent events that took place in Prague had a profound 
effect inside the KKE. Indeed, while the leadership of the KKE opted to remain 
faithful to the line of the CPSU and the International Communist movement, a splinter 
group that opposed the Soviet Union’s action created the party that took the name of 
KKE-Interior. Thus, the newly founded KKE-Interior joined the French, Spanish, and 
Italian Communist Party in what would be later called the movement of 
Eurocommunism. Despite the differences amongst those parties, Dunphy (2004) 
identified five shared points.  
 The first one involved the denunciation of the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia. 
Thus, one of Eurocommunism’s major points related to the assertion of the right to 
independence for the Communist Parties across the continent from the domination of 
the CPSU. The second one related to the path to socialism. Despite several 
divergences,89 we could argue that the parties that partook in the Eurocommunist 
movement accepted, to an extent, the idea that the change will have to accept liberal 
democratic values, such as parliamentary democracy. The Eurocommunist movement, 
thus, presented an alternative to Stalinism and Social Democracy; a third way that saw 
in the process of European integration a possibility of peaceful unification of the 
European working classes. In addition to the acceptance of said rules, the 
Eurocommunist movement accepted several values labelled by the Eastern 
Communist movement as ‘bourgeois’. As a result, freedom of press, multi-party 
democracy, contested elections were amongst values of intrinsic merit to socialism. 
This ideological position received, and continues to receive, heavy criticism by those 
WECPs, which have maintained their orthodox Marxist-Leninist positions. The 
Eurocommunist stance towards the bourgeois state and parliament is widely regarded 
as a clear sign of opportunism. If we were to accept Domenico Losurdo’s (2014) 
distinction between Western Communism and Eastern Communism, we would 
conclude that KKE-Interior by breaking apart with the KKE transformed itself in a 
                                                
89 The main difference involves the PCI’s ‘compromesso storico’, as mentioned in the previous Chapter 
and the PCF’s overall stance. For a more detailed view see, (Dunphy, 2004, pp.24-26). 
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Western Communist Party, while the KKE maintained its Eastern Communist 
identity90.  
 The third one is expressed by the fact that the parties in highly symbolic move 
denunciated human rights violations inside the Eastern bloc. We could argue, thus, 
that this symbolic distancing between them and the Soviet Union, alongside the overall 
critical stance towards the countries of ‘really existing socialism’ rendered them even 
further away from the Eastern Communist Movement. The fourth shared issue related 
to the complete rejection of the Cold War status quo. Indeed, the parties opted not to 
take sides and professed their struggle towards the end of the bipolar system that was 
breeding war and conflicts throughout the world. The final point is the intensification 
of the cooperation amongst the parties of the Eurocommunist movement leading to 
convergence both in terms of tactics and programmatic positions. Indeed, the EC 
constituted for the Eurocommunist parties a field of struggle both in terms of the 
advancement of the working class’ interests, as well as the creation of a third pole 
between the US and the USSR. This significant point arguably constitutes the 
foundation of the parties’ distinct Europeanism. A pan-European political arena 
constituted, according to the Eurocommunists, the ideal arena for the struggle of the 
European peoples towards socialism.   
 Thus, amid those important events commences the history of the political formations 
that led to the current Syriza. Following the restoration of democracy in Greece, the 
KKE-Interior resumed its legal political life and chose to declare its disassociation 
with the Eastern European Movement by abandoning the Leninist principle of 
democratic centralism91. Another highly symbolic move by the KKE-Interior could be 
seen in its name change to Greek Left (E.AR). This symbolic move could be argued 
to follow the overall tactic of the party to address the concern that the creation of the 
PanHellenic Socialist Movement was creating inside the Greek Radical Left. Indeed, 
founded in 1974 PASOK was quickly becoming a mass movement whose position and 
rhetoric vis-à-vis NATO, and the EC were rather critical. Indeed, PASOK’s founding 
                                                
90 For a detailed account of Losurdo’s conceptualization see, Losurdo (2014). 
91 Democratic centralism constitutes a Leninist axiom regarding the internal decision making 
mechanisms of communist parties. According to said principle, the party line was to be discussed 
internally. Once the party organs had voted for a final decision, then this would constitute the party 
line, which would be binding upon all members. 
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declaration read clearly that it would question “[…] international treaties and 
agreements, which have led Greece to an economic, political, and military dependence 
to Western groups of monopolies and especially American imperialism” (PASOK, 
1974). PASOK’s electoral triumph in 1981 constituted an important obstacle to the 
electoral relevance of the EA. Nevertheless, PASOK’s office seeking course led to a 
significant moderation towards its stance towards the EC and NATO and led some of 
its officials to move to the EA and later to Synaspismos. EA was, thus, able to attempt 
to maximise on PASOK’s moderation by appealing to a left-wing electorate that was 
rather critical to the Orthodox Communist identity to the KKE.  
 
c. The Era of Synaspismos; Towards the New Left 
 
 Synaspismos was born in 1988, when KKE and E.AR created a coalition to “make it 
easier for the Left to meet very broad, progressive forces of PASOK’s space” (KKE, 
1988). This is arguably one of the unique moderation periods of the hard-line KKE92. 
This coalition proved to be rather brief and by 1992 Synaspismos was an independent 
political formation bearing the characteristics of most post-Communist parties of the 
early 1990s. The reasons behind this final big split inside the Greek left can be traced 
back to KKE’s 13th Congress held in 1991. Indeed, it was then that the hard-liners led 
by Aleka Papariga managed to secure a close victory (KKE, 1991) . Thus, commenced 
a period of a return to orthodox Marxism-Leninism which would not attempt any more 
openings to the rest of the Radical Left political forces of Greece (Rizospastis, 2005). 
Papariga’s election to the position of KKE’s General Secretary led most of the 
coalition’s renewers to break from KKE and join Synaspismos, which launched as a 
separate political formation in June 1992 under the leadership of Maria Damanaki93. 
During the first elections as an independent party Synaspismos did not manage to 
reach the threshold of 3% by a mere 0.06% and remained without parliamentary 
representation (Synaspismos, 2013a). The negative electoral result led Damanaki to 
resign and the party elected Nikos Konstantopoulos as its new President. The position 
of Synaspismos’ presidency was at the time contested by the future president of Syriza, 
                                                
92 Another coalition that bore similar characteristics took place in 1974, when KKE allied with KKE-
Interior and the Greek Democratic Left (EDA). Thus, they created a formation named United Left. 
93 Damanaki was amongst the prominent ‘renewers’ of KKE that left the party for Synaspismos. 
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Alekos Alavanos, and the Democratic Left’s [Δηµοκρατική Αριστερά] (DIMAR) 
current president, Fotis Kouvelis. The schism that took place in the 1990s between 
KKE and Synaspismos is of great importance in understanding the parties’ dynamics 
inside the Greek political debate. Tensions are still rather high, despite the decades 
passed, and we could argue that the lack of a rapprochement between the forces of the 
Radical Left can be partially explained by the events of the 1990s.  
 Throughout the 1990s, Synaspismos’ vote-share remained low but steady. The party 
managed to secure its best electoral result in the elections for the EP of 1994, when it 
elected 2 MEPs with the overall 6.94% of the vote-share (Synaspismos, 2013a). In 
relation to Synaspismos’ stance vis-à-vis the EU, we could argue that the party 
maintained its core Eurocommunist ideas that were elaborated in the previous 
paragraphs. Synaspismos was amongst the parties of the European Left that voted in 
favour of the Maastricht Treaty in the Greek Parliament and explained its positive vote 
in the following manner, “Synaspismos was founded as a force of the European Left. 
One of the main elements of its new identity is the stable European orientation” 
(Synaspismos, 1992).  
 Despite voting in favour, the party’s Central Committee highlighted the Union’s 
democratic deficit and argued that the party’s commitment to Europeanism aimed at 
the working from within to democratise it (Synaspismos, 1992). The party’s vote in 
favour of the Maastricht Treaty provoked a heated debate in Parliament between 
Synaspismos and KKE. This debate was brought into the surface during the 2010 
crisis, as the KKE’s analysis views the Maastricht Treaty as the root cause of the 
current EU’s reactionary nature (Imerodromos, 2008). Synaspismos’ rationale was 
rendered cleared during its 2nd Congress in 1996 when the party declared that, “we are 
firmly in favour of the path towards a united Europe. Synaspismos considers that the 
interest of the society as well as the nation under all aspects lies with being actively 
and equally present in the process of European Integration. Nonetheless, we are firmly 
against an integration built in the basis of the unregulated powers of the market, of 
capital and of Atlanticism. We are fighting for a united Europe based on democracy, 
social solidarity, cohesion and convergence, peace and safety for everyone […] a 
democratic and federal European Union, based on common foreign and defence 
policy” (Synaspismos, 1996, pp. 11-12).  
 The party celebrated its 3rd Congress in 2000, which re-elected Konstantopoulos in 
the position of the party’s President. During a programmatic Congress held in 2003 
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Synaspismos made a symbolic move that had several tactical and strategical 
connotations. Indeed, the party’s name changed from Coalition of Left and Progress 
to Coalition of the Left of Movements and Ecology. Indeed, the Central Committee 
shortly after the end of the programmatic Congress released a document that shed light 
into the change of the name, as it clearly read that “Synaspismos was founded from 
forces and people originating from all historical currents of the left movement in our 
country: the communist, the socialist, the social democratic, the movement of political 
ecology, as well as forces originating from the struggles for democracy as well as the 
social movements” (Synaspismos, 2003b). Indeed, Synaspismos, quite similarly to the 
rest of the parties under analysis in the present thesis, saw in the movements against 
the new world order followed by the events of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq as a unique 
opportunity of linkage. Indeed, as the party’s Central Committee found that “[we] 
must continue to keep relations of fertile interaction with the wide and multifaceted 
social movements which also mark the beginning of a new era, the movements against 
neoliberal capitalist globalisation, the movements which overwhelm the cities and 
villages of the whole planet defending peace, the movements which highlight the 
character of the contemporary left” (Synaspismos, 2003b). We could argue, thus, that 
the change in the name signified Synaspismos’ turn towards the new social 
movements. The party indeed displayed the same stance vis-à-vis the Greek 
indignados94 movement, which spread throughout Greece on the eve of the financial 
crisis in 2010. 
 
d. The Era of Syriza; The first Step Towards the Government of the Left 
 
In 2003, high ranking members of Synaspismos initiated a series of debates alongside 
minor forces of the Greek Radical Left aiming at the creation of a unifying political 
subject (Mpalafas, 2012). This process led to the creation of Syriza, which was 
launched in January 2004. Indeed, alongside Synaspismos several minor parties, such 
as the Renewing Communist and Ecologic Left (AKOA), the Movement for the 
United in Action Left (KEDA), and the Internationalist Working Left (DEA) were 
united under the banner of Syriza. Despite the attempt to combine the parties’ electoral 
influence, the coalition’s first electoral performance failed the expectation as it only 
                                                
94 For a concise analysis of the indignados movement see, Prentoulis & Thomassen (2014). 
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secured 3.26%, which translated in 6 elected MPs (Ministry Interior, 2004). In addition 
to the arguably negative electoral performance, the fact that only MPs originating from 
Synaspismos were elected led the rest of the political parties inside Syriza to openly 
accuse Synaspismos of dominating the coalition. These issues were, nevertheless, 
addressed during Synaspismos’ 4th Congress that elected Alekos Alavanos as the 
party’s president. Alavanos originated from the party’s Communist faction95 named 
Left Platform (LP). Synaspismos’ new president was an avid supporter of the newly 
founded Syriza and we could, thus, argue that his election was decisive in the 
strengthening of the coalition. Indeed, following Alavanos’ election Syriza became 
the focus of Synaspismos’ attention and was organisationally restructured in a way 
that allowed all member parties to be represented in the coalition’s most important 
organs. Concurrently, Alavanos believed that the party required younger people to 
take control, to be able to reach out to the younger generation of Greek citizens who 
were becoming increasingly apolitical (Mpalafas, 2012). Indeed, Alavanos was 
arguably the person behind Alexis Tsipras’ election as Synaspismos’ president during 
the party’s 5th Congress held in 200896.  
 Thus, commenced the era of dual leadership, which as demonstrated in the previous 
chapters constituted an organisation trend during that time among the European RLPs. 
Tsipras retained the presidency of Synaspismos, while Alavanos the leadership of 
Syriza, especially with regards to its parliamentary group. Nevertheless, the 
relationship between the two leaders became increasingly tense, commencing with 
Syriza’s electoral performance during the elections for the EP of 2009. Even though 
Syriza was polling exceptionally high throughout 2008,97 the coalition only managed 
to secure 4.7% of the vote-share in 2009 (Ministry Interior, 2009). Following the 
increasing tension between the two leaders, Alavanos decided to withdraw his support 
                                                
95 A faction that was predominately made of members that left KKE during the 1990s and that had no 
connection to KKE-Interior and EAR. Other prominent members of the faction are Panayiotis Lafazanis 
and Nikos Xountis. For more on the Left Platform, see Mpelegris (2012).  
96 Several party officials and political commentators would argue that Alavanos imposed Tsipras during 
the Congress. An insight into Tsipras’ election will be presented in the proceeding Leadership part.  
97 Amongst the most important reason behind Syriza’s high polling in 2008, one comes across the events 
that shook Greece following the murder of Alexandros Grigoropoulos, a 16-year-old student, by a 
police officer in December 2008. Following Grigoropoulos’ death, a series of riots took place in Athens 
and the biggest Greek cities leading to extensive destructions and massive violence.  
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from Syriza and Tsipras in the eve of the 2009 general elections (Tsatsis, 2009). 
Following the 2009 elections, Tsipras was elected as an MP and managed, thus, to 
obtain control of Syriza’s parliamentary group. Synaspismos’ 6th Congress was held 
in 2010 amid the socio-economic-political turmoil created by the PASOK 
government’s decision to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the EC, 
the ECB, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The MoU was thought to tackle 
the grave financial issues that were affecting the country and consisted of a series of 
draconian austerity measures that generated massive societal outcry. The 
government’s decision to pursue these policies created further divisions inside 
Synaspismos and led the ‘renewers’ under the leadership of Fotis Kouvelis to break 
out from the party and form an additional political subject on the left of PASOK’s 
space that took the name Democratic Left (DIMAR, 2010).  
 The society’s opposition to the austerity measures imposed by the PASOK 
government was growing and paved the way to Syriza’s surprising emergence as the 
country’s most promising political formation. Indeed, during the general elections of 
May 2012 the Social Democrats of PASOK and the right-wing conservatives of New 
Democracy [Νέα Δηµοκρατία]98 lost more than half of their combined vote-share. 
Indeed, during the elections of May 2012 ND and PASOK combined a 32.03% 
(Ministry Interior, 2012a), compared to an overwhelming 77.39% obtained during the 
general elections of 2009 (Ministry Interior, 2009). Indeed, the political earthquake of 
the May 2012 elections saw Syriza quadrupling its vote-share, which rose to 16.8%, 
and rendered Syriza the second most popular party in Greek politics (Ministry Interior, 
2012a). The elections of May 2012 created a very fragmented parliament, which 
resulted in the inability of the parties’ leaders to form a government. As a result, new 
snap elections took place in June 2012, which saw Syriza’s vote-share grow even 
further, despite losing the election to ND by a mere 3%(Ministry Interior, 2012b) 99.  
 Despite losing the election, Syriza’s impressive electoral performance signified the 
end of the bipolar Greek political system that was for decades dominated by two 
parties. Following the June elections, Syriza was the major opposition force inside the 
                                                
98 These two parties had monopolised the Greek political life ever since the restoration of democracy 
in 1974. 
99 Indeed, Syriza obtained 26.9% second to ND that secured almost 30% of the vote share (Interior, 
2012b).  
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Greek parliament, having secured 71 out of 300 MPs. The party’s alternative political 
proposal that saw a different Europe and an alternative way out of the severe crisis 
was gaining momentum inside the Greek society and especially amongst the lower 
middle classes that for years have been supporting the Social Democrats of PASOK. 
The party’s success also served as a catalyst for the further harmonisation of Syriza’s 
coalition and resulted in its transformation into a unitary party. Indeed, Synaspismos 
decided to dissolve and merge into Syriza a few months before Syriza’s 1st Congress 
held in July 2013 (Synaspismos, 2013b). During Syriza’s 1st Congress, Tsipras 
managed to secure the overwhelming support of the party delegates and was, thus, 
reconfirmed as the party’s president.  
 
e. The 2015 Elections and the Government of the Left 
 
Following the 2012 legislative elections, Syriza was the major opposition inside the 
Greek parliament. The party during its time as the major opposition force sought to 
underline and emphasize on the coalition government’s austerity measures, which 
brought the people to its knees. They utilized their position on the political spotlight 
to gain a larger vote share both from the party’s right as well as the party’s left. The 
growing instability of the coalition government, which was after all made of two long-
standing political opponents, as well as the critical state of the Greek economy 
rendered the possibility of early elections a highly likely scenario. In addition to this, 
the coalition government had to face the upcoming Presidential election in 2015. 
According to the Greek constitution, the President of the Hellenic Republic is elected 
by the Greek parliament in a plenary session. The requested majority during the first 
vote is that of 2/3. In case that the requested majority is not met, a second vote takes 
place five days after the first one. The requested majority is again that of 2/3. In case 
of an unsuccessful outcome during the second vote, a third one takes place five days 
after the second one. The majority requested this time is reduced to 180 votes, to 
facilitate the election. In case of an unsuccessful outcome, the sitting President is 
obliged to call for new legislative elections (Parliament, 2010, pp. 44-45). It will be 
then the newly elected parliament that would have to elect the new President. The 
requested majority is significantly reduced to a simple majority in an attempt to 
facilitate the Presidential election and concurrently avoid the possibility of an 
increased political instability.  
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 Given that the coalition government was supported by no more than a simple majority 
inside the parliament, Syriza pressed on the issue of the upcoming Presidential election 
as early as the autumn of 2014. Concurrently with the decreasing parliamentary 
support, the coalition government was polling low throughout the last months of 
2014100. The issue of democratic legitimisation was brought forward by Syriza’s 
opposition especially with regards to the new agreement with the so-called troika, an 
agreement, allegedly, bringing about new austerity measures101 relating to cuts on 
pensions and wages. The political turmoil in conjunction with the alleged 
unwillingness of the troika to sign a new deal with a highly unstable government, led 
the PM Samaras to call for an early Presidential election-taking place in the 17st of 
December 2014 (Enikos, 2014a). The coalition government arguably tried to apply 
pressure to the increasing number of independent MPs, as well as DIMAR’s MPs to 
aid the government in their attempt to elect a President and manage to stay in office 
for two more years. Nonetheless, the coalition government’s attempt proved 
unsuccessful as even during the third vote the Greek parliament failed to elect a new 
President. As a result, legislative elections were announced immediately for the 25th 
of January 2015.  
 The electoral campaign was very intense and arguably short. Syriza continued to poll 
higher than its major opponents of ND and PASOK combined. The core objective for 
Syriza was, thus, to reach a percentage of the vote share, which would secure them 
with an overall parliamentary majority. Syriza’s campaign was characterised by the 
notion of hope. The electoral slogan read clearly “Hope is coming, Greece moves 
forward, Europe is changing” (Syriza, 2015), a slogan clearly echoing the EL’s motto 
relating to the Greek question. Indeed, the EL’s post-election announcement read that 
“we will create a Greece that advances in a Europe that changes” (EL, 2015). Syriza 
carefully constructed its electoral discourse based on the hope that the party 
represented for significant change both in Greece and inside the EU. This attempt was 
significantly aided by the increasing number of delegations from most the EL’s party-
members that reached the Greek capital on the eve of the elections. During the party’s 
                                                
100 A representative example of the polls during the final months of 2014 can be found here: MRB 
(2014). 
101 A detailed account of the alleged austerity measures of the so-called Hardouvelis’ email can be found 
here: Enikos (2014b). 
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central political rally in Athens, the President of Syriza, Alexis Tsipras, invited the 
leader of Podemos onto the stage. This choice can be seen as an attempt to visually 
reconstruct the domino effect theory. An idea widely utilised by both Syriza and the 
EL. According to this theory, the electoral victory of one of EL’s party-members in 
the national political arena would bring about a series of chain reactions inside the EU. 
Functioning as a political earthquake that could cause a swift change in the balance of 
political powers in Europe. During his brief salutation to the crowd, the leader of 
Podemos used a slogan, which managed to envisage the core of the European left’s 
strategy. ‘Syriza, Podemos, Venceremos’ swiftly became a trend amongst the 
European Left. 
 Syriza’s electoral strategy was successful, as the party managed to win the elections 
and elect 150 MPs102. The party managed to gain an impressive ten per cent of the 
vote-share in comparison to the previous legislative elections in June 2012, reaching 
an overall percentage of 36.34 % (Ministry Interior, 2015a). Technically, Syriza could 
form an autonomous government, as the opposition parties would not be able to 
propose a vote of confidence against the government that requires a minimum of 151 
votes. Nonetheless, the party in an attempt to avoid the political instability that such a 
government could bring about quickly came to an understanding with the right-wing 
populist party of Independent Greeks (ANEL). ANEL is a movement founded by 
former ND MP and Minister Panos Kamenos, who resigned from his seat in parliament 
following the so-called Memorandum era in late 2010. The coalition government 
between these two parties is indeed quite unique, given their gross ideological 
differences. Notwithstanding those differences, their firm opposition to the austerity 
policies unites ANEL and Syriza. Their coalition government was thus created to 
renegotiate the terms of the country’s bailout agreement with the troika. Even so, the 
party’s decision to ally itself with ANEL created some political turmoil inside Syriza, 
especially amongst the members of the LP103. Following the negotiations with ANEL, 
PM Tsipras announced his cabinet comprising of ten ministers with Kamenos himself 
occupying the Ministry of Defence, whilst two more ANEL MPs were nominated as 
undersecretaries.  
                                                
102 The parliamentary majority was thus missed by only one seat in the Greek parliament.  
103 For more details on the LP’s reaction to the majority’s decision to ally with the LP, see the 
subsequent part on party factionalism. 
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 The Syriza-led coalition government sought to initiate the negotiations with the 
country’s European allies immediately. The newly appointed Finance Minister Yanis 
Varoufakis met with his most important European counterparts upon his nomination. 
Concurrently, PM Tsipras visited several European PMs as well as the President of 
the European Commission, Juncker, and President of the European Parliament, 
Schulz.  Despite the initial pleasantries, the country’s European partners heavily 
opposed the majority of the government’s proposed policies vis-à-vis the professed 
end of austerity. Major pressure was thus applied to the Greek economy, and several 
serious dilemmas were posed. Indeed, the current balance of political powers inside 
the EU cannot be seen as favourable towards Syriza’s proposed policies. Despite the 
firm opposition, the Syriza-led government managed to come to an initial 
understanding with its European partners in late February 2015. The understanding 
between the government and the EU caused once again a series of chain reactions 
inside Syriza, as some of the LP’s prominent members heavily criticized the 
agreement and suggested that the EU’s stance clearly suggests that the end of austerity 
cannot be managed inside the Eurozone.  
 Despite the attempts of the Syriza-led government, the negotiations with the troika 
led to a stalemate in June 2015 (Nikolakakis, 2016, p. 7). It was then that the EC issued 
an ultimatum to the Syriza-led government involving a series of austerity measures as 
a conditio sine qua non for the continuation of the support that the ECB was offering 
to the Greek banking system (Nikolakakis, 2016, p. 7). It was on June 28, 2015 that 
PM Tsipras decided to call for a snap referendum that was held in July 5 (Nikolakakis, 
2016, p. 7). The Greek citizenry was, thus, called to decide on whether to accept the 
EC’s ultimatum. During the politically heated week that led to the referendum, Syriza 
called for a ‘No’ vote and gathered thousands of citizens in the pro ‘No’ rally in 
Athens’ Syntagma square (Nikolakakis, 2016, p. 8). There, the EL and most its most 
important member parties were present in active support and solidarity with the Greek 
government and the Greek people (Nikolakakis, 2016, p. 8). The ‘No’ vote managed 
to secure an overwhelming 61.31% and led to a series of events at a European level 
(Ministry Interior, 2015b). The second round of brief negotiations that followed the 
Referendum led to an initial agreement reached after one of the longest Euro Summits 
in the history of the EU on July 11, 2015 (Nikolakakis, 2016, p. 8). The agreement 
reached was seen by Syriza and the rest of the EL as a financial coup d’état, as the EU 
appeared to have threatened Greece with a Grexit from the Eurozone, if the Syriza-led 
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government was not to accept the austerity measures included in the agreement 
(Nikolakakis, 2016, p. 8). While dissatisfaction was growing amongst the Greek 
electorate, Syriza’s LP immediately sought to heavily criticize Tsipras’ decision to 
sign an agreement, which was seen by the LP as a capitulation. The LP’s leadership 
initially stated that it would remain part of Syriza in an attempt to redirect the party to 
its rightful ideological path, but it soon opted for withdrawing from Syriza and form 
an independent political formation bearing the name Popular Unity [Λαϊκή Ενότητα] 
(LAE). Indeed, LAE took part independently from Syriza during the snap elections 
held in September 2015 that verified the primacy of Syriza in Greek politics, despite 
the negative outcome of the government with the troika. Indeed, Syriza managed to 
maintain its electoral influence and elect 145 MPs (Ministry Interior, 2015c) and 
formed another coalition government with the parliamentary support of ANEL. 
Contrary to Syriza’s success, LAE did not manage to reach the threshold for 
parliamentary representation, as it only managed to secure 2.86% of the vote share 
(Ministry Interior, 2015c).  
 
 
Figure 9: Synaspismos’ (until 2004) and Syriza’s electoral performance 1996-2015. 
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2. Syriza’s Stance Towards the EU Over Time 
 
 
a. Introduction 
 
 To assess Syriza’s stance towards the EU, the present thesis will apply the Johansson 
and Raunio (2001) framework alongside Charalambous’ (2013) Communist dilemma. 
The time frame relates, as for the rest of the case studies, to the period following the 
creation of the EL in December 2004 until the elections of late 2015. The framework, 
as mentioned in the third chapter of the thesis, consists of seven conditioning factors, 
and will commence with the analysis of the party’s ideology via the analysis of party 
Congress materials. Given that Syriza became a unitary party in 2013, the Congress 
materials that cover the period from 2004 to 2013 will be based on that of 
Synaspismos’ ones, as Synaspismos constitutes undoubtedly the dominant political 
force inside Syriza.  
 
b. Ideology 
 
 An analysis of Syriza’s Congress materials will aid the present thesis to evaluate 
Syriza’s ideology, as a conditioning factor of the party’s stance vis-à-vis the EU. The 
first one is the political decision of Synaspismos’ 4th Congress. Given that the party’s 
4th Congress refers predominately to the 2003 programmatic Congress’ political 
document, its analysis is deemed necessary. In addition to these documents, the party’s 
political decisions following its 5th and 6th Congresses, held in 2008 and 2010 
respectively, as well as the political decision of the 1st Congress of Unitary Syriza will 
be analysed.  
 As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, Synaspismos’ origins could be 
traced back to the Eurocommunist KKE-Interior104. In the decades that went by 
                                                
104 With the exception of most of the LP’s members who broke with KKE in the 1990s and subsequently 
moved to Synaspismos. Those members’ acceptance of the key notions of Eurocommunism is arguably 
rather low.  
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between the 1970s and the early 2000s several other ideological currents were united 
under the banner of Synaspismos and most importantly under the wide coalition of 
Syriza. We could argue that the common denominator amongst all these different 
strands of radical Left thought is the denial of Stalinism, especially with regards to the 
personality cult and the national ways to Socialism, as well as the critical stance 
towards the Soviet and Eastern European Socialist experiences. Indeed, Synaspismos 
functioned as a melting pot for Maoists, Trotskyists, libertarian socialists, ecologists, 
feminists, and other modern political strands of the new Left (Synaspismos, 2003a, p. 
10). Because of the denunciation of the Stalinist idea of ‘Socialism in one country’, 
Syriza views the EU, despite its shortcomings and deficits, as a platform that could 
bring about a society based on Socialism with freedom and democracy that has a 
necessary pan-European and global dimension (Syriza, 2013e)105.  
 The analysis of the above documents has shown that Synaspismos has not undergone 
any important ideological changes between 2004 and 2015. Indeed, the party’s 
documents present the highest degree of coherence and ideological homogeneity 
despite the inclusion of more political forces inside the party. The following 
paragraphs will present an overview of the most important common denominators and 
reoccurring themes. A further element will be added by the integration of some of 
those theses with works of key left-wing thinkers that have resurfaced following the 
financial crisis of 2008. Indeed, it would appear as if the crisis and its devastating 
effects has signified a new era not only for the RLPs but also for Radical Left thinkers. 
Slavoj Zizek, indeed, argued that the crisis signalled the end of the neo-liberal 
domination, as well as that “our side no longer has to go on apologising; while the 
other side had better start soon” (Zizek, 2009, p. 8). In such a context Synaspismos 
initiated a process that would reconfirm “an all covering alternative political proposal 
for the perspective and the role of Europe in the modern world, in the path to socialism 
with democracy and freedom” (Synaspismos, 2004, p. 2).  
 The acceptance of the Marxist tools of political, economic, and social analysis 
constitutes the party’s key ideological position. The difference, nevertheless, between 
Synaspismos and the KKE or other Orthodox Communist Parties relates to the denial 
of dogmas. As mentioned in the previous section relating to party history, Syriza ever 
                                                
105 This element is a constant ideological key position of Synaspismos and Syriza throughout the period 
of analysis.  
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since the times of KKE-Interior was part of the Western Communist tradition if we 
were to accept the basic premises of Losurdo’s conceptualisation (Losurdo, 2014). 
Marx is the “core, but not the exclusive reference, of the left’s theory. Marx’s work, 
as of course any other human work, could not solve all the problems that social 
movements had and still must face. This is the reason why many ‘Marxisms’ have 
been developed […]” (Synaspismos, 2003a, p. 12). Marx constitutes the ideological 
foundation of the party but the work of modern Marxist and radical thinkers is 
tantamount important. Moreover, the party believes that the importance of those 
modern thinkers is rendered timelier since neoliberal globalisation is “[…] presented 
as the infallible truth by the new unitary thought” (Synaspismos, 2003a, p. 5) 106. 
Indeed, the party notes that “[…] against the internationalised despotic capitalists and 
their armies a new globalisation of social solidarity and ecological responsibility is 
being developed” (Synaspismos, 2003a, p. 9). This alternative globalisation made of 
an increasing number of people that realise the necessity of wealth redistribution, 
having understood the true nature of capitalism, seen as the root cause for humanity’s 
most evils. These new movements constitute for Synaspismos the societal forces that 
will demand the overcoming of the capitalist mode of production and its substitution 
with Socialism with freedom and democracy (Synaspismos, 2004, p. 9). These 
constant ideological points led the unitary Syriza to declare the socialism of the 21st 
Century107 as the party’s strategic objective. An idea completely opposed to the 
dogmatic application of Marxist theory which, according to the party, led to the 
catastrophes of the Eastern bloc and its Socialist experiments (Syriza, 2013e).  
 The most relevant aspect of the party’s ideology is, nevertheless, its distinct Left 
Europeanism. We could argue, thus, that despite the devastating effects of the crisis, 
the party views the transcendence of national borders and national divisions of the 
working classes brought about by the process of European integration as the only 
viable path towards its professed Socialism with freedom and democracy. Here, the 
influence of the creation of the EL in 2004 is of great significance, as it presented the 
                                                
106 Here Synaspismos arguably refers to works such as Fukuyama (1992), which saw in the end of the 
Cold War, the complete and final victory of Capitalism over any alternative system.  
107 A concept arguably influenced also by a debate over the idea of Communism in the 21st Century 
held in London and organised by prominent radical philosopher and political theorists. For more see, 
(Badiou, 2010). 
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party with the necessary vehicle for the creation of a pan-European movement and a 
unified political subject that could about the necessary radical changes to the European 
edifice. The financial crisis and its devastating effects on the Greek economy, society, 
and polity strengthened the party’s Europeanism and resulted in a sharpening of the 
party’s critique towards the EU. Despite such a critique being constant throughout the 
documents approved by the party’s 2003 and 2004 Congresses, subsequent documents 
demonstrate that the party opted to place even more salience on the its critique to the 
EU institutions. Indeed, in 2008 Synaspismos argued that “even if the balance of 
power inside the EU is not favourable to the parties of the European left, we still need 
to keep on fighting for the overthrow of the neoliberal forces” (Synaspismos, 2008, p. 
12). 
 By 2010 the effects of the crisis had already reached Greece and resulted in a decisive 
sharpening of Synaspismos’ critique towards the EU. The political document of the 
party’s 6th Congress held in 2010 demonstrates the party’s conclusions vis-à-vis the 
European management of the crisis and argues that the peoples of Europe should fight 
the neoliberal forces that are posing an existential threat to the European project 
altogether. Indeed, the document involved the utilisation of Marxist tools of analysis 
as it read clearly that “we are amid an international capitalist crisis of which root cause 
is the overaccumulation of capital. In substance a structural systemic crisis, which 
began in 2008 initially in the banking sector and the financial system, and later in 
investments and the reduction of production and influenced as a natural consequence 
the working peoples and their incomes” (Synaspismos, 2010, p. 1). Moreover, the 
party found that the sovereign debt crisis affecting predominately the Member States 
of the Eurozone is a direct consequence of the neoliberal policies pursued ever since 
the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, which is found to have placed the capitalist 
exploitation in the foundation of the European edifice. This led the party to denounce 
its critical support of the Maastricht Treaty during the ratification of Treaty in the 
Greek parliament in 1992 (Synaspismos, 2010, p. 2).  
 Despite the negative conclusions that the party reached vis-à-vis the EU, it argued 
that there can be no real solutions outside the Union. Indeed, the party believes that 
“the alternative solution is the struggle of the peoples of Europe for a change in the 
balance of power in every country as well as the common coordinated struggle for 
another Europe. A democratic and social Europe, free from monetarism and the 
compulsion of capital.” (Synaspismos, 2010, p. 3). Thus, for Synaspismos there are 
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no national solutions, but pan-European ones. For this reason, the party noted that the 
EL should intensify its struggle to unite the European peoples under the banner of an 
alternative exit from the crisis with a socialist outlook.  
 Syriza’s 1st Congress as a unitary party elaborated a political document that displays 
a very high degree continuity with regards to the party’s Europeanism. Indeed, it 
would appear that the worsening of the crisis affecting the EU led Syriza to argue that 
“the reason of existence of a EU in benefit of the peoples is slowly disappearing from 
the horizon. The euro is mainly seen as the vehicle of German policy, widening the 
inequalities between countries as well as the inequalities amongst social classes, while 
Asian patterns are imposed to European societies; patterns, which clearly benefit 
European capital. The future of the EU as well as the Eurozone itself is rendered more 
and more uncertain.  The policies of austerity and recession disintegrate the bonds 
amongst the European states, strengthen Euro scepticism, anti-Europeanism, widens 
the nationalist juxtapositions and render the revival of fascism easier” (Synaspismos, 
2013b, p. 1). This is an argument that was also made by Jürgen Habermas who quite 
similarly argued that after the first bailout packages, “the realization hit home to me 
for the first time that the failure of the European project was a real possibility” 
(Habermas, 2012, p. 102). For Syriza, thus, austerity was not only posing a threat to 
the Greek citizenry but was jeopardising the European project altogether.  
Economists such as Yanis Varoufakis and James K. Galbraith appear to share this 
rather negative view. Indeed, they found that the only viable alternative and solution 
for the European problems was constituted by the left. Thus, their choice to entitle 
their article in the New York Times ‘Only Syriza Can Save Greece’108. Moreover, the 
two economists argued that, “the crisis could take down the Greek government and 
bring the left-wing opposition to power. This wouldn’t be a bad thing for Europe or 
the United States. The policies currently imposed upon Europe’s periphery are 
worsening the crisis, threatening Europe’s integrity, and jeopardizing growth. A Greek 
government that rejects these self-defeating policies will do more help than harm” 
(Galbraith & Varoufakis, 2013, p. 1). According to them, thus, a government of the 
Left in Greece could be the European project’s last hope for a democratic future. 
Indeed, the authors argued that Syriza’s possible electoral victory would lead to a 
series of chain reactions that would lead to more governments of the Left across the 
                                                
108 In the American printed version, the article’s title appeared ‘Only the Left Can Save Greece’. 
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European South. This close cooperation amongst the countries of the South is, thus, 
for the authors a conditio sine qua non for the survival of the European project and the 
successful transition to Socialism with freedom and democracy109.   
 The importance of the theoretical works produced by this increasing number of 
critical thinkers can be envisaged in the fact that Yanis Varoufakis was nominated 
Finance Minister in Syriza’s government and remained in this position for the first six 
months of Syriza’s government of the left. Varoufakis has been a prolific writer and 
became known to the wider public in the years following the severe financial crisis 
that emerged in the aftermath of the 2008 bankruptcy of American financial 
institutions. His economic thought is hugely influenced by Marxist political economy. 
Nevertheless, he cannot be characterised as a Marxist economist110. In recent work, 
Varoufakis et. al. (2013) present a proposal for saving the Eurozone. Said work is 
heavily characterised by the idea of European federalism, which is presented as a 
conditio sine qua non for the correct functioning of the common currency and the 
common market. In Varoufakis’ opinion Eurozone cannot exist without a sovereign 
European legislative that would create the necessary system of checks and balances 
for a democratic EU. In addition to Varoufakis’ nomination, another well-known 
radical academic, Costas Lapavitsas, was elected MP for Syriza in the 2015 elections. 
Lapavitsas’ economic analysis of the Eurozone crisis can be seen as a more orthodox 
Marxist than Varoufakis’. In his most recent work Lapavitsas (2012) presented the 
possibility of default and even an exit from the Eurozone as a possible solution to the 
country’s issues. In fact, we could argue that Lapavitsas’ ideas are closer to the core 
of the LP and resulted in his resignation from Syriza following the schism of August 
2015.  
 In conclusion of Syriza’s ideology as a factor towards the party’s stance vis-à-vis the 
EU we could argue that its ideology is arguably amongst the most influential factors. 
Syriza’s distinct Europeanism links the party to the rest of the parties studied in the 
present thesis and constitutes a direct by-product of its renunciation of Stalinism and 
its critical view of the Eastern Communist movement. Indeed, the party’s 
                                                
109 Alexis Tsipras in an article published in the Spanish newspaper El Pais in May 2013 presented a 
similar argument. For more see,  (Tsipras, 2013). 
110 Varoufakis’ ideological foundation is rendered very clear in his article featured in the Guardian. For 
more see, Varoufakis (2015). 
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Europeanism present ever since the times of KKE-Interior has been strengthened by 
the crisis affecting Greece and the wider EU. Despite the inability of Syriza to change 
on its own the European balance of power, we could argue that its firm belief in the 
European ideal, influenced the party in accepting the accord with the EU in July 2015 
which the party viewed as a necessary compromise. The thesis’ argument is, thus, that, 
contrary to the mainstream opinion, Syriza’s acceptance of the MoU proposed by the 
EU in July 2015 is not an indication of the party’s office seeking strategy but rather a 
demonstration of its core belief in the possibility of working for a different EU from 
within. The analysis will resume with the public opinion factor.  
 
c. Public Opinion 
 
 In attempting to evaluate the importance of public opinion regarding Syriza’s stance 
towards the EU, the present thesis will utilise data published by the EC via the 
Standard Eurobarometers of 2004, 2008, 2012, 2013, and 2014. Moreover, data 
relevant to the crisis affecting the EU will be used as presented in a special 
Eurobarometer in 2012. The data will be initially presented individually, while the end 
of this part will attempt to compare the findings and conclude on the importance of 
public opinion.  
 The data relevant to 2004 present us with an important marker. Indeed, the Greek 
citizenry appears to be the most optimistic towards the short-term future. In total 51% 
declared themselves optimistic, something that renders the Greek citizenry the most 
optimistic in the EU scoring 22 points higher than the EU15 average (EC, 2004d, p. 
14).  
The data relating to the overall opinion that the Greek citizenry held with regards to 
the country’s membership in the EU are of great importance. Indeed, 71% of the Greek 
respondents regarded the country’s membership as something positive. As a result, the 
Greek citizenry occupied the second place after Luxembourg and together with Ireland 
while scoring 23 points over the EU15 average (EC, 2004d, p. 19). It is of importance 
to note that the Greek citizenry’s positive stance had been steadily growing in the 
period from 1999 to 2004. Indeed, in 1999 the positive sentiments towards the EU 
were at 59% (EC, 2004d, p. 20). Moreover, the Greek respondents displayed a high 
level of trust towards the EU. Indeed, 77% of the Greek sample found that the EU’s 
greater involvement in the citizens’ daily life is a positive development (EC, 2004d, 
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p. 28). In addition to this, the EU was found to be the most trustworthy institution for 
the Greek citizenry. Indeed, by scoring 68%, Greece was placed first amongst the 
EU15 and much higher than the EU average of 41% (EC, 2004d, pp. 39-40). The final 
indicator that will be utilised relates to the Greek citizens’ stance towards 
globalisation. Given that Synaspismos heavily criticised the neoliberal globalisation 
and its negative effects on the citizenry, the citizens’ stance towards it is worth noting. 
The data demonstrate that the Greek citizenry held opinions similar to the ones of 
Synaspismos. As a matter of fact, 64% of the interviewees believed that globalisation 
served more big companies instead of medium-small ones, 60% of them found that 
globalisation was threatening employment, and 54% identified globalisation as the 
root cause for environmental issues (EC, 2004d, p. 63). Moreover, only 33% of the 
Greek citizenry believed that globalisation was benefiting Greece, while 28% found 
that the process of globalisation might prove beneficial for their own future (EC, 
2004d, p. 63).  
 The next Eurobarometer of 2008 presents us with a rather different outlook. Indeed, 
the Greek citizenry appeared to have become very much pessimistic vis-à-vis the 
economic, and employment prospect of the country. Indeed, 65% of the interviewees 
were rather negative on the economic prospects; likewise, 66% of the sample were not 
at all positive regarding the employment prospects in of Greece (EC, 2008d, p. 6). 
With regards to the citizens’ trust towards the EU, we witness a relative decline. Thus, 
the percentage of the Greek interviewees fell from 68% in 2004 to 59% in 2008 (EC, 
2008d, p. 15). Despite that decrease, the Greek score was still well above the EU27 
average of 50%. The most important variation in the Greeks’ view of the EU relates 
to their evaluation of the country’s EU membership. Indeed, the Greek citizenry’s 
score was decisively lower than in 2004, 71%, as only 47% of them found that 
Greece’s participation in the EU is positive (EC, 2008d, p. 22). Despite this swift 
change, 73% of the Greek citizenry still regarded the country’s EU membership as 
something beneficial (EC, 2008d, p. 23). Another significant part of the study relates 
to the degree of support towards the euro. Here the Greek citizenry appears rather 
divided as 51% appeared favourable (EC, 2008d, p. 25). Nevertheless, the percentage 
of Greeks against the euro was amongst the highest in the EU (EC, 2008d, p. 25). We 
could argue, thus, that 2008 marks the year when the negative trend in Greek public 
opinion commenced. Despite the increasing negative attitude, the Greek citizenry’s 
evaluation of the EU remained quite high.  
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 The data published in the aftermath of the crisis constitute arguably the most 
important ones, given the devastating effect of the crisis on the country and the role of 
the European institutions in them. The data analysed here include the Eurobarometer 
of 2012, the special report on the crisis, and the Eurobarometer of 2013. The first data 
that should be considered refer to the Greeks’ outlook towards the future. Indeed, we 
could note that the negative trend that commenced in 2008 was continued, as the 2012 
data reveal that 73% of the Greek citizenry appeared pessimistic with regards to their 
financial future and 77% with regards to their prospects of employment (EC, 2012, p. 
1). The most striking marker presented by the 2012 Eurobarometer relates to the trust 
towards the EU, which appears to have reached the surprising low 19% of the citizenry 
(EC, 2012, p. 2). With regards to the crisis, 28% of the Greek interviewees found that 
the EU could tackle the crisis’ effects, while only 29% responded the same in relation 
to the Greek government (EC, 2012, p. 3). As to the crisis-specific questions, 87% of 
the Greek citizenry found that the crisis will lead to a closer cooperation amongst the 
EU Member States, something that places the Greek citizenry slightly above the EU27 
average of 84% (EC, 2012, p. 37). Despite the negative outlook towards the future, 
44% of the Greek interviewees believed that the EU would become stronger as a result 
of the crisis, while the EU27 average was 53% (EC, 2012, p. 37). Another important 
marker is the fact that 59% of the Greek citizenry found that the crisis brought them 
closer to the rest of the European citizens which places Greece much higher than the 
EU27 average of 42% (EC, 2012, p. 37). The last data concern the evaluation of the 
attempts made by the European and national institutions for tackling the effects of the 
crisis. Here, the Greek interviewees demonstrate their profound malaise, as 96% found 
the government’s attempts completely inefficient, while 85% stated the same with 
regards to the European institutions (EC, 2012, p. 19). The markers of the 2012 
Eurobarometer draw a rather catastrophic picture. The Greek citizenry displays their 
discontent towards the Greek and European institutions, as well as their pessimism 
about their prospect A marker that should be highlighted is, nevertheless, the part of 
the Greek citizenry that felt closer to the rest of the European citizens. Given that the 
countries that scored the highest in this marker111 are the ones mostly affected by the 
                                                
111 Indeed, Cyprus, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland scored 67%, 58%, 49%, 47%, 42% respectively 
(EC, 2012, p. 37). 
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financial crisis, this attitude appears to converge with Syriza’s and the EL’s idea of 
solidarity amongst the Member States mostly affected by the financial crisis.  
 The 2013 Eurobarometer demonstrates traces of continuity with regards to the 
negative trends affecting the Greek citizenship. In essence, it reiterates the citizens’ 
pessimistic outlook. Despite the slight decrease in their negativity, 62% of the 
interviewees feel that their financial state will worsen and 68% share this view with 
regards to their employment (EC, 2013d, p. 1). At this point one could argue that the 
dramatic rise in the Greek rate of unemployment could have influenced the citizens’ 
stance. Indeed, unemployment in Greece increased from 15,3% to 26,6% (Eurostat, 
2015).Thus, we can assume that people affected by such severe social and economic 
conditions cannot easily contemplate a worse scenario for their future. As 
demonstrated by other markers, only a small section of the Greek interviewees, 11%, 
demonstrated a positive outlook with regards to their financial and employment 
condition, whereas the rest of the Greek citizens found that their status will remain 
steady (EC, 2013d, p. 1). In addition to these markers, the 2013 Eurobarometer 
provides us data regarding the Greek citizenry’s trust towards the EU which display 
the same negative trend. Indeed, only 19% of the Greek citizens place their trust in the 
EU (EC, 2013d, p. 2). The final data relevant to the present thesis’ focus relate to the 
opinion that the Greek citizens hold regarding the EU’s future. The fact that 82% of 
the Greek interviewees believe that only a stronger cooperation between the Member 
States of the EU could effectively address the issues arising from the crisis, indicate 
that despite the negativity and lack of trust, the majority of the Greek citizenry is not 
rejecting the idea of more Europe (EC, 2013d, p. 26).  
 The data provided by the 2014 Eurobarometer (EC, 2014) confirm the negative trend 
regarding the EU’s future. In fact, according to the latest Eurobarometer, the Greek 
citizenry is the least optimistic vis-à-vis the future of the EU, as 60% of the population 
felt rather pessimistic in that regard. Nevertheless, there was a slight rise in the 
percentage of citizens feeling rather optimistic. Indeed, 38% of the population 
expressed their optimism regarding the future of the EU, compared to a mere 29% in 
the 2013 version of the same survey (EC, 2013). The negative trend is also depicted 
in the citizens’ image of the Union. According to the data available, Greeks are twice 
more likely to view the EU in a rather negative manner than their European 
counterparts. Indeed, 44% of the citizenry views the EU in negative terms, whereas 
the EU average is of 22%. Conversely, a mere 23% of the Greek citizenry views the 
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EU positively; a percentage that constitutes a slight rise when compared to the 2013 
data. This negative trend could be partially explained by the fact that 78% of the Greek 
citizens believe that the EU is responsible for the austerity policies that have been 
affecting most the EU Member States (EC, 2014, p. 2). Another important dimension 
of the Greek public opinion can be found in the data relevant to Greece’s future inside 
the EU. According to the poll data, 54% of the citizenry consider that Greece would 
not have a better future outside the EU, whereas the EU average is of 28.58%. 
Interestingly enough, 40% of the respondents found that Greece would be able to 
create a better future outside the EU. A final indicator of the Greek public opinion 
relates to the trend towards the Eurozone and the common market. The Greek citizenry 
is found to score above the EU average in its positive stance towards the common 
currency, as 63% appear favourable to the euro. At the same time, the Greek citizens 
score lower than the EU average of 36% in relation to their negativity towards the 
common currency. Indeed, the percentage of the Greek citizens with a negative stance 
towards the Euro is 35% and remained stable when compared to the previous year.  
A comparative overview of the markers published by the Eurobarometers leads us to 
argue that the Greek public opinion has upheld its negative outlook vis-à-vis the EU 
in the aftermath of the severe crisis. We could argue that the reason behind such a 
stance is the austerity measures that affected the clear majority of Greek citizens and 
the role that the European institutions, as members of the troika, have played in their 
application. Overall, we could argue that the Greek citizenry appear to hold similar 
views to the ones professed by Syriza with regards to the ways of tackling the crisis, 
as well as with regards to the EU’s future. It is important to note that the solidarity 
demonstrated by the Greek citizens’ response constitutes another convergence with 
the core message of both Syriza and the EL. We could argue, thus, that Syriza’s stance 
towards the EU is to an extent in harmony with the clear majority of the Greek citizens’ 
opinions, particularly in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that the majority of the Greek citizenry believe that the EU is a rather powerful 
and influential actor in global affairs112. As a result, they feel as if the EU provides a 
secure environment for the country’s future. On one hand, this core belief of the Greek 
public opinion creates a solid social basis of support both for the country’s 
                                                
112 According to the Eurobarometer 58% of the Greek citizens feel that the EU influences greatly global 
affairs (EC, 2014, p. 3). 
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membership in the EU, as well as the Eurozone. On the other hand, the heavy critique 
that most citizens direct towards the EU economic policies strengthens Syriza’s 
critical stance towards the current European edifice. This, prima facie, oxymoronic 
stance of the Greek citizens is considered to have influenced greatly Syriza’s internal 
debate. In fact, the country’s membership in the EU and more precisely the Eurozone 
has been open for debate amongst the members of the LP. Nonetheless, the party’s 
majoritarian current has firmly maintained that the Greek society is radicalised to the 
extent of debating such a possibility. The following part will deal precisely with 
Syriza’s internal debate vis-à-vis the EU. 
 
d. Party Factionalism 
 
The framework’s third conditioning factor is related to party’s factionalism. Before 
becoming a unitary party in 2013, Syriza was a rather loose electoral coalition between 
minor political forces of the Greek radical Left that were created during the 1990s. 
Following the 1st Congress, most of Syriza’s founding parties dissolved, as did for 
instance Synaspismos, even though several prominent members opposed this decision 
(Papadimitriou, 2013). Thus, this decision paved the way for a series of heated debates 
during Syriza’s 1st Congress in 2013 (Koroneos, 2013). The analysis of Syriza’s 
factionalism will be carried out by comparing the analyses and political proposals 
promoted by the party’s most relevant faction known as the Left Platform (LP)113 
during the party’s 1st Congress. The LP, indeed, was founded upon the creation of the 
independent Synaspismos in 1992 predominately by former high ranking officials of 
KKE. It is important to note, thus, that those party officials had no direct links to the 
Eurocommunist legacy of the KKE-Interior era, something that could partially explain 
both the faction’s opposition to Synaspismos’ vote in favour of the ratification of 
Maastricht Treaty by the Greek parliament, as well as their decision to leave Syriza in 
August 2015.   
 Indeed, Syriza until July 2013 comprised of several constituent parties, which could 
be categorised in the radical left ones and the more centrist ones. The first category 
includes the Internationalist Workers’ Left (DEA), the Communist Organisation of 
                                                
113 The LP as mentioned in the historical part decided to break away from Syriza in August 2017 
following the party’s accord with the European institutions in July 2017. Nevertheless, the present part 
will attempt to highlight the differences that led to this schism.  
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Greece (KOE), Kokkino [Κόκκινο] (Red), the Movement for the United in action Left 
(KEDA), the Renewing Communist Ecological left (AKOA), the Greek Ecosocialists, 
the Rosa organisation, the Radicals, and Synaspismos.  The second category involves 
the Democratic Social Movement (DIKKI), the Active Citizens with the Left, the 
Union of Democratic Centre, and the Citizens’ Union Rigas (Syriza, 2013a). Before 
its transformation to a unitary party, all constituent member parties were de jure 
represented in the coalition’s Central Committee and its Political Secretariat, 
guaranteeing, thus, a voice to every single party regardless of their electoral influence. 
Syriza’s 1st Congress amended the party’s statutes and subsequently ended the de jure 
representation of all constituent parties, as, theoretically, after July 2013 Syriza had 
no constituent parties to begin with (Syriza, 2013b).  
 The comparative study of the 1st Congress’ political decision and the one brought 
forward by the LP could lead us to the following conclusions. The ideological 
references between the two documents appear very much coherent. Indeed, both the 
LP and the majority faction of Syriza believe that the objective should be the creation 
of a Socialist Europe of the peoples with freedom and democracy. Nonetheless, several 
issues relating to overcoming the crisis and the role of the European institutions and 
the Eurozone must be addressed in order to elaborate such a solution. The party’s final 
political decision seems less radical114 than the one proposed by the LP especially with 
regards to the austerity measures and the question of the debt. The version of the 
majority underlines that, “we need to cancel the memoranda and the implementing 
laws […] To renegotiate the loan treaties and cancel their burdensome conditions, the 
primary fact remains that the question of public debt constitutes a European and not a 
Greek problem strictu sensu. In addition to that, we will never allow our country to 
become a debt colony […] the  objective of the renegotiation is mainly the cancellation 
of the biggest part of the debt whereas the residual should be paid after a certain grace 
period […] as our slogan clearly reads out ‘no sacrifice for the euro’, our first priority 
remains the prevention of the humanitarian disaster and the satisfaction of the social 
needs in the country” (Syriza, 2013f, p. 1).  
                                                
114 The less radical nature of the final document is a by-product of the comparison between the proposal 
of the LP regarding the debt question and the rectified decision.  
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Apparently, the version proposed by the LP includes a more radical115 plan that did 
not exclude a possible exit from the Eurozone. For the LP, the crisis proved that the 
European institutions cannot be reformed or refounded.  Indeed, they considered that 
to be able to establish a Socialist Europe of the peoples, one needs to overthrow the 
current European status quo, which in its current form resembles the ‘Holy Alliance’ 
aimed this time against the working classes of Europe (Syriza, 2013g, p. 1). With the 
regards to the question of Eurozone, the LP argues that the party should theorise a 
possible exit from it as a last resort. According to LP’s argument, the negotiations with 
the European institutions would pose several dilemmas vis-à-vis Greece’s Eurozone 
membership. A Syriza government that would pressure for the required cancelation of 
the country’s debt promoting the rupture with the policies of austerity would, thus, be 
faced with an ultimatum posed by the European institutions that would attach the 
country’s membership to the Eurozone to the implementation of the austerity 
measures116.  The LP, thus, found that, “such a possibility of exiting the Eurozone, 
which demands a good preparation, in no case constitutes a ‘disaster’ or a national 
isolation. Contrary to that, as long as said exit is part of a progressive plan for rupture 
with the memoranda and the troika and the overthrow of austerity and towards 
socialism, it could constitute besides the temporary difficulties, which it will cause, a 
viable and positive proposal for both the Greek and the European peoples. The 
possible exit from the Eurozone is not part of a different political plan, it does not lead 
to a different programme or different alliances, but on the contrary states our 
decisiveness to implement our programme and our plan of rupture and overthrowing 
in a socialist direction in an unwavering and decisive manner till the end, fully 
understanding what a direct rupture with the Eurozone would bring about as well the 
fact that said rupture demands a full preparation of an alternative plan” (Syriza, 2013g, 
p. 1).  
 Based on the analysis of LP’s documents, we could argue that the faction openly 
questions the party’s Left Europeanism. Indeed, before the party’s 1st Congress, Panos 
                                                
115 Radical in the sense of more critical and decisive towards the countries position inside the EU and 
not in a normative sense.  
116 Similarly to the dilemma faced by the government in Cyprus in 2013. For an overview of the Cyprus 
incident see, (Makriyannis, 2013).  
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Kosmas117 published an article where he openly questioned the party’s Europeanism 
basic assumption. Kosmas (2013) found that the key assumption that views the crisis 
as a European issue that necessarily requires a pan-European solution is flawed. 
Indeed, he argues that “five and a half years of the international capitalist crisis have 
undoubtedly demonstrated that the management of the crisis is competitive: each 
European bourgeoisie, commencing from the weaker ones (Greek, Portuguese etc.) to 
the strongest ones (Italian, German, French etc.), tries to save itself, its profits, and its 
position in the imperialist chain” (Kosmas, 2013, p. 3). Moreover, he states that the 
fact that national bourgeoisies compete inside the EU is what is hampering the process 
of political integration inside the Union. Furthermore, Kosmas (2013) argues that the 
lack of a peaceful way of sequestering the European bourgeoisies leads to the 
conclusion that the only path towards the political integration is the overthrow of 
capitalism at a European level. He concludes, thus, that this can only be achieved by 
creating a chain reaction inside the EU by overthrowing capitalism initially at a 
national level (Kosmas, 2013). A government of the left, thus, would according to 
Kosmas deepen the Socialist reforms of the economy, polity, and society. Kosmas’ 
argument appears coherent with Lenin’s concept of the ‘weakest link of the imperialist 
chain’ and Trotsky’s idea of ‘permanent revolution’118. Finally, Kosmas sharpens his 
critique to the party’s Europeanism by stating that, “the strategy of the left 
Europeanism, which proposes ruptures at a European level, while at a national one 
views a utopian plan of Keynesian consent with the bourgeoisie, twists the dialectics 
of internationalism and constitutes a caricature of internationalism” (Kosmas, 2013, 
p. 9).  
Following the electoral victory of Syriza in the legislative elections held in January 
2015, the LP managed to be represented inside the cabinet. Indeed, the LP’s ‘leader’, 
Panayiotis Lafazanis, was nominated as Minister of Productive Reconstruction, 
Environment, and Energy. Besides Lafazanis, three prominent figures of the LP were 
                                                
117 A prominent member of the LP and a member of Syriza’s Central Committee. 
118 For a concise overview of Lenin’s and Trotsky’s concepts see, (Bloodworth, 2013).  
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appointed to quasi-ministerial positions119. In fact, the number of undersecretaries120 
rose significantly given that PM Tsipras decided to decrease the number of Ministries 
to ten by merging several important Ministries. We could argue that the presence of 
the LP inside the Syriza-led government played a significant role in the hard stance 
that the government presented during the negotiations with the troika that commenced 
in February 2015. Thus, the decision to call the snap referendum in July of the same 
year could be argued to constitute an indication of the LP’s influence on the party’s 
overall stance. Nevertheless, the majority’s decision to accept a similar accord in July 
2015 constituted the breaking point for the members of the LP that left Syriza and 
formed the new party of LAE. We could argue, thus, that the presence of the LP inside 
Synaspismos and Syriza, following the 2013 Congress, had an important effect on the 
party’s stance towards the EU. Indeed, as demonstrated above the LP found several 
flaws to the party’s Europeanism, something rendered very evident when Syriza 
managed to form a government and attempted to apply its alternative plan for the 
country’s exit from the crisis. In conclusion, we could argue that the LP, as the totality 
of the more Communist factions inside all the parties studied in the present thesis, 
constitute an important asset as they tend to balance the parties’ overall stance between 
the Communist Left and Social Democracy. In attempting, thus, a argument we could 
argue that the LP’s breaking away could lead Syriza towards the political centre, 
especially given the quasi-complete disintegration of PASOK.  
  
e. Party Leadership 
 
 The framework’s fourth factor involves the influence of leadership on Syriza’s stance 
vis-à-vis the EU. During the period under analysis, the party’s leadership has 
undergone solely one change. Indeed, Syriza’s actual President replaced Alekos 
Alavanos in 2008. As referred to in the previous section on Syriza’s history, Alavanos’ 
support to Tsipras’ candidacy for the Presidency of Synaspismos was part of his plan 
to revitalise the party. As suggested previously, the two men grew apart and Alavanos 
                                                
119 Those are constituted by Kostas Hsyxos (Vice-Minister of Defense), Nikos Xountis (Vice-Minister 
of European Affairs, Foreign Department), Dimitris Stratoulhs (Vice- Minister of Social Security, 
Ministry of Health and Social Security) 
120 The Greek term can be more accurately translated in vice-ministers, which envisages a rather more 
important role. 
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eventually decided to leave Syriza and found a new political party named Plan B in 
2013 (Iskra, 2013a). The period during Alavanos’ presidency of Synaspismos and 
Syriza is the sole period during which the LP dominated the party’s political 
orientation. Indeed, Alavanos promoted the creation and further strengthening of 
Syriza, seen as a platform that would radicalise Synaspismos via establishing 
interactions with political formations of the Communist Left. Nonetheless, the left 
Europeanism of both Synaspismos and Syriza was left intact during the era of 
Alavanos. Alavanos’ decision to leave Synaspismos and Syriza in 2011 and the 
subsequent launching of Plan B demonstrate the ideological gap between the two 
leaders, especially with regards to the European question. Despite the differences, we 
could argue that the party’s organisational patterns leave no real space for the 
President to dictate the party’s stance121. To be able to assess the ideas of Syriza’s 
leaders, several interviews and opinion pieces will be considered. The focus will be 
placed principally on matters relating to the crisis and the ways of tackling its 
consequences, as these are the points that constitute the major point of contest between 
them.  
 The sharp decline of the Greek economy and the interconnected social discontent 
created by the austerity, led Alavanos to reveal the extent of his ideological unease 
with the EU architecture, an unease that resembles the one demonstrated by the LP, 
which supported his candidacy for the presidency of the party (Mpalafas, 2012). 
Indeed, Alavanos shared the views of LP especially with regards to the evaluation of 
the incidents in Cyprus, where the European institutions imposed austerity despite the 
parliament’s initial rejection of the measures. The events in Cyprus constituted the 
catalyst for his withdrawal from Syriza (Makriyannis, 2013). In one of the first 
interviews given following his resignation from Syriza and creation of the Plan B, he 
argued that, “we made a decision after the events in Cyprus. The Cypriots had 
negotiated with the troika from an apparently strong position: in March 19th, their 
parliament unanimously rejected the position that the finance ministers of the 
Eurogroup had taken three days before. In a week’s time, everything exploded. The 
second decision taken by the Eurogroup quickly became worse than the first one. The 
                                                
121 Indeed, during Syriza’s 1st Congress, the LP had been pressing on the issue that highlighting the 
president’s role should remain low with regards to policy formulation. For a concise view on the issue 
see, (Kouvelakis, 2013).  
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European Central Bank exercised a blackmail in order for Nicosia to accept the 
conditions dictated, threatening to block the liquidation towards the banks of the 
island” (Réveil Communiste, 2013). In reality, Alavanos’ and LP’s conclusions 
regarding the crisis and the country’s Eurozone membership appear identical. The sole 
difference involves the extent of the analyses’ pessimism. Whereas LP notes that 
Syriza must be ready to address the possibility of such a rupture, Alavanos believes 
that, “the [Syriza’s] opinion that the memorandum can be cancelled inside the 
Eurozone has been completely collapsed given the tool in possession of the ECB to 
stop the liquidation in euros” (Iskra, 2013b).  
 Concurrently, Alavanos argued that one could not rule out the possibility of a possible 
exit even from the EU altogether, not only the Eurozone. According to Alavanos the 
reforms required to address the crisis’ effects will mathematically lead to an open 
conflict with the European institutions, which could consequently lead to exiting the 
EU. With regards to such a possibility, Alavanos stated that “unfortunately, there are 
not enough studies on a possible exit of Greece from the Union. There are numerous 
complex aspects” (Réveil Communiste, 2013). The main point of contention, thus, 
between Alavanos and Tsipras is the acknowledgement of a possibility of exiting both 
the EU and the Eurozone.  
 Tsipras’ view is quite different from the one expressed by Alavanos. In line with the 
majority of the party, Tsipras argues that the present critical state of the EU requires 
the instant and joint action of the EL in defence of the European project. The totality 
of Tsipras’ public interventions and interviews display the distinct Europeanism that 
is present in the party’s discourse. An article written for the Spanish newspaper El 
Pais, indicative of Tsipras’ vision, will serve to substantiate the thesis’ argument. 
Indeed, Tsipras states that the economic, social, and political circumstance of the 
Greek state has reached an unprecedented critical juncture, which is only comparable 
to the immediate aftermath of the Second World War (Tsipras, 2013). Tsipras argues 
that despite Greece being the Member State most heavily affected by the crisis, its 
state is not unique. According to Tsipras, the problem is significantly “[…] wider: the 
realisation of the efforts by a dogmatic political and economic elite that wants to 
overcome the endogenous institutional and economical disequilibrium of the 
Economic and Monetary Union by reducing unilaterally the wages and the quality of 
life of the Southern European countries. Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Italy face, to a 
certain extent, austerity policies equivalent to the ones in Greece, with similar 
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disastrous results” (Tsipras, 2013, p. 1). As regards the path towards overcoming the 
crisis, Tsipras reiterates that the sole way is “[…] cooperation, democracy and, above 
all, the political and ideological defeat of the austerity doctrine” (Tsipras, 2013, p. 2). 
Such a plan called for the European Left forces, especially the ones on the European 
South, to establish additional collaboration so as to promote the required “[…] reforms 
which will establish democracy and cooperation in Europe” (Tsipras, 2013, p. 2).  
 In attempting a comparative conclusion of the above mentioned views, we could 
argue that the two leaders’ conclusions vis-à-vis the EU in the post-crisis environment 
are diverging to a great extent. Indeed, it would appear as if the crisis highlighted the 
gap between Alavanos and Tsipras in a rather emphatic way. Even though leadership 
plays a much less important role in RLPs than mainstream parties, the significance of 
the role of the party leader should not be underestimated. Tsipras’ role, especially after 
being elected PM has been arguably strengthened and has solidified the domination of 
the Europeanist faction even before the schism of August 2015, which led to the 
secession of most members of the LP from Syriza. Thus, we could argue that 
Alavanos’ decision to step down in 2011 played a very important role in Syriza’s 
stance towards the EU.   
   
f. Party Competition 
 
 Syriza is currently competing in a political arena that has gone through a complete 
restructuring following the end of the bipolar era dominated by the centre-right ND 
and the Social Democrats of PASOK. The Greek Left, particularly following the 
disintegration of the USSR, remained divided in a vast number of major and minor 
political subjects. Synaspismos and KKE constituted historically the two main pillars 
of the Greek Left. While KKE has maintained historically a stable and significant 
electoral performance that allowed the party to achieve a steady parliamentary 
representation throughout its history,122 Synaspismos and Syriza, after 2004, has been 
constantly struggling to reach the threshold of 3% that would allow it to be represented 
in the Greek parliament. The financial crisis along with the imposition of the austerity 
policies provoked a political earthquake that put an end to the three decades of the 
bipolar era of Greek politics.  
                                                
122 With the exception of the periods that KKE was declared illegal.  
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 In order to evaluate the importance of party competition vis-à-vis Syriza’s stance 
towards the EU, an examination of Syriza’s major political opponents will be carried 
out. Firstly, we come across Syriza’s traditional competitor, KKE. Secondly, we come 
across the Social Democrats of DIMAR. KKE’s stable position of rejection of the EU 
is completely opposed to Syriza’s, while DIMAR’s view appears to be significantly 
convergent to the one demonstrated by Syriza. Indeed, DIMAR’s decision to partake 
in the ND-led government following the elections of June 2012 attests to the party’s 
tactical and ideological flexibility when faced with the scenario of the country’s 
withdrawal from the EU (DIMAR, 2013).  
 Indeed, DIMAR clearly stated that its core opinion with regards to the European 
question is that, “the country must remain in the Eurozone. Any discussion regarding 
the possible exit from the euro […] equates with disaster. The change of policies, the 
support of euro and the economic and political unification of Europe constitute the 
basic terms for the country’s future” (DIMAR, 2011). In that way DIMAR 
demonstrated, is not conceptualising a possible exit from the Common Currency, not 
even as a remote last instance possibility. With regards to the party’s key political 
theses, DIMAR’s conceptualisation of the crisis seems convergent to Syriza’s 
Europeanist majority. Indeed, DIMAR’s political documents construct a discourse that 
views austerity as inflicted upon the peripheral Member States of the South by the 
ones of the North. Greece is seen by DIMAR as the most critical case of all the 
countries of the European periphery. The critical state of the country is seen partially 
as a result of the Greek “inefficient administrative structures, the weak production, the 
significant competitiveness deficit and mainly because of the unwillingness of the 
dominant political powers to tackle the well-known pathologies of the country’s 
politico-economic system” (DIMAR, 2012, p. 1). Despite the Greek pathologies, 
DIMAR considers that the problem is much broader, as Greece is not the sole country 
affected by the devastating crisis. According to DIMAR’s view, the common 
denominator between Greece, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal is austerity. Indeed, in 
DIMAR’s opinion, the policies of austerity are leading these Member States into a 
vicious circle of economic stagnation and fiscal deficit. Moreover, DIMAR sees the 
altering of the balance of powers inside the EU as the only possible solution to the 
issues affecting Europe. Nevertheless, DIMAR argues that Greece must address the 
pathologies that are affecting the country, so as to be able to take advantage of a 
possible change inside the EU (DIMAR, 2012, p. 4).  
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 The case of KKE, on the other hand is straightforward as the party carries on its 
traditional rejection of the EU. Indeed, at its 19th Congress, the party provided a 
Marxist-Leninist analysis regarding the crisis and sharpened its critique towards 
Syriza’s involvement therein. Following KKE’s view, Syriza professes a government 
of the left that will attempt to manage capitalism and whose goal consists of “[…] a 
new ‘Marshall plan’ for the European South” (KKE, 2013, p. 1). Moreover, the party 
argues that Syriza identifies itself “as a left party which unites people coming from 
the Social Democrats of the 3rd of September123 up to the so-called ‘renewing 
communists’, who defend the ‘social state’. [Syriza’s] strategy in terms of power and 
the EU is social democratic and monopoly-friendly” (KKE, 2013, p. 3). KKE’s 
analysis distinguishes itself from DIMAR’s and Syriza’s ones, as it places the 
country’s withdrawal from the EU and the Eurozone as a conditio sine qua non for the 
successful socialist transformation of the Greek economy, polity, and society. Indeed, 
KKE’s political document clearly stated that “the struggle for the country’s release 
from the EU is bound with the struggle against the power of the monopolies and the 
struggle of the working class and of its allies for the workers’-popular power. The 
positions for the exit from euro and the EU coming from bourgeois parties, without 
affecting the power of monopolies, their ownership, the affixture of Greece in 
imperialist centres and countries, disorients the popular struggle for the exit from the 
EU with popular sovereignty and people’s power […] today when the ‘prestige’ of the 
EU ravels while the crisis affects other countries, the alliances of the South or the ones 
with the Euro-Atlantic axis, the US or the UK, do not constitute solutions in favour of 
the people. Nowadays the struggle for exiting the EU with the peoples in a power 
position must be intensified in every country, in all 27 Member States” (KKE, 2013, 
p. 5).  
 Following these analyses, we could argue that Syriza has very little space for political 
manoeuvre, as DIMAR, KKE are competitors both at the party’s right and left. 
Following LP’s exit from Syriza and the subsequent creation of LAE, Syriza is now 
facing one more political opponent to its left, whose core positions have been 
thoroughly examined in the previous section of the present chapter. Nevertheless, as a 
                                                
123 KKE refers to the PASOK’s founding date of 3rd September 1974 and subsequently to the growing 
number of elite members of Syriza that have previously been involved with PASOK. For KKE this is 
a clear indication of Syriza’s opportunism.  
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result of LP’s breaking away from Syriza, DIMAR appears now much more inclined 
to a possible cooperation with Syriza. This, presents Syriza with more political space 
to its right, whilst the competition to its left is now significantly more pressing.  
 
Party Competition Under the Lens of the Communist Dilemma 
 
The application of the theoretical lens of the communist dilemma to the patterns of 
party competition, enables us to reach several important conclusions. As mentioned in 
the previous section of the present thesis, the issue here relates to the party’s profile 
on European integration and its interaction with their propaganda against or in favour 
of the other indigenous political forces. This could, arguably, highlight both how such 
moderation, or lack thereof, manifests itself in the context of domestic party 
competition, as well as whether electoral opportunities or changes in overall strategy 
are the main driving factors of change on the issue. Accordingly, as Charalambous 
(2001) summarizes, the analysis of a party’s approach towards other parties’ European 
policies can be outlined by the following questions: 
a. Have a party’s main opponents or electoral strategy changed, thus explaining 
attitudinal or salience changes in its profile on the issue of European 
integration? 
b. Through their general views on European integration and EU-related matters, 
do communist parties differentiate themselves from other left or non-left actors 
and, if so, how they achieve this? 
(Charalambous, 2013, p. 46) 
To be able to utilise the aforementioned questions, the present thesis will need to 
slightly modify the second question. Given that the parties under study do not 
constitute communist parties, the second question will be formulated as follows. 
Through their general views on European integration and EU-related matters, do RLPs 
differentiate themselves from other left, communist, and non-left actors, and if so, how 
do they achieve this? As a result, three possibilities can be assumed in respect to the 
parties’ responses. The first possibility views the parties projecting EU-related matters 
in their public discourse or emphasize them in a way that highlights that they have 
become more moderate than before. The second possibility views the parties as 
utilising the same mechanisms in order to present themselves as more radical in a way 
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that they move more closely towards their ideological identity. The third, and final, 
possibility views the parties as utilising the same mechanisms in their effort to 
reconfirm their existing ideological profile.  
 Following the careful analysis of the party competition factor, we could attempt to 
respond to the questions posed by Charalambous (2013). In relation to the first one, 
we could argue that so far there has been no substantial change in Syriza’s electoral 
opponents regarding the issue of European integration. In relation to the second one, 
we could argue that there is evidence of the second and third argument in Syriza’s 
case. The party’s decision to renounce its initial support of the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992 (Synaspismos, 1992) at its congress in 2010 (Synaspismos, 2010) can be seen as 
an attempt to place emphasis on a European issue in a way that highlights its radical 
nature, whilst moving closely towards its ideological identity. Most importantly, 
Syriza has utilised salience-placing mechanisms to reconfirm its firm ideological 
profile in terms of the European integration. Indeed, the present thesis argues that 
Syriza’s distinct left Europeanism has been significantly strengthened by the severe 
financial crisis. Syriza chose to highlight the party’s firm belief that the neo-liberal 
nature of the European edifice poses an existential threat to the European project. By 
doing so, Syriza aimed at highlighting the ideological differences both with its left-
wing electoral opponents, KKE, LAE and the rest of the extra-parliamentary left, as 
well as its centre-left electoral opponents.  
  
g. Transnational Affiliations 
 
 The thesis’ next conditioning factor relates to Syriza’s transnational affiliations. 
Syriza has honoured the Eurocommunist legacy inherited by the era of KKE-Interior, 
as it has constantly taken part in all pan-European attempts for the greater coordination 
amongst the European RLPs. As suggested in previous chapters, the need for a 
harmonised European political subject was addressed in 2004, when several European 
RLPs, amongst which Synaspismos, founded the EL (EL, 2013). The following 
analysis will involve the EL’s main programmatic positions and the degree of 
coherence between the EL’s views and the ones expressed by Syriza. To be able to 
assess the aforesaid coherence, the analysis of the EL’s political resolution adopted by 
the party’s 2nd congress held in November 2007 is necessary. Furthermore, the agenda 
for a social Europe approved by the party’s 3rd congress in December 2010 presents 
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us with the necessary post-crisis perspective. Finally, the political decision of the 
Europarty’s 4th congress held in Madrid in 2013 will present us with EL’s analysis as 
the crisis inside the EU was deepening.  
 EL’s political positions display a high degree of coherence both with the ideology and 
the key political proposals of Syriza. The EL opens its political document with the 
following question: “the contradiction between capitalism and the emancipation of the 
individual, armament and war, climate change and environmental disasters, and the 
privatisation of all spheres of life lead us to ask once again ‘socialism or barbarism’? 
(EL, 2007, p. 1). The EL presents its key goals as being sharply opposed to the growing 
impact of neoliberalism in the EU (EL, 2007, p. 3), which transformed the European 
edifice into an “undemocratic, neo-liberal, patriarchal and militaristic model of the 
European construction” (EL, 2007, p. 5). The EL’s version of EU is depicted as a 
Union guaranteeing labour and social rights, contrary to the neoliberal and deregulated 
current EU, which fosters exploitation. Moreover, the EL argues that public services 
should be placed again under public control. The environmental character of the EL’s 
alternative vision is highlighted and placed in sharp contrast with the devastating 
effects of globalised capitalism to the environment. Peaceful cooperation amongst the 
nations in contrast to the imperialist wars that the current EU is partaking is also 
highlighted in the EL’s political decision (EL, 2007, pp. 13-17). The EL argues that 
such an alternative vision of the EU requires, “a deep democratic reconstruction of the 
European institutions that constitutes an indispensable component of our whole 
strategy. In this field the European Left Party, and our large social and political 
alliance, undertake the historical responsibility to change the political balance and the 
political orientations in Europe” (EL, 2007, p. 18). Overall, we could argue that the 
EL’s political decision resonates the core ideological values of Syriza of democracy, 
environmentalism, and pacifism, whilst maintaining the outlook of a socialist 
transformation124. 
 The EL’s ‘Agenda for a social Europe’ is a political decision affected to a great extent 
by the crisis inside the EU and the Eurozone. The EL considers that the troika has 
imposed intolerable policies to the peoples of Europe. According to the EL the crisis, 
is posing a threat “of economic collapse, massive exacerbation of poverty and 
                                                
124 ELP’s socialist vision is in harmony with the theoretical work of the Western European Communist 
current, but would clash with the Eastern European version of it.  
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precariousness, and the destruction of the social model and European civilisation 
itself” (EL, 2010). As a result, the party argues that the critical state of the EU proves 
the party’s criticism right and demonstrates the necessity of the EU to turn from, “the 
logic of profit into the new logic of human development” (EL, 2010, p. 2). Moreover, 
the EL argues that the crisis goes deeper than the economy and affects the Union’s 
democratic deficit, which requires immediate attention. With regards to the policies 
destined to address the crisis, the EL proposes the tighter regulation of the banking 
sector. In addition to this, the party argues in favour of the nationalisation of the major 
banking institutions, which will bring them under democratic control  (EL, 2010, p. 
8).  
Regarding the question of the sovereign debts, the party calls for, “the annulation of 
part of the sovereign debt, in order to assist the indebted countries to develop policies 
for the restructuring of their economies and avoid the destruction of social 
development” (EL, 2010, p. 8). Moreover, the party proposes several policies to tackle 
the effects of the financial crisis. Indeed, the EL calls for a guaranteed support for the 
unemployed, reduction of the working hours, as well as a European-wide minimum 
wage (EL, 2010, p. 12). With regards to the party’s European ideal, the EL states that 
“the European Left stands for a vision of a radically different world, democracy, peace 
and socialism […] we aspire to a world of freedom, justice, and equality, without 
repression, exploitation, wars, hunger or need” (EL, 2010, p. 16).  
 In the latest political decision following EL’s 4th Congress, we come across a political 
document heavily influenced by the deepening European crisis, which is depicted as 
the “worst crisis in its history since the Thirties and the Second World War” (EL, 
2013, p. 1). In fact, the EL opens its latest political decision heavily attacking the 
European status quo, as the document clearly states that “according to the promises of 
the forces that dominate Europe, the European project was to be one of peace and 
social progress; it is now being transformed into a nightmare where the only horizon 
offered to the peoples of Europe is one of brutal and generalised social regression. 
Europe as a whole has been thrust into this turmoil by the crisis of the financialised 
capitalist system, the social and ecological consequences of which have hit humanity 
and the planet with unprecedented violence, as well as by the crisis of a model of the 
European Union that has cast in an ultraliberal mould, under the supervision of the 
financial markets” (EL, 2013, p. 1). In the EL’s opinion the policies imposed to the 
peoples of Europe pose an existential risk to the European edifice, as the devastating 
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effects of the crisis have created the necessary conditions for the emergence of 
nationalisms and xenophobia. Thus, it is the EL’s role to unite under its banner all 
those forces that can bring about a major change on the economic and political model 
of the EU, in an attempt to create a “new European project, one which is based on the 
interests of the peoples and respect for their sovereignty, in order to restore a sense of 
meaning to European integration” (EL, 2013, p. 3).  
 The EL’s political decision highlights the important role played by the neoliberal 
political forces in creating a Union based on market deregulation and decreasing social 
welfare. The aforesaid political forces are found to be liable for the devastating effects 
of the crisis, as well as for their inability to provide a viable solution to it. Furthermore, 
the document argues that the financial crisis has provided “an opportunity to speed up 
a brutal process of economic and social restructuring in the region, by imposing a 
broad process of structural adjustments” (EL, 2013, p. 5). Against this process of 
economic and social restructuring, the EL proposes a series of measures, which would 
rebuild the European edifice. This alternative is based on four important pillars. The 
first relates to employment, social, ecological, and solidarity development. The second 
deals with the emancipation from the financial markets. The third involves the respect 
for popular sovereignty and democratic development. The fourth and final pillar 
concerns peace and cooperation among peoples. The final part of this chapter will deal 
with the specific programmatic positions of the EL in an attempt to compare them with 
Syriza’s position, and test the argument of policy transfer between the EL and Syriza.  
 The application of the theoretical lens of the communist dilemma to Syriza’s 
transnational affiliations allows us to draw the following conclusion. Syriza, 
especially in the period following the elections for the EP, has sought to place even 
more relevance on its role inside the EL. The fact that Syriza’s President A. Tsipras 
was chosen by the EL as the Europarty’s candidate for the Presidency of the European 
Commission can be seen as proof of the importance that Syriza places on the EL and 
vice versa. Furthermore, the highly Europeanised legislative elections in Greece 
provided an an exceptional opportunity for Syriza to highlight the party’s European 
affiliations. During the brief electoral campaign, delegations from the EL and its most 
important party members arrived in Greece in an order to show their active support to 
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Syriza. In numerous occasions, high ranking officials of the EL125 had an active 
participation in political rallies and other electoral events. Moreover, the fact the EL’s 
banner was featured in the totality of Syriza’s electoral leaflets constitutes without any 
doubt proof of the party’s intention to place the utmost importance to its European 
affiliations. Therefore, we could argue that the third argument formulated in the 
previous chapter can be verified. Indeed, it appears as if Syriza chose to place more 
importance to its European affiliations so it can reconfirm and further establish its 
existing ideological profile as a European force of the radical left.  
 An initial comparison of the analyses of the EL and Syriza leads us to conclude that 
there is indeed a high degree of convergence both in terms of core ideological elements 
and political proposals. The analysis of the crisis performed by the two parties appears 
identical and the same holds true with regards to their criticism to the neoliberal 
leitmotif of the European edifice. The EL is apparently of great importance to Syriza. 
Firstly, the existence of a Radical Left party Europarty constitutes an advantage, as it 
renders Syriza’s Europeanism theoretically feasible. Secondly, the EL constitutes the 
platform that Syriza requires so as to create the necessary pan-European alliances for 
the promotion of the pan-European solutions proclaimed by the party. Thirdly, it 
differentiates Syriza from KKE’s Euro-rejectionism and highlights, thus, Syriza’s 
distinct internationalism. Fourthly, it provides with a good propaganda response to the 
arguments that Syriza is a ‘euro-sceptic’ party. As a result, we could argue that the 
existence and evolution of the EL solidified, to an extent, Syriza’s distinct left 
Europeanism and influenced, thus, quite significantly its stance towards the EU. 
 
h. European Integration 
 
 The integration process per se constitutes the last conditioning factor. In order 
effectively comprehend Syriza’s overall response to the process of European 
integration, a comparative examination of the findings of the previous chapters is 
required. This will enable the present thesis to reach some initial conclusions with 
regards to Syriza’s stance during the period under analysis, as well as the relative 
importance of the factors of the thesis’ theoretical framework.  
                                                
125 Including even the EL’s President at the time, Pierre Laurent, who was asked onto the stage during 
Syriza’s central political rally in Athens in January 23rd, 2015 by Alexis Tsipras. 
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 As a result of Syriza’s Eurocommunist heritage and its core ideological beliefs the 
party’s stance towards the EU has been critical yet constructive. Syriza, indeed, exerts 
heavy criticism to the neoliberal leitmotif that the party finds to be present ever since 
the Treaty Maastricht. Despite this sharp criticism, Syriza has constantly argued in 
favour of the Greek membership in the EU and the Eurozone. Indeed, the party’s 
objective is to manage to refund the European project from within. Syriza’s 
conceptualisation of Socialism requires, indeed, a permanent struggle of the unified 
European working classes. Thus, the process of European integration is a fundamental 
aspect of the party’s ideology, which envisages the transcendence of national divisions 
of the working classes. Consequently, Syriza, contrary to Communist parties that 
remain loyal to the Eastern Communist movement, is able to operate with much more 
ease inside the EU. Indeed, when Syriza had to choose between moderation and 
ideological consistency, the party was able to remain faithful to its core ideology 
without having to alter its stance towards the EU, despite the dramatic increase of its 
electoral influence and the subsequent election to office amid the financial crisis. As 
a matter of fact, the crisis solidified the party’s critique towards the European 
architecture and was arguably amongst the reasons behind the party’s electoral 
success, as Syriza managed to represent the electorate’s critical support of the EU. 
Consequently, we could argue that Syriza, as a unit, remained rather consistent 
throughout this period. Nevertheless, the third level of analysis has highlighted the 
entire process of the schism inside Syriza. The sharpening of the LP’s criticism 
towards the majority’s Europeanism was has manifested itself ever since the party’s’ 
1st Congress in 2013, as the events of Cyprus led the faction to reconsider its approach 
to the issue of the Eurozone membership. The party’s electoral victory in January 2015 
and the initiation of the negotiations with the troika served as catalysts for the 
intensification of the internal struggle. Indeed, following the unity demonstrated on 
the eve of the July 2015 referendum, the subsequent accord with the European 
institutions constituted the beginning of the end. Syriza had to make several important 
programmatic concessions, which the Europeanist majority saw as a necessary step in 
the long process of altering the balance of powers inside the EU. However, up to now 
the party has not altered its ideological profile, despite the LP’s withdrawal, the re-
election in September 2015 and the added competition both to the party’s left and 
right.  
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As a result, we could argue that Syriza has faced and continues to face dilemmas posed 
by the process of European integration. Nevertheless, the party’s distinct Europeanism 
rendered the party’s response significantly easier than for the Euro-rejectionist 
Communist Parties, such as the Greek KKE. The financial crisis and its devastating 
effects solidified Syriza’s harsh criticism vis-à-vis the EU and provided a 
substantiation to the party’s constant denunciation of the neoliberal EU. Following the 
party’s electoral triumph in January 2015, Syriza faced a series of dilemmas, as the 
negotiations with the European institutions proved harder than expected and arguably 
verified the rigidity of the European edifice. This led to the intensification of the 
internal struggle between the LP and the Europeanist majority around the question of 
the country’s Eurozone, and even EU, membership, which ultimately resulted in the 
LP’s collective exit from the party. This could serve, thus, as evidence of the degree 
of Syriza’s commitment to the European ideal.  
  
i. Programmatic Policies; Syriza and the EL under the Lens of the Communist 
Dilemma  
 
 As suggested in the previous chapter of this thesis, the theoretical lens of the 
communist dilemma will be applied to three areas of investigation. The first one is 
related to party competition, the second involves the party’s transnational affiliations. 
The third and final one relates to the party’s programmatic policies. For the needs of 
this area of investigation, the present thesis will examine the degree of divergence or 
lack thereof between the party’s political texts, as examined above, and the party’s 
detailed political positions in the field of EU-related issues126. Furthermore, it is this 
thesis’ firm belief that several useful conclusions could be reached from a comparative 
analysis of Syriza and EL’s proposed policies. This could also serve to test an initial 
argument relating to the possibility of policy transfer between the two parties.  To do 
so, the present thesis will seek to compare the policies presented to the Greek 
                                                
126 In an era when most aspects of the internal policymaking are being Europeanised, it is technically 
impossible to establish the boundaries between EU-related and non-EU-related issues. For this reason, 
the present thesis will take into consideration the most important aspects of Syriza’s Thessaloniki 
programme, as they are all to an extent subject to European regulation. 
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electorate by Syriza prior to the elections of 25th January127 to the policies proposed 
by the EL during its latest congress in 2013.  
 Commencing with our analysis, we will first examine the Thessaloniki programme. 
Syriza’s electoral programme seeks to immediately tackle the issue of the country’s 
sovereign debt. Syriza proposes the holding of a European Conference on the debt, 
and draws a parallel with the German debt and the way it was dealt with in 1953. 
According to Syriza this conference would, cancel the greater part of the public debt’s 
nominal value, for it to become sustainable. As far as the remaining part of debt is 
concerned, Syriza proposes a “‘growth clause’ regarding the repayment of the 
remaining part so that it is growth-financed and not budget-financed” (Syriza, 2014). 
In addition to this, the party proposed a moratorium in debt servicing to save funds for 
growth, as well as the exclusion of public investment from the restrictions of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Furthermore, the party calls for a European New Deal of 
public investment by the European Investment Bank, and for quantitative easing by 
the ECB with direct purchases of sovereign bonds. Those measures constitute, for 
Syriza the conditio sine qua non for achieving a “socially viable solution to Greece’s 
debt problem so that our country is able to pay off the remaining debt from the creation 
of new wealth and not from primary surpluses, which deprive society of income” 
(Syriza, 2014). The proposed solution to the country’s sovereign debt can be viewed 
to be entirely coherent with the party’s political decision in 2013. Syriza, thus, chose 
to place importance on this issue in an attempt to reinstate its programmatic 
position/policy rhetoric, and remained ideologically consistent vis à vis the communist 
dilemma posed to it by the process of European integration.  
 The programme of Thessaloniki, then, proposes several policies divided in four 
pillars. The first one relates to tackling the humanitarian crisis. Under this pillar, 
policies such as free electricity, meal subsidies, and housing guarantee are proposed 
for families living under the poverty line. In addition to this, the restitution of the 13th 
pension for pensioners receiving less than 700 euros, as well as free medical and 
pharmaceutical care for the uninsured unemployed is proposed. The second pillar 
involves the restarting of the economy and the promotion of tax justice. Under the 
                                                
127 Widely known as the Thessaloniki programme, because it was presented to the Greek electorate 
during the Thessaloniki annual international expo. Said policy programme was to constitute Syriza’s 
electoral proposal during the 2015 elections. 
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second pillar, Syriza proposes a series of measures to alleviate the increasing tax 
burden especially for middle-class and working class households. Amongst the most 
important policies proposed under this pillar, one finds the personal debt relief by 
restructuring non-performing loans, also known as red loans, the establishment of a 
public development bank, as well as the restoration of the minimum wage to 751 euros. 
The third pillar relates to the national plan to regain employment. Under this pillar, 
Syriza proposes a two-year employment programme for 300,000. In addition to this, 
the party proposed “the restitution of the institutional framework to protect 
employment rights, the collective agreements and arbitration, as well as the abolition 
of all regulations allowing for massive and unjustifiable layoffs as well as for renting 
employees” (Syriza, 2014). The fourth and final pillar, regards the transformation of 
the political system to deepen democracy. Under this final pillar, Syriza proposed a 
number of policies. Firstly, it calls for the regional organisation of the state, as well as 
the enhancement of transparency, economic autonomy and effective operation of 
municipalities and regions. Secondly, it calls for the empowerment of citizens’ 
democratic participation. More precisely, it proposes the introduction of new 
institutions, such as people’s legislative initiative, people’s veto and people’s initiative 
to call a referendum.   
 In an attempt to evaluate Syriza’s answer to the communist dilemma, we could argue 
that Syriza’s programmatic positions are very much coherent with its political 
decisions. As to the party’s programmatic positions vis-à-vis the process of the 
European integration, we could argue that Syriza’s stance has remained stable in its 
critical and constructive approach. As a result, we could verify that the party has 
chosen ideological consistency over moderation/pragmatism. Regardless of the heated 
internal debate relating to the future of the country inside the EU and the Eurozone, 
Syriza’s Europeanism has been strengthened by the crisis, and this is reflected in the 
party’s programmatic positions.  
 In order to be able to compare the policies proposed by the EL, the present thesis will 
attempt an analysis of the party’s political decision during its recent congress. In fact, 
EL’s political decision concludes with four policy pillars thought to overcome the 
crisis and rebuild Europe. The first one relates to employment, social, ecological and 
solidarity development. Amongst the proposed policies one comes across the defence 
and development of the public sector, and the launching of new employment 
programmes to tackle the rising levels of youth unemployment. In addition to this, the 
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EL calls for the restoration of minimum wages as well as of pensions, so that they can 
provide decent remuneration. Moreover, the EL declares that every single country128 
should be able to “increase wages and the level of social protection” (EL, 2013, p. 11). 
The second pillar regards the emancipation from financial markets. Under this pillar, 
the EL “advocates the immediate organisation of a European convention on public 
debt, which will decide on the cancellation of the biggest part of the – unsustainable – 
public debts of over-indebted countries, along with revised repayment terms, such as 
a growth-clause” (EL, 2013, p. 12). Moreover, the EL calls for the democratisation of 
the ECB and the creation of a European institution, which would have the role of 
promoting public investments. Finally, the EL proposes radical changes in the tax 
system, aiming to re-establish social justice. The third pillar concerns popular 
sovereignty and democratic development. Under this pillar, the EL proposes the 
development of popular action and participatory democracy in institutions and 
enterprises. The fourth and final pillar involves the objective of peace and cooperation 
among peoples. Amongst the policies proposed under this pillar, one comes across the 
abolition of the Schengen and Frontex agreements, as well as the proposal for new 
economic and trade relations with the rest of the world. Indeed, as the document 
clearly states, “security is built through development” (EL, 2013, p. 13).  
 The comparison between the programmatic positions of Syriza and the EL  leads us 
to the conclusion that there is a great level of coherence between the two parties. 
Indeed, in respect to the question of the public debt, the position maintained by the 
two parties is completely harmonised. Both the EL and Syriza call for a European 
convention on public debt, which would seek to cancel a great part of the public debt 
of over-indebted countries. With regards to the repayment of the residual part of the 
countries’ public debts, both parties propose the inclusion of a growth clause, which 
would prioritise the economic recovery of the countries involved to the repayment of 
their public debt. The harmonisation between the policies proposed by the two parties 
is also evident in respect to the creation of a European institution, which would 
promote public investments. Moreover, both the EL and Syriza present highly 
consistent programmatic positions in respect to social welfare, minimum wages, 
pensions, the defence of the public sector, and the need for new employment 
                                                
128 Arguably a reference to the fact that the countries under the supervision of the troika are unable to 
take such decisions without the consent of their European partners, and the IMF.  
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programmes to tackle unemployment. Finally, both parties have opted to place 
importance to the need of strengthening institutions of direct democracy and popular 
initiatives.   
 In conclusion, we could argue that Syriza’s constructive and critical stance towards 
the process of European integration was maintained even at the level of programmatic 
positions. Indeed, the party’s proposed policies place emphasis on EU-related issues 
in an attempt to re-establish its solid Europeanism. Concurrently, Syriza has responded 
to the dilemma posed by the process of European integration by being ideologically 
consistent. In regards to the comparison between the policies of Syriza and the EL, we 
could argue that there is a high degree of harmonisation. The parties’ programmatic 
positions are based on common axioms and are formulated in a very similar manner. 
Especially in relation to the question of the public debt, as well as the creation of a 
European institution promoting public investment, the proposed policies are identical 
in their formulations. As a result, the argument of policy transfer between the two 
parties could be prima facie verified and could present a very useful area of 
investigation in future research.  
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IX. Addressing the Research Questions; an Insight into the EL 
 
a. Introduction 
 
The final section of the thesis will attempt to address the research questions that it 
posed at the beginning. As a result, it aims at providing an insight into the EL, a 
comparative analysis of the parties, and attempt to argumente over the different 
trajectories of the parties in their respective national arenas. This final section will, 
thus, be divided in three parts that address a combined version of the research 
questions that were posed at the beginning of this thesis, followed by the conclusion. 
 
b. The EL’s key strategic positions 
 
 During the analysis of the national party members of the EL, the present thesis has 
presented with an overview and a comparison of the key positions of the EL, as 
demonstrated in the official political documents of the Euro-party’s congresses. The 
analysis of previous documents, enriched by the political document adopted by the 
party’s 5th Congress held in December 2016, leads us to the following conclusions vis-
à-vis the EL’s key strategic positions and the future of the EU. The axes presented by 
the EL during its latest Congress will be utilised in the attempt to reconstruct the core 
alternative vision of the EU. 
 The EL is arguing in favour of the radical refoundation of the European edifice based 
on the respect of national sovereignty exercised by the national parliaments, as well 
as the sovereign peoples of the EU Member States. At this point, we could argue here 
that the EL chose to place more emphasis on the respect for national sovereignty in 
the aftermath of the dire situation in which the Syriza-led government found itself 
during the 2015 referendum and the subsequent negotiations with the European 
institutions. The long-term objective of the refounding of the EU consists in the 
gradual socialist transformation of the European edifice based on the principles of 
democratic socialism and the rejection of capitalism, seen as the root cause for all 
inequalities. This very idea is at the heart of the project of the EL, as it could be argued 
to constitute the most essential shared ideological characteristic amongst the EL’s 
party members. The rejection, thus, of national ways to socialism and the conception 
of a shared struggle towards the transcendence of national borders and the ultimate 
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unification of the working-class struggle in the continent remain central. To this end 
the EL has maintained several key strategic positions throughout the period under 
study of the present thesis, which could be synthesised in the following manner.  
  The first strategic axis of the EL relates to the respect of popular sovereignty (EL, 
2016c, p. 7). Thus, the Euro-party proposes several radical changes with regards to the 
decision-making mechanism of the EU. Its key strategic position to this end lies in the 
assertion of the right of each Member State to not apply any European directive that 
is deemed socially or economically regressive regarding its peoples’ rights. To ensure 
that such directives and laws will not be passed in the future, the EL calls for a joint 
legislative function performed by national parliaments and the EP, as well as ending 
the EC’s right to initiate legislation (EL, 2016c, p. 8). Thus, the EL’s most important 
strategic position is a radical refounding of the European legislative process, which 
apparently seeks to establish an absolute parity of the national and European 
parliaments. As argued in the previous paragraph, the emphasis on the respect to 
popular sovereignty could be argued to be a direct consequence of the events relating 
to the Syriza-led government in 2015. Despite the idea of respect to popular 
sovereignty not being novel, this radical position appears for the first time to the EL’s 
debate in 2016. Thus, we could argue that the continuing crisis inside the EU, both in 
terms of relative economic stagnation and in terms of the rise of anti-EU sentiments,129 
is having a rather important effect on the EL’s policies, which appear increasingly 
radical,130 despite parties such as Syriza having to make concessions in practice.  
 The second strategic axis of the EL aims to establish a new development model for 
the EU (EL, 2016c, p. 8). In this axis, the EL reiterates its long-standing policies 
relating to the European economy. Indeed, the EL envisions a development model that 
will break with the liberal and neo-liberal tradition and create the necessary conditions 
for the promotion of employment and guaranteed public services for the peoples of 
Europe. More specifically, the EL underlines that the ECB needs to stop financing 
banking institutions and multinational corporations (EL, 2016c, p. 8). Instead, the EL 
                                                
129 The vote of the UK to leave the EU is utilised in the EL’s latest political document as a clear 
indication of the Union’s inability to cope with national sovereignty. 
130 Radical in the sense of being even further away from the current European architecture. Whereas in 
previous years the EL advocated in favour of the strengthening of the EP as a policy sufficient to address 
the EU’s democratic deficit, it now calls for the complete re-foundation of the European legislative 
process.  
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proposes that funds should be channelled towards the creation of jobs within EU’s 
borders (EL, 2016c, p. 8). This idea of a new European deal with the creation of jobs 
via a series of public investments is a constant in the EL’s political message. Another 
important aspect of the EL’s alternative political message relates to blocking further 
privatisations and strengthening the public sector of the Union’s Member States. The 
EL is reiterating here its commitment to the respect of national sovereignties by 
emphasising that the European policies regarding the economy should be the outcome 
of a process involving the Member States and promoting the implementation of 
measures at a national level (EL, 2016c, p. 9). The EL, thus, appears to have 
maintained its core positions vis-à-vis its alternative development plan. Nevertheless, 
it is worthwhile noting that more emphasis is placed on the respect of national 
sovereignty. This does not necessarily mean that the EL is turning against its past 
Federalist vision. Indeed, in the final sentence of the political document’s reference to 
the development model it is mentioned, “if countries so wish, national public services 
could work together more closely in order to tackle common challenges that are facing 
the peoples of Europe” (EL, 2016c, p. 9). On this basis, we could deduce that the EL 
is not turning its back to more Europe. On the contrary, we could argue that this is an 
indication of the EL’s attempt to demonstrate its opposition to the current European 
model, which the party finds rather undemocratic. Concurrently, the vision of this new 
development plan that the EL promotes is arguably a response to the increasingly 
relevant right-wing populist discourse both in respect to national sovereignties, as well 
as to the defence of the national economies131.  
The third strategic axis of the EL relates to the measures aimed at promoting social 
equality amongst the Member States of the EU. The importance, here, of ending the 
practice of social dumping across the EU is, for the EL, one of the most reoccurring 
issues in the party's political documents. Here, the EL demonstrates its distinct 
Europeanism, as it calls for the harmonisation of social and labour provisions. Indeed, 
the EL argues that for the peoples of Europe to come together, the EU needs to 
establish two principles. The first relates to social non-regression, “[...] meaning EU 
provisions on social and environmental matters can only be applied if they are superior 
to national legislation” (EL, 2016c, p. 9). The second one refers to the establishment 
                                                
131 Such right-wing populist discourses are becoming increasingly popular in Europe. Marin Le Pen’s 
National Front (FN) and the UK Independence Party (UKIP) constitute prime examples.   
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of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', which should gradually guarantee that 
all workers across the EU receive equal benefits, wages, and working conditions (EL, 
2016c, p. 9). Concurrently, another reoccurring issue in the EL's alternative political 
proposal refers to the reduction of the working hours across the EU and the opposition 
to the neoliberal leitmotif of the current free trade regime as means to combatting 
social inequalities. We could argue that this axis reflects the distinct Europeanism of 
the EL. Indeed, the call for the harmonisation of social and labour rights and the 
alignment of policies to the highest standards in Europe constitutes the core of the EL's 
alternative proposal. 
 The fourth and final strategic axis of the EL revolves around the financial foundation 
of the EU. The party's latest political document reiterates its previous key proposals, 
while providing with a novel conceptualization of the Eurozone. Initially, the EL 
stresses the importance of combatting fiscal dumping between the Member States of 
the EU and accuses once again the existence of tax havens inside the Union of creating 
the necessary conditions for tax competition amongst its Members (EL, 2016c, p. 10). 
At the same time, the EL chooses to place even more emphasis on the question of 
sovereign debt. In this framework, the party considers that “breaking with austerity 
involves breaking with the dictatorship of debt” (EL, 2016c, p. 10). In fact, the party 
reiterates its firm position that calls for the cancellation or the renegotiation of the debt 
of the Southern European countries. The total syntony with the Syriza-led government 
is demonstrated, as the party states that “[...] the European Council and the European 
Commission must listen to the Greek government's demand to renegotiate the debt” 
(EL, 2016c, p. 10). In addition to the question of the debt, the EL treats the question 
of the Eurozone. Here, the party chooses to significantly alter its conceptualisation of 
the monetary union. Indeed, the party argues that the countries that do not wish to 
remain part of the Eurozone “[...] should be able to do so without being subjected to 
sanctions, pressures or blackmail” (EL, 2016c, p. 10). This does not necessarily mean 
that the EL argues against the Eurozone per se. On the contrary, the party reiterates its 
alternative vision of the Eurozone, seen as a tool in the hands of the real economy and 
under the direct control of the European peoples. We could argue, thus, that the events 
in Greece in 2015 have determined the EL's stance towards the Eurozone, as the party 
has now reached the conclusion that, given the current architecture of the Eurozone, 
the euro cannot be fetishized. 
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 These are, thus, the key strategic positions of the EL with regards to the EU. In 
attempting to reconstruct the party's alternative vision of the Union, we could argue 
the following. Firstly, a critical element relates to the EL 's notion of popular 
sovereignty. Indeed, we could argue that the EL constructs its alternative version 
around their distinct concept of popular sovereignty, which is an antagonistic one to 
the one proposed by the right-wing populist parties, which appear to have gained 
momentum at the moment, and the liberal ones currently in power across Europe. The 
idea regarding the respect for the democratic decisions of the European peoples has 
been a constant ideological position of the EL. The importance of the question of 
popular sovereignty nowadays is demonstrated by the plethora of debates that have 
accompanied events such as the referendum on the UK's EU membership, the election 
of President Trump, as well as the referendum on the Constitutional amendment in 
Italy in 2016. The EL, thus, despite emphasising the respect of sovereignty does not 
call for the disintegration of the EU and the return to a powerful nation-state, as do the 
right-wing populist parties. On the contrary, the EL demands a radical reconstruction 
of the European edifice, to allow it to respect the will of the European peoples, as well 
as integrating national parliaments in its decision-making mechanisms. What the EL 
contests is the tendency of the liberal political forces to treat the question of 
sovereignty as something archaic and to an extent irrelevant. It contests, thus, the 
liberal cosmopolitanism by bringing forward its distinct Left Europeanism and 
internationalism. As a result, although the party believes that more Europe is necessary 
to ameliorate the condition of the European working class, it also considers that 
referendums and election results cannot be treated as events unable to shape the course 
of a country. In other words, it denies the rights of elites, unfettered by democracy, to 
determine the pace and direction of the European project. The EL, thus, places at the 
very core of its alternative vision for the EU the universal right of the European 
peoples to decide their own destiny. 
 Secondly, the EL following this cardinal principle argues in favour of the rewriting of 
the European Treaties and  the subsequent reformation of the European institutions 
and the interconnected decision-making mechanisms. The rewriting of the Treaties 
will transform the EU into a union that will place the interests of the citizens before 
profits. Indeed, the EL believes that the EC should be stripped of its decision-making 
powers, as it finds that these powers are utilised solely in the interests of big European 
capital. The national parliaments should, according to the EL, take the place of the EC 
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and work alongside the EP to promote a radical agenda that would foster social 
equality and would guarantee a dignified life to its citizens. Only then would the EU 
be able to facilitate the harmonisation of rights and policies to the highest European 
standard. In the spirit of the same cardinal principle, the EL's vision involves a ECB 
that will be under the complete control of the European citizenry and the national 
parliaments. The transformation of the ECB is a key aspect of the EL's alternative 
vision. Indeed, an ECB that is subordinated to the will of the European people would 
be instrumental in shaping a novel development model that would promote 
employment, public services, and constitute the lender of last resort for the Member 
States, liberating them from the influence of international speculators. 
 Thirdly, the EL's alternative vision of the EU involves the drastic overhaul of the 
Eurozone, as the party believes that the euro is now a tool in the hands of the European 
ruling classes. In its place, the EL envisages a Eurozone that will take into account the 
diverse socio-economic realities of the various Member States. The EL's vision vis-a-
vis the Eurozone is still, nevertheless, rather vague in regards to the specific form and 
functioning. The debate around the possible solutions to the current problematic, 
according to the EL, situation is still ongoing. This is arguably the result of the lack of 
absolute consensus amongst the EL's member parties. An insight into the EL’s internal 
debate and lack of consensus regarding specific issues will be attempted in the 
proceeding section of this final chapter.  
 The future of the EU, thus, according to the EL lies in the respect of popular 
sovereignty, without nevertheless proposing a return to the era of the powerful nation 
state. As a result, we could argue that in the case of the EL, the normative dichotomy 
between anti-EU and pro-EU that characterises other political families is to an extent 
irrelevant. Indeed, the EL considers that maintaining the European level, thus, 
transcending the national divisions of the continent’s working classes is a conditio sine 
qua non for the successful implementation of the gradual socialist transformation of 
the European continent. Thus, we could argue that for the EL the question is not being 
pro-European or Euro-rejectionist, but being in favour of a socialist transformation or 
not. In reality, the EL, as well as for the totality of its member parties treated in the 
present thesis, by negating the Eastern Communist dogma of national roads to 
socialism holds in the very core of its ideology the idea of a Socialist United Europe 
of the peoples. Thus, the Democratic Socialism remains the utmost objective of both 
the EL and its most important member parties. The question of this core ideological 
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belief will be dealt with in the final section of this chapter, where the present thesis 
will try to address the effect of the financial crisis on the EL’s Left Europeanism. 
 
c. EL’s influence on the national member parties 
 
During the analysis of the individual case studies and the comparison between the 
policies of the member parties and the EL, the present thesis has demonstrated that 
there is, indeed, a high degree of homogeneity both between the national parties and 
between them and the EL. To answer the questions relating to the EL's importance, 
efficiency, and the presence of a consensus or lack thereof, the present thesis will 
utilise one more document that will contribute to substantiating the claims made in the 
previous chapters and to an extent verify its main arguments. Indeed, during the EL's 
5th Congress, the party released a document that summarises the responses of both 
member and observer parties on questionnaires aimed at evaluating the EL's role, 
efficiency, and future.  
 During the analysis of the individual case studies and the comparison between the 
policies of the member parties and the EL, the present thesis has demonstrated that 
there is, indeed, a high degree of homogeneity both between the national parties as 
well as between them and the EL. We could argue, thus, that the EL plays a very 
significant role in relation to the parties' policies towards the EU. Although we are 
unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt the argument of policy transfer between the 
EL and the member parties and vice versa, the data presented in the document 
mentioned above could further substantiate such a claim. During the analysis of the 
case studies, the present thesis has shown how several key policies appear to be almost 
identical for all the parties under examination. The position regarding the question of 
the sovereign debt of the countries of the European South constitutes an illuminating 
example of a completely harmonised position on a European-related issue. Indeed, the 
member parties appear to verify this argument, as according to their responses to the 
questionnaires the main usefulness of belonging to the EL “[…] is represented by the 
possibility of coordinating our policies […]” (EL, 2016b, p. 2). Moreover, the member 
parties state that harmonisation of the various parties’ points of view constitutes 
another important dimension of belonging to the EL (EL, 2016b, p. 2).  
 The importance and influence of the EL for the member parties’ policies and stance 
towards the EU is not, nevertheless, limited to the argument of policy transfer and 
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policy harmonisation. Indeed, we could argue that the existence of the EL per se 
constitutes a critical dimension of the member parties’ ideological coherence. This 
argument is further substantiated further by the data presented in the document 
published by the EL. According to the member parties, the EL’s conviction that “[…] 
there is no solution only at a national level but also at a European one” (EL, 2016b, p. 
1) presents them with the necessary platform for building the necessary alliances that 
will eventually bring about an alternative European integration process leading 
beyond capitalism. It is, thus, the distinct left Europeanism of the party members that 
renders the existence of a pan-European political subject a conditio sine qua non for 
the common fight against the current European architecture. As a result, we could 
argue that the EL strengthens the parties’ left Europeanism and provides with both 
practical and theoretical solutions to the increasingly Europeanised life of political 
parties. As the member parties suggest the utility of the EL membership is quite 
significant even in national political battles (EL, 2016b, p. 2). Thus, we could argue 
that the argument formulated in the previous chapter that saw the existence of the EL 
as an important ideological weapon is verified by the member parties.  
 In regards to the EL’s overall efficiency the evaluation and evolution document 
presents us with some interesting data as well as an insight into the EL’s strengths and 
shortcomings. Overall, we could argue that the party is rather efficient in performing 
its role at the European level, as demonstrated by the responses of the party members 
that the present thesis has presented up until now. In addition to the responses so far, 
the party members positively evaluate the role of the EL in bringing together political 
forces with a diversity of positions on multiple issues predominately via the 
cooperation with the Social Forums and the Altersummit (EL, 2016b, p. 1). Moreover, 
the member parties assess that the Transfrom! network developed by the EL reinforces 
the efficiency of the party, as it adds quality analysis regarding the European and 
global scenario while providing a stable relationship with the social movements (EL, 
2016b, p. 1). The efficiency of the EL can also be seen in the successful running of 
the 2014 European campaign. Indeed, the candidacy of Alexis Tsipras for the 
Presidency of the European Commission rallied significant support and contributed to 
the development of convergences for wider coalitions, such the L’Altra Europa con 
Tsipras in Italy. Even though the 2014 campaign proved to be rather successful and 
thus an indication of the EL’s efficiency, the member parties find that a greater 
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coordination and effort could lead to a truly European campaign involving, thus, all 
the EU Member States (EL, 2016b, p. 3). 
 In regards to the EL’s shortcomings, the responses of the member parties lead us to 
the following conclusions. The party members find that at times the EL fails to address 
important political issues at the appropriate level and as a result issues that are of 
significance for member parties are either not dealt with or are dealt in a very 
inefficient manner (EL, 2016b, p. 1). Additionally, they consider that the EL should 
take more into account the regions of Central and Eastern Europe (EL, 2016b, p. 2). 
At this point, we need to add that the EL’s strategy of approaching parties from Eastern 
Europe has been proven rather problematic. Indeed, given the significant divergence 
between Eastern and Western RLPs in several issues,132 the EL’s choice to recruit 
certain parties from this region has limited its ability to persuade Western European 
parties, such as the Dutch Socialist Party (PS), to join its ranks. Moreover, several 
member parties are of the opinion that the EL is too often the spectator and that it 
should “endeavour to be more effective and show itself as the driver, the catalyser for 
the political debate and the fight of the alternative European forces. It should combine 
different forces and unite them in new impulses” (EL, 2016b, p. 2). It would appear 
as if most of the member parties of the EL argue in favour of a stronger, autonomous, 
and more decisive role for the Euro-party. The debate, nevertheless, regarding EL’s 
role has been ongoing ever since its creation. In this front, the biggest division is 
between the PCF on one side and Rifondazione and Die Linke on the other. Indeed, 
we could argue that this is amongst the reasons for the change of stance that the party 
has had vis-à-vis specific matters133. More conclusions regarding the consensus or lack 
thereof inside the EL will be dealt with in the following paragraphs.  
 The final shortcomings that the member parties have highlighted at the EL’s 5th 
Congress relate to the party’s structure and decision-making process. Indeed, the first 
                                                
132 Indeed, we could argue that given the rather reactionary nature of Eastern European societies some 
of the EL’s party members from Eastern Europe appear to be standing against some of the important 
values of the so-called new Left. LGBT rights, their stance towards the USSR, and the former Eastern 
bloc are amongst the most relevant issues.  
133 Issues that relate predominately to the significant enlargement of the EL’s member parties during 
period under the leadership of Pierre Laurent from the PCF, which was arguably reducing the coherence 
of the party. Concurrently, an attempt to empower the EL was evident during the period that the party 
was under the influence of Rifondazione and Die Linke.  
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criticism that the member parties have in regards to the party’s structure refer to the 
Council of Chairpersons. It appears as if most of the member parties find this 
institution to be the most remote and inaccessible (EL, 2016b, p. 4). We could argue, 
thus, that the EL’s leadership should become more accessible and more involved in 
the party’s life instead of remaining mere symbols. Another major criticism relates to 
the EL’s working groups. Despite the member parties valuing the existence of the 
working groups, they find that information regarding their work is not regularly 
communicated by the EL (EL, 2016b, p. 4). In addition to this, most member parties 
find that the EL should aim on creating new working groups on relevant European 
issues, as well as more professional groups that will involve several experts from 
around Europe, to be able to formulate its policy proposals and overall perform its role 
more efficiently (EL, 2016b, p. 7). Another important issue affecting the EL’s 
efficiency relates to the decision-making process. As a result, the member parties 
demand more transparency and argue that the EL should publicise the reports of every 
meeting of the party’s principal organs (EL, 2016b, p. 5). Moreover, the member 
parties argue that the there is a great need for further democratisation of the decision-
making process “[…] pertaining to policy, delegations, and the use of finding […]” 
(EL, 2016b, p. 5). There is, thus, demand for the inclusion of all the member parties 
in the decision-making process. Indeed, we could argue that the EL has ever since its 
creation been ran as the project of its founding members that have exercised arguably 
an absolute control over the party’s most important decisions.  
 Ever since its creation in 2004, the EL has adopted differing phases of both regarding 
its tactics, as well as its role inside the European political arena. As mentioned in the 
previous paragraphs depending on the party that was influencing more the EL, the 
party demonstrated either a willingness to open up to the largest number of political 
formations across the continent, or limiting the number of member parties and 
focusing more on coherence and clarity of its political message. Given the change in 
leadership during the 5th Congress held in 2016,134 one would expect a swift shift in 
the party’s strategy vis-à-vis the EL’s composition, a change that would focus more 
on coherence and less on the number of members. Nevertheless, the analysis of the 
Congress materials leads us to argue that the political turmoil that has been affecting 
                                                
134 As mentioned previously the 5th Congress elected Gregor Gysi, from Die Linke, as President of the 
EL. Gysi replaced, thus, Pierre Laurent of the PCF. 
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the European political scene has aided the creation of a wider consensus inside the EL 
vis-à-vis the party’s future strategic goals. Indeed, the EL’s internal debate will be the 
focus of the following paragraphs. The party’s political decision, evaluation and 
evolution, as well as the document on the adopted motions that the EL published on 
its website will aid us to test the arguments formulated in the thesis’ previous chapters.  
 The political turmoil that the financial crisis has created in the European political 
scene created opportunities for RLPs in Europe. As discussed extensively in the 
respective chapter, Syriza has been the party that managed to seize this opportunity 
and become the first full member of the EL to win the general elections and lead a 
coalition government. Syriza’s victory exercised a twofold influence on the EL. On 
the one hand, the EL and its member parties realised that a government of the Left is 
something feasible, especially in the post-crisis Europe. On the other hand, it quickly 
came to the realisation135 that unless the balance of power inside the EU becomes more 
sympathetic to the causes of the EL, any change at the national or European level will 
remain a utopia. Indeed, the events following the Greek referendum in 2015 and the 
deal that Syriza secured in its aftermath shocked the EL and gave rise to a series of 
debates inside all member parties of the EL. Traces of those debates are echoed in the 
EL’s political document, and we could argue that helped shape a consensus regarding 
the party’s strategic objectives. Indeed, the EL argues that Syriza’s example renders 
even clearer the need for assembling “the broadest possible spectrum of those on the 
left who share the desire to stop the devastation […]” (EL, 2016c, p. 14). It appears, 
thus, as if the EL is opening up to its right, as it clearly states that it would welcome 
the ecologist and Social Democratic forces that have refused to harmonise with the 
neoliberal wave (EL, 2016c, p. 14). The objective is, thus, for the EL to create the 
broadest possible alliances inside the EU. Alliances that would be able to significantly 
alter the neoliberal consensus of the current EU leadership. These broader alliances 
include forces that will not join the EL, such as DiEm25136 and Plan B, as the EL notes 
that “[…] we must always work better with the many forces that will not join the EL” 
                                                
135 Based on the experience of the negotiations between the Syriza-led government and the European 
institutions, where the EU has demonstrated an almost complete lack of flexibility. 
136 DiEm25 (Democracy in Europe Movement 2025) is a pan-European movement launched by Yanis 
Varoufakis and several European and American political philosophers, such as Slavoj Zizek and Noam 
Chomsky that aims to democratise the European institutions. 
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(EL, 2016c, p. 15). It seems, thus, that the EL is attempting a qualitative step forward 
not only because of the inclusion of political forces that do hold differing opinions in 
regards to important issues, such as the question of the Eurozone, but also because it 
moves towards an annual General Assembly of the party that will attempt to render 
the party’s presence more significant (EL, 2016c, p. 15).  
 In addition to the opening up to political forces on its right, the EL appears to have 
reached a consensus with regards to the party’s linkage with European Trade Unions, 
as well as individual citizens. Indeed, the EL’s political decision demonstrates a strong 
consensus in regards to linking its political action with European Trade Unions, such 
as European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). The party, indeed, finds that 
industrial action is a key for “[…] shifting the balance of forces toward the working 
class […]” (EL, 2016c, p. 14). Moreover, the EL appears to have reached a strong 
consensus regarding on the important issue of individual membership. Indeed, the 
party’s document clearly states that there is a great need for more ‘rank-and-file’ 
militants to help support its campaigns and political actions across the EU (EL, 2016c, 
p. 8). The issue of individual membership, indeed, has been debated over ever since 
2005, without producing, nevertheless, any definitive response. We could argumente 
that the real issue thwarting the promotion of individual membership lies with the lack 
of a clear consensus amongst the most important member parties on the issue of the 
EL’s future direction. Indeed, by promoting individual membership, the EL would 
pave the way in building a stronger party that transcends the national member parties 
and becomes, thus, more independent and influential. Given that the French and 
German member parties held rather opposing views on the matter of the party’s role, 
we could argue that the current critical situation in the EU and the political turmoil 
that this situation has generated has led the member parties to reach a consensus on 
the important issue of individual members.  
 Despite having arguably reached a strong consensus on several important issues, the 
EL’s internal debate reveals that there is, indeed, a question that appears to be dividing 
the party. The evaluation and evolution document demonstrates that the member 
parties are expecting the EL to find a shared position on the issue of the crisis, 
especially with regards to the question of the Eurozone, so as to enable the party to 
formulate concrete proposals. As was argued in the previous part of this chapter, the 
political document of the EL does treat the issue of the Eurozone, but the party’s 
position is rather vague. We could argue, thus, that the question of the Eurozone 
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constitutes the most divisive issue currently inside the EL. This argument could be 
substantiated even more, if we take into account that while all of the motions that were 
voted as a block received an overwhelming percentage of support, 88.52%, the one 
relating to the German and French elections faced a significant amount of internal 
opposition, 32% (EL, 2016a, p. 25). We could argue, thus, that the declaration of 
support to the candidacy of Jean-Luc Melenchon constitutes the real issue behind the 
significant opposition. Indeed, Jean-Luc Melenchon’s positions on the question of the 
Eurozone137 touch precisely on the most contested issue inside the EL. We could 
argue, thus, that the EL’s hesitation to formulate a clear response to the question of 
the Eurozone is caused by the party’s unwillingness to polarise its internal debate to 
the point of losing member parties.  
 Overall, we could argue that the EL appears rather united around the majority of the 
issues that have been part of its internal debate ever since its creation. Indeed, the data 
suggest a strong support towards the party’s political decision and proposed plans of 
actions. Despite the party appearing very much united, for the reasons that were raised 
above, the question of the Eurozone constitutes a very divisive issue that could 
theoretically hurt the EL’s consensus and even its composition. Nevertheless, given 
the importance of the question, it is arguably impossible for the EL to maintain its 
current stance of avoiding a clear-cut formulation. We could, thus, answer the question 
posed at the beginning of this thesis in the following manner. There is, indeed, a 
growing consensus amongst the EL’s most dominant member parties. Nevertheless, 
since the pressing question of how to handle the Eurozone’s crisis appears very much 
divisive, widening the consensus while maintaining the same composition seems not 
very likely at present.  
 To answer the final question, we need to consider the arguments and arguments 
formulated during the present chapter, as well as the ones presented during the 
individual case studies that preceded it. In comparing the Eurocommunist movement 
and the short history of the EL, we come across several similarities as well as several 
key differences. The key ideological positions constitute undoubtedly the most 
striking similarity. Indeed, the Eurocommunist movement was the necessary response 
of the WECPs of the time to the gradual independence from the CPSU. The reason 
behind this is none other than the parties’ core ideology required a platform to display 
                                                
137 For more details, see the chapter on the PCF. 
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their internationalism,138 which in the past was their membership in the International 
Communist Movement. Once the ties with the Soviet-led movement were cut, those 
parties saw in the process of European integration a means of transcending the national 
divisions of the working class and in the EC of the time an opportunity to unite the 
working classes of Europe. As a result, we could argue that between the EL and the 
Eurocommunist movement the vision of the process of European integration and the 
EU are quasi-unaltered. Concurrently, quasi-unaltered is also the degree of divergence 
between the PCF and the rest of the parties. Indeed, the PCF has historically held a 
unique stance towards the process of European integration, as demonstrated both in 
the respective chapter and in the previous paragraphs. Nevertheless, given that the EL 
involves a much larger number of parties than the Eurocommunist movement, this 
divergence of opinions might be easier to manage from a collective standpoint.  
 Despite the significant similarities between the two phenomena, it is the differences 
that might lead us to a more secure argument. Indeed, the most striking difference 
involves the fact that the current EU is much more advanced than the EC of the 
Eurocommunist era of the first EP elections.139 The same can be argued for the process 
of European integration that for decades now has bound the various European Member 
States, rendering any exit scenario, regardless of the strategic perspective that such an 
exit might have, much more complicated. Another striking difference lies in the 
historical events influencing the phenomena. On the one hand, the Eurocommunist 
movement had, to an extent, to adapt to the reality of the Perestroika and the professed, 
at the time, end of history. The fall of the USSR and of the Eastern European Socialist 
experiments weighted upon the parties of the time and led them to a downward spiral 
of schisms and sharp electoral decline. The very idea of alternatives to capitalism had 
very few chances of flourishing in an environment that saw the end of the Cold War 
as a clear victory of capitalism against communism. On the other hand, the EL at the 
moment is operating in a socio-economic-political environment of an unprecedented 
crisis inside the EU. A crisis that has presented its member parties with unique 
opportunities for increasing their relevance in European politics, while concurrently 
strengthening the EL’s distinct left Europeanism. Indeed, the current crisis could be 
                                                
138 Which is embedded in the ideological identity of the Radical Left. 
139 As mentioned in the previous chapters it was during those first elections and the parties’ participation 
in them for the EP that the divergence between the PCF and the PCI became very apparent.  
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argued to prove the criticism that the EL and its member parties have launched against 
the European architecture quite right. As a result, the Radical Left’s discourse at the 
present time is competing with the radical-right one to express the deep discontent of 
a significant percentage of the European citizenry. We could argue, thus, that the 
current environment is one that could theoretically see the Radical Left gaining, even 
more, momentum in its attempt to refound Europe according to their own alternative 
version. A final and very important difference between the Eurocommunist movement 
and the EL concerns the fact that the EL is not a loose coalition of political forces 
forged thanks to the cultivation of strong intrapersonal relations amongst leaders of 
parties. It is a Europarty that can finance its political action, support its member 
parties, and able to run its own political campaigns during European elections. As a 
result, its chances of surviving the amount of internal turmoil that affects all parties 
are arguably rather high.  
 Even though there can be no certainty as to the EL being something more than a déjà 
vu of the Eurocommunist movement,140 we could argue that it currently looks rather 
likely. Indeed, the degree of integration alongside the rather fertile, for alternative 
political narratives, social environment could theoretically lead the EL to grow both 
in terms of support and influence in the next years. More member parties are currently 
participating or leading national governments of EU Member States than ever before 
in the history of the Western European Radical Left and that is something that proves 
the success that its alternative narrative can have, but can be also be a double-edged 
sword. 
 
d. EL’s political discourse 
 
 The final research question relates to the discourse that the member parties of the EL 
have created. As mentioned in the previous part of this thesis, the theoretical and 
methodological tools of the CDA as proposed by Fairclough (1992) will be utilised in 
an attempt to reconstruct Syriza’s discourse, which is viewed as an exemplification of 
the EL’s overall discourse. To be able to do so, the present thesis will analyse the 
speech given by Alexis Tsipras in the party’s central political rally held in Athens in 
                                                
140 In the sense that the EL and the effect that it had on the coordination of the European RLPs appears 
to be less ephemeral.   
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January 22nd, 2015. In addition to the analysis of Tsipras’ speech, an examination of 
Pierre Laurent’s, at the time president of the EL, brief statement following Syriza’s 
electoral victory in January 2015, as well as of several electoral posters both of Syriza 
and of the other member parties under analysis here will be carried out. The present 
thesis argues that the role played by the visual construction of Syriza’s, 
Rifondazione’s, IU’s, and PCF’s alternative is of great analytical importance. The 
choice of words and images could be viewed as an equally important communicative 
event to other forms of political interaction, such as political speeches and rallies. 
Following the analysis of the speech and the posters, the present thesis will seek to 
trace the connection between the discourse created and social practice, following the 
premises of Fairclough’s framework mentioned in the previous chapter.  
 The speech given by Syriza’s president, Alexis Tsipras, is constructed around the 
stark contradiction between fear against hope and national division against national 
unity. Syriza’s discourse thus carefully constructs an image that sees Syriza as the 
force of the future that brings hope in a changing Europe. In Tsipras’ speech one comes 
across numerous references depicting Syriza as the force of hope and national unity 
that aims to overcome the forces of fear and national division represented by the 
current establishment. Indeed, the current establishment - made of mainly Nea 
Dimokratia is depicted as terrorists- who seek to maintain their political power through 
an intense campaign of blackmail to the people. As Tsipras declared, “there will be no 
more fear. Mr. Samaras’141 last hope, fear, is over for good, both inside and outside 
Greece. Europe is changing, Greece moves on, hope is here and this coming Sunday 
history will be made […] Syriza’s victory will be a historical triumph for our people, 
who will win over fear and pain and will punish its terrified terrorists” (Tsipras, 2015). 
Furthermore, Syriza is also depicted as a force uniting the Greek people. This is 
constructed in a way that sharply contrasts the attempts made by Nea Dimokratia to 
divide the people and revive a political discourse that bears the characteristics of the 
civil war and the immediate post-war era. As Tsipras clearly notes, “creating divisions 
is the weapon of the powers that have governed this country for the last four years 
bringing about its demise. Unity is our weapon, for that reason I would like, from this 
historic rally some days before the historical overthrow, from this historic square with 
                                                
141 Former Prime Minister and President of Nea Dimokratia. 
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the symbolic name, Concord,142 to call every Greek woman and man in a new national 
concord, in a new social alliance” (Tsipras, 2015). The historical reference to the role 
of the left and the dividing nature of the government’s political message are 
emphasized again in Tsipras’ speech. In fact, the president of Syriza argued that 
“during the difficult occasions in the country’s history,143 the people placed their hopes 
to the left as they are doing now. We will have a patriotic role to unite the Greeks, so 
as to build an escape route from the crisis” (Tsipras, 2015). The contradiction between 
the dividing discourse of Nea Dimokratia and the uniting discourse of Syriza is 
highlighted once again in another instance during Tsipras’ speech. “We leave Mr. 
Samaras in his dividing, civil-war-like speech of hate, and we look ahead. He has 
managed to get back from the historical memory the anti-communism of the post-war 
era. In front of this preaching of hate we respond with a call for national unity and for 
a new national responsibility” (Tsipras, 2015), declared Alexis Tsipras. He then 
continues to verbally construct the image of fear against hope by saying that, “our 
opponents chose to fight us with these dark weapons. The only ones that suit their dark 
policies and dark affiliations, as well as the darkness they represent […] Never before 
had a PM violated his office behaving as a salesman of fear […] To fear we respond 
with hope, to terrorism we respond with vision” (Tsipras, 2015), concludes Tsipras.  
 Based on this discursive contrast between the forces of hope and unity and the forces 
of fear and social division, Syriza constructs its alternative vision for the country’s 
future. Syriza’s discourse on this respect bears the characteristics of a national, 
patriotic struggle for the liberation of the country. In fact, Tsipras notes that “Syriza 
intends to bring into action the vision of liberation […] a new liberation from the 
suffering of the Memorandums’ era, of barbarity, and of the enslavement that lasted 
for four years now” (Tsipras, 2015). Said liberation will signify that “Greece, our 
country, gave birth to democracy, and on the 25th of January democracy will come 
back in order to spread once again in the whole of Europe” (Tsipras, 2015). Syriza is 
thus depicted as the political force that represents the clear majority against the 
interests of the privileged few. The party’s role is according to Tsipras, “to protect the 
                                                
142 Tsipras refers to the name of the Square in Athens, where the rally took place. The name of the 
square is Concord Square. 
143 Tsipras refers to the resistance movement during the Nazi occupation of Greece, which was to a 
large extent organized by the Communist Party of Greece. 
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vast majority, the 99% of society that has been continuously looted by the 
Memorandums, and to locate the 1% so that they pay” (Tsipras, 2015). Democracy 
will return and will have a cathartic effect on Greek society. Justice, transparency, and 
solidarity are amongst the words that Syriza chose to construct its discourse with. 
Indeed, Syriza is depicted as the people’s champion that has “[…] no connections 
towards the country’s oligarchy, which has brought the people to its knees. We only 
answer to the people” (Tsipras, 2015). With Syriza the people will manage to reclaim 
its ownership of the state. “The proprietor of the state is the sovereign people” 
(Tsipras, 2015), noted Alexis Tsipras. It is thus Syriza’s role to unite “the Greeks to 
change Greece” (Tsipras, 2015) against the “establishment, which intends to give 
more privileges to the few and powerful and deny even more rights to the masses” 
(Tsipras, 2015). To be able to perform its historical cathartic role Syriza needs the 
people actively on its side. “We need your support not only in the ballot boxes, but 
most importantly during the fight that commences the day after the elections, and it 
will be a hard fight. We need you as active citizens taking the streets to demonstrate, 
to fight and win with us” (Tsipras, 2015), noted Tsipras during his speech. 
Furthermore, in an attempt to associate itself with the future of the country, Tsipras 
refers emphatically to the youth. In this instance, Syriza is depicted as the bright future. 
In yet again another sharp contrast, the party’s political opponents are presented as the 
dark past. “I would like now to refer to the country’s youth. They stole your jobs, they 
stole your dreams, and they stole your country. Don’t let them rob you of your hope 
and future, too” (Tsipras, 2015), noted Tsipras. He then added that “we need the youth 
to be the vanguard for the big fights that lie ahead. We need you, Greece needs you” 
(Tsipras, 2015). It is thus through Syriza that the younger generation will be able to 
make its own future, and exit once and for all the dark era of the Memorandums 
associated with the party’s political opponents.  
 In Syriza’s discourse, the party is depicted as the champion not only of the Greek 
people but also of the European ones. Its discourse arguably aims at creating an image 
of Syriza as the vanguard of the European forces of the left, which are in a constant 
fight against those that are endangering the European project.  “We will initiate a 
shared fight with the peoples of the South but also the peoples across Europe in order 
to be liberated by the noose of austerity” (Tsipras, 2015), remarked Tsipras. Syriza’s 
election is viewed as “a historical moment for Greece and Europe. Greece gave birth 
to democracy and on Sunday the country will send a message of democracy to the 
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whole of Europe. This message will echo across Europe to strengthen all those voices, 
which fight against austerity. Austerity indented for the masses, while the profits are 
divided amongst the few” (Tsipras, 2015). Austerity is viewed as the by-product of 
the odious and non-viable sovereign debts of most European countries and is depicted 
as “a catastrophic experiment, which is transforming the peoples of Europe in lab rats” 
(Tsipras, 2015). In fact, it is the issue of the debt that “is undermining Europe’s 
perspective, and constitutes a dynamite in the foundations of the European edifice” 
(Tsipras, 2015). As a result, Syriza’s victory is once again depicted as a “historical 
moment that does not concern only the Greek people. History writes that the people 
of Greece in the name of the peoples of Europe and millions of people all over Europe 
are watching us; young women and men are basing their hopes on us. We will prove 
them right, we will carry on together with them the fight to change Europe, in order 
for democracy, social justice, and solidarity to return to Europe” (Tsipras, 2015). “We 
are the big challenge for the big change that Europe needs. Syriza is the most 
characteristic example of a Europe that changes” (Tsipras, 2015), noted Tsipras in 
response to the voices raised by many in Europe that saw Syriza putting Europe in 
danger. 
 In the final part of Tsipras’ last speech in front of the Greek electorate before the 
general elections, Syriza sought to visually and verbally construct the domino effect 
that its electoral victory could bring about. Indeed, Tsipras noted, “amongst us today 
there is a large representation of the European Left; the president of the European Left 
Party, Pierre Laurent, and the president of Die Linke. The citizens of Germany will be 
on our side, the peoples have nothing to separate them, only things to unite them” 
(Tsipras, 2015). Subsequently, Tsipras calls onto the stage “the one that people say 
will bring, together with us, the wave of change in Europe. The people, not the leaders, 
will bring about the change in Europe. Syriza and Podemos turn a new page in Europe” 
(Tsipras, 2015). With these carefully chosen words Tsipras welcomed into the stage 
the leader of Podemos, Pablo Iglesias. At the same time, the square was taken over by 
Leonard Cohen’s highly symbolic song ‘First we take Manhattan’; a musical choice 
that could be viewed as a very important part of the visual reconstruction of the 
domino effect attempted by Syriza. Iglesias initially thanked Tsipras for the invitation 
and sang along Cohen “first we take Manhattan then we take Berlin” (Tsipras, 2015). 
Subsequently, he addressed the people with a brief message in Greek; “there is a wind 
of democratic change in Europe. Change in Greece bears the name of Syriza. In Spain, 
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it bears the name Podemos. Hope is coming, hasta la Victoria. Syriza, Podemos, 
Venceremos!” (Tsipras, 2015). Tsipras concluded this visual reconstruction by saying, 
“the peoples speak the same language when they fight and when they clinch their fist. 
We will win!” (Tsipras, 2015).  
 Syriza’s discourse was thus constructed on several sharp contrasts between the party 
and its political opponents, as well as several important signifiers. On one hand, the 
Greek and European establishment is depicted as the dark force of the past, which 
brought the peoples of Europe to its knees. The austerity they brought about is viewed 
as another social experiment, which benefits the few and privileged against the 
interests of the peoples and robs them of their future. Syriza on the other hand is 
depicted as the peoples’ champion, and the force of the future. With the peoples’ active 
support, Syriza could serve as the vanguard for the protection of the European edifice, 
which is in grave danger. Hope, solidarity, justice, change and future are amongst the 
most important signifiers in Syriza’s discourse. These words are fundamental in 
reconstructing the alternative professed by Syriza. This can be also seen in the party’s 
electoral material, where these exact same words are repeatedly utilized to solidify the 
party’s discourse in an attempt to overcome the competing political discourses both in 
Greece and in Europe. Syriza’s role as the peoples’ champion across Europe is 
something that is evident in the posters utilised by the rest of the parties under analysis.  
 This discursive practice can be argued to be representative of EL’s discourse, as Pierre 
Laurent’s brief statement following Syriza’s electoral victory bears the same 
characteristics and uses the same signifiers. Indeed, Laurent noted that “tonight the 
Greek people have regained their dignity that was severely hurt by the decisions taken 
by the members of the troika, the EC, and the rest of the EU officials. Indeed, the 
imposed policies of unprecedented austerity cultivated a climate of fear across 
Europe” (Laurent, 2015). Despite this climate of fear, Laurent argued that “ Greece 
has given a good lesson to Europe, as the Greek people has shown that they deserve 
to be respected, thus, reclaiming their dignity” (Laurent, 2015). Indeed, Laurent added 
that, “ this is a good lesson of hope for the Greek people, of course, as well as for the 
peoples of Europe that are struggling alongside Syriza and the EL against austerity” 
(Laurent, 2015). With regards to the future and the changes that this election could 
bring about, Laurent’s statement follows the exact same pattern. Indeed, he claimed 
that “ the first step towards changing direction in Greece and Europe is the vote of the 
Greek people tonight that needs to be respected by the EU officials. Another important 
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factor is the credibility of Syriza’s political program that is completely opposed to the 
policies imposed by the troika that have failed completely and have brought the 
country to ruins. The final factor is the support of the Syriza government by a pan-
European social movement that shows how the Greek election is just the beginning 
for the whole of the EU to exit the crisis and overcome austerity, xenophobia, and 
racism”.  
 It would appear, thus, that Laurent’s brief statement utilises the same signifiers and 
builds on the discourse that Syriza utilised, based on the notions of popular 
sovereignty, hope, and dignity, as opposed to the current state of the EU that is 
depicted as a force that based on fear is imposing policies that are bringing about a 
social catastrophe. As a result, we could argue that Syriza’s discourse is not only 
representative of the one utilised by the EL, but it appears as if it is constructed in 
synergy amongst the EL’s most important member parties. A argument that can be 
tested with regards to the visual reconstruction of the discourse utilised by the EL 
member parties that follows.  
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Figure 10: This is one of the many posters that were widely spread across the country 
immediately after the elections. It reads; “we are present. We participate, we control, we 
support, we vindicate. Syriza, Greece moves forward, Europe changes”. In addition to this, the 
leaflet also called the citizens to contact their local branch of Syriza. 
 
  
  
 
 
Figure 11: This is the most widespread electoral poster that Syriza utilised during the electoral 
campaign. It reads; “hope is coming, Greece is moving forward, Europe is changing”. 
 366 
 
 
Figure 12: This is another widespread electoral poster that Syriza used during both the elections 
for the EP in 2014, as well as the legislative elections in 2015. It reads; “Greece is showing the 
way, left for the first time. It should be noted that next to the Syriza banner there is an EL of 
the same size. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: This is yet another poster that Syriza used during the 2015 electoral campaign. It 
reads, “for the needs of the many, left now in Greece and Europe”. 
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Figure 14: Figure 14: This electoral poster used during the 2015 electoral campaign by Syriza 
features a clinched fist and reads; “they decided without us, we move forward without them, 
overthrow in Greece, a message to Europe” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: This is an electoral poster that was created by the youth organisation of Syriza and 
was subsequently utilised during the 2015 electoral campaign. It reads; “fear is changing sides. 
Now it is time to speak!” 
 368 
 
 
Figure 16: This electoral poster from the 2015 electoral campaign reads; “we render   the   
Memorandums a thing of the past. We open the road for hope. Overthrow in Greece, change in 
Europe”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: This electoral poster utilised by the French PCF and Front de Gauche is arguably 
the most illuminating one with regards to the EL’s discourse. Indeed, the poster reads “break 
up and rebuild Europe, together we change everything”. 
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Figure 18: This poster created from the PCF and the Front de Gauche depicts a person bearing 
the Greek traditional costume while it reads “Greece placed under guardianship? Never”. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: This poster created by Rifondazione in light of the European elections of 2014 reads 
“alongside Tsipras. United for an alternative Left in Europe”. 
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Figure 20: Another poster, this time created by the PCF and Front de Gauche, using Tsipras’ 
photo and reading “’ Alexis Tsipras, European Left, yes to the Europe that rejects the TTIP”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: A poster produced by the Spanish IU for the European elections in 2014 reads “Beat 
the troika, the power of the people”. 
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Figure 22: A poster created by Rifondazione on the occasion of the Greek   referendum. It reads 
“No, supporting the Greek people” while depicting a Greek flag”. 
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Figure 23: A poster created by the IU in light of the elections for the EP in 2014 reading “Let’s 
take to Europe the power of the people”. 
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 Based on the visual reconstruction that the present thesis presented, we could argue 
that Syriza utilised visual means to solidify its political discourse. Signifiers such as 
‘change’, ‘overthrow’, ‘hope’ are repeatedly utilised in an attempt to overcome the 
oppositions’ signifiers that were characterised by fear and insecurity. Syriza as 
evidenced above chose to display the banner of the EL next to its own. This choice 
can be viewed as an attempt to place more salience to its European affiliation. 
Concurrently, the discourse that views Syriza as the leading force of the European left 
was further emphasized in these displays.  
 In addition to this, the PCF, Rifondazione, and IU visual reconstruction highlights the 
importance of Syriza’s victory and emphasises on their support to the Greek people 
and the Greek government during the negotiations with the European institutions in 
the aftermath of Syriza’s electoral victory in January 2015. The parties’ discourse as 
viewed via the electoral posters utilised during the elections places the notion of the 
people in a central position. Something that we saw in Syriza’s discourse as well. The 
most illuminating visual reconstruction of the EL’s and its member parties’ discourse 
is constituted arguably by figure number 8, created and utilised by the PCF and the 
FdG. Indeed, the poster clearly depicts the member parties of the EL as uniting against 
the powerful European elites in order to re-found Europe and change everything. We 
could, thus, conclude that with regards to the visual reconstruction of the parties’ 
discourse, the signifiers and visual representation appears to be highly convergent.  
 As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, the present thesis aims on grasping another 
dimension of Syriza’s and the EL’s discourse. Said dimension of the analysis will 
include considerations about whether the discursive practice reproduces or, instead 
restructures the existing order of the political discourse and about what consequences 
this has for the broader social practice. It seeks thus to test whether Syriza’s and the 
EL’s discourse aims on mobilising its supporters, to change the existing order. 
Regarding this last dimension, the present thesis argues that Syriza’s and the EL’s 
discourse appears to aim towards a wider inclusion of the people in the process of 
government. Traces of such an attempt can be found in Tsipras’ speech. In fact, as 
mentioned above Tsipras declared that “we need your support not only in the ballot 
boxes, but most importantly during the fight that commences the day after the 
elections, and it will be a hard fight. We need you as active citizens taking the streets, 
to demonstrate, to fight, and win with us” (Tsipras, 2015). Something that is also 
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evident in the electoral posters of the rest of the parties, as well as in the visual 
reconstruction of the domino effect during Syriza’s final political rally. 
 In addition to this upon its election, Syriza distributed throughout the country the 
poster in figure 10. This poster called for the people’s active participation and 
interaction with Syriza. This poster was accompanied by a leaflet stating that “on 
January 25 Greek society won over fear, opening the road for hope. With its vote, the 
people gave a powerful and clear command for the restitution of its dignity, for social 
justice and restoration of democracy in an independent and proud country” (Syriza, 
2015, p. 2). To this the leaflet adds that “the road towards the cherished change of 
history in this country, and in this European Union, remains long and tough. In this 
path, though, as a society we cannot, we do not want, and we do not intend to remain 
mere bystanders. We should, honouring our decision, to continue together the 
historical step of the 25th of January, to become fellow travellers. To co-create, at last, 
throughout the time where and how we go, following a logic that is complete opposite 
to the one of the assignment” (Syriza, 2015, p. 3). For this reason, Syriza calls the 
people to “participate. We are citizens. We inform ourselves responsibly, we close our 
ears to any sort of propaganda, we think, we discuss, and we act […] Issues are not 
only resolved with passing on legislation, but step by step inside society” (Syriza, 
2015). Concurrently, it calls the people to “control. The critique and control we 
possess do not end with our vote. We should be present in the public debate […] to 
make sure that the policies are tailored to the needs of the many” (Syriza, 2015). 
Additionally, Syriza calls the people to “support. As a people characterized by unity 
and solidarity, we constitute the most important asset in any negotiation, and in any 
crash against the interests of the establishment. Our support is necessary in the street, 
in the places of work, and in our neighbourhoods. In the battles that are given and will 
be given by the government for the restoration of our national dignity, sovereignty, 
and vision, this is true: either we all win together, or we all lose together” (Syriza, 
2015). Last, Syriza calls the people to “vindicate. The fight did not end on January the 
25th, but should now be stepped and organized. From the places of work to our social 
relations, from our relationship with the state to our exposition to the large private 
interests, from our fights for the natural environment and the public interest to the 
vindication for human and labour rights, we should re-launch. Because, we should not 
forget, our movements are the oxygen that gives life to societal vindications” (Syriza, 
2015).  
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 Indeed, it appears as if Syriza’s discourse had an effect to both the Greek and 
European society. Upon the initiation of the negotiations with the country’s European 
partners, and the IMF, thousands of people took the streets in Athens and other 
European capitals in support of the Greek government. These demonstrations of 
solidarity constitute unique events in the political history of the country, as never had 
there been a rally in favour of the government. Thus, we could argue that Syriza’s 
attempt to change the political discourse. This change in the political discourse appears 
to have a significant impact on social practices inside the country. Concurrently, the 
degree of support that the Syriza-led government received both discursively and 
practically from the rest of the party members and the EL itself constitute another 
indication of the unified political discourse that the European Left created to compete 
against the discourses of the mainstream European political forces. 
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X. Conclusion 
 
 
 This final section will attempt to synthesise the arguments made in the preceding parts 
and pave the way to future research on this subject matter. More specifically this final 
part will attempt to sum up the research questions and the main arguments of the thesis, 
highlight its main findings and their implications for the various literatures, as well as 
to address the issue of what points are generalizable beyond the current case studies.  
 The first set of research questions that this thesis posed related to the EL’s key 
strategic positions, its alternative vision for the EU, as well as verifying the argument 
that views democratic socialism as the outmost goal of the EL and its national member 
parties. According to this thesis’ findings the EL’s key strategic positions revolve 
around four major themes. The first one relates to the EL 's notion of popular 
sovereignty. Indeed, the thesis argues that the EL constructs its alternative version 
around their distinct concept of popular sovereignty, which is an antagonistic one to 
the one proposed by the right-wing populist parties and the liberal ones currently in 
power across Europe. The EL, thus, despite emphasising the respect of sovereignty 
does not call for the disintegration of the EU and the return to a powerful nation-state, 
as do the right-wing populist parties. On the contrary, the EL demands a radical 
reconstruction of the European edifice, to allow it to respect the will of the European 
peoples, as well as integrating national parliaments in its decision-making 
mechanisms. What the EL contests, is the tendency of the liberal political forces to 
treat the question of sovereignty as something archaic and to an extent irrelevant. It 
contests, thus, the liberal cosmopolitanism by bringing forward its distinct Left 
Europeanism and internationalism. The EL, thus, places at the very core of its 
alternative vision for the EU the universal right of the European peoples to decide their 
own destiny. This cardinal principle leads us to the second major theme that revolves 
around the rewriting of the European Treaties and the reformation of the European 
institutions. The thesis’ findings suggest, thus, that the EL argues in favour of 
structural changes within the EU that would allow the harmonisation of rights and 
policies to the highest European standard. The third major theme involves the drastic 
overhaul of the Eurozone, as the party believes that the euro is now a tool in the hands 
of the European ruling classes. In its place, the EL envisages a Eurozone that will 
consider the diverse socio-economic realities of the various Member States. 
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Nevertheless, the thesis’ findings suggest that the EL's vision vis-a-vis the Eurozone 
is still rather vague in regards to the specific form and functioning. The debate around 
the possible solutions to the current problematic, according to the EL, situation is still 
ongoing. Indeed, the thesis’ findings verify the lack of absolute consensus amongst 
the EL's member parties, rendering the question of the Eurozone one of the most 
divisive ones.  
 Consequently, the thesis argues that the EL’s alternative vision for the EU lies with 
the respect of popular sovereignty, without nevertheless proposing a return to the era 
of the powerful nation state. As a result, the thesis’ findings suggest that in the case of 
the EL, the normative dichotomy between anti-EU and pro-EU that characterises other 
political families is to an extent irrelevant. Indeed, the EL considers that maintaining 
the European level, thus, transcending the national divisions of the continent’s 
working classes is a conditio sine qua non for the successful implementation of the 
gradual socialist transformation of the European continent. Thus, the thesis argues that 
for the EL the question is not being pro-European or Euro-rejectionist, but being in 
favour of a socialist transformation or not. In reality, the EL, as well as for the totality 
of its member parties treated in the present thesis, by negating the Eastern Communist 
dogma of national roads to socialism holds in the very core of its ideology the idea of 
a Socialist United Europe of the peoples. Consequently, the thesis finds that 
Democratic Socialism remains the utmost objective of both the EL and its most 
important member parties.  
 The second set of research questions that the present thesis posed related to the EL’s 
influence on its member parties, its efficiency in performing its role, and the existence 
of a consensus amongst its member parties. Concurrently, the thesis’ findings verify 
the argument that saw the parties’ left Europeanism as being strengthened by the 
financial crisis that has been affecting the EU ever since 2008. Finally, the thesis 
provides a response to the question regarding the future developments inside the EL 
and the possibility of it becoming something more than a déjà vu of the 
Eurocommunist movement of the past decades.  
 With regards to the EL’s influence, the thesis argues that the importance of the EL for 
its member parties is echoed in the high degree of homogeneity between the national 
parties as well as between them and the EL. Consequently, we could argue that the EL 
plays a very significant role in relation to the parties’ policies towards the EU. Despite 
not being able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the argument of policy transfer 
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between the EL and the member parties, the thesis’ findings could provide with an 
initial substantiation of this argument. Indeed, the thesis’ empirical findings 
demonstrate several key policies as being almost identical, such as for instance the 
parties’ proposals with regards to the question of the European member states’ 
sovereign debts. Nevertheless, the EL’s importance is not limited in the argument of 
policy transfer and policy harmonisation. Indeed, the present thesis argues that the 
EL’s existence per se constitutes a critical dimension of the member parties’ 
ideological coherence. The findings, thus, suggest that the EL presents the member 
parties with the necessary platform for building the required alliances that will 
eventually bring about an alternative European integration process leading beyond 
capitalism. It is, thus, the distinct left Europeanism of the party members that renders 
the existence of a pan-European political subject a conditio sine qua non for the 
common fight against the current European architecture. As a result, the thesis argues 
that the EL strengthens the parties’ left Europeanism and provides with both practical 
and theoretical solutions to the increasingly Europeanised life of political parties. The 
findings, indeed, suggest the importance of the EL membership is quite significant 
even in national political battles. Something that is evident in the instance of the 
L’Altra Europa con Tsipras, a national political campaign that could have not been 
possible without the support of the EL and the most important member parties. Despite 
the campaign only having relative success, the fact that a national political campaign 
was so much dependent on a Europarty shows the importance of the EL and its 
uniqueness amongst the rest of the Europarties that are rarely, if ever, so much present 
in their member parties’ national political campaigns.  
 With regards to the EL’s efficiency in performing its important role, the thesis’ 
findings suggest that it is rather efficient, as demonstrated also by the success of the 
aforementioned political campaign in Italy during the elections for the EP. Indeed, the 
EL is positively evaluated by its member parties and praised for its attempts to build 
bridges amongst parties of the European radical left. Nevertheless, the findings of the 
present thesis suggest that the EL is also affected by several shortcomings that relate 
to the party’s decision making mechanisms, the at times lack of decisive action, and 
inability to integrate several parties from Central and Eastern Europe.  
 As to the existence of a consensus inside the EL, the thesis argues that the EL appears 
rather united around the majority of the issues that have been part of its internal debate 
ever since its creation. Indeed, the findings suggest a strong support for the opening 
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up of the EL to a wider range of political forces in Europe. Indeed, following the 
negotiations of the Syriza-led government with the European institutions, the EL came 
to the realisation that in order to be able to achieve its final objective to change Europe, 
wider coalitions with European political forces is of the essence. Moreover, the EL’s 
decision to create the broader alliances possible inside the European political 
landscape demonstrates its willingness to work towards changing the currently 
unfavourable, to its demands, balance of power inside the EU and manage to influence 
even more the process of European integration. To this end, the EL is currently 
attempting to rally behind its demands for a different Europe the support of European 
Trade Unions and individual citizens from all Member States. The response, thus, of 
the EL and its member parties is not a sharp return to national politics and the 
abandoning of the European ideal, but a struggle to gain even more relevance at a 
European level, to pursue their goal of a Socialist Europe of the peoples. Indeed, we 
could argue that the idea of a united European working class is embedded in the 
parties’ ideological identity that any attempt to abandon it would require a conscious 
and painful effort to re-theorise their role and their identity in the modern political 
landscape. Despite the party appearing very much united on most issues, the question 
of the Eurozone constitutes a very divisive one that could theoretically hurt the EL’s 
consensus and even its composition. Nevertheless, given the importance of the 
question, it is arguably impossible for the EL to maintain its current stance of avoiding 
a clear-cut formulation. We could, thus, answer the question posed at the beginning of 
this thesis in the following manner. There is, indeed, a growing consensus amongst 
the EL’s most dominant member parties. Nevertheless, since the pressing question of 
how to handle the Eurozone’s crisis appears very much divisive, widening the 
consensus while maintaining the same composition seems not very likely at present.  
 The thesis’ empirical findings have arguably managed to substantiate the argument 
that the crisis has had a strengthening effect on the parties’ left Europeanism. Indeed, 
the fact that all parties studied here have reiterated and even placed more salience to 
their critical stance towards the current process of European integration is a prime 
indication of such a phenomenon taking place. To this end, the theoretical lens of the 
Communist dilemma has been of the highest significance. As the crisis was deepening, 
the parties under study here were facing a growing number of dilemmas with regards 
to their responses to the crisis and the future of the EU. The popular dissatisfaction 
with the European institutions, that was not present in pre-crisis era, led the parties to 
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place the highest of importance to their critical stance vis-à-vis the EU, as well as to 
their alternative vision of the EU. This did not constitute a change in their stance, 
which has been quasi unaltered throughout the period under investigation, but a 
change in the way that the parties wanted to portray themselves given the new socio-
economic-political circumstances. Here lies, thus, the importance of the Communist 
dilemma, which enabled the thesis to highlight the parties’ strategy and response to 
the dynamic environment of the EU, and distinguish between a change in stance and 
a change in self-portrayal. Consequently, we could argue that the crisis had rendered 
the EL’s and member parties’ Europeanism more resolute and decisive. Thus, less 
inclined to make any ideological concessions in support of the current European 
edifice. Something that was, for instance, committed by the Social Democratic parties 
across the EU, leading to a sharp decline in their electoral influence in most EU 
Member States. In addition to this, the current crisis has generated a debate that 
questions the very core of the European institutions and legitimises to an extent the 
EL’s discourse and alternative vision. The devastating effects that the crisis had on 
much of the European economies and societies signified for the EL a critical juncture 
in time where the question of Socialism with peace and democracy at a pan-European 
level could constitute the answer to the demands of the European citizens. Moreover, 
the fact the future of the EU is at a crossroads following the decision of the UK to 
leave the Union presents an opportunity for the EL and its member parties to influence 
its future architecture.  
 With regards to the comparison between the EL and the Eurocommunist movement 
of the past the thesis’ findings suggest that the two political phenomena present several 
similarities and differences. The key ideological positions constitute undoubtedly the 
most striking similarity. Indeed, the Eurocommunist movement was the necessary 
response of the WECPs of the time to the gradual independence from the CPSU. The 
reason behind this is none other than the parties’ core ideology required a platform to 
display their internationalism dictated by their Marxist identity, which in the past was 
their membership in the International Communist Movement. Once the ties with the 
Soviet-led movement were cut, those parties saw in the process of European 
integration a means of transcending the national divisions of the working class and in 
the EC of the time an opportunity to unite the working classes of Europe. As a result, 
we could argue that between the EL and the Eurocommunist movement the view of 
the process of European integration and the EU are quasi-unaltered. Concurrently, 
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quasi-unaltered is also the degree of divergence between the PCF and the rest of the 
parties. Indeed, the PCF has historically held a unique stance towards the process of 
European integration, as demonstrated both in the respective chapter and in the 
previous paragraphs. Nevertheless, given that the EL involves a much larger number 
of parties than the Eurocommunist movement, this divergence of opinions is argued 
to be easier to manage from a collective standpoint. Despite the similarities, the EL 
and the Eurocommunist movement took place in differing environments. The current 
EU is significantly more complex than the EC of the Eurocommunist era and the first 
elections for the EP. In addition to this, the EL is not a loose coalition of political 
forces forged thanks to the cultivation of strong intrapersonal relations amongst 
leaders of parties. It is a Europarty that can finance its political action, support, not 
financially but from an organisational point of view, its member parties, and able to 
run its own political campaigns during European elections. As a result, its chances of 
surviving the amount of internal turmoil that affects all parties are arguably rather 
high. Consequently, the thesis argues that the EL could indeed be more than a déjà vu. 
Indeed, the degree of integration alongside the rather fertile, for alternative political 
narratives, social environment could theoretically lead the EL to grow both in terms 
of support and influence in the next years. More member parties are currently 
participating or leading national governments of EU Member States than ever before 
in the history of the Western European Radical Left and that is something that proves 
the success that its alternative narrative can have, but can be also be a double-edged 
sword. 
 The final research question posed by this thesis related to the existence of a unified 
and coherent political discourse proposed by the EL and its national member parties. 
The thesis’ empirical findings based on the methodological tools of the CDA as 
proposed by Fairclough (1992) presented an in-depth analysis of Syriza’s political 
discourse as presented in the party’s central political rally in January 2015. In addition 
to the analysis of Tsipras’ speech, an examination of Pierre Laurent’s, at the time 
president of the EL, brief statement following Syriza’s electoral victory in January 
2015, as well as of several electoral posters both of Syriza and of the other member 
parties under analysis here will be carried out. This thesis argues that the role played 
by the visual construction of Syriza’s, Rifondazione’s, IU’s, and PCF’s alternative is 
of great analytical importance. The choice of words and images could be viewed as an 
equally important communicative event to other forms of political interaction, such as 
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political speeches and rallies. Following the analysis of the speech and the posters, the 
present thesis traced the connection between the discourse created and social practice, 
following the premises of Fairclough’s theory. The comparative analysis of Syriza’s 
and EL’s political discourse led the thesis to argue that both the EL and Syriza utilise 
the same signifiers, based on the notions of popular sovereignty, hope, and dignity, as 
opposed to the notions of popular to the current state of the EU that is depicted as a 
force that based on fear is imposing policies that are bringing about a social 
catastrophe. Consequently, the thesis argues that Syriza’s discourse is not only 
representative of the one utilised by the EL, but it appears as if it is constructed in 
synergy amongst the EL’s most important member parties. The thesis’ findings with 
regards to the visual reconstruction of the parties’ political discourse led to the 
verification of the argument of the existence of a unified political discourse, which 
also had an important impact on social practices.  
 The contribution and the implications that the thesis’ findings have for the literatures, 
is arguably fourfold. Firstly, the thesis’ comparative findings add to the current 
literature on European RLPs an in-depth analysis of the EL and four of its most 
important member parties. The empirical findings of the thesis shed light to aspects of 
party life that have not been previously investigated. Secondly, the in-depth analysis 
of recent congress material and political documents of the EL and its four important 
member parties updates the relevant literature on RLPs and provides for fertile ground 
for further investigation. Thirdly, the thesis’ discussion and analysis of the dialectics 
of European, national, and intra-party interplays shed light to all three dimensions of 
party life, something that was missing altogether from the literature. This final third 
dimension presents the literature with an additional level of analysis that could be 
utilised not only by researchers working on parties of the radical left, but more 
generally to researchers of political parties of all ideological spectrums. Finally, the 
thesis’ overview and analysis of the unified political discourse of the EL and its 
member parties adds to the literature an initial sample that could be utilised in further 
comparative research of the political discourses present inside the EU and their 
interconnection with social practices. Indeed, a comparative study of the antagonism 
between mainstream and radical discourses inside the EU could shed even more light 
on this, understudied, aspect of European politics.  
 Finally, the findings of the present thesis have raised several questions that could pave 
the way for further research on this subject matter. Indeed, the present thesis has 
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arguably demonstrated that despite the high degree of ideological convergence, the 
common historical trajectories, and the devastating effects of the countries in most 
Member States, the parties under analysis here have had differing electoral 
trajectories. Indeed, as established in the previous chapters, the totality of the countries 
has been heavily affected by the financial crisis that has overtaken the EU ever since 
2008. Despite the crisis having strengthened the parties’ Europeanism and 
concurrently synchronised, to an extent, the citizenships’ opinion with the ones 
professed by the national member parties and the EL, not all of them have managed to 
widen their electoral influence. Indeed, only the Greek Syriza has managed to not only 
significantly widen its vote-share, but also win two consecutive elections and lead a 
coalition government. The rest of the parties, with the exception of the IU in Spain, 
have remained arguably insignificant and have even seen their influence diminish even 
further. Indeed, the Italian PRC and the French PCF have both found themselves 
without real parliamentary representation. Nevertheless, and despite the PCF polling 
its worst result ever in the 2017 legislative election, the PCF managed to increase its 
parliamentary representation slightly. Especially with regards to the PCF, which had 
to support the candidacy of Melenchon during the 2017 presidential elections despite 
the significant divergence vis-à-vis the question of the Eurozone and the country’s EU 
membership. Melenchon’s electoral performance should be, nevertheless, highlighted 
as despite the divergence between him and the PCF, the political formation that he 
leads is a member party of the EL. Indeed, Melenchon’s candidacy managed to secure 
19.5% and missed the opportunity to compete in the second round of the French 
presidential elections by less the two percent. 
 As mentioned above, the parties examined here share a historical path that has brought 
them from gradually breaking their strong ties with the International Communist 
movement and the CPSU and commencing a process of re-evaluation of the Socialist 
experiments of the Eastern bloc, to widening their ideological influences with modern 
works influenced by the Marxist school of thought, as well as opening to modern 
social movements and cleavages. Following the end of the Cold War, all the parties 
struggled to maintain their electoral influence. This proved a rather arduous task, 
especially for the PRC, as the PCI had been for decades the most electorally successful 
Western European Communist Party. Nevertheless, the post 9/11 world and the rise 
of the movements against globalisation provided an opportunity for the parties to link 
themselves with social movements and regain some influence. As a result of this 
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opening towards social movements and minor political formations, the parties under 
analysis here formed wider coalitions in an attempt to unite the Left in their respective 
countries and create political subjects able to compete in their national political arenas. 
We could initially argue that the creation of the EL in 2004 played an important role 
with regards to the creation of these coalitions, given that the EL constitutes a platform 
bringing the parties closer together, leading to exchange of ideas, promoting, thus, 
such trends. This influence that one member party can have on the rest of the EL 
members is demonstrated by the effect that Syriza’s success has had inside the Italian 
Radical Left. Indeed, the creation of the L’Altra Europa electoral list based on Tsipras’ 
candidacy and the subsequent, futile to an extent, efforts to create an Italian Syriza 
demonstrate this setting of trends that the EL can promote.  
The fact that the example of Syriza was not followed by other member parties, 
especially those from other Southern European countries, raises several questions. We 
could initially argue that a major reason is constituted by the fact that despite the harsh 
economic, political, and social effects of the crisis in both Spain, Italy, and to a lesser 
extent in France, Greece constitutes the country mostly affected by it. Indeed, the rate 
of unemployment since 2010 can only be matched by that in Spain. In addition to this, 
the series of accords signed by the country with the troika have, to an extent, 
eliminated a significant percentage of the Greek lower middle classes. With regards 
to the inability of the Spanish IU follow Syriza’s trajectory we could argue that the 
creation of Podemos and the party’s inability to take advantage of the opportunity 
presented by the indignados movement constitutes a major reason. In addition to this, 
another possible reason behind the inability of the PCF and PRC to achieve similar 
electoral performances is constituted by the fact that all of them have taken part in 
coalition governments with the respective Social Democratic parties of their countries. 
This could have arguably rendered them much less appealing to the part of the 
electorate that was radicalised to an extent in the aftermath of the crisis. Indeed, the 
PRC and the PCF have been arguably rendered less appealing, as their relationship 
with the PD and the PS has been quite constant throughout the period under 
examination. Indeed, it was the PCF’s decision to run alongside the PS during the local 
elections in Paris that served as a catalyst for the end of the Front de Gauche, whereas 
the choice of the PRC to ally with the PD has led to several splits inside the party. 
Finally, we could argue that Syriza’s inability to secure an accord with the troika that 
would pose an end to austerity in 2015 left the arguments of the rest of the member 
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parties much less appealing and possibly much less feasible in the eyes of the 
electorate. Nevertheless, the relative success of the coalition government between the 
Socialists, the Left Bloc, the PCP, and the Greens in Portugal could arguably provide 
yet another example for the European radical Left. The questions raised in this final 
part of the thesis and the interconnected questions and initial arguments could 
constitute the basis for an additional study of the Portuguese and German radical left 
that could aid in providing more detailed responses as to the reasons behind the 
divergence in electoral gains by member parties of the EL in the era of the financial 
crisis.  
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